Papers by Barbara Fultner
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's <I>Being and Time</I>, 2013
Hypatia Reviews Online, 2019
Barbara Fultner is a professor and chair of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at Denison ... more Barbara Fultner is a professor and chair of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at Denison University. She is the editor of Jürgen Habermas: Key Concepts and translator of Habermas's Truth and Justification. Her work lies at the intersection of critical theory, feminist philosophy, social theory, and philosophy of language and mind and focuses especially on feminist social ontology, intersubjectivity, embodiment, and collective agency. Quote: "[W]e should expect others to misunderstand us. Moreover, we might also have to expect ourselves to misunderstand them. Call that the principle of humility." ***
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2001
Presentation de l'ouvrage de R. B. Brandom intitule «L'explicitation: raisonnement, repre... more Presentation de l'ouvrage de R. B. Brandom intitule «L'explicitation: raisonnement, representation et engagement discursif» (1994) qui defend une theorie pragmatiste de la signification et de l'intelligibilite, a partir de concepts normatifs fondes sur la pratique sociale.
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2017
Language Under Discussion
Judith Bridges’ analysis of -splain discourse illustrates the slipperiness of language in the age... more Judith Bridges’ analysis of -splain discourse illustrates the slipperiness of language in the age of Twitter, microblogging, and cancel culture and helps explain why having meaningful public discourse seems increasingly difficult. X-splaining is a form of epistemic injustice. I suggest that, barring a Humpty-Dumpty theory of meaning, attempts to recontextualize neologisms like mansplain to make them antonyms of their original meanings should be seen as misuses. Moreover, -splain terms creatively and conveniently compress multiple meanings into one, but can also function to cut off dialogue, making it harder to hold speakers accountable for their claims.
The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory, 2017
In recent years, analytic philosophers have begun to pay increased attention to shared or “collec... more In recent years, analytic philosophers have begun to pay increased attention to shared or “collective intentionality,” a term referring broadly to our human capacity to act in concert. From the deeply rooted individualistic perspective of contemporary cognitive science, this ability represents a real problem. However, from the perspective of critical theory, and of Jurgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action in particular, the social has always been integral to how we think of agency and the self. Furthermore, there is a long tradition in critical theory of using empirical research in psychology and sociology to inform conceptions of self and agency. In this chapter, the author shows how subjectivity and intersubjectivity are inextricably intertwined in the Habermasian theoretical framework, and traces the ways in which Habermasian account parallels feminist conceptions of the self as relational.
Consciousness & Emotion Book Series, 2012
Adequate accounts of intersubjectivity must recognise that it is a social, cognitive, and affecti... more Adequate accounts of intersubjectivity must recognise that it is a social, cognitive, and affective phenomenon. I draw on Jurgen Habermas’ formal-pragmatic theory of meaning and of the lifeworld as an alternative to phenomenological approaches. However, his conception of the lifeworld reflects a cognitivist bias. Intersubjectivity cannot be adequately conceptualised merely in terms of our mutual accountability and exchange or reasons; the affective dimension of our social interactions must also be recognised. I propose to redress this shortcoming by taking account of empirical research on intersubjectivity, joint attention, and attachment. This leads me to suggest supplementing the three Habermasian validity claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity with a fourth, a claim to attachment , which fits with understanding the earliest infant interactions in terms of altercentric participation. Since an adequate account of the social nature of linguistic communication must do justice not only to the lifeworld as a shared background of intelligibility, but also as a background against which differences in point of view are articulated, I conclude with a brief look at the ontogeny of perspective. Keywords: lifeworld; intersubjectivity; validity claims; attachment; cognition; affect; perspective; J. Habermas; M. Merleau-Ponty
Dialogue, Politics and Gender, 2013
In Dialogue, Politics and Gender, ed. Jude Browne. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013.)
Continental Philosophy Review, 2001
This paper examines the role of Habermas's concept of the lifeworld in processes of reaching... more This paper examines the role of Habermas's concept of the lifeworld in processes of reaching mutual understanding. This concept is shown to be ultimately too amorphous to bear the theoretical weight Habermas places on it. He conceives the lifeworld both as diffuse and holistic, yet also as structured; as a set of taken-for-granted and counterfactual presuppositions, yet also as a kind of knowledge. In the end, he presupposes what the lifeworld is supposed to explain: mutual intelligibility of subjects in interaction. These conceptual tensions affect the explanatory power of the lifeworld and the usefulness of the theory of communicative action for conflict resolution. Where conflict resolution is aimed at mediating radical disagreements with minimal concord between parties, presuming consensus may not be possible or optimal. The present analysis argues for the need to develop other means of establishing a sufficient level of background consensus against which communicative acti...
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1996
Abstract Jurgen Habermas has proposed a tripartite classification of analytic philosophy of langu... more Abstract Jurgen Habermas has proposed a tripartite classification of analytic philosophy of language into formal semantics, intentionalistic semantics, and use‐theories of meaning. Here, I focus on the relationship between formal semantics and Habermas’ own account of meaning and truth. I argue against his early ‘consensus theory of truth’, according to which truth is defined as idealized warranted assertibility and explained by the ‘discursive redemption’ of validity claims. A claim is discursively redeemed if it commands rationally motivated consensus of all discursive partners. I argue that this is not so much a theory of truth as of justification. As an account of truth, it is unsatisfactory because warrants can be lost in light of new arguments, and because consensus is seen as criterial for truth only if it is in principle defeasible ‐ hence there remains a gap between truth and even idealized warranted assertibility. In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas’ views undergo a shift. Following ...
Numéro 2: L'acte d'imagination: Approches phénoménologiques (Actes n°10)
I argue that linguistic competence and communication are best understood as requiring sensitivity... more I argue that linguistic competence and communication are best understood as requiring sensitivity to both normativity and creativity. Yet most mainstream (analytic) accounts of meaning tend to focus on problems of normativity rather than creativity. Phenomenology offers a corrective to this imbalance because of its emphasis on embodiment and intersubjectivity, as well as the role it accords to the imagination. I begin by contrasting an account of rule-following that excludes the imagination with one that appeals to Kant’s schematism and show that the schematic imagination makes possible a “seeing-as” that plays a key role in rule-following. I then use Gadamer’s hermeneutics to articulate a notion of creative imagination. Finally, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied imagination to fill out a conception of language as not only a lived but also an inherently embodied practice.
Language Under Discussion, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 58–64, 2014
François Cooren's ventriloquist pragmatism aims to do justice to the richness and complexity of c... more François Cooren's ventriloquist pragmatism aims to do justice to the richness and complexity of communication and is informed by a wide range of communication theories. While I share Cooren's pragmatist intuitions, I am less certain about his ventriloquist pragmatism (or pragmatist ventriloquism). I therefore ask, first, what we gain from the ventriloquism metaphor; and, second, how pragmatism serves as a meta-perspective and how ventriloquism facilitates a dialogue between the seven traditions of communication theory he identifies. Finally, I consider a Habermasian theory of communicative action as a possibly preferable alternative. François Cooren's (2014) insightful conception of communication aims to do justice to communication's richness and complexity and is informed by a wide range of communication theories. Cooren shows great sensitivity to the plethora of considerations interlocutors need to take into account: They draw on their environments and their particular situations and contexts in communicating with one another; they not only express their own intentions when they speak, but sometimes also speak for others; at the same time, their intentions (as well as their beliefs and desires) are shaped by their individual as well as collective and socio-cultural histories and experiences; they are accountable for the claims they make in speaking and draw on these histories, environments, and situations to make good on their claims. The meaning of what interlocutors say is thus not solely up to them, but shaped by their relations to the world. It is not easy to combine all of these elements in a unified and coherent theory, and I agree with Cooren that pragmatism provides the right kind of theoretical framework. I
In Dialogue, Politics and Gender, ed. Jude Browne.
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013.)
In Cambridge Companion to Being and Time, Mark Wrathall, ed. (Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
In Moving Ourselves, ed. Tim Racine, Jordan Zlatev, Ad
Foolen, and Ulrike Lüdtke (John Benjamins... more In Moving Ourselves, ed. Tim Racine, Jordan Zlatev, Ad
Foolen, and Ulrike Lüdtke (John Benjamins Publishing, 2012).
In Dialogues with Davidson, Jeff Malpas, ed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2005
Philosophical Studies, 2002
Brandom's inferentialism provides a semantics that complements Habermas's theory of communicative... more Brandom's inferentialism provides a semantics that complements Habermas's theory of communicative action without sacrificing its intersubjectivist insights. Pace Habermas, Brandom's conception of communication is robustly intersubjective. At the pragmatic level, interlocutors inherit each other's commitments and entitlements and must justify their claims when challenged; at the semantic level, anaphora show how the web of meaning is knit together, connecting expressions of the language as well as interlocutors. Finally, Habermas's thesis that there are three irreducible types of validity claim is preserved by linking claims to truth and rightness with mutually irreducible patterns of inference.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1996
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Papers by Barbara Fultner
Foolen, and Ulrike Lüdtke (John Benjamins Publishing, 2012).
Foolen, and Ulrike Lüdtke (John Benjamins Publishing, 2012).