Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro... more Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro? Este artigo mostra que mudanças partidárias na direção dos ministérios não necessariamente se traduzem em mudanças na composição dos cargos de confiança. Funcionários de confiança com funções de policymaking são mais afetados pela mudança de ministro do que os demais. Além disso, órgãos afetados por escândalos de corrupção tiveram uma taxa de permanência de seus funcionários de confiança maior do que a dos demais órgãos. Fica evidente a necessidade de considerar a policy expertise dos funcionários, medida em tempo de serviço público, para entender a rotatividade. O artigo aponta para a pertinência de estudar as relações "Executivo-Executivo" no Brasil.
Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a ... more Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a voluminous literature that sheds important light on our understanding of the policy-making process in Brazil and the relationship between the Executive and the political parties in Congress. However, little is known about how the bureaucracy is used as a tool for political patronage and its overall role in the policy-making. We aim to advance the understanding of this phenomena by studying which factors explain the distribution of political appointee positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy among political parties. By using an unique panel dataset and applying an One-Way Random Effects GLS regression model we found that the number of seats a party has in the lower Chamber, the party's appointment of a cabinet minister, and being from the same party as the president's (formateur party) play a fundamental role at explaining why some parties are more able to fill political appointees' positions with their party members in the bureaucracy than others. These findings lend credence to the idea that appointments in the Brazilian bureaucracy can be better understood as "coalition goods" (by establishing an exchange baseline between the partisent's party and the parties in the coalition) instead of "exchange goods" (as tools that help cover the ongoing costs of holding together the coalition).
In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, and behavioral perspectives in a compr... more In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, and behavioral perspectives in a comprehensive model that explores determinants of executive and legislative approval based on economic performance in Brazil and Chile. Our main question is, do voters attribute responsibility for the state of the economy to their representatives in the Legislative Branch as they apparently do to officeholders in the Executive Branch? We search for answers to this question with an eye on how active the distinct branches of government are in economic policy-making and voters' levels of political sophistication. Our main hypothesis is that less sophisticated voters will blame politicians indiscriminately for the state of the economy, independent of how influential each branch of government is on economic policy. More sophisticated voters will better discern the role each branch plays in economic policymaking and will not blame representatives in the Legislative Branch for the state of the economy when Congress is not active in economic policy-making. The cases of Brazil and Chile under Cardoso and Lagos offer the perfect opportunity to test this hypothesis, which is confirmed by our data.
This article discusses voters' electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the se... more This article discusses voters' electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the second round of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections. The goal is to test the hypothesis that voters applied a new form of strategic voting in the first round of the elections: strategic punitive vote. We argue that this type of electoral behavior was decisive to explain vote choices in the 2006 presidential elections as well as the conditions for strategic voting in ballotage systems.
Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used ... more Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.
Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro... more Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro? Este artigo mostra que mudanças partidárias na direção dos ministérios não necessariamente se traduzem em mudanças na composição dos cargos de confiança. Funcionários de confiança com funções de policymaking são mais afetados pela mudança de ministro do que os demais. Além disso, órgãos afetados por escândalos de corrupção tiveram uma taxa de permanência de seus funcionários de confiança maior do que a dos demais órgãos. Fica evidente a necessidade de considerar a policy expertise dos funcionários, medida em tempo de serviço público, para entender a rotatividade. O artigo aponta para a pertinência de estudar as relações "Executivo-Executivo" no Brasil.
Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a ... more Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a voluminous literature that sheds important light on our understanding of the policy-making process in Brazil and the relationship between the Executive and the political parties in Congress. However, little is known about how the bureaucracy is used as a tool for political patronage and its overall role in the policy-making. We aim to advance the understanding of this phenomena by studying which factors explain the distribution of political appointee positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy among political parties. By using an unique panel dataset and applying an One-Way Random Effects GLS regression model we found that the number of seats a party has in the lower Chamber, the party's appointment of a cabinet minister, and being from the same party as the president's (formateur party) play a fundamental role at explaining why some parties are more able to fill political appointees' positions with their party members in the bureaucracy than others. These findings lend credence to the idea that appointments in the Brazilian bureaucracy can be better understood as "coalition goods" (by establishing an exchange baseline between the partisent's party and the parties in the coalition) instead of "exchange goods" (as tools that help cover the ongoing costs of holding together the coalition).
In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, and behavioral perspectives in a compr... more In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, and behavioral perspectives in a comprehensive model that explores determinants of executive and legislative approval based on economic performance in Brazil and Chile. Our main question is, do voters attribute responsibility for the state of the economy to their representatives in the Legislative Branch as they apparently do to officeholders in the Executive Branch? We search for answers to this question with an eye on how active the distinct branches of government are in economic policy-making and voters' levels of political sophistication. Our main hypothesis is that less sophisticated voters will blame politicians indiscriminately for the state of the economy, independent of how influential each branch of government is on economic policy. More sophisticated voters will better discern the role each branch plays in economic policymaking and will not blame representatives in the Legislative Branch for the state of the economy when Congress is not active in economic policy-making. The cases of Brazil and Chile under Cardoso and Lagos offer the perfect opportunity to test this hypothesis, which is confirmed by our data.
This article discusses voters' electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the se... more This article discusses voters' electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the second round of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections. The goal is to test the hypothesis that voters applied a new form of strategic voting in the first round of the elections: strategic punitive vote. We argue that this type of electoral behavior was decisive to explain vote choices in the 2006 presidential elections as well as the conditions for strategic voting in ballotage systems.
Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used ... more Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.
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