Let's call this BIP 77

Hi @DanGould, the first comment on this PR seems to indicate that this proposal is still WIP. Is that an accurate understanding? If this PR is not yet ready to be merged, perhaps it should be changed to "Draft". If I misunderstood the status of this PR, please respond below so someone may review to assess whether this is ready for merge.

The main changes from the last review are that

• HTTP request methods (POST, GET, PUT) control the flow of the protocol rather than further path subdiretories
• bip21 parameters (pj subdirectory and ohttp key config) serialize as compressed public keys to shorten the URI
• Use PSBTv0 since PSBTv2 support is still very limited
• explicitly mention the format of the ohttp KeyConfiguration URL fragment

NACK

This BIP is bad for privacy

Can you provide the reasoning, please?

NACK

This BIP is bad for privacy

Can you provide the reasoning, please?

Risks with accepting donations using payjoin:

• Probing: Already mentioned in BIP 78
• Small donations: Best form of attack in which FBI donates some sats to support their work and know all the UTXOs in the wallet

Example: https://hrf.org/payjoin

Risks with accepting donations using payjoin:

• Probing: Already mentioned in BIP 78 but BIP 77 author too emotional to accept it
• Small donations: Best form of attack in which FBI donates some sats to support their work and know all the UTXOs in the wallet

@1440000bytes Your first point has already been addressed and he has added a link to the attack vectors section on BIP-78. No one is "not accepting" anything. Are you asking that the full explanation given on probing attacks in BIP-78 be redundantly added here? What exactly is your criticism?

Your second point has already been addressed in BIP-78, here is what the link that you suggested be added says:

While we cannot prevent this type of attack entirely, we implemented the following mitigations:

- When the receiver detects an original transaction being broadcast, or if the receiver detects that the original transaction has been double spent, then they will reuse the UTXO that was exposed for the next payjoin.
- While the exposed UTXO will be reused in priority to not leak other UTXOs, there is no strong guarantee about it. This prevents the attacker from detecting with certainty the next payjoin of the merchant to another peer.

BIP-78 already explains what can be done to mitigate this, and fully acknowledges this tradeoff.
Can you explain, in terms of probing attacks, how BIP-77 would be worse for privacy than the already accepted BIP-78?

The sender could first register an additional session subdirectory for the response, and include the associated public key along with the original PSBT when posting to the receiver's subdirectory. The sender would then respond in the sender's subdirectory.

Eliminating the request/response distinction would avoid a metadata leak, namely whether or not the payjoin flow was completed, since requests and responses would be indistinguishable.

A followup suggestion would be removing explicit session initialization. Incidentally in the reference directory it appears that since post_session is stateless, calling it before other operations is indeed not enforced. GET & POST handlers do appear to validate the id path component, but if they did then the first successful request would indicate to either party that the subdirectory ID is valid (or perhaps arbitrary IDs were allowed by design?)

Timing analysis of subdirectory polling could still leak information about which payjoin requests were responded to, but aggressive clients could mitigate this by maintaining a pool of pre-allocated and randomly polled subdirectories ahead of time, and by responding to themselves in some of them with dummy payloads to generate random cover traffic.

@nothingmuch I'll write up your suggestions to simplify the protocol. It makes the directory implementation simpler, requires fewer protocol message types, and even reduces bandwidth. wowza

The sender could first register an additional session subdirectory ... and include the associated public key along with the original PSBT

HPKE E2EE deployed in this application in Authenticated mode (akin to Noise Framework's IK model) already requires the sender to include their session public key as associated data, so this is an pretty darn easy change to make. The change not only simplifies the protocol messaging, but as you say eliminates a metadata leak. I'm a big fan.

A followup suggestion would be removing explicit session initialization

This makes sense too. Creating separate subdirectory resources for either sender or receiver on POST then GETting updates to replace the repeated sender POST polling reduces bandwidth too, since the GET request doesn't contain that repeat POST body.

Even without aggressive client mitigation of the remaining client leaks subject to timing analysis assuming this suggestion is put in place, your new design deletes complexity and improves efficiency.

I'll update the BIP to the best of my understanding based on your comment and link it to a rust-payjoin issue to implement. This spec has already made some breaking changes since the last directory release, so it's a good time for another one since we won't break production implementations other than our own.

Edit: Is there a potential authorization issue now that the sender POSTs first? In the current design of the protocol, only the receiver might need authorization from the directory in order to initialize a session subdirectory, and having knowledge of a session public key was sufficient for the sender to use an initialized subdirectory. Now, the sender would also need to obtain authorization somehow, since the directory doesn't yet know about the session the receiver has implicitly initiated by communicating directly with the sender, out of band from the directory. We'll have to work out how this might affect the expiration mechanic as well.