This chapter is about what we might call’ singular’ ontological debate. As a first approximation,... more This chapter is about what we might call’ singular’ ontological debate. As a first approximation, let’s say that a singular ontological debate is a debate about whether or not some particular putative thing exists. This as opposed to general ontological debate, about whether there are any things of a given type. So a schoolyard argument over the existence of Santa Claus might be a nice illustration of singular ontological debate. Or consider disputes between presentists and eternalists over the existence of historical figures like Socrates. Of course, whether or not there are historical figures (full stop) is a general ontological issue; but whether or not Socrates in particular exists is a singular one, on our rough and ready characterization of the contrast. It’s easy to multiply examples, silly or serious, from ordinary and theoretical discourses alike. To lend the topic a dash of extra gravitas, note that one of the most divisive issues in human history is ostensibly a singular ...
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020
Is there anything wrong with using a concept C in the course of arguing against the use of C? You... more Is there anything wrong with using a concept C in the course of arguing against the use of C? You might think not, so long as the argumentation is framed as a kind of reductio; or climbing a ladder to be kicked away. On the other hand, you might find such “hypocritical” arguments self-undermining: if they’re sound, then we shouldn’t accept any of their premises that make use of C. Understanding the status of hypocrisy is an urgent question for conceptual ethics (and therefore engineering), insofar as concepts of philosophical interest tend to be central to our conceptual schemes, in the sense that they tend to turn up in the analyses of lots of other concepts. Developing these points (of view), the present chapter exposes a worrisome feature of the anti-hypocrisy argument just sketched: it seems to be indeterminate whether or not the argument is itself hypocritical.
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020
Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representationa... more Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representational devices such as concepts and words. Conceptual engineers looks for the problems with such devices and attempt to come up with ways of improving flawed concepts: they attempt to say how those concepts should be. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the possibility, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. It consists of twenty chapters; some advocate for the field, while others develop sceptical arguments, and some focus on the various methodological issues that arise while others apply the method to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.
What does realism about an arbitrary subject-matter have to do with truth? Some views say everyth... more What does realism about an arbitrary subject-matter have to do with truth? Some views say everything, others hardly anything. Both answers are reflected in ongoing debates between self-styled realists and anti-realists in metaphysics, and other areas. Error theory, nonfactualism, fictionalism, and other forms of opposition to realism are normally articulated and differentiated using the notions of truth and falsity. Given its preoccupation with the limits of literal representation, fictionalism can seem especially ensared in semantics and/or the theory of mental content. Be that as it may, the present chapter aims to establish that there remains an important sense in which the fictionalist gambit does not essentially have anything to do with truth or falsity. In particular, many recognizably fictionalist positions are compatible with nominalism about truths: the view that nothing whatsoever is true.
This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philo... more This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the view known as deflationism. In clear language, the book covers a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth–value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas.
There are statements of the form "There are no Fs" that we would like to count as true, yet it is... more There are statements of the form "There are no Fs" that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
This chapter is about what we might call’ singular’ ontological debate. As a first approximation,... more This chapter is about what we might call’ singular’ ontological debate. As a first approximation, let’s say that a singular ontological debate is a debate about whether or not some particular putative thing exists. This as opposed to general ontological debate, about whether there are any things of a given type. So a schoolyard argument over the existence of Santa Claus might be a nice illustration of singular ontological debate. Or consider disputes between presentists and eternalists over the existence of historical figures like Socrates. Of course, whether or not there are historical figures (full stop) is a general ontological issue; but whether or not Socrates in particular exists is a singular one, on our rough and ready characterization of the contrast. It’s easy to multiply examples, silly or serious, from ordinary and theoretical discourses alike. To lend the topic a dash of extra gravitas, note that one of the most divisive issues in human history is ostensibly a singular ...
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020
Is there anything wrong with using a concept C in the course of arguing against the use of C? You... more Is there anything wrong with using a concept C in the course of arguing against the use of C? You might think not, so long as the argumentation is framed as a kind of reductio; or climbing a ladder to be kicked away. On the other hand, you might find such “hypocritical” arguments self-undermining: if they’re sound, then we shouldn’t accept any of their premises that make use of C. Understanding the status of hypocrisy is an urgent question for conceptual ethics (and therefore engineering), insofar as concepts of philosophical interest tend to be central to our conceptual schemes, in the sense that they tend to turn up in the analyses of lots of other concepts. Developing these points (of view), the present chapter exposes a worrisome feature of the anti-hypocrisy argument just sketched: it seems to be indeterminate whether or not the argument is itself hypocritical.
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020
Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representationa... more Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representational devices such as concepts and words. Conceptual engineers looks for the problems with such devices and attempt to come up with ways of improving flawed concepts: they attempt to say how those concepts should be. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the possibility, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. It consists of twenty chapters; some advocate for the field, while others develop sceptical arguments, and some focus on the various methodological issues that arise while others apply the method to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.
What does realism about an arbitrary subject-matter have to do with truth? Some views say everyth... more What does realism about an arbitrary subject-matter have to do with truth? Some views say everything, others hardly anything. Both answers are reflected in ongoing debates between self-styled realists and anti-realists in metaphysics, and other areas. Error theory, nonfactualism, fictionalism, and other forms of opposition to realism are normally articulated and differentiated using the notions of truth and falsity. Given its preoccupation with the limits of literal representation, fictionalism can seem especially ensared in semantics and/or the theory of mental content. Be that as it may, the present chapter aims to establish that there remains an important sense in which the fictionalist gambit does not essentially have anything to do with truth or falsity. In particular, many recognizably fictionalist positions are compatible with nominalism about truths: the view that nothing whatsoever is true.
This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philo... more This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the view known as deflationism. In clear language, the book covers a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth–value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas.
There are statements of the form "There are no Fs" that we would like to count as true, yet it is... more There are statements of the form "There are no Fs" that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
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