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Cavalerie au temps de la Rome antique

en:Roman cavalry

Republican cavalry (338-88 BC)

As their name implies, the equites were liable to cavalry service in the Polybian legion. Equites originally provided a legion's entire cavalry contingent, although from an early stage, when equites numbers had become insufficient, large numbers of young men from the First Class of commoners were regularly volunteering for the service, which was considered more glamorous than the infantry. By the time of the Second Punic War, it is likely that all members of the First Class served in the cavalry, since Livy states that members of Class I were required to equip themselves with a round shield (clipeus), rather than the oblong shield (scutum) required of the other classes - and all images of cavalrymen of this period show round shields. It appears that equites equo privato (i.e. First Class members) were required to pay for their own equipment and horse, but that the latter would be refunded by the state if it was killed in action. Cavalrymen in service were paid 1 drachma per day, triple the infantry rate, and were liable to a maximum of 10 campaigning seasons' military service, compared to 16 for the infantry.

Each Polybian legion contained a cavalry contingent of 300 horse, which does not appear to have been officered by an overall commander. The cavalry contingent was divided into 10 turmae (squadrons) of 30 men each. The squadron members would elect as their officers 3 decuriones ("leaders of 10 men"), of whom the first to be chosen would act as the squadron's commander and the other two as his deputies. From the available evidence, the cavalry of a Polybian legion (and presumably confederate cavalry also) was armoured and specialised in the shock charge.

Campaign record

There is a misconception that Roman Republican cavalry was inferior to other cavalry and that they were just to support their far superior infantry. However, Philip Sidnell, argues that this view is misguided and that the cavalry was a powerful and crucial asset to the Republican army..

Sidnell argues that the record shows that Roman cavalry in Republican times were a strong force in which they bested higher reputed cavalry of the time. Examples include the Heraclea (280 BC), in where the Roman cavalry dismayed the enemy leader Pyrrhus by gaining the advantage in a bitterly contested melee against his Thessalian cavalry, then regarded as the finest in the world, and were only driven back when Pyrrhus deployed his elephants, which panicked the Roman horses.

A key reason for some historians' disparagement of the Roman cavalry were the crushing defeats, at the Trebia and at Cannae, that it suffered at the hands of the Carthaginian general Hannibal during the latter's invasion of Italy (218-6 BC) which were only rendered possible because of a powerful cavalry force. But Sidnell argues that this is only because of a consistent numerical superiority in cavalry. Another disadvantage for the Romans in the Second Punic War was that their respective cavalry were heavily armoured shock cavalry, used to the rudimentary tactic of charging. This, however useful against an infantry that has been routed or is flanked, failed against Hannibal's nimble, Numidian light cavalry that used a skilful, elaborate series of movements that consistently defeated the Roman cavalry.

The Second Punic War placed unprecedented strains on Roman manpower, not least on the over 10,000+ drachmae First Class which provided the cavalry. During Hannibal's apocalyptic march through Italy (218-6 BC), thousands of Roman cavalrymen were killed on the battlefield. The losses were especially serious for the knights properly so-called (equo publico): Livy relates how, after Cannae, the gold rings of dead Roman knights formed a pile one modius (ca. 9 litres) large. In the succeeding years 214-203 BC, the Romans kept at least 21 legions in the field at all times, in Italy and overseas (and 25 legions in the peak year). This would have required the knights to provide 220 senior officers (120 tribuni militum, 60 decuriones and 60 praefecti sociorum). It was probably from this time that the 18 centuriae of knights became largely an officer class, while the 6,300 Roman cavalrymen required were raised from the rest of the First Class.

The cavalry of Roman armies before the Second Punic War had been exclusively Roman and confederate Italian, with each holding one wing of the battleline (the Romans usually holding the right wing). After that war, Roman/Italian cavalry was always complemented by allied native cavalry (especially Numidia), and was usually combined on just one wing. Indeed, the allied cavalry often outnumbered the combined Roman/Italian force e.g. at Zama, where the 4,000 Numidians held the right, with just 1,500 Romans/Italians on the left. One reason was the lessons learnt in the war, namely the need to complement heavy cavalry with plenty of light, faster horse, as well as increasing the cavalry share when engaging with enemies with more powerful mounted forces. It was also inevitable that, as the Roman Republic acquired an overseas empire and the Roman army now campaigned entirely outside Italy, the best of non-Italian cavalry would be enlisted in increasing numbers, including (in addition to Numidians) Gallic, Spanish and Thracian horse. Towards the end of the republic and the beginning of the Roman Empire, the Roman cavalry itself was rendered less and less of a powerful force, with Rome meeting its cavalry needs with auxiliary, allied cavalry instead.

Nevertheless, Roman and Italian confederate cavalry continued to form an essential part of a Roman army's line-up for over a century. They were again, less successful against elusive tribal cavalry such as the Lusitanians under Viriathus in their bitter resistance to Roman rule (151-140 BC) and the Numidians themselves under king Jugurtha during the latter's rebellion (112-105 BC), when they were obliged to rely heavily on their own Numidian allied horse and the Romans were deprived of their strongest cavalry.

End of the citizen cavalry

The Jugurthine War is the last war in which Roman/Italian confederate cavalry is attested as having played a significant part. After that references to the citizen cavalry become rare and the Roman army seems to have become largely dependent on non-citizen cavalry, either recruited in the subject provinces or supplied by allied kings. The conventional explanation is that legionary cavalry was abolished as part of the so-called army reforms of Gaius Marius of the army around 107 BC and entirely replaced by native allied cavalry. But the "Marian reforms" are a myth invented by modern historians. There is no evidence that Marius abolished the manipular structure of legions in favour of cohorts, or turned the army from a conscript into a professional force, or removed the property qualification for service in the legions (the latter had been progressively reduced, and anyway largely ignored, since the 2nd Punic War). Even less can it be said that he abolished the citizen cavalry, since it is attested under Marius at the Battle of Vercellae (101 BC) and in 82 BC during the civil war between Sulla and Pompey. Far more significant for the army's structural development was the grant of Roman citizenship to all of Rome's Italian confederates after the Social War (91-88 BC). This led to the abolition of the old Italian confederate alae and the recruitment of all Italians into the legions. For the cavalry, the abolition of the alae had the radical result of reducing the Roman/Italian cavalry to just a quarter of its previous size, since legions contained only a third as many horse as confederate alae. Legionary cavalry was thus reduced to a fraction of a Roman army's overall cavalry complement: a consular army of 2 legions now contained about 20% cavalry (i.e. ca. 4,000 horse), of which, at most, only 600 were Romans. Indeed, the Roman element may now have numbered just 240, as it is possible that around this time, the legionary cavalry contingent was reduced to 120.Modèle:Hcref It also appears that from this time onwards, Roman knights were no longer levied for cavalry service, which was now recruited from Italian commoners. By the time of Gaius Julius Caesar's Gallic War (58-51 BC), it appears that legionary cavalry may have disappeared altogether, and that Caesar was entirely dependent on allied Gallic contingents for his cavalry operations. This is deduced from an incident in 58 BC when Caesar was invited to a parley with the German king Ariovistus and needed a cavalry escort. Since he didn't yet trust the allied Gallic cavalry under his command, he instructed them to lend their horses to some members of the Tenth Legion, which thereafter acquired the nickname equestris ("mounted legion"). (However, this incident leaves open the possibility that Roman cavalry still existed, but was not large enough to satisfy the needs of the moment).

The question arises as to why the Romans allowed their citizen cavalry to lapse in this way, given its record as a highly effective and useful force. The main reason is probably the limited pool of available equites and First Class members. The equites had long since become exclusively an officer class (a role they retained throughout the Principate), as the empire had become simply too large and complex for aristocrats to serve as ordinary troopers. At the same time, many of the First Class of commoners had developed major business interests and had little time for military service. Although Italian commoners of the lower classes could, of course, have been recruited and trained as cavalrymen in larger numbers, that must have seemed costly and unnecessary when subject countries such as Gaul, Spain, Thrace and Numidia contained large numbers of excellent native cavalry which could be employed at much lower pay than citizens.

References

• Livy, Ab urbe condita 1.15
• Harry Thurston Peck. Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities. New York. Harper and Brothers. 1898.

Matos et notes pour Cavalerie au temps de la Rome antique

Africa

Les provinces d'Afrique et de Numidie constituant le « grenier à blé » de Rome, les Romains mirent en place pour les protéger contre les raids des nomades cavaliers - et notamment contre la puissante menace des Gétules - un important dispositif défensif, le « limes et fossatum Africae ». Il était constitué de fortins, de fossés et de murs désservis pour un solide réseau de voies, soit une ligne de défense avancée quasi-continue, qui partant de Leptis Magna en Tripolitaine, contournait le massif des Aurès par le sud et remontant vers le nord ouest, atteignait Césarée de Mauritainie.

Équipement de la cavalerie romaine

LE

Sassanides.

Celtes.

Jules César dit dans les Commentaires sur la Guerre des Gaules être « très impressionné par la cavalerie gauloise bien que les chevaux soient petits et laids ».

Equipements ennemis

D'après des fouilles archéologiques, l'invention du fer à clous serait à attribuer aux Celtes. Leurs fers étaient plus légers et plus petits que nos fers contemporains et étaient fabriqués par des druides. Avec la conquête de la Gaule, le fer cloué arriva jusqu'aux Romains qui l'adaptèrent en taille et en poids à leurs chevaux plus grands et plus lourds. On ne trouve les premiers témoignages du ferrage, d'origine allemande, qu'à partir du IV-V siècle. Diverses formes de ces fers, encore plus lourds et plus grands que ceux des Romains, furent décrits.

Equipement romain

Rome : La selle gauloise utilisée par l'armée romaine : arçon en bois et cornes en bronze recouvertes de cuir. Les quatre excroissances de la selle servaient aux cavaliers à se maintenir car ils montaient sans étriers, mais avec des éperons + hipposandales (?)