Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that hum... more Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in actioni.e., the free willrequired for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward (see, e.g., Pereboom , ; Levy ; Caruso and Morris ). For agents to be morally responsible for their actions in this sense is for the actions to be theirs in such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agents would deserve to be blamed or praised just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (Pereboom : ). Accordingly, here we will understand free will as the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, and free will skepticism as doubt or denial that we have this sort of control. Some free will skeptics deny that we are morally responsible in this sense because they believe it is incoherent or impossible that we satisfy its control conditions (Strawson , , ). That is, it's incoherent or impossible that we have the free will required to be morally responsible in this sense. Others maintain that, though not incoherent or impossible, our best philosophical and scientific theories about the word provide strong and compelling reasons for adopting the skeptical perspective. What all varieties of free will skepticism share, however, is the belief that the evidential standard for our having basic desert moral responsibility is not met, and as a result there is a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the practices associated with itsuch as the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment.
Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s chapter on hard-incompatibilist existentialism explores the prac... more Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s chapter on hard-incompatibilist existentialism explores the practical and existential implications of free will skepticism, focusing on punishment, morality, and meaning in life. They consider two different routes to free will skepticism: the route that denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will, which receives impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience, and the route that does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that, whether deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will. They argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route, the second remains intact and that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy.
I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same t... more I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same time a conception of life without this type of free will would not be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial (cf. Pereboom 2001). In this article, I explore which sorts of emotional attitudes are consistent with a denial of the sort of free will required for moral responsibility, and whether they can sustain a meaningful life. In the process, I respond to Shaun Nichols's recent criticism of my position (cf. Nichols 2007).
... Consider a related objection: Kant identifies purely conceptual cognition with intellectual c... more ... Consider a related objection: Kant identifies purely conceptual cognition with intellectual cognition. ... But, in reply, for Leibniz implicit in every concept of a thing there is a purely ... 17 Perhaps Leibniz also motivates the concept containment theory of truth by the Principle of Sufficient ...
Al dente means "firm to the bite," and that is how Italians eat pasta. Soft pasta is no more fit ... more Al dente means "firm to the bite," and that is how Italians eat pasta. Soft pasta is no more fit to eat than a limp and soggy slice of bread. As soon as pasta begins to lose its stiffness and becomes just tender enough so that you can bite through without snapping it, it is done. Once you have learned to cook and eat pasta al dente, you'll accept it no other way. (Marcella Hazan, The Classic Italian Cookbook, pp. 90-1)
We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first deni... more We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well...
Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that hum... more Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in actioni.e., the free willrequired for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward (see, e.g., Pereboom , ; Levy ; Caruso and Morris ). For agents to be morally responsible for their actions in this sense is for the actions to be theirs in such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agents would deserve to be blamed or praised just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (Pereboom : ). Accordingly, here we will understand free will as the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, and free will skepticism as doubt or denial that we have this sort of control. Some free will skeptics deny that we are morally responsible in this sense because they believe it is incoherent or impossible that we satisfy its control conditions (Strawson , , ). That is, it's incoherent or impossible that we have the free will required to be morally responsible in this sense. Others maintain that, though not incoherent or impossible, our best philosophical and scientific theories about the word provide strong and compelling reasons for adopting the skeptical perspective. What all varieties of free will skepticism share, however, is the belief that the evidential standard for our having basic desert moral responsibility is not met, and as a result there is a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the practices associated with itsuch as the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment.
Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s chapter on hard-incompatibilist existentialism explores the prac... more Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s chapter on hard-incompatibilist existentialism explores the practical and existential implications of free will skepticism, focusing on punishment, morality, and meaning in life. They consider two different routes to free will skepticism: the route that denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will, which receives impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience, and the route that does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that, whether deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will. They argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route, the second remains intact and that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy.
I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same t... more I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same time a conception of life without this type of free will would not be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial (cf. Pereboom 2001). In this article, I explore which sorts of emotional attitudes are consistent with a denial of the sort of free will required for moral responsibility, and whether they can sustain a meaningful life. In the process, I respond to Shaun Nichols's recent criticism of my position (cf. Nichols 2007).
... Consider a related objection: Kant identifies purely conceptual cognition with intellectual c... more ... Consider a related objection: Kant identifies purely conceptual cognition with intellectual cognition. ... But, in reply, for Leibniz implicit in every concept of a thing there is a purely ... 17 Perhaps Leibniz also motivates the concept containment theory of truth by the Principle of Sufficient ...
Al dente means "firm to the bite," and that is how Italians eat pasta. Soft pasta is no more fit ... more Al dente means "firm to the bite," and that is how Italians eat pasta. Soft pasta is no more fit to eat than a limp and soggy slice of bread. As soon as pasta begins to lose its stiffness and becomes just tender enough so that you can bite through without snapping it, it is done. Once you have learned to cook and eat pasta al dente, you'll accept it no other way. (Marcella Hazan, The Classic Italian Cookbook, pp. 90-1)
We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first deni... more We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well...
Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, th... more Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate.
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