Eugen Fischer
BPhil (Oxford), DPhil (Oxford), PD (LMU Munich)
I taught at the universities of Oxford and Munich before coming to UEA. I have been a Heisenberg Research Reader, Golestan Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Central European Institute for Advanced Study / Collegium Budapest.
My current research focuses on philosophical intuitions: intuitions which are used as evidence for philosophical theories or engender philosophical paradoxes and problems. In collaboration with colleagues from psychology, I am pursuing an interdisciplinary research programme currently emerging from experimental philosophy: The ‘sources project’ (aka 'cognitive epistemology', or the 'underwater part' of 'iceberg epistemology') seeks to develop psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions that help us assess their evidentiary value. I study intuitions at the root of classical paradoxes about the mind and perception. I am particularly interested in the role of analogy and metaphor in automatic cognition as well as in the role of verb-related stereotypes. My recent and forthcoming papers on the topic include:
Mind the Metaphor! A Systematic Fallacy in Analogical Reasoning. Analysis 75 (2015), 67-77
Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors. Synthese 191 (2014), 569-606
Messing Up the Mind? Analogical Reasoning with Metaphors. In H. Jales Ribeiro (ed.): Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Springer 2014, pp. 129-148
My experimental work on verb-related stereotypes is done in collaboration with psychologist Paul Engelhardt (UEA) and computational linguist Aurelie Herbelot (Cambridge):
E. Fischer & P.E. Engelhardt: Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit. Ratio (SI Experimental Philosophy as Applied Philosophy, 2017)
E. Fischer & P.E. Engelhardt: Intuitions' Linguistic Sources: Stereotypes, Intuitions, and Illusions. Mind and Language 31 (2016), 67-103
E. Fischer, P.E. Engelhardt & A. Herbelot: Intuitions and Illusions. From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment. In: E. Fischer and J. Collins (eds.): Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, Routledge, 2015 (paperback ISBN 978-1-13-888728-2), pp. 259-292
Paradox-Psychology. Cognitive Epistemology and Philosophical Problem-Resolution (in German). In T. Grundmann, J. Horvath and J. Kipper (eds.): Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Suhrkamp 2014, pp. 285-313
The second, subtly related, focus of my work is on therapeutic aims and methods in philosophy, and on when and why they need to complement familiar forms of philosophical argument and analysis. In particular, I have used findings from cognitive psychology and concepts from cognitive psychotherapy (CBT) to develop some meta-philosophical and methodological ideas first mooted by Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. This line of research has redeveloped the notions of ‘philosophical problem-dissolution’ and ‘therapeutic philosophy’ within a post-linguistic paradigm. Major publications include:
Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy. Outline of a Philosophical Revolution, Routledge 2011 (Paperback 2013)
How to Practice Philosophy as Therapy: Philosophical Therapy and Therapeutic Philosophy, Metaphilosophy 42 (2011), 49-82
Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy, Philosophical Investigations 34 (2011), 22-54
Wittgenstein’s Non-Cognitivism – Explained and Vindicated, Synthese 162 (2008), 53-84
I have also done some primarily exegetical work on Wittgenstein. I am co-editor (with Severin Schroeder) of the monograph series “Wittgenstein’s Thought and Legacy” (Routledge) and of the collection:
Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fischer (eds.): Wittgenstein at Work. Method in the “Philosophical Investigations”. Routledge 2004 (Paperback 2010).
I am happy to supervise work on any of these and directly related topics.
Phone: +44 1603 593416
Address: School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia
Norwich NR4 7TJ
I taught at the universities of Oxford and Munich before coming to UEA. I have been a Heisenberg Research Reader, Golestan Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Central European Institute for Advanced Study / Collegium Budapest.
My current research focuses on philosophical intuitions: intuitions which are used as evidence for philosophical theories or engender philosophical paradoxes and problems. In collaboration with colleagues from psychology, I am pursuing an interdisciplinary research programme currently emerging from experimental philosophy: The ‘sources project’ (aka 'cognitive epistemology', or the 'underwater part' of 'iceberg epistemology') seeks to develop psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions that help us assess their evidentiary value. I study intuitions at the root of classical paradoxes about the mind and perception. I am particularly interested in the role of analogy and metaphor in automatic cognition as well as in the role of verb-related stereotypes. My recent and forthcoming papers on the topic include:
Mind the Metaphor! A Systematic Fallacy in Analogical Reasoning. Analysis 75 (2015), 67-77
Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors. Synthese 191 (2014), 569-606
Messing Up the Mind? Analogical Reasoning with Metaphors. In H. Jales Ribeiro (ed.): Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Springer 2014, pp. 129-148
My experimental work on verb-related stereotypes is done in collaboration with psychologist Paul Engelhardt (UEA) and computational linguist Aurelie Herbelot (Cambridge):
E. Fischer & P.E. Engelhardt: Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit. Ratio (SI Experimental Philosophy as Applied Philosophy, 2017)
E. Fischer & P.E. Engelhardt: Intuitions' Linguistic Sources: Stereotypes, Intuitions, and Illusions. Mind and Language 31 (2016), 67-103
E. Fischer, P.E. Engelhardt & A. Herbelot: Intuitions and Illusions. From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment. In: E. Fischer and J. Collins (eds.): Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, Routledge, 2015 (paperback ISBN 978-1-13-888728-2), pp. 259-292
Paradox-Psychology. Cognitive Epistemology and Philosophical Problem-Resolution (in German). In T. Grundmann, J. Horvath and J. Kipper (eds.): Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Suhrkamp 2014, pp. 285-313
The second, subtly related, focus of my work is on therapeutic aims and methods in philosophy, and on when and why they need to complement familiar forms of philosophical argument and analysis. In particular, I have used findings from cognitive psychology and concepts from cognitive psychotherapy (CBT) to develop some meta-philosophical and methodological ideas first mooted by Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. This line of research has redeveloped the notions of ‘philosophical problem-dissolution’ and ‘therapeutic philosophy’ within a post-linguistic paradigm. Major publications include:
Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy. Outline of a Philosophical Revolution, Routledge 2011 (Paperback 2013)
How to Practice Philosophy as Therapy: Philosophical Therapy and Therapeutic Philosophy, Metaphilosophy 42 (2011), 49-82
Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy, Philosophical Investigations 34 (2011), 22-54
Wittgenstein’s Non-Cognitivism – Explained and Vindicated, Synthese 162 (2008), 53-84
I have also done some primarily exegetical work on Wittgenstein. I am co-editor (with Severin Schroeder) of the monograph series “Wittgenstein’s Thought and Legacy” (Routledge) and of the collection:
Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fischer (eds.): Wittgenstein at Work. Method in the “Philosophical Investigations”. Routledge 2004 (Paperback 2010).
I am happy to supervise work on any of these and directly related topics.
Phone: +44 1603 593416
Address: School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia
Norwich NR4 7TJ
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Books by Eugen Fischer
Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones.
Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views?
Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology.
Contents and Contributors:
Introduction: Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental Philosophy – An Introduction Eugen Fischer and John Collins The Volume: Synopsis Eugen Fischer and John Collins Part 1: The Armchair and Naturalism 1. The Nature of A Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic? David Papineau 2. Understanding the Question: Philosophy and its History Tim Crane 3. Two Kinds of Naturalism John Collins 4. Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition Mikkel Gerken 5. Thought Experiments, Concepts, and Conceptions Daniele Sgaravatti 6. Against Naturalistic Defences of Intuition Hilary Kornblith Part 2: Varieties of Experimental Philosophy 7. Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy Jonathan M. Weinberg 8. The Illusion of Expertise Edouard Machery 9. Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism Jennifer Nado 10. Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism Bence Nanay 11. Experimental Philosophical Semantics and the Real Reference of 'Gödel' Amir Horowitz 12. Intuitions and Illusions: From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt and Aurelie Herbelot. Index
Recent review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35797-philosophical-delusion-and-its-therapy-outline-of-a-philosophical-revolution-2/
""
Contributors: E. Ammereller, C. Diamond, E. Fischer, H. Glock, P.M.S. Hacker, O. Hanfling, A. Kenny, S. Mulhall, E. von Savigny, S. Schroeder, J. Schulte, S. Shanker
Papers by Eugen Fischer
Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones.
Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views?
Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology.
Contents and Contributors:
Introduction: Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental Philosophy – An Introduction Eugen Fischer and John Collins The Volume: Synopsis Eugen Fischer and John Collins Part 1: The Armchair and Naturalism 1. The Nature of A Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic? David Papineau 2. Understanding the Question: Philosophy and its History Tim Crane 3. Two Kinds of Naturalism John Collins 4. Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition Mikkel Gerken 5. Thought Experiments, Concepts, and Conceptions Daniele Sgaravatti 6. Against Naturalistic Defences of Intuition Hilary Kornblith Part 2: Varieties of Experimental Philosophy 7. Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy Jonathan M. Weinberg 8. The Illusion of Expertise Edouard Machery 9. Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism Jennifer Nado 10. Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism Bence Nanay 11. Experimental Philosophical Semantics and the Real Reference of 'Gödel' Amir Horowitz 12. Intuitions and Illusions: From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt and Aurelie Herbelot. Index
Recent review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35797-philosophical-delusion-and-its-therapy-outline-of-a-philosophical-revolution-2/
""
Contributors: E. Ammereller, C. Diamond, E. Fischer, H. Glock, P.M.S. Hacker, O. Hanfling, A. Kenny, S. Mulhall, E. von Savigny, S. Schroeder, J. Schulte, S. Shanker
To help answer this question, the paper brings together two hitherto largely distinct strands of research from cognitive psychology, in a case-study on the philosophy of mind: The paper uses structure-mapping theory (Gentner 1983, Gentner and Bowdle 2008) to explain how simple analogical reasoning generates conceptual metaphors that facilitate more complex analogical reasoning, which is often non-intentional (Day and Gentner 2007). Second, the paper examines how such reasoning – non-intentional analogical reasoning which employs conceptual metaphors (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011) – interacts with partial-matching effects in memory-based processing (Kamas et al. 1996, Park and Reder 2004). Drawing on Budiu and Anderson’s (2004) model of ‘information-based processing’, the paper shows that this interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper brings out the relevance of such fallacies by showing that they shaped introspective conceptions of the mind that dominated philosophical discourse throughout early modernity and retain some cultural influence to this day. The paper delineates when and where those fallacies are liable to occur, and closes (time permitting) with some suggestions about how they can be identified and avoided.
Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions can help us assess their evidentiary value. To explain and assess conceptual or classificatory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophers have suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules proposed by cognitive psychologists. The present paper extends this approach in two ways: By integrating results from three disparate strands of psychological research, on intuitive judgement, on analogical and metaphorical reasoning, and on associative processing, the paper motivates the proposal of a new heuristic, the metaphor heuristic, and shows that it helps us explain and assess general factual intuitions which have been central to the philosophies of mind and perception. This explanation satisfies key desiderata imposed by the relevant research programmes in cognitive psychology and facilitates the assessment of the philosophical intuitions explained.