Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more li... more Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before (n = 362) and after (n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners' outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis (r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of... more Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation-based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation-based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechani... more Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation. Cooperation is essential for groups, organizations, and societies to achieve and maintain public goods that benefit all group members. However, cooperation to provide public goods usually requires people to overcome the temptation to free ride and take advantage of others' cooperation. Why do people cooperate despite this temptation to prioritize their own interests? Previous theory suggests that reputation (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups 1–3. Yet, little is known about the relative difference between gossip and punishment to promote cooperation and what happens to cooperation rates after these mechanisms are removed in future interactions 4. We extend previous research by directly comparing gossip and punishment in their relative ability to (1) promote cooperation, (2) enhance individual welfare, and (3) maintain cooperation in future interactions with no such mechanisms. One of the most widely studied solutions to cooperation problems involves opportunities to punish others' (selfish) behavior 1,2. Punishment decreases the incentive to free ride and makes cooperation relatively more beneficial for individuals. Indeed, punishment reduces the conflict between personal and collective interests in providing the public good, and thus increases cooperation 1,2. Yet, punishment is costly for individuals and groups, and is not always a feasible solution to promote cooperation 5. Moreover, although people do punish free riders during controlled experiments when given the chance 2,6 , peer punishment can be uncommon in real-life situations in both small-scale and large-scale societies 7,8. Thus, there is a need to generate other effective solutions to promote cooperation in groups. Importantly, people are prone to gossip about norm violators and free riders, and this gossip facilitates reputation spreading in large groups and social networks 9,10. Gossip is the exchange of positive or negative social information about absent others 10–13. Thus, gossip can influence others' reputation and enable people to select trustworthy partners and avoid cheaters, especially in large groups where directly observing all social interactions is not possible. Both simulation models and empirical studies suggest that reputation monitoring and exchange via gossip serves as a low-cost and efficient mechanism to promote cooperation 11–14. Reputation facilitates cooperation through a system of indirect reciprocity, where people with a cooperative reputation have greater chance to receive future indirect benefits from third parties 3. Indeed, reputation and indirect reciprocity can promote
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechani... more Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.
We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperatio... more We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperation, especially in situations that can result in greater indirect benefits from others. Drawing on evolutionary theory, we derive novel hypotheses about how two reliably recurring properties of human social networks – they are “small” and contain fewer well-connected people – provide insight about when people may maximize indirect benefits of generosity. Across three studies, we find support for the hypothesis that people increase their generosity when the recipient (or an observer) is connected and can gossip to at least one or many others whom they might interact with in the future. Moreover, reputational concern, rather than expected indirect benefits from one's future partners, primarily mediated this observed gossip-based generosity, and the mediation effect of reputational concern was statistically more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials. We discuss the importance of these findings in the context of evolutionary perspectives on human cooperation, along with some novel insights about how properties of social networks influence social behavior.
We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperatio... more We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperation, especially in situations that can result in greater indirect benefits from others. Drawing on evolutionary theory, we derive novel hypotheses about how two reliably recurring properties of human social networks – they are “small” and contain fewer well-connected people – provide insight about when people may maximize indirect benefits of generosity. Across three studies, we find support for the hypothesis that people increase their generosity when the recipient (or an observer) is connected and can gossip to at least one or many others whom they might interact with in the future. Moreover, reputational concern, rather than expected indirect benefits from one's future partners, primarily mediated this observed gossip-based generosity, and the mediation effect of reputational concern was statistically more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials. We discuss the importance of these findings in the context of evolutionary perspectives on human cooperation, along with some novel insights about how properties of social networks influence social behavior.
Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-grou... more Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-group members, compared to out-group members, there is inconsistent evidence in support of this perspective. Applying meta-analytic techniques, we harness a relatively recent explosion of research on intergroup discrimination in cooperative decision making to address several fundamental unresolved issues. First, summarizing evidence across studies, we find a small to medium effect size indicating that people are more cooperative with in-group, compared to out-group, members (d = 0.32). Second, we forward and test predictions about the conditions that moderate in-group favoritism from two influential perspectives – a social identity approach and a bounded generalized reciprocity perspective. Although we find evidence for a slight tendency for in-group favoritism through categorization with no mutual interdependence between group members (e.g., dictator games, d = 0.19), situations that contain interdependence result in stronger in-group favoritism (e.g., social dilemmas, d = 0.42). We also find that in-group favoritism is stronger when there is common (versus unilateral) knowledge of group membership, and stronger during simultaneous (versus sequential) exchanges. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that intergroup discrimination in cooperation is the result of in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation. Finally, we test for additional moderators of in-group favoritism, such as the percentage of men in the sample, experimental versus natural groups, and the country of participants. We discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical perspectives on in-group favoritism, address implications for the methodologies used to study this phenomenon, and suggest directions for future research.
Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes... more Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes that gossip promotes cooperation when one anticipates future interdependence with the gossip recipient (Hypothesis 1), that this effect is more pronounced for proself, compared to prosocial, individuals (Hypothesis 2), and explores the mediating role of reputational concern and expected indirect benefits in the relation between gossip and cooperation. Results from three studies supported these hypotheses, showing that people are more generous in response to gossip to their future interaction partner(s), compared with gossip to other(s) they would never meet or no gossip. Moreover, proselfs, compared with prosocials, showed a larger increase in generosity when they anticipated future interactions with the gossip recipient(s). The observed gossip-based gen- erosity was primarily mediated by reputational concern rather than expected indirect benefits from future partners, and the mediation of reputational concern was more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials.
Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more li... more Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before (n = 362) and after (n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners' outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis (r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of... more Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation-based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation-based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechani... more Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation. Cooperation is essential for groups, organizations, and societies to achieve and maintain public goods that benefit all group members. However, cooperation to provide public goods usually requires people to overcome the temptation to free ride and take advantage of others' cooperation. Why do people cooperate despite this temptation to prioritize their own interests? Previous theory suggests that reputation (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups 1–3. Yet, little is known about the relative difference between gossip and punishment to promote cooperation and what happens to cooperation rates after these mechanisms are removed in future interactions 4. We extend previous research by directly comparing gossip and punishment in their relative ability to (1) promote cooperation, (2) enhance individual welfare, and (3) maintain cooperation in future interactions with no such mechanisms. One of the most widely studied solutions to cooperation problems involves opportunities to punish others' (selfish) behavior 1,2. Punishment decreases the incentive to free ride and makes cooperation relatively more beneficial for individuals. Indeed, punishment reduces the conflict between personal and collective interests in providing the public good, and thus increases cooperation 1,2. Yet, punishment is costly for individuals and groups, and is not always a feasible solution to promote cooperation 5. Moreover, although people do punish free riders during controlled experiments when given the chance 2,6 , peer punishment can be uncommon in real-life situations in both small-scale and large-scale societies 7,8. Thus, there is a need to generate other effective solutions to promote cooperation in groups. Importantly, people are prone to gossip about norm violators and free riders, and this gossip facilitates reputation spreading in large groups and social networks 9,10. Gossip is the exchange of positive or negative social information about absent others 10–13. Thus, gossip can influence others' reputation and enable people to select trustworthy partners and avoid cheaters, especially in large groups where directly observing all social interactions is not possible. Both simulation models and empirical studies suggest that reputation monitoring and exchange via gossip serves as a low-cost and efficient mechanism to promote cooperation 11–14. Reputation facilitates cooperation through a system of indirect reciprocity, where people with a cooperative reputation have greater chance to receive future indirect benefits from third parties 3. Indeed, reputation and indirect reciprocity can promote
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechani... more Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.
We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperatio... more We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperation, especially in situations that can result in greater indirect benefits from others. Drawing on evolutionary theory, we derive novel hypotheses about how two reliably recurring properties of human social networks – they are “small” and contain fewer well-connected people – provide insight about when people may maximize indirect benefits of generosity. Across three studies, we find support for the hypothesis that people increase their generosity when the recipient (or an observer) is connected and can gossip to at least one or many others whom they might interact with in the future. Moreover, reputational concern, rather than expected indirect benefits from one's future partners, primarily mediated this observed gossip-based generosity, and the mediation effect of reputational concern was statistically more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials. We discuss the importance of these findings in the context of evolutionary perspectives on human cooperation, along with some novel insights about how properties of social networks influence social behavior.
We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperatio... more We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperation, especially in situations that can result in greater indirect benefits from others. Drawing on evolutionary theory, we derive novel hypotheses about how two reliably recurring properties of human social networks – they are “small” and contain fewer well-connected people – provide insight about when people may maximize indirect benefits of generosity. Across three studies, we find support for the hypothesis that people increase their generosity when the recipient (or an observer) is connected and can gossip to at least one or many others whom they might interact with in the future. Moreover, reputational concern, rather than expected indirect benefits from one's future partners, primarily mediated this observed gossip-based generosity, and the mediation effect of reputational concern was statistically more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials. We discuss the importance of these findings in the context of evolutionary perspectives on human cooperation, along with some novel insights about how properties of social networks influence social behavior.
Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-grou... more Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-group members, compared to out-group members, there is inconsistent evidence in support of this perspective. Applying meta-analytic techniques, we harness a relatively recent explosion of research on intergroup discrimination in cooperative decision making to address several fundamental unresolved issues. First, summarizing evidence across studies, we find a small to medium effect size indicating that people are more cooperative with in-group, compared to out-group, members (d = 0.32). Second, we forward and test predictions about the conditions that moderate in-group favoritism from two influential perspectives – a social identity approach and a bounded generalized reciprocity perspective. Although we find evidence for a slight tendency for in-group favoritism through categorization with no mutual interdependence between group members (e.g., dictator games, d = 0.19), situations that contain interdependence result in stronger in-group favoritism (e.g., social dilemmas, d = 0.42). We also find that in-group favoritism is stronger when there is common (versus unilateral) knowledge of group membership, and stronger during simultaneous (versus sequential) exchanges. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that intergroup discrimination in cooperation is the result of in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation. Finally, we test for additional moderators of in-group favoritism, such as the percentage of men in the sample, experimental versus natural groups, and the country of participants. We discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical perspectives on in-group favoritism, address implications for the methodologies used to study this phenomenon, and suggest directions for future research.
Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes... more Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes that gossip promotes cooperation when one anticipates future interdependence with the gossip recipient (Hypothesis 1), that this effect is more pronounced for proself, compared to prosocial, individuals (Hypothesis 2), and explores the mediating role of reputational concern and expected indirect benefits in the relation between gossip and cooperation. Results from three studies supported these hypotheses, showing that people are more generous in response to gossip to their future interaction partner(s), compared with gossip to other(s) they would never meet or no gossip. Moreover, proselfs, compared with prosocials, showed a larger increase in generosity when they anticipated future interactions with the gossip recipient(s). The observed gossip-based gen- erosity was primarily mediated by reputational concern rather than expected indirect benefits from future partners, and the mediation of reputational concern was more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials.
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