Books by Felipe Leon
This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Read... more This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things?
Papers by Felipe Leon
It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is al... more It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false.
The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. O... more The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of the world requires extensive empirical investigation. But since thought experiments are done from the armchair, how can they tell us about the world? A standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments provides an answer to this question, and in a way that fits naturally with a standard picture of the nature of the facts philosophers investigate: Philosophers are about the business of investigating the essences of things and kinds. But a thing’s essential and accidental properties are modal properties. Thus, one can discern a thing’s essence by discovering its modal profile. But if so, then thought experiments are naturally suited as tools for the armchair philosopher. For thought experiments shed light on modal facts. Therefore, since philosophers investigate essences, facts about essence are modal facts, and the thought experiment is one of the few tools they have for discerning such facts, thought experiments play a legitimate and indispensable role in philosophical methodology. In my dissertation, I argue that the standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments is inadequate, and sketch a more promising account. First, I argue that our knowledge of possibility is restricted to the relatively humdrum. And if so, then since the standard account ties the utility of thought experiments to our knowledge of possibility, too many thought experiments will be ruled out as useless, which raises serious concerns about the significance, and perhaps even the legitimacy, of armchair philosophy. Thus, there is pressure for armchair philosophers to reject the standard account. Second, I sketch an alternative picture of the nature of facts philosophers investigate – one that’s more fine-grained than the standard modal-profile picture. Relatedly, I sketch a correspondingly fine-grained semantics for claims about such facts. This alternative picture underwrites the legitimacy of a hitherto underappreciated sort of thought experiment, which I call the non-modal thought experiment. Such thought experiments shed light on facts about the world that are more fine-grained than what can be discerned by merely examining their modal profiles. I argue that non-modal thought experiments often succeed at just the points where the more familiar modal thought experiments fail, and thus that the two are naturally suited to complement one another in the philosopher’s practice. Finally, I exploit the points mentioned above to sketch an account of the variety and utility of thought experiments that’s much more nuanced than that of the standard account. I then illustrate some of its virtues by indicating its ability to account for a wide range of epistemically forceful thought experiments – both humdrum and exotic –, and by demonstrating how it can be used to make progress in debates that have reached a stalemate due to conflicting modal intuitions
Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, 2016
In this paper, I sketch and defend a thoroughgoing empiricist account of our knowledge of metaphy... more In this paper, I sketch and defend a thoroughgoing empiricist account of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility. I argue that our knowledge of Moorean metaphysical possibilities traces back to our knowledge of the actual world through empirical sources (such as observation and observation-sensitive theory). In this connection, I advocate a pluralist account, according to which deductive, inductive, and abductive inferences from actuality are all legitimate sources of our knowledge of possibility.
Philo, 2011
A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, wh... more A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig's defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland's philosophical arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful.
Is God the Best Explanation of Things?
Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, 2016
Southwest Philosophy Review, 2016
Theists argue that God and his activity provide the cause or sufficient reason for the existence ... more Theists argue that God and his activity provide the cause or sufficient reason for the existence and nature of the universe. Atheists, by contrast, argue that God isn't needed to cause or explain the universe's existence or nature. The notions of causation and sufficient reason thus play a key role in arguments concerning theism and atheism. The present chapter provides an overview of these notions and their bearing on the epistemic merits of the two views. The plan of the chapter is as follows. First, we discuss the core issues and options with respect to the nature of causation and its bearing on theism and atheism. Second, we explore and critically evaluate the most widely discussed theistic argument that makes crucial use of a causal premise, viz., the kalām cosmological argument. Finally, we explore and critically evaluate a representative sampling of the most widely discussed theistic argument-type that makes crucial use of an explanatory premise, viz., the cosmological argument from contingency. In each of these sections, it will be concluded that considerations respecting causation and sufficient reason do not favor theism over atheism.
The primary aim of this chapter is to consider whether considerations about a priori domains and ... more The primary aim of this chapter is to consider whether considerations about a priori domains and abstract objects favor atheism over theism.
Philo 14:1, 2011
A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, wh... more A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig's defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland's philosophical arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful.
… and Phenomenological Research, Jan 1, 2010
Decisive counterexamples to substantive philosophical theses are few and far between. It is relat... more Decisive counterexamples to substantive philosophical theses are few and far between. It is relatively uncontroversial that Gettier (1963) gave us one. It is much more controversial whether Frankfurt (1969) did. Indeed, there is a huge literature surrounding so-called Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs), with no clear consensus one way or the other. Many have contributed to the project of attempting to construct a foolproof FSC; many have argued against the possibility of successfully completing that project. 1 In this paper, we do not aim to add directly to either of these projects. Rather, we aim to avoid both of them in a way that we hope will shed light on the debate as a whole.
Book Reviews by Felipe Leon
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Books by Felipe Leon
Papers by Felipe Leon
Book Reviews by Felipe Leon