Papers by Jeffrey McDonough
Powers, 2021
This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern s... more This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is th... more Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that is, does teleology necessarily involve a subject’s cognizing some end, goal, or purpose? What is the scope of teleology—is the concept of teleology, for example, applicable to elements and animals, or only to rational beings? Finally, is teleology explanatory? When we say that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn, have we explained why they swim upstream? When we say that eyes are for seeing, ...
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2015
in a stimulating recent paper, "violations of the principle of Sufficient Reason (in leibniz and ... more in a stimulating recent paper, "violations of the principle of Sufficient Reason (in leibniz and Spinoza)," Michael Della Rocca argues that rationalists face a daunting dilemma: either abandon the principle of Sufficient Reason or embrace a radical, parmenidian-style monism. The present paper argues that neither historical nor contemporary rationalists need be afraid of Della Rocca's dilemma. The second section reconstructs Della Rocca's argument in five steps. The third section argues that leibniz's treatment of relations undermines one of those steps in particular and thus provides him-as well as contemporary rationalists-with a way out. The fourth section argues that a similar way out is available to Spinoza, and that it's a better way out than either of the two options Della Rocca offers on Spinoza's behalf. The essay concludes with an historically-minded suggestion for those eager to revitalize the once-again popular notion of grounding.
Leibniz Society Review, 2007
In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep thr... more In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz's views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz's views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their systematic compatibility with Leibniz's theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the principle are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz's views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009
This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz's defense of teleology within the order of... more This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz's defense of teleology within the order of nature. The first section explores Leibniz's contributions to the study of geometrical optics, and argues that his introduction of the "Most Determined Path Principle" or "MDPP" allows him to bring to the fore philosophical issues concerning the legitimacy of teleological explanations by addressing two technical objections raised by Cartesians to non-mechanistic derivations of the laws of optics. The second section argues that, by drawing on laws such as the MDPP, Leibniz is able to introduce a thin notion of teleology that gives him the resources to respond to the most pressing charges of his day against teleological explanations within natural philosophy. Finally, the third section argues that contemporary philosophers have been overly hasty in their dismissal of Leibniz's account of natural teleology, and indeed that their own generally thin conceptions of teleology have left them with few well-motivated resources for resisting his elegant position. 2 I use the following abbreviations for Leibniz's and Descartes's standard texts (full references are provided in the bibliography): A=German Academy of Sciences (ed.
Philosophical Review, 2010
Leibniz famously maintains that God has created the best of all possible worlds. Not surprisingly... more Leibniz famously maintains that God has created the best of all possible worlds. Not surprisingly, it is often objected that other possible worlds seem better and so that a benevolent, all-powerful God should have created a different world instead. But there is in some ways a more fundamental difficulty facing Leibniz's modal ontology: even granting that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that God has done something good in creating it, why doesn't God instantiate other possible worlds as well. Why, that is, doesn't he create not only the best of all possible worlds, but also the second best, the third best, etc.? 1 After all, Leibniz maintains that existence itself is good, and seems committed to the view that no substance per se entails the existence or non-existence of any other substance. It appears to follow that a wholly good and omnipotent God should want-and be able-to create together every possible substance, and in doing so every possible world. But that, it seems, would leave no unrealized possibilities, and thus no alternatives to what God actually creates. In this way, as in so many others, Leibniz's commitments appear to push him towards a Spinozistic necessitarianism that he was anxious to avoid. 2 In response to this particular version of the threat of Spinozism, Leibniz suggests that not all possible substances are compossible-that they can't all be created togetherand thus that not all possible worlds are compossible-that they can't all be created together.
Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 2011
Philosophy East and West, 2019
Philosophical Review, 2016
British Journal For the History of Philosophy, 2002
... that, 84 JEFFREY K. MCDONOUGH ... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions su... more ... that, 84 JEFFREY K. MCDONOUGH ... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an in nite variety of postures and situ-ations. There ...
Synthese, Aug 31, 2003
The following paper attempts to explore, criticize and develop Thomas Kuhn's most mature -and sur... more The following paper attempts to explore, criticize and develop Thomas Kuhn's most mature -and surprisingly neglected -view of incommensurability. More specifically, it focuses on (1) undermining an influential picture of scientific kinds that lies at the heart of Kuhn's understanding of taxonomic incommensurability; (2) sketching an alternative picture of scientific kinds that takes advantage of Kuhn's partially developed theory of disciplinary matrices; and (3) using these two results to motivate revisions to Kuhn's theory of taxonomic incompatibility, as well as, to the purported bridge between taxonomic incompatibility and some of the traditional problems associated with incommensurability.
The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon, 2000
The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon, 2000
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014
Although often overlooked today, optics thrived in the early modern era as a science of first ran... more Although often overlooked today, optics thrived in the early modern era as a science of first rank, engaging many of the best minds of the period and producing some of its most dramatic scientific results. This essay attempts to shed light on Leibniz’s efforts to contribute to the development of early modern optics by focusing on his derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction. The first three sections examine his attempts to derive the central laws of geometrical optics in works drawn from his early, middle, and later optical studies. The fourth section briefly sketches his efforts to extend the sophisticated techniques found in his optical writings to related problems in natural philosophy. Connections to more familiar themes from Leibniz’s philosophy are drawn along the way.
Teaching Philosophy, 2000
In facing their writing assignments, students in my introductory philosophy courses confront two ... more In facing their writing assignments, students in my introductory philosophy courses confront two primary obstacles. First, they often don't have a feel for what sort of paper they are expected to write. They easily mistake an extended expression of opinion, or a replaying of assigned texts, for a philosophical essay. Second, although their abilities vary widely, most of them are not (yet) good writers. They have difficulties in both structuring and conveying their thoughts in written form.
Perspectives on Science, 2010
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Papers by Jeffrey McDonough