Talk:Glenn D. Walker

Glenn Walker Vietnam Tour

Stanton Shelby’s reference to Glenn Walker’s 4th Division tour is incorrect. The reference states Walker served through August 1970. I was in the 4th Division at An Khê/Camp Radcliff from March 10 through December 7 (when the Division was recalled to Fort Carson, CO), 1970. I was in the 4th Infantry Division, HHC & Band DISCOM, and I played in the Band at the COC (Change of Command) ceremony when Walker was replaced by Major General Bill Burke. That was in June 1970.

Moreover, the REASON Walker was replaced is due to his negligence, if not official dereliction, regarding the defense of Hon Cong Mountain, which was INSIDE the 26-kilometer perimeter of Camp Radcliff, protected by a network of guard towers and bunkers located at approximately 50-meter intervals around the entire perimeter. The mountain, itself, located INSIDE the base camp (imagine a bundt pan), was also “protected” by a lesser bunker-line defense of barbed and concertina wire, but it was weak in comparison to the more-heavily-reinforced outer perimeter guard line. I know, because I pulled guard duty MANY NIGHTS on both. The inner-mountain perimeter protection was ineffective and frightening. NVA (PAVN) sappers REGULARLY infiltrated the defense of both perimeters, resulting in much damage—and death—inside the camp.

In May 1970, as a player in the Cambodian Incursion implemented by President Nixon on April 30, the 4th Infantry Division deployed combat forces to the northeastern area of Cambodia. I remember vividly, because several members of our band who were not designated true 02/bandsman MOSs—particularly 11-series and other combat MOSs—were stripped from the band and sent off to fight in Cambodia…never to be heard from or seen again.

The significance of the 4th Division deployment, as it relates to Glenn Walker, is that the NVA—realizing the vulnerability of the base, as a result of all combatants having been extracted from base security—IMMEDIATELY seized upon the opportunity and began systematic, almost nightly attacks against the weakened base. The attacks lasted the entire month of May, into June. I know, because we were awakened, nearly every night, early in the morning, by barrages of wayward RPG and B40 rockets, aimlessly impacting and destroying many camp facilities, to include ammunition depots, motor pools, random personnel barracks, and most significantly, the aircraft—mostly rotary-winged—staged on the enormous Golf Course airfield. In addition to aerial assaults, the NVA sappers, bearing only satchel charges and wire cutters, infiltrated both perimeters—the exterior and interior (surrounding Hon Cong)—and destroyed as many assets as possible.

The outer guard perimeter was much more difficult to penetrate than the inner, as the defensive barrier was roughly 100 meters deep with obstructive rows of concertina wire and barbed-wire fencing embedded with “trip flares,” which when tripped, would illuminate the areas of enemy penetration, giving high visibility to the human, enemy targets. Additionally, Claymore mines—the final line of defense—were planted along the innermost lines of concertina coils, and they could be triggered by the tower and bunker-defense guards. And those were some devastatingly “bad, anti-personnel” explosive weapons.

The inner guard perimeter line (bundt pan) was MUCH-LESS defended. There were no guard towers—only ground-level bunkers. Moreover, the perimeter wire depth was only about 25 meters. Also, the bunker defense line was poorly-lit. Unlike the outer perimeter, which was illuminated by tall, powerful, halogen lamps posted about every 75 meters—plus brilliant, long-throw spotlights installed at each tower—the inner perimeter illumination consisted of weaker, mobile/vehicular parabolic lanterns, converted for perimeter guard illumination. It was scary as hell to pull Hon Cong guard duty.

General Walker had been warned by MANY advisors—both lesser- and superior-ranked officers—to reinforce security at the base of Hon Cong Mountain, because the mountain was riddled with a network of NVA tunnels. Instead, he doubled and even tripled certain areas of the outer perimeter guard positions and associated duty assignments.

One memorable night toward the end of May, all hell broke loose throughout the camp, as NVA sappers and long-range artillery assaulted Radcliff. I was on outer-perimeter bunker guard that night, and I was scared to death. I recall breaches to the 100-meter barrier with trip flares and Claymores going off, and continuous weapons fire—M16s, M60s, and M79 (thumper) grenade launchers—all up and down the guard line. My bunker-guard mate and I were no exception. We were discharging every course of ammunition available.

At one point, we received notification on our OD walkie talkie that NVA activity had been detected in an area just a few dozen meters BEHIND our bunker location. Our bunkers were designed for forward viewing, as the structure was a sandbagged shell, suitable for frontal attack response, only. We experienced a solid hour of pure panic, not knowing if Charlie would sneak up on us from behind and lob a satchel charge into our sandbag shell.

It should be noted the sappers were so adept at their trade, they could infiltrate the 100-meter maze of barbed and concertina wire, trip flares, and Claymores with a pair of wire snips—undetected—navigate to pre-determined targets, plant their satchel charges, and exit through the 100-meters—undetected—before we knew we had been invaded.

On this particular evening, the damage was extraordinary. The final toll was, if memory serves, and according to after-action reports, “17-million-dollars-worth” of helicopters parked on the Marston Mat (PSP) steel-planked Golf Course. In addition, dozens of ammunition dumps, motor pool Quonset huts, command and barracks structures, communication and water towers, and sundry other “points of NVA interest” were destroyed, and several (unofficial) deaths resulted.

The after-action determined that the large percentage of infiltrators came from within Hon Cong Mountain—those tunnels that Glenn Walker had ignored and/or denied for weeks prior to the devastating attack. *It is of note that this assault event shows up NOWHERE in any Wikipedia references to Walker, the 4th Infantry Division, or Camp Radcliff. But it happened. I have photos of U.S. choppers and C-130 (Puff) gunships raining saturating tracer fire along the outer base perimeter—inside and outside (to the village side) the wire/mine field—and along the base of Hon Cong. I was there. It happened.

Sometime in mid-June of 1970, Walker’s tour was cut short. He was withdrawn and re-assigned to the Pentagon, and on the day of the COC appointing his replacement, Major General William Burke, Walker was ceremoniously decorated and ceremoniously removed to the States to wreak his brand of general-officer wisdom, i.e., havoc, on the pencil pushers of the Pentagon.

For weeks after—non-stop, 24/7—we could hear the explosive concussions of grenades destroying the ant-hill maze of tunnels bored inside Hon Cong Mountain.

Walker was GONE BEFORE THE END OF JUNE. Burke remained to oversee the December 7th withdrawal.

Stanton Shelby’s information is incorrect. I have corrected accordingly. Hobbmark (talk) 19:54, 30 August 2023 (UTC)