Papers by Sergei Zakharov
La démographie de la Russie est suivie très attentivement, excessivement peut-être. D’abord car e... more La démographie de la Russie est suivie très attentivement, excessivement peut-être. D’abord car elle est l’objet même d’une très forte attention des autorités et médias russes, eux-mêmes, et que la question démographique fait souvent l’objet d’une annonce particulière, depuis quelques années, par Vladmir Poutine lors de son adresse annuelle à la nation. Ensuite car la Russie a de longue date une démographie atypique, tant l’espérance de vie est restée faible durant plusieurs décennies, tant aussi sa croissance démographique tenait à l’importance des migrations, pour bien d’autres raisons encore, telles ces régions qui se sont vidées de leurs habitants depuis le début de ce siècle, en Extrême orient mais aussi en Russie centrale.
Complément du n° 295 de Population et Société
Changes in family formation strategies in France, Lithuania and Russia are analyzed to detect new... more Changes in family formation strategies in France, Lithuania and Russia are analyzed to detect new partnership formation patterns along with the structural and cultural factors underlying this process. Each country has undergone quite different transitions during the 20th century. France's has been consequent; Lithuania's, delayed; and Russia's, distorted. In France, a single factor explains consensual union, namely the degree of religiousness. In Russia and Lithuania, where new forms of couples have emerged more recently than in France, several structural and cultural factors characterize the persons harbingering these new union
Population (French Edition), 1997
La mortalité en Russie ces dix dernières années a intrigué, par la rapidité de son augmentation. ... more La mortalité en Russie ces dix dernières années a intrigué, par la rapidité de son augmentation. Plusieurs travaux ont d'ores et déjà étudié ces dynamiques de façon approfondie. Cet article offre une interprétation nouvelle de ces dynamiques, qui complète ...
The rapid increase in mortality in Russia during the past ten years is perplexing. Several author... more The rapid increase in mortality in Russia during the past ten years is perplexing. Several authors have explored these movements in depth. In this paper, the authors offer a new interpretation of these dynamics which complements those put forward by previous authors. It shows that the dynamics cannot be studies without taking account of previous movements observed since the 1960s. They suggest that recent developments are the cumulative result of a compensation mechanism which followed the rapid decrease in mortality which occurred around 1985, and of the continuation of a deterioration movement which began in the early 1960s. It does not represent a new trend to a rapidly deteriorating situation. To prove this and to explain these rapid fluctuations, the authors have developed a model based on hypotheses which involve heterogeneous populations. In addition to analysing mortality in Russia, they provide new models which relate to the consequences of heterogeneity on the dynamics of ...
Population (French Edition), 1997
La mortalité en Russie ces dix dernières années a intrigué, par la rapidité de son augmentation. ... more La mortalité en Russie ces dix dernières années a intrigué, par la rapidité de son augmentation. Plusieurs travaux ont d'ores et déjà étudié ces dynamiques de façon approfondie. Cet article offre une interprétation nouvelle de ces dynamiques, qui complète ...
A large literature is now devoted to the demographic crises, experienced by the USSR between 1920... more A large literature is now devoted to the demographic crises, experienced by the USSR between 1920 and 1947. This literature more often attempts to make a global estimate of the losses of the soviet people. In this article, we present a more precise overview of such approaches, putting the stress on the geographic disparities and the important contrasts between generations, led by these crises. For this aim, in a first part, the censuses and their comparison with incomplete data of the civil registration lead us to present a regional geography of demographic crises. Such a reconstruction is therefore used as a basis of a comparison between soviet crises and those experienced during the XIX century Russian Empire. In a second part, the different age structures presented in the 1897 to 1989 censuses are corrected to obtain exact annual age structures. The uses of a specific statistical method helped us to give precise reconstructions. It is therefore possible to describe in detail the ...
Avdeev (Alexandre), Blum (Alain), Zakharov (Serge), Andreev (Evgenij).- Reaccion de una poblacion... more Avdeev (Alexandre), Blum (Alain), Zakharov (Serge), Andreev (Evgenij).- Reaccion de una poblacion heterogenea a una perturbacion. Un modelo de interpretacion de las evoluciones de la mortalidad en Rusia El rapido aumento de la mortalidad en Rusia durante estos ultimos diez aňos ha des- pertado interes. Varios trabajos han analizado las dinamicas dela mortalidad en profundi- dad. En este articulo se ofrece una interpretacion nueva, que completa las ya existentes, de taies dinamicas. Se demuestra que no es posible examinarlas sin tener en cuenta las evoluciones observadas desde los aňos sesenta. Las evoluciones recientes se pueden interpretar como la suma de un mecanismo de recuperacion que siguio a la rapida disminucion de la mortalidad observada desde 1985 y la continuidad de una degradacion iniciada a principios de la decada de los sesenta. No se trata pues de una nueva tendencia a una degradacion ace- lerada. Para demostrarlo, los autores desarrollan un modelo basado en las hipote...
Annales de Démographie Historique, 1992
Longtemps restee sous forme d'interrogation devant l'insuffisance des sources, l'hist... more Longtemps restee sous forme d'interrogation devant l'insuffisance des sources, l'histoire demographique de l'URSS se revele peu a peu. L'ouverture des archives rend maintenant l'acces possible aux diverses sources, censitaires ou d'etat civil, que le pouvoir sovietique avait prefere laisser enfermees a l'abri des regards. ; Cette histoire est en etroite symbiose avec l'histoire politique, les mouvements demographiques de court terme, jalonnes par des catastrophes de 1917 a 1930 suivent les grandes ruptures politiques. En revanche, les evolutions de long terme revelent des mouvements imperturbables, qui ne sont qu'interrompus temporairement par ces drames. Cet article suit donc ces grandes tendances contradictoires.
Working papers of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research receive only limited review. ... more Working papers of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research receive only limited review. Views or opinions expressed in working papers are attributable to the authors and do not necessarily refl ect those of the Institute.
Демографическое обозрение
The idea of an extraordinary growth in fertility in Russia is widespread in the Russian expert co... more The idea of an extraordinary growth in fertility in Russia is widespread in the Russian expert community and media space. This increase is believed to be indicative of the positive results of the special financial measures taken by the government after 2006 to stimulate fertility. The author’s viewpoint is more reserved. There are some positive developments, but their significance is quite insufficient to view the future of Russian fertility through rose-colored glasses. With this paper, we continue our previous long-term research in the field of in-depth demographic analysis of Russian fertility, incorporating the latest official statistical data for 2014. The paper provides an overview of the trends of key fertility indicators over a few decades, as well as developing some approaches to cohort fertility analysis in order to obtain more reliable projections. In the first part, we examine period fertility indicators (for calendar years), taking into account the latest changes in the...
Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 1993
Population and Development Review, 2013
ABSTRACT Russia has a history of pronatalist policies dating back to the 1930s. Two sets of prona... more ABSTRACT Russia has a history of pronatalist policies dating back to the 1930s. Two sets of pronatalist measures were implemented during the past 40 years. The one designed in the early 1980s proved to be a clear failure. Instead of raising fertility, completed cohort fertility declined from 1.8 births per woman for the 1960 birth cohort to 1.6 for the 1968 cohort. The government of President Putin became concerned with the dire demographic conditions of high mortality and low fertility in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. A comprehensive set of pronatalist measures came into effect in January 2007. The period total fertility rate increased from 1.3 births per woman in 2006 to 1.6 in 2011, which the authorities view as an unqualified success. An unbiased demographic evaluation as well as analyses of Russian experts reveals that apparently the measures mainly caused a lowering of the age at birth and shortening of birth intervals. It appears that any real fertility increase is questionable, i.e. cohort fertility is not likely to increase appreciably. The recent pronatalist measures are likely to turn out to be a failure.
Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 2009
ABSTRACT
The authoritarian state, true to its history, is willing to cynically use church institutions exc... more The authoritarian state, true to its history, is willing to cynically use church institutions exclusively for its own interests. When necessary, and even under rather random circumstances, the ideology, rhetoric, and even manner in which church and state work together can radically change.
During the grand Covid-19 pandemic clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
Mourir tôt ou tard? L’Église et l’Étata en Russie lors de la première pandémie de l’ère démographique postmodern, 2021
The authoritarian state, true to its history, is willing to cynically use church institutions exc... more The authoritarian state, true to its history, is willing to cynically use church institutions exclusively for its own interests. When necessary, and even under rather random circumstances, the ideology, rhetoric, and even manner in which church and state work together can radically change.
During the grand pandemic of Covid-19 clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
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Papers by Sergei Zakharov
During the grand Covid-19 pandemic clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
During the grand pandemic of Covid-19 clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
During the grand Covid-19 pandemic clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
During the grand pandemic of Covid-19 clerical myths have again been placed in doubt: “a soul can be saved without a church, rituals, and a priest,” “communion is a source of infection and death,” etc.
The value of human life in Russia remains extremely low, and the passive attitude towards life and death remains a problem. Based on the current numbers of martyrs/sufferers from the epidemic, Russia may become one of the world leaders, a fact that justifies its 2018 rating as 109th in the world in life expectancy.
objectives and instruments of the former Soviet Union, while also preserving certain archaic aspects of pre-Soviet Russian family policy. Indeed, because Russian family policy has historically been contradictory in both its ideological underpinnings and its demographic and social consequences often mythologising past social and demographic realities- post-Soviet family policy in Russia has no clear cementing ideology. It is instead woven together from poorly structured and disjointed elements.
Fundamental problem of contemporary Russian family policy lies
not so much in particular policy instruments ( although these too are
poor) or in a lack of resources, as in the inadequacy of family ideology
for the country's contemporary challenges; more precisely, it lies in the
primacy given to ageing social institutions and the state's denial of the
fact that the family and its role evolve. The Russian state views the family, first and foremost, as a resource for advancing high policy or geopolitical goals.
In the post-imperial period, Russian family policy changed many times
over, fundamentally along a "more state" versus "less state" axis. Every
attempt at state interference in the family and in the processes of childbearing or rearing was accompanied by a change in family ideology along a "liberal-conservative-traditional" axis.
The phases of Russia's demographic modernisation (known among demographers as the First and Second Demographic
Transitions) , as well as its periods of worsening social-demographic conditions, can be identified in both the Soviet and post-Soviet versions of modernisation. The Russian political elites of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods observed objective demographic changes in Russian society but reacted negatively to social innovations in familial life and maintained a conservative approach to family policy.
The Russian state's approach to demographic and family policy is not
new. Indeed, it was the dominant approach of developed countries from
the end of the nineteenth century through to the middle of the twentieth
century. Between the world wars, when questions of national identity
were central to the policy challenges of European states, politicians
and totalitarian regimes sought out similar policies, embedded in militant nationalism and traditionalism, as an answer to their demographic, socioeconomic and geopolitical challenges. Pronatalism played a central role in these policies.
Dans une seconde partie, les divers structures par age issues des recensements de 1897 a 1989 ont ete corrigees pour obtenir des pyramides des ages annuels correctes . L 'utilisation d 'une methode statistique specifique no us a perm is d 'arriver a des reconstitutions fines. n est possible alors de decrire en detaille devenir de toutes les generations qui ont vecu ces periodes de crises. De plus ces reconstitutions donnent la base indispensable a une etude critique des reconstitutions de la dynamique demographique sovietique de la premiere moitie du xxeme siecle. Elles fournissent enfin des indications interessantes sur les evolutions recentes, et en particulier sur la degradation de la mortalite infantile a partir de 1970.
Abstract: A large literature is now devoted to the demographic crises, experienced by the USSR between 1920 and 1947. This literature more often attempts to make a global estimate of the losses of the soviet people. In this article, we present a more precise overview of such approaches, putting the stress on the geographic disparities and the important contrasts between generations, led by these crises. For this aim, in a first part, the censuses and their comparison with incomplete data of the civil registration lead us to present a regional geography of demographic crises. Such a reconstruction is therefore used as a basis of a comparison between soviet crises and those experienced during the XIX century Russian Empire.
In a second part, the different age structures presented in the 1897 to 1989 censuses are corrected to obtain exact annual age structures. The use of a specific statistical method helped us to give precise reconstructions. It is therefore possible to describe in detail the future of all the generations who have experienced these critical years. Moreover, our reconstruction gives the indispensable basis of a critical study on the soviet demographic dynamic .reconstitution, which have been done by rather different authors. It finally gives interesting precisions on the last evolutions, and, especially, on the degradation of infant mortality from the 70s.