Papers by Alessandro Cigno
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in marrying among themselves... more We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in marrying among themselves, and thus maintaining the gendered division of labour, originally justified on comparative-advantage grounds by the advent of the plough, even after they emigrate to a modern industrial economy where individual productivity depends on education rather than physical characteristics. The result rests on the argument that, if efficiency requires the more productive spouse to specialize in raising income, and the less productive one in raising children, irrespective of gender, an efficient domestic equilibrium will be implemented by a costlessly enforceable premarital contract stipulating that the husband should do the former and the wife the latter. A contract may not be needed, however, if time spent with children gives direct utility, because an effi cient equilibrium may then be characterized by little or no division of labour.
This document briefly explains and illustrates the set of indicators developed for the Country st... more This document briefly explains and illustrates the set of indicators developed for the Country statistics found on the Understanding Children's Work (UCW) project website. The indicators are not the theoretical best of the many that could be constructed on child work, but rather those that are feasible given the available data. As such, the indicators are unable to fully capture the various dimensions of the child work phenomenon. They do, however, provide at least partial answers to the following key questions: 1) what is child work? 2) How widespread is it? 3) What are its characteristics? 4) How damaging is it for the child's health and future earning capacity? 5) Which household, local or national characteristics make it more likely that a child will work? The data used to develop the indicators are from household surveys conducted mainly by the World Bank, under its Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) program, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Internation...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
We show that the descendants of primeval plough users have an interest in maintaining the gender ... more We show that the descendants of primeval plough users have an interest in maintaining the gender division of labour which was originally justi…ed on comparative-advantage grounds, even though in a modern economy individual productivity depends on education rather than physical characteristics. The result rests on the argument that the contract enforcement technology developed in response to the availability of the plough serves a purpose also in a modern economy because of a possible holdup problem in the implementation of a Nash-bargaining equilibrium with domestic division of labour.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
Individual actions coordinated only by the market do not generally yield an e¢cient allocation of... more Individual actions coordinated only by the market do not generally yield an e¢cient allocation of consumption over the life cycle of each generation, and across generations. The existence of a self-enforcing "constitutional" arrangement, delivering an e¢cient allocation of consumption, but not a socially optimal population pro…le, can be demonstrated at the family level. A similar arrangement at societal level is less plausible. Voting models recognize that the policy introduced by one parliament can be reversed by the next. The probability that a parliament will vote for transfers to children, as well as to the old, increases if the former serve to pay for education, since that raises the contributive capacity of tomorrow's adults, and will thus bene…t tomorrow's old people.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
What's the Use of Marriage? We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equil... more What's the Use of Marriage? We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research d... more Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author.
Lectio Magistralis, 2013
What is the relationship between public debt and private wealth? And what do family policies have... more What is the relationship between public debt and private wealth? And what do family policies have to do with these financial aggregates? We will see that there is a connection, but let's first clarify what is meant by family. In the common sense, a family includes ascenders, descendants and collaterals. But when we talk about family policies we only think of potential parents or families with pre-school children.
Oxford Economic Papers, 1983
Let us assume that men enter the labor market at about the age of twenty. They work for forty-…ve... more Let us assume that men enter the labor market at about the age of twenty. They work for forty-…ve years or so and then live for …fteen years in retirement. Naturally, ... men will want to consume less than they produce in their working years so that they can consume something in the years when they produce nothing. ... If there were only Robinson Crusoe, he would hope to put by some durable goods which could be drawn on in his old age. He would, so to speak, want to trade with Mother Nature current consumption goods in return for future consumption goods. ... For the present purpose, I shall make the extreme assumption that nothing will keep at all. Thus no intertemporal trade with Nature is possible. If Crusoe were alone, he would obviously die at the beginning of his retirement years. But we live in a world where new generations are always coming along. ... [C]annot men during their productive years give up some of their product to bribe other men to support them in their retirement years?" (Samuelson, 1958
Routledge Siena Studies in Political Economy, 2008
It is not necessary to assume gender discrimination, or that men and women have di¤erent preferen... more It is not necessary to assume gender discrimination, or that men and women have di¤erent preferences, to explain why a woman might supply less labour, and get less consumption than her husband. Nor is it necessary to assume that parents like sons better than daughters to explain why a girl might receive less education than a boy. All that is needed is some recognition that childbirth a¤ects the father's and the mother's earning capacity asymmetrically, and that the human capital e¤ect of withdrawing from the labour market is irreversible.
Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, 2006
Individual actions coordinated only by the market do not generally yield an e¢cient allocation of... more Individual actions coordinated only by the market do not generally yield an e¢cient allocation of consumption over the life cycle of each generation, and across generations. The existence of a self-enforcing "constitutional" arrangement, delivering an e¢cient allocation of consumption, but not a socially optimal population pro…le, can be demonstrated at the family level. A similar arrangement at societal level is less plausible. Voting models recognize that the policy introduced by one parliament can be reversed by the next. The probability that a parliament will vote for transfers to children, as well as to the old, increases if the former serve to pay for education, since that raises the contributive capacity of tomorrow's adults, and will thus bene…t tomorrow's old people.
Fertility and Public Policy, 2010
The laissez-faire fertility rate is likely to be inefficiently high. Pensions reduce fertility, b... more The laissez-faire fertility rate is likely to be inefficiently high. Pensions reduce fertility, but it may not be desirable to use them as a tool to bring fertility to its efficient level. A second best can be implemented using a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions, the other allowing them to do so by having children, and investing in the children's human capital.
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2011
In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage may induce domestic cooperation, and enhance effici... more In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage may induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it may lend credibility to the prospective main earner’s promise to compensate the main childcarer at some future date, when the children will no longer be economically dependent on them. In a community-property jurisdiction, marriage will induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it rules out strategic behavior. Whatever the matrimonial property regime, reducing the cost or difficulty of obtaining a divorce will have no permanent effect on the divorce rate. In separate-property jurisdiction, it will encourage marriage, and induce more married women to specialize in market work. Couples should be allowed to choose the matrimonial property regime.
L'Actualité économique, 1999
RÉSUMÉ Les effets et le choix optimal d’instruments de politique destinés aux familles (allocatio... more RÉSUMÉ Les effets et le choix optimal d’instruments de politique destinés aux familles (allocations pour enfants à charge, taxes sur les biens consommés spécifiquement par les enfants, etc.) sont analysés à l’aide d’un modèle économique où les ménages possèdent un choix en matière de fécondité. Quand la fécondité est un facteur endogène, nous obtenons des résultats remarquables si nous considérons simultanément les avantages pour enfants à charge et l’imposition du revenu et de la consommation. Entre autres, les différentes capacités des familles à élever des enfants et, par conséquent, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, les variations du nombre d’enfants, peuvent ne pas être pertinentes d’un point de vue fiscal si l’État peut effectuer des transferts forfaitaires (impôts/subventions) personnalisés aux familles. Plus surprenant encore, on peut montrer que, si l’État est dans l’impossibilité de procéder à des transferts forfaitaires personnalisés, mais qu’il est en mesure de di...
The World Bank Economic Review, 2011
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use... more Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need-and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
We derive the behavioural implications of legislation on the subject of marriage, divorce, de-fac... more We derive the behavioural implications of legislation on the subject of marriage, divorce, de-facto unions, domestic violence, and labour market discrimination, within a game-theoretical frame- work. The predictions are consistent with two empirical obser- vations. One is that, while the prevalent pattern in developing countries is for the father to specialize completely in market work, the tendency in developed countries is towards mother and father sharing market work and care of the children more or less equally between them. The other is that the sign of the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour market participa- tion, negative worldwide until the mid-1970s, remains negative across developing countries, but has turned positive where devel- oped countries are concerned. We show that domestic division of labour is e¢ cient, while equal sharing is not. But we also argue that e¢ ciency is bought, in developing countries, at the expense of women, and discuss w...
Labour Economics, 2008
A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably introduces a wedge between the wage rate and the marginal... more A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably introduces a wedge between the wage rate and the marginal take-home pay. A Bismarckian one can do so only if it is not actuarially fair, or in the presence of credit rationing. Interestingly, if the two possible sources of distortion are present at the same time, they will tend to o¤set each other. The distortion may even change sign (the agent may work too much). In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour less if the scheme is Bismarckian, than if it is Beveridgean.
Journal of Population Economics, 2006
The paper reexamines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enfor... more The paper reexamines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.
Journal of Population Economics, 1992
Recent economic explanations of changes in fertility behaviour have focussed on the effects of la... more Recent economic explanations of changes in fertility behaviour have focussed on the effects of labour-market-related incentives. The present paper draws attention to another set of incentives, those connected with the transfer of resources over time. The theoretical implications of intergenerational altruism as a possible motive for having children and making transfers to them are considered, and contrasted with those arising from the competing hypothesis that such actions are motivated by old-age-security considerations. From a comparison of these theoretical predictions with the findings of a number of empirical studies, it would appear that self-interested concern for one's old age, rather than any great love for future members of one's dynasty, is or has been so far the dominant force driving fertility and intergenerational transfers worldwide.
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Papers by Alessandro Cigno