Drafts by Lari Launonen
Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) raises a number of issues that are of interest to theologians... more Cognitive science of religion (CSR) raises a number of issues that are of interest to theologians and philosophers of religion. The latter have focused primarily on the epistemological implications of CSR, that is, whether science shows religious belief to be irrational. Another broad question is whether CSR is compatible with theism and Christian theology. Theological doctrines, such as Calvin's views about sensus divinitatis and the noetic effects of sin, play an important part in these conversations. Less attention has been directed to how CSR can function as a source for theological and philosophical inquiry. So far, CSR has been invoked in discussions on the natural knowledge of God, classical theism, and divine hiddenness, for examples. This article provides an overview of the recent philosophical and theological engagements with CSR.
entails full-blown, global skepticism about our cognitive faculties as a whole. After all, if "na... more entails full-blown, global skepticism about our cognitive faculties as a whole. After all, if "natural selection does not care about truth," but "only about reproductive success" (Stich 1990: 62), how can we trust any of our cognitive system to lead us to true beliefs? The main purpose of our paper is to discuss a recent EDA invoking cultural evolution and develop a response to it. We will begin by recapitulating a well-known EDA by Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins (2013) and a response to it by Jonathan Jong and Aku Visala (2014). According to Griffiths and Wilkins, in order to avoid evolutionary skepticism about beliefs in any given domain, the truth-value of beliefs in that domain must be linked to their reproductive value (as when true beliefs about predators better guard against being eaten than false beliefs). They argue that true commonsense beliefs would have been more beneficial for our ancestors than false beliefs. Scientific beliefs can be likewise vindicated by appealing to commonsense reasoning. The evolutionary success of religious or moral beliefs, however, have nothing to do with their truth-value. Jong and Visala respond that such an EDA confuses the causes of belief with reasons to believe. What is crucial, they maintain, is that a believer has access to evidence for her belief. If commonsense reasoning can help debug our belief-forming process so as to allow for scientific beliefs, a similar debugging can perhaps vindicate religious beliefs as well. It all depends on whether one has evidence to support one's beliefs. Taylor Davis (2020) has responded to this by reworking Griffiths and Wilkins's argument. By appealing to recent work on the cultural evolution of religion, he argues that cultural selection, not genetically inherited cognitive capacities, explains why the selection process of scientific beliefs is truth sensitive while the one for religious beliefs is not. The cultural fitness of scientific beliefs depends-at least partly-on their power to predict, while the cultural fitness of religious beliefs is tied to their ability to produce prosocial behavior. He agrees with Jong and Visala that reasons and evidence can help salvage religious belief, but notes that few ordinary people can point to good reasons to believe. We will respond to Davis' EDA by building a Milvian Bridge for theistic and core Christian beliefs in the context of cultural evolution. 2. The EDA of Griffiths and Wilkins Griffiths and Wilkins (2013) have presented a much-discussed argument that seeks to undermine moral and religious beliefs while vindicating commonsense and scientific beliefs. They begin by explaining the logic of evolutionary skepticism. Evolutionary science shows that our cognitive systems are products of natural selection. Since natural selection only cares about survival and reproduction, not truth, this raises the question of whether we can ever achieve knowledge. Moreover, research on cognitive heuristics and biases suggests that in some cases evolution has favored error-prone cognitive systems instead of truth sensitive ones (McKay & Dennett 2009). Given that beliefs are products of evolved cognitive systems, they argue, all beliefs are guilty until proven innocent. They stand in need of vindication against evolutionary skepticism. Griffiths and Wilkins move on to offer an evolutionary vindication of commonsense beliefs. Since cognitive mechanisms are clearly adaptations, "it is hard to see what the basic evolutionary function of cognition could be other than tracking truth" (Griffiths & Wilkins 2013: 137). Some measure of truth sensitivity is necessary for reproduction and survival. While natural selection may not care about truth as such, it cares about truth to the extent it contributes to reproductive success. For instance, truthlike commonsense beliefs about ourselves and middlesized objects in our environment serve this goal better than false beliefs. However, even here the mind operates under constraints. Brains require a large amount of energy. Evolution has favored
The Origins of Religion: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Religious Studies, 2017
For several centuries, natural explanations of religion have provided tools for the "cultured des... more For several centuries, natural explanations of religion have provided tools for the "cultured despisers" of religion. 1 One of the first theories was offered by Xenophanes (c. 570 -c. 740 BC), who took gods as anthropomorphic fabrications of the human mind. The 17th and 18th centuries saw the rise of causal-historical accounts explaining the emergence of primitive religious beliefs and practices. Often, these accounts were motivated by the desire to expose the irrational roots of religion. 2
Jumalan ennaltatietämyksen ja ihmisen vapaan tahdon välinen ongelma on kenties yhtä vanha kuin us... more Jumalan ennaltatietämyksen ja ihmisen vapaan tahdon välinen ongelma on kenties yhtä vanha kuin uskonnonfilosofia itse. Tässä tarkastelen ongelmaa kahdesta näkökulmasta. Aiheen modernin keskustelun ytimessä on ensinnäkin kiista vapaan tahdon oikeasta määrittelystä, ja aloitan vertailemalla näitä. Toiseksi käsittelen pahuuden ongelmaa, joka näyttää olevan monille filosofeille jopa tärkein yksittäinen syy pitäytyä libertarianistiseen käsitykseen vapaasta tahdosta.
Mikä tekee ihmisestä ihmisen ja Jumalan kuvan? Mikä erottaa ihmisen muusta eläinkunnasta? Mitä "o... more Mikä tekee ihmisestä ihmisen ja Jumalan kuvan? Mikä erottaa ihmisen muusta eläinkunnasta? Mitä "osia" ihmisessä on? Länsimaisen teologian historiassa suosituin käsitys ihmisen konstituutiosta on ollut dualismi (immateriaalinen sielu ja materiaalinen ruumis). Myös ihmisen kolmijako eli trikotomismi (henkisielu-ruumis) on myös saanut jossain määrin kannatusta. Viime vuosien filosofinen teologia on tuonut kuvaan lisää erilaisia käsityksiä ihmisestä. Keskustelu ei koske pelkästään sitä, mistä substansseista tai osasista ihminen koostuu, vaan myös sitä, mitä tarkoitetaan "ruumiilla", "mielellä", "sielulla" ja "persoonalla" ja missä suhteessa nämä ovat toisiinsa. Voiko esimerkiksi mieli, sielu tai persoona olla olemassa ilman ruumista tai aivoja?
Religious pluralism is not a new challenge for Christians. But it seems that factors such as grow... more Religious pluralism is not a new challenge for Christians. But it seems that factors such as growth of globalization and the development of information techonology (internet) have, perhaps, brought these questions to the fore. But why is religious pluralism a challenge? Let's ask Philip , who consider religious pluralism as one of the five largest "causes for doubt" for Christians today. They put it thus:
Papers by Lari Launonen
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2023
Against claims that cognitive science of religion undercuts belief in God, many defenders of thei... more Against claims that cognitive science of religion undercuts belief in God, many defenders of theistic belief have invoked the Religious Reasons Reply: science cannot undercut belief in God if one has good independent reasons to believe. However, it is unclear whether this response helps salvage the god beliefs of most people. This paper considers four questions: (1) What reasons do Christians have for believing in God? (2) What kinds of beliefs about God can the reasons support? (3) Are the reasons rationalizations? (4) Can cognitive science undercut the reasons? Many Christians invoke everyday religious experiences (EREs)-such as experiences of divine presence, guidance, and communication-as reasons to believe. Unlike another popular reason to believe in God (the appearance of design and beauty in nature), EREs can support beliefs about a relational God who is present to me, who guides my life, and who speaks to me. EREs are not rationalizations since they seem to cause and sustain such beliefs. Nonetheless, EREs like experiences of hearing God speak are problematic reasons to believe. 'Soft' voice-hearing experiences are easily undercut. 'Hard' experiences of an external, audible voice are probably underpinned by similar cognitive processes as audio-verbal hallucinations.
Teologinen aikakauskirja, 2022
Philosophia Reformata, 2022
Cognitive science of religion has inspired several debunking arguments against theistic belief. H... more Cognitive science of religion has inspired several debunking arguments against theistic belief. Hans Van Eyghen's book Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion is the first monograph devoted to answering such arguments. This article focuses on Van Eyghen's responses to two widely discussed debunking arguments, one by Matthew Braddock and another by John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths. Both responses have potential but also face problems. Even if Van Eyghen manages to show that these authors have not fully excluded the possibility of noninferential theistic belief being underpinned by reliable belief-forming processes, he fails to offer convincing reasons to think the processes are in fact reliable. A positive argument for their reliability might ultimately have to be based on evidence for God's existence, namely, theistic arguments. The question of the rationality of religious belief (de jure) thus cannot be isolated from the question of God's existence (de facto).
Theology and Science, 2022
The traditional view of hell as eternal conscious torment is challenged by proponents of universa... more The traditional view of hell as eternal conscious torment is challenged by proponents of universalism and conditional immortality. However, they need to explain why the church has been misled in adopting the traditional view. This paper draws from cognitive and evolutionary science of religion to provide an "error theory" of why eternal hell became the dominant view. Early Christianity grew rapidly despite persecution and marginalization. The fear of hell probably helped Christian communities to maintain cooperation by weeding out free riding even in times of crisis. Here the traditional view proved to be more effective than its competitors.
Religions, 2021
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, ... more The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends
partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural
Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports t... more Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to such a faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion faces two theological problems. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to moral evil. But if God hates idolatry and evil, why would he guide cognitive evolution toward such outcomes? A typical response points to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, must also assume that God is restoring the minds and hearts of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place.
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 2021
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has inspired a number of debunking arguments against god-beli... more Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has inspired a number of debunking arguments against god-belief. They aim to show that the belief-forming processes that underlie belief in god(s) are unreliable. The debate surrounding these arguments gives the impression that CSR offers new scientific evidence that threatens the rationality of religious belief. This impression, however, is partly misleading. A close look at a few widely discussed debunking arguments shows, first, that CSR theories as such are far from providing sufficient empirical evidence that the belief-forming processes behind god-belief are unreliable. Thus, appealing solely to CSR theories makes a debunking argument weak. Second, there are strong arguments that also invoke CSR, but these gain their strength primarily from more familiar claims about evolutionary epistemology and religious diversity. What CSR actually does in these arguments is providing an explanation of why people might believe in gods even if gods did not exist. But explaining is not debunking. Toward the end of his book The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce has a chapter on the evolutionary debunking of morality. He looks at arguments claiming that while our moral beliefs and behavior have evolutionary roots, moral intuitions may nevertheless be grounded on moral facts. Joyce is skeptical regarding the existence of such facts. Even if moral facts existed, he argues, it is unlikely they would somehow influence the development of our moral intuitions. Hence, moral nihilism rears its ugly head. Now, the reader might be led to think that this conclusion is based on the previous parts of the book. However, Joyce points out that his account of the evolution of morality has no role in his debunking argument against moral realism: "[R]eferences […] to the genealogy of the human moral Lari Launonen is a graduate student in Philosophy of Religion at
Teologinen aikakauskirja, 2017
The Origins of Religion: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Religious Studies , 2017
Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 2018
“Religion is natural” has become a common thesis in Cognitive Science
of Religion (CSR). The clai... more “Religion is natural” has become a common thesis in Cognitive Science
of Religion (CSR). The claim, however, is often ambiguous. This paper seeks to clarify and evaluate the naturalness of religion thesis that flows from CSR theories pointing to the optimal compatibility between recurrent religious concepts and the ordinary operations of the human mind. For the naturalness thesis to be scientifically valid, some criteria for naturalness are needed. Robert McCauley has suggested four typical marks for natural cognitive systems, but his account suffers from the inability to point to any causal operations in human development responsible for the naturalness of religion. Even if naturalness is a problematic concept, the science behind it may nevertheless carry interesting implications. First, since Christian theologians have traditionally viewed man as naturally religious, CSR offers new material for theological considerations. Second, it may also help us make predictions about the future of religion. Third, it has been argued that the naturalness thesis offers support for freedom of religion.
Tutkielmassa analysoidaan kognitiivisen uskontotieteen (KU) ympärillä vuosina 2009–2014 käytya... more Tutkielmassa analysoidaan kognitiivisen uskontotieteen (KU) ympärillä vuosina 2009–2014 käytyä uskonnonfilosofista keskustelua jumalauskon tiedollisesta oikeutuksesta. KU on 1990-luvun alussa kehittynyt poikkitieteellinen tutkimussuuntaus, joka selittää uskonnollisia uskomuksia ja uskonnollista käyttäytymistä ihmismielen luonnollisilla kognitiivisilla mekanismeilla. Osa teorioista selittää taipumusta uskoa Jumalaan/jumaliin.
KU:n pohjalta on kritisoitu jumalauskon rationaalisuutta. Episteeminen kumoaja-argumentti esittää, että jumalausko ei ole tiedollisesti oikeutettua, sillä se on seurausta kognitiivisesta prosessista, joka ei jäljitä totuutta eli tähtää tuottamaan tietoa jumalista. Kristillisen jumalauskon rationaalisuutta on kuitenkin puolustettu eri tietoteoreettisista näkökulmista. Reliabilistinen strategia pyrkii puolustamaan jumalauskoa synnyttävien kognitiivisten prosessien luotettavuutta. Evidenssistrategian mukaan jumalauskon oikeutus ei riipu syntyprosessista, vaan siitä, onko uskovalla hyviä syitä eli perusteita uskoa Jumalaan.
Tarkastelen keskustelua systemaattisen analyysin avulla. Varsinainen tutkimuskysymys on seuraava: (1) Millaisia seurauksia kognitiivisen uskontotieteen teorioilla on jumalauskon tiedolliselle oikeutukselle? Tämä pääkysymys jakautuu kahteen osaan: (2) Millaisia jumalauskon tiedollisen oikeutuksen kyseenalaistavia argumentteja KU:n teorioista on johdettu, ja kuinka pätevinä näitä argumentteja voidaan pitää? (3) Millä tavoilla jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta on puolustettu sen rationaalisuuden kyseenalaistavia argumentteja vastaan ja kuinka pätevinä puolustavia argumentteja voidaan pitää?
Analyysistä käy ilmi, että jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta kritisoivat argumentit ovat puutteellisia. Toisaalta myös teismin rationaalisuutta puolustavilla argumenteilla on vahvuuksia ja heikkouksia. Esimerkiksi evidenssistrategia on puolustuksena tehokas, mutta vaatii uskovalta ihmiseltä kykyä esittää perusteita omalle uskolleen, kun taas reliabilistinen strategia ei tätä vaadi. KU voi myös tehdä kyseenalaista osasta evidenssiä, jolla ihmiset usein perustelevat uskoaan Jumalaan. Reliabilistisen strategian edustajista osa pyrkii yhdistämään KU:n teoriat jumalauskon kehittymisestä reformoidun epistemologian ideaan “jumala-aistista” (sensus divinitatis). Yhdistäminen tarjoaa empiiristä tukea tälle teologiselle idealle, mutta herättää myös teologisia ongelmia.
Book Reviews by Lari Launonen
Religion, Brain & Behavior, 2019
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Drafts by Lari Launonen
Papers by Lari Launonen
partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural
Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
of Religion (CSR). The claim, however, is often ambiguous. This paper seeks to clarify and evaluate the naturalness of religion thesis that flows from CSR theories pointing to the optimal compatibility between recurrent religious concepts and the ordinary operations of the human mind. For the naturalness thesis to be scientifically valid, some criteria for naturalness are needed. Robert McCauley has suggested four typical marks for natural cognitive systems, but his account suffers from the inability to point to any causal operations in human development responsible for the naturalness of religion. Even if naturalness is a problematic concept, the science behind it may nevertheless carry interesting implications. First, since Christian theologians have traditionally viewed man as naturally religious, CSR offers new material for theological considerations. Second, it may also help us make predictions about the future of religion. Third, it has been argued that the naturalness thesis offers support for freedom of religion.
KU:n pohjalta on kritisoitu jumalauskon rationaalisuutta. Episteeminen kumoaja-argumentti esittää, että jumalausko ei ole tiedollisesti oikeutettua, sillä se on seurausta kognitiivisesta prosessista, joka ei jäljitä totuutta eli tähtää tuottamaan tietoa jumalista. Kristillisen jumalauskon rationaalisuutta on kuitenkin puolustettu eri tietoteoreettisista näkökulmista. Reliabilistinen strategia pyrkii puolustamaan jumalauskoa synnyttävien kognitiivisten prosessien luotettavuutta. Evidenssistrategian mukaan jumalauskon oikeutus ei riipu syntyprosessista, vaan siitä, onko uskovalla hyviä syitä eli perusteita uskoa Jumalaan.
Tarkastelen keskustelua systemaattisen analyysin avulla. Varsinainen tutkimuskysymys on seuraava: (1) Millaisia seurauksia kognitiivisen uskontotieteen teorioilla on jumalauskon tiedolliselle oikeutukselle? Tämä pääkysymys jakautuu kahteen osaan: (2) Millaisia jumalauskon tiedollisen oikeutuksen kyseenalaistavia argumentteja KU:n teorioista on johdettu, ja kuinka pätevinä näitä argumentteja voidaan pitää? (3) Millä tavoilla jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta on puolustettu sen rationaalisuuden kyseenalaistavia argumentteja vastaan ja kuinka pätevinä puolustavia argumentteja voidaan pitää?
Analyysistä käy ilmi, että jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta kritisoivat argumentit ovat puutteellisia. Toisaalta myös teismin rationaalisuutta puolustavilla argumenteilla on vahvuuksia ja heikkouksia. Esimerkiksi evidenssistrategia on puolustuksena tehokas, mutta vaatii uskovalta ihmiseltä kykyä esittää perusteita omalle uskolleen, kun taas reliabilistinen strategia ei tätä vaadi. KU voi myös tehdä kyseenalaista osasta evidenssiä, jolla ihmiset usein perustelevat uskoaan Jumalaan. Reliabilistisen strategian edustajista osa pyrkii yhdistämään KU:n teoriat jumalauskon kehittymisestä reformoidun epistemologian ideaan “jumala-aistista” (sensus divinitatis). Yhdistäminen tarjoaa empiiristä tukea tälle teologiselle idealle, mutta herättää myös teologisia ongelmia.
Book Reviews by Lari Launonen
partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural
Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
of Religion (CSR). The claim, however, is often ambiguous. This paper seeks to clarify and evaluate the naturalness of religion thesis that flows from CSR theories pointing to the optimal compatibility between recurrent religious concepts and the ordinary operations of the human mind. For the naturalness thesis to be scientifically valid, some criteria for naturalness are needed. Robert McCauley has suggested four typical marks for natural cognitive systems, but his account suffers from the inability to point to any causal operations in human development responsible for the naturalness of religion. Even if naturalness is a problematic concept, the science behind it may nevertheless carry interesting implications. First, since Christian theologians have traditionally viewed man as naturally religious, CSR offers new material for theological considerations. Second, it may also help us make predictions about the future of religion. Third, it has been argued that the naturalness thesis offers support for freedom of religion.
KU:n pohjalta on kritisoitu jumalauskon rationaalisuutta. Episteeminen kumoaja-argumentti esittää, että jumalausko ei ole tiedollisesti oikeutettua, sillä se on seurausta kognitiivisesta prosessista, joka ei jäljitä totuutta eli tähtää tuottamaan tietoa jumalista. Kristillisen jumalauskon rationaalisuutta on kuitenkin puolustettu eri tietoteoreettisista näkökulmista. Reliabilistinen strategia pyrkii puolustamaan jumalauskoa synnyttävien kognitiivisten prosessien luotettavuutta. Evidenssistrategian mukaan jumalauskon oikeutus ei riipu syntyprosessista, vaan siitä, onko uskovalla hyviä syitä eli perusteita uskoa Jumalaan.
Tarkastelen keskustelua systemaattisen analyysin avulla. Varsinainen tutkimuskysymys on seuraava: (1) Millaisia seurauksia kognitiivisen uskontotieteen teorioilla on jumalauskon tiedolliselle oikeutukselle? Tämä pääkysymys jakautuu kahteen osaan: (2) Millaisia jumalauskon tiedollisen oikeutuksen kyseenalaistavia argumentteja KU:n teorioista on johdettu, ja kuinka pätevinä näitä argumentteja voidaan pitää? (3) Millä tavoilla jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta on puolustettu sen rationaalisuuden kyseenalaistavia argumentteja vastaan ja kuinka pätevinä puolustavia argumentteja voidaan pitää?
Analyysistä käy ilmi, että jumalauskon tiedollista oikeutusta kritisoivat argumentit ovat puutteellisia. Toisaalta myös teismin rationaalisuutta puolustavilla argumenteilla on vahvuuksia ja heikkouksia. Esimerkiksi evidenssistrategia on puolustuksena tehokas, mutta vaatii uskovalta ihmiseltä kykyä esittää perusteita omalle uskolleen, kun taas reliabilistinen strategia ei tätä vaadi. KU voi myös tehdä kyseenalaista osasta evidenssiä, jolla ihmiset usein perustelevat uskoaan Jumalaan. Reliabilistisen strategian edustajista osa pyrkii yhdistämään KU:n teoriat jumalauskon kehittymisestä reformoidun epistemologian ideaan “jumala-aistista” (sensus divinitatis). Yhdistäminen tarjoaa empiiristä tukea tälle teologiselle idealle, mutta herättää myös teologisia ongelmia.
The study consists of an introduction and four journal articles. Article I “The naturalness of religion: What it means and why it matters” analyzes one of the core claims in CSR, namely that religion is natural. After differentiating cognitive naturalness from other kinds of naturalness and considering the evidence on which the claim is based, I argue that naturalness is a comparative concept. That is, folk religious concepts are more natural than, for instance, certain scientific theories (such as quantum mechanics) or theological concepts (such as the Trinity). The article also discusses the four marks of naturalness offered by philosopher Robert McCauley. Despite criticism that the naturalness thesis runs into similar conceptual problems as the concept of innateness, it can nevertheless serve as a popular shorthand for some of the basic assumptions of the byproduct model in CSR. A few theological and philosophical implications of the naturalness of religion are also mentioned.
Article II “Debunking arguments gain little from cognitive science of religion” discusses four debunking arguments by philosophers Robert Nola, Matthew Braddock, John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths, and Taylor Davis. These arguments claim that CSR shows god belief to be epistemically unjustified, at least when the believer has no independent evidence for god(s). The paper begins by clarifying the nature of debunking arguments as undercutting defeaters. Such arguments typically aim to show that the belief-forming process underpinning god beliefs is unreliable. The paper makes two main observations. First, debunking arguments in which the unreliability claim hangs on a specific CSR theory (such as the HADD theory) are usually weak. Second, strong debunking arguments are often largely independent of CSR theories. Any viable naturalistic explanation of religion would seem to serve the arguments almost as well. Therefore, I conclude that CSR may not present such a novel threat to the rationality of religious belief as is often suggested.
Article III “Cognitive regeneration and the noetic effects of sin: Why theology and cognitive science may not be compatible” considers the compatibility of CSR with the theological idea of God as the ultimate cause of theistic belief. Psychologist Justin Barrett and philosopher Kelly James Clark have suggested that God may have guided human cognitive evolution in order to give rise to minds prone to believe in supernatural agency. It has been previously argued that this suggestion faces two theological problems. First, false and idolatrous god beliefs seem more natural than theistic belief. Second, humans have a tribalism bias that seems to be a root cause of much moral evil but is also cognitively natural. The idea that God would guide the evolution of natural cognition is thus theologically problematic: why would a good God who wants people to know him personally give rise to the idolatry bias and the tribalism bias? A natural theological response to these worries would refer to the noetic effects of sin – a theological notion that philosopher Alvin Plantinga invokes in his religious epistemology. This article focuses on problems with this response. A theologically consistent application of the notion, it is argued, would also indicate the existence of a process that Plantinga calls cognitive regeneration. All true believers are said to undergo this process. While we should also expect to find empirical evidence of it, evidence against cognitive regeneration seems easier to find than evidence for it. The fact that even Christian believers entertain anthropomorphic intuitions of God might suggest that their minds do not undergo a cognitive regeneration. More importantly, sociological data on religious prejudice serves as evidence against the affective aspect of cognitive regeneration. Because of these problems, invoking the noetic effects of sin may not be a viable response to the problems of the naturalness of idolatry and tribalism.
Article IV “Hell and the cultural evolution of Christianity” considers how the cognitive and evolutionary study of religion can further the theological debate on the doctrine of hell. The traditional view of hell as eternal conscious torment has been increasingly challenged by the proponents of universalism (according to which everyone will eventually be saved) and conditional immortality (according to which the unsaved will be annihilated). This article draws from the cultural evolutionary account of prosocial religions (the Big Gods account), the mind-body dualism theory, the emotional selection theory, as well as from sociology and biblical studies in offering an “error theory” regarding the success of the traditional view. This error theory can help explain why the view of hell as eternal conscious torment became the dominant paradigm in Western Christianity even if, as conditionalists and universalists argue, it was not the only view of the final fate of the unsaved among early Christian theologians nor necessarily the one best supported by scripture and reason. The traditional view, it is argued, could have enjoyed a cultural and cognitive advantage over the “softer” views of afterlife punishment.