What does it take to live a philosophical way of life? We maintain that practitioners must be com... more What does it take to live a philosophical way of life? We maintain that practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, Stephen Grimm and Caleb Cohoe maintain that it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. We argue that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life.
In this paper I defend a humanistic or non-naturalistic approach to understanding human beings. ... more In this paper I defend a humanistic or non-naturalistic approach to understanding human beings. At the same time, I argue against the view of Dilthey and others who claim that naturalistic approaches can only attempt to explain, rather than understand, human beings. Once we become clearer about what scientific understanding involves, we will see that there is little reason to adopt this view. Although limited, there is undoubtedly a level of intelligibility or understanding that the naturalistic stance can provide with respect to human action, a point which can be seen better by exploring the nature of scientific understanding more closely.
I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who ... more I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields. This gives us a new sense both of what understanding is, and what it is not.
What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consis... more What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consists in knowledge of how to live well, and that this knowledge of how to live well is constituted by various further kinds of knowledge. One concern for this view is that knowledge is not needed for wisdom but rather some state short of knowledge, such as having rational or justified beliefs about various topics. Another concern is that the emphasis on knowing how to live well fails to do justice to the ancient tradition of "theoretical wisdom." I address both of these concerns in filling out the account.
The idea that our judgments about knowledge are sensitive to what is at stake, from a practical p... more The idea that our judgments about knowledge are sensitive to what is at stake, from a practical point of view, can be found in a variety of classic works in epistemology. Locke, for instance, seems to hold that more is required for knowledge when the topic at hand is "weighty" than when it is not, 1 and one of the upshots of W.C.K. Clifford's famous example of the ship owner seems to be that evidence which might under normal circumstances count as "sufficient" or "good enough" for knowledge will no longer count as such when something significant is at stake. 2 When a mistake would lead to something like the loss of human life, the thought seems to be, only an exceptionally well-supported belief will count as good enough for knowledge.
Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present p... more Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.
What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is u... more What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is understanding always provided by explanations? And how is it related to knowledge? Such questions have attracted considerable interest in epistemology recently. These discussions, however, have not yet engaged insights about explanations and theories developed in philosophy of science. Conversely, philosophers of science have debated the nature of explanations and theories, while dismissing understanding as a psychological by-product.
In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.
What does it take to live a philosophical way of life? We maintain that practitioners must be com... more What does it take to live a philosophical way of life? We maintain that practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, Stephen Grimm and Caleb Cohoe maintain that it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. We argue that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life.
In this paper I defend a humanistic or non-naturalistic approach to understanding human beings. ... more In this paper I defend a humanistic or non-naturalistic approach to understanding human beings. At the same time, I argue against the view of Dilthey and others who claim that naturalistic approaches can only attempt to explain, rather than understand, human beings. Once we become clearer about what scientific understanding involves, we will see that there is little reason to adopt this view. Although limited, there is undoubtedly a level of intelligibility or understanding that the naturalistic stance can provide with respect to human action, a point which can be seen better by exploring the nature of scientific understanding more closely.
I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who ... more I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields. This gives us a new sense both of what understanding is, and what it is not.
What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consis... more What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consists in knowledge of how to live well, and that this knowledge of how to live well is constituted by various further kinds of knowledge. One concern for this view is that knowledge is not needed for wisdom but rather some state short of knowledge, such as having rational or justified beliefs about various topics. Another concern is that the emphasis on knowing how to live well fails to do justice to the ancient tradition of "theoretical wisdom." I address both of these concerns in filling out the account.
The idea that our judgments about knowledge are sensitive to what is at stake, from a practical p... more The idea that our judgments about knowledge are sensitive to what is at stake, from a practical point of view, can be found in a variety of classic works in epistemology. Locke, for instance, seems to hold that more is required for knowledge when the topic at hand is "weighty" than when it is not, 1 and one of the upshots of W.C.K. Clifford's famous example of the ship owner seems to be that evidence which might under normal circumstances count as "sufficient" or "good enough" for knowledge will no longer count as such when something significant is at stake. 2 When a mistake would lead to something like the loss of human life, the thought seems to be, only an exceptionally well-supported belief will count as good enough for knowledge.
Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present p... more Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.
What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is u... more What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is understanding always provided by explanations? And how is it related to knowledge? Such questions have attracted considerable interest in epistemology recently. These discussions, however, have not yet engaged insights about explanations and theories developed in philosophy of science. Conversely, philosophers of science have debated the nature of explanations and theories, while dismissing understanding as a psychological by-product.
In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.
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In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.
In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.