Papers by Nino Imedashvili
Caucasus survey, Sep 14, 2023
This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe... more This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe, focusing on the competition for influence in Georgia and Montenegro with comparisons to Moldova and Ukraine. Whereas all four countries have expressed a desire to join NATO-and Russia has consistently communicated its disapproval-Moscow has pursued divergent means to curb NATO expansion and escalated with tit-for-tat strategies. We argue that whether Russia deployed military strategies, economic levers, political tactics or covert actions has varied according to its relative power projection capacity along with the responses of NATO and the target countries. Where power projection capacity is greater due to its contiguous geography (Georgia, Ukraine), Russia staged military interventions, and where it was weaker, in non-contiguous countries (Montenegro, Moldova), it resorted to non-military means. Russia may be uniformly opposed to NATO expansion, but its strategies to keep its neighbours out of NATO and in Russia's orbit are contingent upon its relative power.
Georgia Today, 2022
Propaganda is a powerful weapon of the Russian hybrid war. By influencing people's emotions, it a... more Propaganda is a powerful weapon of the Russian hybrid war. By influencing people's emotions, it achieves on the one hand the undermining of an active minority, and on the other mobilizes unconditional support around the ruling regime/leader. Propaganda manages to "capture" the "emotions" of the people by using a plethora of factors, including ongoing economic and security problems. However, in our blog, we will review merely the emotional pillars of the propaganda structure, and its main patterns and results. The dimensions of propaganda Russian propaganda has two dimensions-internal and external. The internal dimension of propaganda serves to maintain public support for Russia's ruling regime, while the external dimension serves to restore and strengthen Russia's lost influence on the neighboring post-Soviet countries, especially aimed at those with a pro-Western foreign orientation: Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova.
Caucasus Survey, 2023
This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe... more This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe, focusing on the competition for influence in Georgia and Montenegro with comparisons to Moldova and Ukraine. Whereas all four countries have expressed a desire to join NATO-and Russia has consistently communicated its disapproval-Moscow has pursued divergent means to curb NATO expansion and escalated with tit-for-tat strategies. We argue that whether Russia deployed military strategies, economic levers, political tactics or covert actions has varied according to its relative power projection capacity along with the responses of NATO and the target countries. Where power projection capacity is greater due to its contiguous geography (Georgia, Ukraine), Russia staged military interventions, and where it was weaker, in non-contiguous countries (Montenegro, Moldova), it resorted to non-military means. Russia may be uniformly opposed to NATO expansion, but its strategies to keep its neighbours out of NATO and in Russia's orbit are contingent upon its relative power.
GFSIS, 2022
Even authoritarian regimes do not openly dare to reject democracy, fearful of indirectly validati... more Even authoritarian regimes do not openly dare to reject democracy, fearful of indirectly validating the preconception of its high level of legitimacy as a model for state governance. With authoritarian regimes striving to maintain their grip on power for as long as possible, they have thus devised various interpretations of democracy and alternative narratives that serve to legitimize their governance style in law and shield it from internal and external criticism.
As examples, among the terms devised for Putin’s authoritarian governance style are “Sovereign Democracy” and “Governed Democracy”. In 2005, Putin’s chief propagandist Surkov defined the term “Sovereign” as “defense of Russia’s sovereignty from the ‘incompetent’ and ‘unacquainted’ West, which ‘seeks to destabilize Russia’.”
In order to strengthen the authoritarian status quo, Putin has used a number of disinformation political technologies that have proven to be effective so far, including:
The Russian “Rules of the Game”
Campaign for Demonization of the West
The Status of “Foreign Agents” for Critics
Creation of Expert Groups Supporting Putin’s Policies
Creation of “Street” Groups/Gangs Supporting Putin
GFSIS, 2022
There is a theory of democratic peace and an opposing one of "autocratic peace".
According to ... more There is a theory of democratic peace and an opposing one of "autocratic peace".
According to the theory of democratic peace, democracies do not wage war on each other, because, in a transparent system of governance where the government is accountable to the people, political decisions are made through wide-ranging deliberation and compromise. Decisions made in this way gravitate towards peace, as the people will not support putting the destructive experience of war on themselves.
As democracy became dominant in the international system, non-democratic countries perceived it as a threat, seeing the end of their own violent rule in the growing spread of democracy. Therefore, to survive, the autocratic countries began to cooperate closely.
The thesis of "autocratic peace" is premised on the political, economic, and military cooperation of autocratic countries due to the common interest of maintaining power. Sometimes, the cooperation is institutional (“Eurasian Union”, “Collective Security Treaty Organization”, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”), and at other times informal (the Abashidze-Karasin format).
On the one hand, it is a paradox – are not autocracy and peace polar opposites? After all, the autocratic regime maintains power by intimidating citizens, using violence and pressure on them. However, another "peace" is implied here, and in this "peace," the citizens are not free.
GEORGIA`S REFORMS ASSOCIATES , 2022
Holy Dormition Cathedral of Moscow Patriarchate in Kharkiv, the church in Irpin near Kyiv, Svyata... more Holy Dormition Cathedral of Moscow Patriarchate in Kharkiv, the church in Irpin near Kyiv, Svyatagorsk Monastery (lavra) in Donetsk, and the Holy Trinity church in the city of Zhovkva were bombed by Russia in the first days of the invasion of Ukraine . Since then, dozens of other churches and holy sites have been bombed despite President Zelensky’s call that the churches are used as a shelter for civilians, including children.
A bigger shock to the Orthodox Christian World came when Russia’s Patriarch Kirill ‘’blessed” the war. He justified the war as a metaphysical fight against sin, against immoral Western values, and a “gay pride parade” forced on the people of Donbas, on whose behalf Kremlin had launched a “special military operation.” Kirill claimed that people in Donbas were suffering for their “fundamental rejection of the so-called values that are offered today by those who claim world power.” Similar spiritual and cultural sentiments were visible in Putin’s speeches too. Before launching “special military operation” on 24 February 2022, Putin referred to Ukraine as an “inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.”
According to UNESCO, at least 53 Ukrainian cultural sites have been damaged by Russians since 24 February, including 29 religious sites, 16 historic buildings, four museums and four monuments.
Thinking back to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, striking similarities could be drawn. First, Putin rhetorically highlighted cultural and spiritual links with Georgia; shortly afterwards, Russian bombs destroyed Georgian cultural sites. Neither then nor now did the Russian Orthodox Church protest the destruction of the Christian sites of historical value.
In 2013 Putin thanked Georgia’s Patriarch Ilia II “for doing everything … to maintain the humanitarian, spiritual and cultural ties between our fraternal peoples.” In 2008, he rejected Patriarch’s appeal not to recognize the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Russia’s recognition occurred a day after Patriarch’s request.
In 2008 Russia bombed 14 religious and cultural monuments and damaged six cultural heritage sites after the hot phase of military activities was over. These monuments and sites have been abandoned since risking further demolition.
This paper is a reminder of Russia’s barbaric behaviour. In this paper, we collected, examined and analyzed Russian bombed Christian sites in Georgia in 2008 and described the conditions of other damaged sites located in the areas now occupied by Russia. This paper also describes the monuments that underwent inappropriate “rehabilitation works” that erased Georgian traces.
The information below is accurate to the best of our knowledge because the Government of Georgia or other international or local experts can't verify the conditions of cultural heritage sites in the Russian-occupied regions. The information below about the damaged and abandonment monuments located in the area of bombardment in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia is based on the reports from the local inhabitants and museum staff, the data compiled by UNOSAT satellite-based damage assessment for cultural heritage monuments in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war and other credible international reports.
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Papers by Nino Imedashvili
As examples, among the terms devised for Putin’s authoritarian governance style are “Sovereign Democracy” and “Governed Democracy”. In 2005, Putin’s chief propagandist Surkov defined the term “Sovereign” as “defense of Russia’s sovereignty from the ‘incompetent’ and ‘unacquainted’ West, which ‘seeks to destabilize Russia’.”
In order to strengthen the authoritarian status quo, Putin has used a number of disinformation political technologies that have proven to be effective so far, including:
The Russian “Rules of the Game”
Campaign for Demonization of the West
The Status of “Foreign Agents” for Critics
Creation of Expert Groups Supporting Putin’s Policies
Creation of “Street” Groups/Gangs Supporting Putin
According to the theory of democratic peace, democracies do not wage war on each other, because, in a transparent system of governance where the government is accountable to the people, political decisions are made through wide-ranging deliberation and compromise. Decisions made in this way gravitate towards peace, as the people will not support putting the destructive experience of war on themselves.
As democracy became dominant in the international system, non-democratic countries perceived it as a threat, seeing the end of their own violent rule in the growing spread of democracy. Therefore, to survive, the autocratic countries began to cooperate closely.
The thesis of "autocratic peace" is premised on the political, economic, and military cooperation of autocratic countries due to the common interest of maintaining power. Sometimes, the cooperation is institutional (“Eurasian Union”, “Collective Security Treaty Organization”, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”), and at other times informal (the Abashidze-Karasin format).
On the one hand, it is a paradox – are not autocracy and peace polar opposites? After all, the autocratic regime maintains power by intimidating citizens, using violence and pressure on them. However, another "peace" is implied here, and in this "peace," the citizens are not free.
A bigger shock to the Orthodox Christian World came when Russia’s Patriarch Kirill ‘’blessed” the war. He justified the war as a metaphysical fight against sin, against immoral Western values, and a “gay pride parade” forced on the people of Donbas, on whose behalf Kremlin had launched a “special military operation.” Kirill claimed that people in Donbas were suffering for their “fundamental rejection of the so-called values that are offered today by those who claim world power.” Similar spiritual and cultural sentiments were visible in Putin’s speeches too. Before launching “special military operation” on 24 February 2022, Putin referred to Ukraine as an “inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.”
According to UNESCO, at least 53 Ukrainian cultural sites have been damaged by Russians since 24 February, including 29 religious sites, 16 historic buildings, four museums and four monuments.
Thinking back to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, striking similarities could be drawn. First, Putin rhetorically highlighted cultural and spiritual links with Georgia; shortly afterwards, Russian bombs destroyed Georgian cultural sites. Neither then nor now did the Russian Orthodox Church protest the destruction of the Christian sites of historical value.
In 2013 Putin thanked Georgia’s Patriarch Ilia II “for doing everything … to maintain the humanitarian, spiritual and cultural ties between our fraternal peoples.” In 2008, he rejected Patriarch’s appeal not to recognize the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Russia’s recognition occurred a day after Patriarch’s request.
In 2008 Russia bombed 14 religious and cultural monuments and damaged six cultural heritage sites after the hot phase of military activities was over. These monuments and sites have been abandoned since risking further demolition.
This paper is a reminder of Russia’s barbaric behaviour. In this paper, we collected, examined and analyzed Russian bombed Christian sites in Georgia in 2008 and described the conditions of other damaged sites located in the areas now occupied by Russia. This paper also describes the monuments that underwent inappropriate “rehabilitation works” that erased Georgian traces.
The information below is accurate to the best of our knowledge because the Government of Georgia or other international or local experts can't verify the conditions of cultural heritage sites in the Russian-occupied regions. The information below about the damaged and abandonment monuments located in the area of bombardment in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia is based on the reports from the local inhabitants and museum staff, the data compiled by UNOSAT satellite-based damage assessment for cultural heritage monuments in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war and other credible international reports.
As examples, among the terms devised for Putin’s authoritarian governance style are “Sovereign Democracy” and “Governed Democracy”. In 2005, Putin’s chief propagandist Surkov defined the term “Sovereign” as “defense of Russia’s sovereignty from the ‘incompetent’ and ‘unacquainted’ West, which ‘seeks to destabilize Russia’.”
In order to strengthen the authoritarian status quo, Putin has used a number of disinformation political technologies that have proven to be effective so far, including:
The Russian “Rules of the Game”
Campaign for Demonization of the West
The Status of “Foreign Agents” for Critics
Creation of Expert Groups Supporting Putin’s Policies
Creation of “Street” Groups/Gangs Supporting Putin
According to the theory of democratic peace, democracies do not wage war on each other, because, in a transparent system of governance where the government is accountable to the people, political decisions are made through wide-ranging deliberation and compromise. Decisions made in this way gravitate towards peace, as the people will not support putting the destructive experience of war on themselves.
As democracy became dominant in the international system, non-democratic countries perceived it as a threat, seeing the end of their own violent rule in the growing spread of democracy. Therefore, to survive, the autocratic countries began to cooperate closely.
The thesis of "autocratic peace" is premised on the political, economic, and military cooperation of autocratic countries due to the common interest of maintaining power. Sometimes, the cooperation is institutional (“Eurasian Union”, “Collective Security Treaty Organization”, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”), and at other times informal (the Abashidze-Karasin format).
On the one hand, it is a paradox – are not autocracy and peace polar opposites? After all, the autocratic regime maintains power by intimidating citizens, using violence and pressure on them. However, another "peace" is implied here, and in this "peace," the citizens are not free.
A bigger shock to the Orthodox Christian World came when Russia’s Patriarch Kirill ‘’blessed” the war. He justified the war as a metaphysical fight against sin, against immoral Western values, and a “gay pride parade” forced on the people of Donbas, on whose behalf Kremlin had launched a “special military operation.” Kirill claimed that people in Donbas were suffering for their “fundamental rejection of the so-called values that are offered today by those who claim world power.” Similar spiritual and cultural sentiments were visible in Putin’s speeches too. Before launching “special military operation” on 24 February 2022, Putin referred to Ukraine as an “inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.”
According to UNESCO, at least 53 Ukrainian cultural sites have been damaged by Russians since 24 February, including 29 religious sites, 16 historic buildings, four museums and four monuments.
Thinking back to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, striking similarities could be drawn. First, Putin rhetorically highlighted cultural and spiritual links with Georgia; shortly afterwards, Russian bombs destroyed Georgian cultural sites. Neither then nor now did the Russian Orthodox Church protest the destruction of the Christian sites of historical value.
In 2013 Putin thanked Georgia’s Patriarch Ilia II “for doing everything … to maintain the humanitarian, spiritual and cultural ties between our fraternal peoples.” In 2008, he rejected Patriarch’s appeal not to recognize the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Russia’s recognition occurred a day after Patriarch’s request.
In 2008 Russia bombed 14 religious and cultural monuments and damaged six cultural heritage sites after the hot phase of military activities was over. These monuments and sites have been abandoned since risking further demolition.
This paper is a reminder of Russia’s barbaric behaviour. In this paper, we collected, examined and analyzed Russian bombed Christian sites in Georgia in 2008 and described the conditions of other damaged sites located in the areas now occupied by Russia. This paper also describes the monuments that underwent inappropriate “rehabilitation works” that erased Georgian traces.
The information below is accurate to the best of our knowledge because the Government of Georgia or other international or local experts can't verify the conditions of cultural heritage sites in the Russian-occupied regions. The information below about the damaged and abandonment monuments located in the area of bombardment in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia is based on the reports from the local inhabitants and museum staff, the data compiled by UNOSAT satellite-based damage assessment for cultural heritage monuments in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war and other credible international reports.