Papers by Esther Sahle
Legal centralization in British America was characterized by the passing of arbitration from the ... more Legal centralization in British America was characterized by the passing of arbitration from the community level to the colonial courts. As a consequence, when the 1765 Stamp Act raised the cost of court business, colonists were at a loss for alternatives. This paper addresses the question of why, at this point, colonists did not return to earlier, non-state forms of arbitration. It offers an explanation by providing a detailed empirical study of an alternative American legal forum: the Philadelphia Quaker monthly meeting. While busy arbitrating disputes in the early colonial period, it declined from around 1720. Contrary to what might be expected, this decline was not the consequence of state efforts to marginalize competing institutions. Rather, the local Quaker population abandoned their community legal forum in favor of the public courts. This was likely due to the Quaker court's reliance on reputation-based instruments for enforcement. As Philadelphia's population grew, the meeting's practice of pressuring culprits into compliance through public shaming lost its edge. Accordingly, Friends moved their legal business to the public courts. The paper contributes to the debates on the legal pluralism of empires, the history of arbitration, and state formation in the Atlantic. On the 28th day of the Third Month of 1760, Quaker merchant John Reynell approached his Philadelphia monthly meeting. Acting as an attorney for fellow Friend and merchant Elias Bland, he lodged a complaint against a third Quaker merchant: William Griffitts. Griffitts, Reynell reported, was "indebted to said Elias which he neglects paying or giving sufficient security for payment." The meeting dispatched a group of Friends to speak to Griffitts and "acquaint him [that] it is the judgement of this meeting, that he should exhibit an account of his affairs for the satisfaction of his creditors & Friends, & offer
Trade in the early modern Atlantic grew a great deal. While acknowledging that this growth had im... more Trade in the early modern Atlantic grew a great deal. While acknowledging that this growth had important economic, social and cultural consequences, scholars have yet to fully explain its causes. This paper argues that formal religious institutions were key. Based on records from colonial Philadelphia, it shows how the Quaker meeting created a legal forum to resolve commercial disputes. The meeting enforced its verdicts by gathering and disseminating information about disputes locally and across the Atlantic world through the Society of Friends' formal organisation of meetings. Thereby, it re-enforced reputation mechanisms, facilitating the expansion of Philadelphia's trade. In pre-modern societies, long-distance trade constituted a key motor for economic growth. The expansion of trade in the British Atlantic facilitated social mobility and the emergence of the middling sorts as an economic and political force in England. Some prominent scholars have argued that it laid the foundations for the Industrial Revolution, making it the root of present-day global inequality. 1 The factors determining trade expansion, however, remain unclear. Economic historians researching trade have been strongly influenced by the New Institutional Economists (NIE). 2 These argue that within Europe, the emergence of strong, centralised states who enforced property rights enabled trade. European states were however unable to extend their control to the American colonies. The growth of trade in the Atlantic despite weak state structures poses a puzzle yet to be solved. This article offers a solution to this puzzle. Based on the extensive records of colonial Philadelphia's Quaker Monthly Meeting, it shows that in the face of weak state institutions, formal religious institutions evolved to enforce property rights. Its argument is threefold. First, the Meeting established its own legal forum, where it solved commercial disputes through arbitration. Second, it did this in order to compensate for the unreliable public courts. Third, it ensured that litigants honoured its decisions by means of a formally reinforced reputation mechanism. The importance of reputation mechanisms in early modern trade is well established. The Quaker Monthly Meeting is distinct as it found a way to employ reputation mechanisms formally, thereby increasing their impact. It
The Economic History Review, 2015
During the late seventeenth century, when the Atlantic trade experienced unprecedented growth, Qu... more During the late seventeenth century, when the Atlantic trade experienced unprecedented growth, Quakers emerged as the region’s most prominent trading community. Economic Historians credit the group and its business ethics with shaping the economic environment of early modern England and, consequently, its long term economic growth. This paper, however, argues that Friends’ business ethics were identical to those of their non-Quaker contemporaries. Using a wide range of both Quaker and non-Quaker sources, including sermons and merchant advice literature, this paper constitutes the first in-depth study of Quaker and non-Quaker business ethics. Having refuted the claim that the community’s commercial achievements reflect a unique blend of honesty, reliability, and swift payment of debts, the paper suggests an alternative explanation for Friends’ business success.
During the late seventeenth century the Atlantic trade experienced unprecedented growth. The New
... more During the late seventeenth century the Atlantic trade experienced unprecedented growth. The New
Institutional Economists attribute this to the emergence of new institutions for property rights
enforcement. During this period, Quakers emerged as the region’s most prominent trading community.
This paper constitutes the first study of the London Quaker community. In contrast to the literature,
claiming that they enjoyed a competitive advantage due to their church’s formal institutions for
contract enforcement, this paper argues that Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement
emerged only after 1750. This constituted a response to contemporary concern about debt.
Based on a letter book of the London Baltic merchant Michael Mitford dating 1703-1707 this paper ... more Based on a letter book of the London Baltic merchant Michael Mitford dating 1703-1707 this paper argues that the ability of merchant networks to secure property rights in long distance trade must be re-evaluated. Contrary to the argument of the New Institutional Economists, these were not inferior to the nation state in facilitating the expansion of trade and thereby Smithean growth. It is shown that Mitford's network did not limit membership by non-economic criteria but adapted to the needs of trade. It efficiently solved the free-rider problem through a reputation mechanism. As social ties developed parallel to business ties, the shadow of the future was furthermore supported by the threat of ostracism from the community and helped maintain agents' honesty. Members shared a common set of values, including reciprocity, which played an important role in their conduct of business. The network's attempts at expansion were, however, of limited success. This is related to mercantilist policies and ongoing warfare in the region, not to the network's lacking ability. Furthermore it is shown that the network provided the members with contacts and business opportunities and thereby supported their business activities more than political institutions did. The expansion of the nation state actually hindered rather than supported the expansion of trade in the Northern Seas.
Conference Presentations by Esther Sahle
Come join our WEHC panel on the Institutional Foundations of Long-Distance Trade before Industria... more Come join our WEHC panel on the Institutional Foundations of Long-Distance Trade before Industrialisation!
We are also planning a follow-up workshop at the University of Bremen with more participants.
Books by Esther Sahle
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Papers by Esther Sahle
Institutional Economists attribute this to the emergence of new institutions for property rights
enforcement. During this period, Quakers emerged as the region’s most prominent trading community.
This paper constitutes the first study of the London Quaker community. In contrast to the literature,
claiming that they enjoyed a competitive advantage due to their church’s formal institutions for
contract enforcement, this paper argues that Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement
emerged only after 1750. This constituted a response to contemporary concern about debt.
Conference Presentations by Esther Sahle
We are also planning a follow-up workshop at the University of Bremen with more participants.
Books by Esther Sahle
Institutional Economists attribute this to the emergence of new institutions for property rights
enforcement. During this period, Quakers emerged as the region’s most prominent trading community.
This paper constitutes the first study of the London Quaker community. In contrast to the literature,
claiming that they enjoyed a competitive advantage due to their church’s formal institutions for
contract enforcement, this paper argues that Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement
emerged only after 1750. This constituted a response to contemporary concern about debt.
We are also planning a follow-up workshop at the University of Bremen with more participants.