Papers by Wolfgang Mühlberger
FIIA Comment, 2020
The killing of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi last year put the jihadist nexus in North-Western Syria back ... more The killing of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi last year put the jihadist nexus in North-Western Syria back in the spotlight. The faltering of Idlib’s de-escalation zone is currently increasing the risk of a direct military confrontation between Turkish-controlled forces and the Syrian and Russian militaries, reigniting the geopolitical component of the conflict.
EuroMeSCo Policy Brief No. 91, 2019
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) forms part of a comprehensive s... more Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) forms part of a comprehensive strategy, aimed at undercutting what it perceives as Western supremacy in the international sphere. For this purpose, a process was set in motion by the skillful use of opportunities, arising in particular from the lack of a political solution and of concerted military action in Syria by those calling for Bashar al-Asad to step down. On the other hand, in the perception of several regional leaders, Russia emerged as a consistent actor, sticking to allies and proving reliability – while being appreciated for favouring the preponderant authoritarian status quo. The resulting open-ended endeavour, where Moscow reshapes the regional order by building strategic partnerships and engaging in military intervention, carries implications for all interested actors, including the EU.
DECENTRALISATION IS BEING DEVELOPED TO UPEND THE LEGACY OF A HIGHLY CENTRALISED STATE
The municip... more DECENTRALISATION IS BEING DEVELOPED TO UPEND THE LEGACY OF A HIGHLY CENTRALISED STATE
The municipal elections in May were the first major step towards an ambitious decentralisation project in Tunisia. Yet although the administrative structure is continuing to evolve alongside a democratising system, the aim of improving the state-society relationship has been jeopardised by record-level abstentions.
After a decade of intra-Palestinian strife, rival factions Fatah and Hamas realised the need for ... more After a decade of intra-Palestinian strife, rival factions Fatah and Hamas realised the need for a political compromise. The signature of the reconciliation agreement indicates the adaptability of Hamas’s survival strategy and Fatah’s quest for renewed legitimacy. Yet its implementation remains uncertain.
The dispute over Doha’s autonomous foreign policy remains acute as the parties to the conflict ce... more The dispute over Doha’s autonomous foreign policy remains acute as the parties to the conflict cement their positions. Breaking this deadlock requires mediation, preferably by a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) member, plus the willingness to compromise, in order to avoid unintended consequences.
After almost six years of war in Syria, the Astana peace talks in January marked a symbolic novel... more After almost six years of war in Syria, the Astana peace talks in January marked a symbolic novelty by convening only military players. States with substantial military engagement and a selection of ‘authorised’ militias met to discuss an extension of the post-Aleppo ceasefire. The contours of Syria’s future are slowly taking shape.
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is losing its cross-border territorial gains from 2014 o... more The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is losing its cross-border territorial gains from 2014 on multiple fronts in Iraq and Syria as major military campaigns are being carried out in Mosul and Al-Bab, and under preparation in Raqqa, “capital” of the self-styled caliphate. A huge number of actors with often opposed goals are involved in the anti-Daesh offensives. The future support for and the room for maneuver of Daesh will be significantly determined by Iraq’s political arrangements and the peace-building process in Syria.
The September ceasefire expired after the scheduled duration of a single week due to the bombardm... more The September ceasefire expired after the scheduled duration of a single week due to the bombardment of sensitive targets by the brokers – instead of being extended and shored up by a political track. Agreeing on the modalities without the ability or willingness to enforce them, makes ceasefires futile, and undermines peace negotiations.
The Tunisian uprising in late 2010 and early 2011 heralded the era of post-Bourguibism and ushere... more The Tunisian uprising in late 2010 and early 2011 heralded the era of post-Bourguibism and ushered in a ‘Second Republic.’ While several structural elements of this new political and governance system, both
institutional and procedural, have crystallized over the past five years (constitution, pluralistic party landscape, free elections), other features are still being debated with verve (interpretation of the
constitution, identity questions, the relationship between Islam and the State, the need for economic reforms and freedom of expression). Even though the possibility to openly and publicly address such
previously unthought-of issues represents a major achievement of the ‘Dignity Revolution,’ the underlying contending worldviews of the major political stakeholders tend to exacerbate rather than subdue
societal polarization. This mixed record indicates the ambivalent and still open-ended nature of the progressing socio-political transformation.
Five years after the ouster of dictator Hosni Mubarak and three years into the overthrow of his e... more Five years after the ouster of dictator Hosni Mubarak and three years into the overthrow of his elected successor, Mohammed Mursi, it is time to ask what became of the two major slogans,
chanted across Tahrir and many other places throughout Egypt in early 2011. The first rallying cry demanded the abolition of “the system” (Isqât an-nidhâm); the second called for “bread, freedom, justice and dignity”. Will the new parliament, which is still in a state of flux, heed these popular demands? Or is the National Assembly set on a trajectory of return to one-party rule?
The first round of parliamentary elections in October (2015) turned out to be symptomatic of a de... more The first round of parliamentary elections in October (2015) turned out to be symptomatic of a derailed democratic transition in Egypt. Mainly endorsing the return of
authoritarian governance structures, they epitomise the regime’s resistance to the reform demands of the protestors.
Egypt’s political transition entered a new phase with the military coup in mid-2013: pluralistic ... more Egypt’s political transition entered a new phase with the military coup in mid-2013: pluralistic tendencies have been systematically uprooted and the Egyptian armed forces have positioned themselves as a determining political force.
This report is the outcome of three sessions that convened a group of experts, the Arab Foresight... more This report is the outcome of three sessions that convened a group of experts, the Arab Foresight Group, during 2014. It takes into account projections made by a wide array of organisations and is based to the maximum extent possible on available data (referenced in the bibliography in the annex, pp. 50-51). It reduces speculation to a bare minimum, and identifies the relative certainties or megatrends which concern
the Middle East region and which are not likely to change over the next decade; perhaps more importantly, it also identifies six game-changers: those areas where policy-makers will influence the course of events by their choices. Depending on
these choices, three probable scenarios have been hypothesised for the year 2025. All assumptions and extrapolations are based on what the expert group considered both probable and plausible.
The strength of ISIL (Da’ish) has been assured by its adversaries’ weakness. The movement can als... more The strength of ISIL (Da’ish) has been assured by its adversaries’ weakness. The movement can also bank on support from several regional players, who have now,
paradoxically, joined the anti-ISIL coalition. Any effective strategy to defeat the jihadis must be based on a shared goal and sequenced to ensure long-term success.
The security climate in Libya two years after
the end of the “February 17 Revolution” is
characte... more The security climate in Libya two years after
the end of the “February 17 Revolution” is
characterized by three problematic trends:
a combination of lawlessness and impunity,
continued score-settling, and increased Islamist
militancy.
Two years after the February 17 revolution,
and one year after the first free
elections in more t... more Two years after the February 17 revolution,
and one year after the first free
elections in more than six decades,
the hopes and expectations of Libyans
for a brighter future remain high.
The proper sequencing and prioritization
of constitutional and security-related
issues will be essential for the
success of the on-going state-building
project.
In Tunesien starteten mit der Selbstverbrennung von Mohamed Bouazizi am 17. Dezember 2010 beispie... more In Tunesien starteten mit der Selbstverbrennung von Mohamed Bouazizi am 17. Dezember 2010 beispiellose politische Umwälzungen. Damit wird der Beginn eines gesellschaftlichen Wandels markiert, der mittlerweile den Großteil der arabischen Welt erfasst hat. Nach dem Sturz des tunesischen Regimes kippte auch die Herrschaft Hosni Mubaraks in Ägypten. In Libyen zeichnen sich ebenfalls gravierende Veränderungen ab. Unter dem Druck der Straße hat die algerische Regierung weit-
reichende Reformmaßnahmen angekündigt und teilweise bereits umgesetzt. Selbst in Marokko ist das alawidische Königshaus mit massiven Reformforderungen konfrontiert. Die nächsten Monate werden die Richtung der politischen Veränderungen bestimmen und auch von den europäischen Nachbarn eine neue Politik vis-à-vis Nordafrika erfordern.
Die als arabischer Frühling bekannt gewordenen Umwälzungen hatten nicht nur innenpolitische Auswi... more Die als arabischer Frühling bekannt gewordenen Umwälzungen hatten nicht nur innenpolitische Auswirkungen auf die arabischen Länder des Maghreb und Maschrek, sondern führten auch zur Veränderung des strategischen israelischen Umfelds. Israel sieht sich infolge der regionalen Tendenzen zu politischer Pluralisierung mit einem zunehmend ablehnenden Umfeld konfrontiert. Insbesondere der Sturz
des ägyptischen Langzeitpräsidenten Mubarak sowie die Instabilität Syriens könnten weitreichende Folgen für Israel haben, ohne jedoch zu einer fundamentalen Verschiebung der regionalen Kräfteverhältnisse zu führen. Den arabischen Transitionsstaaten gemeinsam ist ein Aufstieg von Kräften des politischen Islam, welche Israel prinzipiell feindlich gesinnt sind und Bereitschaft signalisieren, die gestiegene Bedeutung
der öffentlichen – pro-palästinensischen – Meinung bewusst zu instrumentalisieren.
Im Vorfeld der diesjährigen Gemeindewahlen wurde auf Initiative des Innenministers Ziad Baroud la... more Im Vorfeld der diesjährigen Gemeindewahlen wurde auf Initiative des Innenministers Ziad Baroud langwierig über eine Reform des Wahlrechts debattiert. In Ermangelung eines Konsenses musste er schlussendlich die Abhaltung der Wahlen zum geplanten Zeitpunkt durchsetzen. Diese fanden unter massiven Sicherheitsvorkehrungen statt und bestätigten sowohl die lokalen Machthaber in ihren Ämtern als auch die Bedeutung der zwei antagonistischen nationalen Bündnisse. Neben einer gewissen Relevanz der Streitkräfte (Lebanese Armed Forces) liegt die Stabilität des Libanon jedoch mehrheitlich in den Händen externer Akteure, nicht zuletzt aufgrund des fortbestehenden politischen Konfessionalismus.
Uploads
Papers by Wolfgang Mühlberger
The municipal elections in May were the first major step towards an ambitious decentralisation project in Tunisia. Yet although the administrative structure is continuing to evolve alongside a democratising system, the aim of improving the state-society relationship has been jeopardised by record-level abstentions.
institutional and procedural, have crystallized over the past five years (constitution, pluralistic party landscape, free elections), other features are still being debated with verve (interpretation of the
constitution, identity questions, the relationship between Islam and the State, the need for economic reforms and freedom of expression). Even though the possibility to openly and publicly address such
previously unthought-of issues represents a major achievement of the ‘Dignity Revolution,’ the underlying contending worldviews of the major political stakeholders tend to exacerbate rather than subdue
societal polarization. This mixed record indicates the ambivalent and still open-ended nature of the progressing socio-political transformation.
chanted across Tahrir and many other places throughout Egypt in early 2011. The first rallying cry demanded the abolition of “the system” (Isqât an-nidhâm); the second called for “bread, freedom, justice and dignity”. Will the new parliament, which is still in a state of flux, heed these popular demands? Or is the National Assembly set on a trajectory of return to one-party rule?
authoritarian governance structures, they epitomise the regime’s resistance to the reform demands of the protestors.
the Middle East region and which are not likely to change over the next decade; perhaps more importantly, it also identifies six game-changers: those areas where policy-makers will influence the course of events by their choices. Depending on
these choices, three probable scenarios have been hypothesised for the year 2025. All assumptions and extrapolations are based on what the expert group considered both probable and plausible.
paradoxically, joined the anti-ISIL coalition. Any effective strategy to defeat the jihadis must be based on a shared goal and sequenced to ensure long-term success.
the end of the “February 17 Revolution” is
characterized by three problematic trends:
a combination of lawlessness and impunity,
continued score-settling, and increased Islamist
militancy.
and one year after the first free
elections in more than six decades,
the hopes and expectations of Libyans
for a brighter future remain high.
The proper sequencing and prioritization
of constitutional and security-related
issues will be essential for the
success of the on-going state-building
project.
reichende Reformmaßnahmen angekündigt und teilweise bereits umgesetzt. Selbst in Marokko ist das alawidische Königshaus mit massiven Reformforderungen konfrontiert. Die nächsten Monate werden die Richtung der politischen Veränderungen bestimmen und auch von den europäischen Nachbarn eine neue Politik vis-à-vis Nordafrika erfordern.
des ägyptischen Langzeitpräsidenten Mubarak sowie die Instabilität Syriens könnten weitreichende Folgen für Israel haben, ohne jedoch zu einer fundamentalen Verschiebung der regionalen Kräfteverhältnisse zu führen. Den arabischen Transitionsstaaten gemeinsam ist ein Aufstieg von Kräften des politischen Islam, welche Israel prinzipiell feindlich gesinnt sind und Bereitschaft signalisieren, die gestiegene Bedeutung
der öffentlichen – pro-palästinensischen – Meinung bewusst zu instrumentalisieren.
The municipal elections in May were the first major step towards an ambitious decentralisation project in Tunisia. Yet although the administrative structure is continuing to evolve alongside a democratising system, the aim of improving the state-society relationship has been jeopardised by record-level abstentions.
institutional and procedural, have crystallized over the past five years (constitution, pluralistic party landscape, free elections), other features are still being debated with verve (interpretation of the
constitution, identity questions, the relationship between Islam and the State, the need for economic reforms and freedom of expression). Even though the possibility to openly and publicly address such
previously unthought-of issues represents a major achievement of the ‘Dignity Revolution,’ the underlying contending worldviews of the major political stakeholders tend to exacerbate rather than subdue
societal polarization. This mixed record indicates the ambivalent and still open-ended nature of the progressing socio-political transformation.
chanted across Tahrir and many other places throughout Egypt in early 2011. The first rallying cry demanded the abolition of “the system” (Isqât an-nidhâm); the second called for “bread, freedom, justice and dignity”. Will the new parliament, which is still in a state of flux, heed these popular demands? Or is the National Assembly set on a trajectory of return to one-party rule?
authoritarian governance structures, they epitomise the regime’s resistance to the reform demands of the protestors.
the Middle East region and which are not likely to change over the next decade; perhaps more importantly, it also identifies six game-changers: those areas where policy-makers will influence the course of events by their choices. Depending on
these choices, three probable scenarios have been hypothesised for the year 2025. All assumptions and extrapolations are based on what the expert group considered both probable and plausible.
paradoxically, joined the anti-ISIL coalition. Any effective strategy to defeat the jihadis must be based on a shared goal and sequenced to ensure long-term success.
the end of the “February 17 Revolution” is
characterized by three problematic trends:
a combination of lawlessness and impunity,
continued score-settling, and increased Islamist
militancy.
and one year after the first free
elections in more than six decades,
the hopes and expectations of Libyans
for a brighter future remain high.
The proper sequencing and prioritization
of constitutional and security-related
issues will be essential for the
success of the on-going state-building
project.
reichende Reformmaßnahmen angekündigt und teilweise bereits umgesetzt. Selbst in Marokko ist das alawidische Königshaus mit massiven Reformforderungen konfrontiert. Die nächsten Monate werden die Richtung der politischen Veränderungen bestimmen und auch von den europäischen Nachbarn eine neue Politik vis-à-vis Nordafrika erfordern.
des ägyptischen Langzeitpräsidenten Mubarak sowie die Instabilität Syriens könnten weitreichende Folgen für Israel haben, ohne jedoch zu einer fundamentalen Verschiebung der regionalen Kräfteverhältnisse zu führen. Den arabischen Transitionsstaaten gemeinsam ist ein Aufstieg von Kräften des politischen Islam, welche Israel prinzipiell feindlich gesinnt sind und Bereitschaft signalisieren, die gestiegene Bedeutung
der öffentlichen – pro-palästinensischen – Meinung bewusst zu instrumentalisieren.
westlicher Akteure islamistische Dschihadisten mittlerweile als größere Gefahr für den Frieden perzipiert werden als der ursprüngliche „Hauptfeind“, das syrische Regime von Baschar al-Asad.
muslimischer Intellektueller, ihre religiöse Tradition in Einklang mit den Herausforderungen der Moderne zu bringen. Die Zugänge zu dieser Thematik könnten unterschiedlicher kaum sein, zeichnen sich jedoch alle durch den bewussten Gebrauch der Vernunft aus, die als Mittel zur Erlangung einer aktualisierten Auslegung der religiösen Schriften des
Islam dienen soll. Die menschliche Vernunft erhält in dieser Optik aber eine der mohammedanischen Offenbarung und der islamischen Überlieferung eindeutig untergeordnete Rolle, da sie nur ein Werkzeug zur Textinterpretation darstellt und nicht in Opposition zum eigentlichen religiösen Denken in Erscheinung tritt.
Abstract: "Since Colonel Gaddafi’s demise in late 2011, Libya has embarked on a political transition marked by conflict and uncertainty. The meddling of external players has increased fragmentation and polarization along multiple emerging fault lines. The United Nations has exerted considerable efforts to foster reconciliation and to engage local actors in a political process. Against this backdrop of rival governments, lacking human security and conflicting external interests, the UN process could be enhanced by the OSCE’s longstanding experience in conflict mitigation, mediation and dialogue facilitation."
other North-African countries, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, experienced varying degrees of upheaval. The aim of this study is to highlight the distinct roles played by the armed forces of the latter three states in this tentative political transition by analysing the interests that effectively determined their level of involvement during and after the revolts, postures which in turn impacted on the orientation of this potentially groundbreaking political transformation.** The main argument developed in this study is that the three militaries, as a rule, did not side with the revolution per se but acted according to their own institutional interests.
terrorist designation will effectively constrain Hezbollah’s financial and operational capabilities, let alone motivate its retreat from the Syrian war zone.