Daniel Pires Nunes
Daniel Pires Nunes is PhD in Philosophy (University of Caxias do Sul). He also holds a Master's degree in Philosophy (UCS, 2014, with the dissertation nominated by the Graduate Program in Philosophy at UCS for the ANPOF Award 2016), specialization in Occupational Safety Engineering (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2009) and in Methodology for Higher Education and Distance Learning (FAEL, 2017). He is an Electrical Engineer (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2004) and holds Complementation Pedagogical - Full Degree (University of Santa Cruz do Sul, 2007). He is currently a professor at the Federal Institute Rio Grande do Sul-Campus Erechim.
Daniel Pires Nunes é doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul. Também possui mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul (2014) (com a dissertação indicada pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UCS ao Prêmio ANPOF 2016), especialização em Engenharia de Segurança do Trabalho pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (2009) e em Metodologia para o Ensino Superior e EAD pela FAEL (2017), graduação em Engenharia Elétrica pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (2004) e Complementação Pedagógica - Licenciatura Plena pela Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul (2007). Atualmente é professor do Instituto Federal Rio Grande do Sul - Campus Erechim. Tem experiência em docência para o ensino profissional e superior com ênfase nas áreas de Eletricidade, Eletrônica, Engenharia Elétrica, Ética e de Segurança e Higiene do Trabalho.
http://lattes.cnpq.br/8114269742454191
Supervisors: Everaldo Cescon and Jaime Parera Rebello
Phone: +55 54 981051170
Address: Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Rio Grande do Sul, Campus Erechim.
Rua Domingos Zanella - 104
Três Vendas
99713028 - Erechim, RS - Brasil
Telefone: (54) 33217500
Ramal: 7539
Daniel Pires Nunes é doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul. Também possui mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul (2014) (com a dissertação indicada pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UCS ao Prêmio ANPOF 2016), especialização em Engenharia de Segurança do Trabalho pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (2009) e em Metodologia para o Ensino Superior e EAD pela FAEL (2017), graduação em Engenharia Elétrica pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (2004) e Complementação Pedagógica - Licenciatura Plena pela Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul (2007). Atualmente é professor do Instituto Federal Rio Grande do Sul - Campus Erechim. Tem experiência em docência para o ensino profissional e superior com ênfase nas áreas de Eletricidade, Eletrônica, Engenharia Elétrica, Ética e de Segurança e Higiene do Trabalho.
http://lattes.cnpq.br/8114269742454191
Supervisors: Everaldo Cescon and Jaime Parera Rebello
Phone: +55 54 981051170
Address: Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Rio Grande do Sul, Campus Erechim.
Rua Domingos Zanella - 104
Três Vendas
99713028 - Erechim, RS - Brasil
Telefone: (54) 33217500
Ramal: 7539
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Dissertation by Daniel Pires Nunes
broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist positions in philosophy of mind. Then, I go on to show how the question of free will arises and can be crucial to such currents of thought. Subsequently, I summarize the biological naturalist position (especially regarding the ontology of consciousness and the question of intentionality) and oppose it to physicalism and functionalism in order to examine the possibility of free will. In this opposition, each theory is
decomposed into its main tenets so that they can be critically analyzed. In this analysis, it appears that free will does not seem to find any room in the scenario presented by physicalism and functionalism. It is argued that Searlean biological naturalism is able to explain – better than the other two positions – how free action can be motivated by something that is external to the mental state which is itself performing the action. I then evaluate the ethical implications of these findings, articulating the issues of intrinsic intentionality, free will, strong artificial intelligence in order to conclude that current machines cannot be assigned moral responsibility, since they are not capable of intrinsic intentionality. Then, I argue for the evolutionary origin of intentionality and therefore morality. Finally, I argue that neuroscience does not eliminate moral responsibility since it does not prove that free will is an illusion, i.e., that this branch of science does not contradict John Searle’s biological naturalism.
Artigos by Daniel Pires Nunes
Papers by Daniel Pires Nunes
Fisicalismo. Livre-arbítrio. Causalidade. Filosofia da mente. Determinismo.
Books by Daniel Pires Nunes
Giovane Rodrigues Jardim
Thesis Chapters by Daniel Pires Nunes
naturalism. Next, we assess why external realism is a condition of possibility for moral realism. In this sense, we examine how John Searle defends that anti-realism is irrational. Subsequently, we approach Searlean's theory of action, especially the explanation of how rational action takes place, according to him. Then, we assess whether Searle was successful when faced with the objections about whether one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is', as he considers his philosophical system to be naturalistic. Next, we examine whether the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as the linguistic act of predicating takes precedence over universal terms. We defend that evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected when we use the formula of constitutive rules in the field of morality, in order to increasingly include other human beings, in an equitable way, decreasing, rationally – and through collective intentionality –, the moral disagreements between groups and individuals, which implies the rational recognition of Universal Human Rights. Given this, we argue that actions and values of particular groups can be respected as long as they respect the general contract, constituted by collective intentionality, through rational recognition. We argue that, as a characteristic of intentionality, rationality does not exist without life, and, therefore, it has intrinsic value. We deduce that the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as, in the repeated application of the constitutive rules, the evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected, with the equitable inclusion of the totality of human beings, as subjects of rights and obligations, in assigning the status of human beings. This lessens moral disagreements between groups and individuals through collective intentionality. The condition of possibility of morality, in this sense, is language itself as a basic social institution. Language, as a logical
delimiter, and altruism, as a logical requirement for what is right and wrong, would be the generalizers of the application of moral terms. Thus, not only the dimension of rationality, but all the other dimensions that potentially make up the self and the other must be considered altruistically in a properly good action. Therefore, pragmatically, the agent's actions, as they do not exist out of context, must also consider that the others – as individuals and as a collective – also develop in such a way that they can give themselves their own ends. Finally, based on Searle's thesis of how a social reality and social and institutional facts are possible, we conclude that there is a way to derive an objective morality.
broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist positions in philosophy of mind. Then, I go on to show how the question of free will arises and can be crucial to such currents of thought. Subsequently, I summarize the biological naturalist position (especially regarding the ontology of consciousness and the question of intentionality) and oppose it to physicalism and functionalism in order to examine the possibility of free will. In this opposition, each theory is
decomposed into its main tenets so that they can be critically analyzed. In this analysis, it appears that free will does not seem to find any room in the scenario presented by physicalism and functionalism. It is argued that Searlean biological naturalism is able to explain – better than the other two positions – how free action can be motivated by something that is external to the mental state which is itself performing the action. I then evaluate the ethical implications of these findings, articulating the issues of intrinsic intentionality, free will, strong artificial intelligence in order to conclude that current machines cannot be assigned moral responsibility, since they are not capable of intrinsic intentionality. Then, I argue for the evolutionary origin of intentionality and therefore morality. Finally, I argue that neuroscience does not eliminate moral responsibility since it does not prove that free will is an illusion, i.e., that this branch of science does not contradict John Searle’s biological naturalism.
Fisicalismo. Livre-arbítrio. Causalidade. Filosofia da mente. Determinismo.
Giovane Rodrigues Jardim
naturalism. Next, we assess why external realism is a condition of possibility for moral realism. In this sense, we examine how John Searle defends that anti-realism is irrational. Subsequently, we approach Searlean's theory of action, especially the explanation of how rational action takes place, according to him. Then, we assess whether Searle was successful when faced with the objections about whether one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is', as he considers his philosophical system to be naturalistic. Next, we examine whether the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as the linguistic act of predicating takes precedence over universal terms. We defend that evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected when we use the formula of constitutive rules in the field of morality, in order to increasingly include other human beings, in an equitable way, decreasing, rationally – and through collective intentionality –, the moral disagreements between groups and individuals, which implies the rational recognition of Universal Human Rights. Given this, we argue that actions and values of particular groups can be respected as long as they respect the general contract, constituted by collective intentionality, through rational recognition. We argue that, as a characteristic of intentionality, rationality does not exist without life, and, therefore, it has intrinsic value. We deduce that the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as, in the repeated application of the constitutive rules, the evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected, with the equitable inclusion of the totality of human beings, as subjects of rights and obligations, in assigning the status of human beings. This lessens moral disagreements between groups and individuals through collective intentionality. The condition of possibility of morality, in this sense, is language itself as a basic social institution. Language, as a logical
delimiter, and altruism, as a logical requirement for what is right and wrong, would be the generalizers of the application of moral terms. Thus, not only the dimension of rationality, but all the other dimensions that potentially make up the self and the other must be considered altruistically in a properly good action. Therefore, pragmatically, the agent's actions, as they do not exist out of context, must also consider that the others – as individuals and as a collective – also develop in such a way that they can give themselves their own ends. Finally, based on Searle's thesis of how a social reality and social and institutional facts are possible, we conclude that there is a way to derive an objective morality.