The Montagovian tradition in formal semantics combines two basic tenets to explain a wide variety... more The Montagovian tradition in formal semantics combines two basic tenets to explain a wide variety of linguistic phenomena.
Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block f... more Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of content. Specifically, I propose a version of the redundancy theory according to which ‘it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio’ expresses the same proposition as ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’. Surprisingly, this variant of the redundancy theory treats ‘is true’ as an ordinary predicate of the language, thereby defusing many standard criticisms of the redundancy theory.
It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously repr... more It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world’s structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law-hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint-carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow them to properly impose constraints on grammar.
In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provide... more In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes that the ordinary claim must be apriori entailed by a description of the core evidence. However, I propose that careful thinking about belief suspension reveals that empirical information can contaminate the reasoning from the core evidence to the ordinary claim S, even if belief in the core evidence is suspended. One result is that empiricists and externalists may freely appeal to thought experiments without having to concede that there are substantive apriori truths.
In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzl... more In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine's proposed solution to Frege's puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution-his attempted solution. The correct characterization of Fine's solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labe... more Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always agree in meaning. We offer a precise interpretation of the challenge posed by (i) and (ii). We then develop some neglected passages of Tarski to show that his semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics.
King (2007, 2009, 2012) argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true... more King (2007, 2009, 2012) argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But—for good reason—King claims that propositions possess truth conditions intrinsically and essentially. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can’t follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.
Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare... more Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare their views on the relationship between language and the world. But Russell's exact characterization of incomplete symbols and the role they play in his philosophy are still disputed. In this paper, I trace the development of the notion of an incomplete symbol in Russell's philosophy. I suggest – against Kaplan, Evans, and others – that Russell's many characterizations of the notion of an incomplete symbol are compatible. To this end, I examine and reject arguments for the purported incompatibility between declaring an expression to be incomplete and incorporating that symbol into a compositional semantic theory. I then examine how Russell puts the notion of an incomplete symbol to use in metaphysics.
The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has haunted broadly Fregean views, ac... more The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has haunted broadly Fregean views, according to which co-referential proper names are not always substitutable salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. Opponents of Fregeanism argue that a belief ascription containing a proper name such as ‘Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable’ is equivalent to a quantified sentence such as ‘there is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and that person is Lindsay’. They conclude that the semantic contribution of a name such as ‘Lindsay’ is the same as the semantic contribution of a variable under an assignment, which these opponents suggest is merely the object assigned to that variable. However, renewed interest in variables suggests that they make a more complicated contribution to the semantic processing of sentences that contain them. In particular, a variable contributes both an assignment-unsaturated and an assignment-saturated semantic value. I use this dual role of the semantics of variables to develop a response to the argument from quantifying in. I take as my point of departure Cumming’s (2008) view that an attitude ascription relates the subject of an attitude to the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. I argue that this approach fails. I propose an alternative, according to which the truth of a belief ascription depends on both the assignment-saturated and the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. This approach reverses standard assumptions concerning the relation between quantification and substitution.
According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one's preferred theory ought to correspond ... more According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one's preferred theory ought to correspond to something in the world, a feature shared by the various entities that satisfy the predicate. 1 If the predicate 'is a kangaroo' occurs in one's preferred theory, then one ought to posit a property which all of the various things that satisfy 'is a kangaroo' have in common. 2 Philosophers of this persuasion divide into two camps. Some endorse sparse conceptions of properties on which some collections of entities lack a common property. Therefore, they hesitate to deploy additional predicates in their preferred description of the world. The predicates of day-to-day language or special sciences likely do not correspond to properties. These predicates then must ultimately give way to the predicates of a more austere schema. Other property theorists endorse abundant conceptions: every arbitrary grouping of individuals shares some property. A theory would be no worse for having a predicate corresponding to any such grouping.
In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theo... more In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theory, Frege introduces a rule which allows a function name to be formed by removing a saturated name from another saturated name which contains it. This rule requires that each name has a rather rich syntactic structure, since one must be able to recognize the occurrences of a name in a larger name. However, I argue that Frege is unable to account for this syntactic structure. I argue that this problem undermines the inductive portion of Frege's proof that all of the names of his system denote in § §29-32 of The Basic Laws.
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from w... more I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as 'this statue is a molded piece of clay'. This suggests that speakers believe propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word 'is', such that 'is' in these sentences means the same as 'constitutes or is constituted by'. I will use standard tests for ambiguity to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument.
Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism is false, since it predicts that one cannot... more Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism is false, since it predicts that one cannot believe, say, that Joe Strummer was born in 1952, without having a belief about the actual world. Soames suggests that agents in other possible worlds may have this belief, but may lack any beliefs about the actual world, a world that they do not occupy and have no contact with. I argue that this argument extends to other popular actuality-involving analyses. I argue that in order for Soames to hold on to his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism, he must provide alternatives to these analyses. I then argue that there is reason to think that these alternatives are not forthcoming, so Soames should surrender his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism.
Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivaties 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012006/> C ertai... more Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivaties 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012006/> C ertain objects are naturally grouped together; they have something in common. Realists claim that this fact demands explanation. For illustration, imagine that the world is restricted to the contents of a box, of which one might offer the following ordinary description:
The Montagovian tradition in formal semantics combines two basic tenets to explain a wide variety... more The Montagovian tradition in formal semantics combines two basic tenets to explain a wide variety of linguistic phenomena.
Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block f... more Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of content. Specifically, I propose a version of the redundancy theory according to which ‘it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio’ expresses the same proposition as ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’. Surprisingly, this variant of the redundancy theory treats ‘is true’ as an ordinary predicate of the language, thereby defusing many standard criticisms of the redundancy theory.
It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously repr... more It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world’s structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law-hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint-carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow them to properly impose constraints on grammar.
In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provide... more In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes that the ordinary claim must be apriori entailed by a description of the core evidence. However, I propose that careful thinking about belief suspension reveals that empirical information can contaminate the reasoning from the core evidence to the ordinary claim S, even if belief in the core evidence is suspended. One result is that empiricists and externalists may freely appeal to thought experiments without having to concede that there are substantive apriori truths.
In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzl... more In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine's proposed solution to Frege's puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution-his attempted solution. The correct characterization of Fine's solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labe... more Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always agree in meaning. We offer a precise interpretation of the challenge posed by (i) and (ii). We then develop some neglected passages of Tarski to show that his semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics.
King (2007, 2009, 2012) argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true... more King (2007, 2009, 2012) argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But—for good reason—King claims that propositions possess truth conditions intrinsically and essentially. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can’t follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.
Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare... more Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare their views on the relationship between language and the world. But Russell's exact characterization of incomplete symbols and the role they play in his philosophy are still disputed. In this paper, I trace the development of the notion of an incomplete symbol in Russell's philosophy. I suggest – against Kaplan, Evans, and others – that Russell's many characterizations of the notion of an incomplete symbol are compatible. To this end, I examine and reject arguments for the purported incompatibility between declaring an expression to be incomplete and incorporating that symbol into a compositional semantic theory. I then examine how Russell puts the notion of an incomplete symbol to use in metaphysics.
The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has haunted broadly Fregean views, ac... more The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has haunted broadly Fregean views, according to which co-referential proper names are not always substitutable salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. Opponents of Fregeanism argue that a belief ascription containing a proper name such as ‘Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable’ is equivalent to a quantified sentence such as ‘there is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and that person is Lindsay’. They conclude that the semantic contribution of a name such as ‘Lindsay’ is the same as the semantic contribution of a variable under an assignment, which these opponents suggest is merely the object assigned to that variable. However, renewed interest in variables suggests that they make a more complicated contribution to the semantic processing of sentences that contain them. In particular, a variable contributes both an assignment-unsaturated and an assignment-saturated semantic value. I use this dual role of the semantics of variables to develop a response to the argument from quantifying in. I take as my point of departure Cumming’s (2008) view that an attitude ascription relates the subject of an attitude to the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. I argue that this approach fails. I propose an alternative, according to which the truth of a belief ascription depends on both the assignment-saturated and the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. This approach reverses standard assumptions concerning the relation between quantification and substitution.
According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one's preferred theory ought to correspond ... more According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one's preferred theory ought to correspond to something in the world, a feature shared by the various entities that satisfy the predicate. 1 If the predicate 'is a kangaroo' occurs in one's preferred theory, then one ought to posit a property which all of the various things that satisfy 'is a kangaroo' have in common. 2 Philosophers of this persuasion divide into two camps. Some endorse sparse conceptions of properties on which some collections of entities lack a common property. Therefore, they hesitate to deploy additional predicates in their preferred description of the world. The predicates of day-to-day language or special sciences likely do not correspond to properties. These predicates then must ultimately give way to the predicates of a more austere schema. Other property theorists endorse abundant conceptions: every arbitrary grouping of individuals shares some property. A theory would be no worse for having a predicate corresponding to any such grouping.
In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theo... more In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theory, Frege introduces a rule which allows a function name to be formed by removing a saturated name from another saturated name which contains it. This rule requires that each name has a rather rich syntactic structure, since one must be able to recognize the occurrences of a name in a larger name. However, I argue that Frege is unable to account for this syntactic structure. I argue that this problem undermines the inductive portion of Frege's proof that all of the names of his system denote in § §29-32 of The Basic Laws.
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from w... more I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as 'this statue is a molded piece of clay'. This suggests that speakers believe propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word 'is', such that 'is' in these sentences means the same as 'constitutes or is constituted by'. I will use standard tests for ambiguity to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument.
Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism is false, since it predicts that one cannot... more Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism is false, since it predicts that one cannot believe, say, that Joe Strummer was born in 1952, without having a belief about the actual world. Soames suggests that agents in other possible worlds may have this belief, but may lack any beliefs about the actual world, a world that they do not occupy and have no contact with. I argue that this argument extends to other popular actuality-involving analyses. I argue that in order for Soames to hold on to his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism, he must provide alternatives to these analyses. I then argue that there is reason to think that these alternatives are not forthcoming, so Soames should surrender his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism.
Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivaties 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012006/> C ertai... more Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivaties 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012006/> C ertain objects are naturally grouped together; they have something in common. Realists claim that this fact demands explanation. For illustration, imagine that the world is restricted to the contents of a box, of which one might offer the following ordinary description:
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