The Significance of Karl Kraus in Wittgenstein's Philosophy, 2023
The Nature of Karl Kraus' Influence on Wittgenstein's Philosophy The article concerns the influen... more The Nature of Karl Kraus' Influence on Wittgenstein's Philosophy The article concerns the influence of Karl Kraus, the Austrian cultural critic, on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It starts by pointing out the significance attributed to the influence of Kraus by Wittgenstein himself, and this is then compared with the inspiration he took from other authors. Then the mottos to both central books by Wittgenstein are identified as the key Krausian indicators. And, interpreting both mottos, the article comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, Wittgenstein was inspired by Kraus to conceive his own work as a linguistic satire. The end of the article uses examples of Wittgenstein's use of comical elements to show satire as a key aspect of his philosophy.
The Origin of the Concern for Common Sense: The Genesis of Shaftes-bury’s Essay “Sensus Communis”, 2019
The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by... more The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, so as to fix its place in Shaftesbury’s body of work. Shaftesbury himself did not employ the eponymous term elsewhere in his works and the author argues that its introduction in the essay did not present a significant conceptual enrichment of Shaftesbury’s doctrine. The introduction of the term is interpreted as a tool for answering Shaftesbury critics. First, Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a Tub is proposed as a stimulus for Shaftesbury’s concern with raillery in his Letter concerning Enthusiasm. Second, Mary Astell is singled out among the critics of the Letter as the one who put forth the most elaborate analysis, including an argument from common sense against Shaftesbury’s test by raillery.
The author operates from the assumption that early modern philosophers’ reflections on common sen... more The author operates from the assumption that early modern philosophers’ reflections on common sense were substantially shaped by Seneca’s texts (which belonged to the common reading of the scholars of the time) in the course of their treatment of the Latin terms “sensus communis”, “bona mens” and “recta ratio” and the French and English counterparts of these terms. From this he concludes that it is entirely appropriate to take a closer look at Seneca’s own treatment of these terms to see if we can find material there that would help us better understand early philosophical reflections about common sense. The next part of the article attempts therefore to show what in Seneca’s treatment of such terms as “bona mens”, “recta ratio“ and “sensus communis” can justify, when they are explicit, the early modern references to him, and the suspicion of his influence when they are not explicit.
The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s... more The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s philosophy, as proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff who claims that Reid was not clear about the concept of common sense, or about the principles of common sense. In contrast, this paper presents Reid’s conception as a clear and traditional Aristotelian notion of common sense and its principles as presuppositions of particular sense judgments, usually taken for granted. The alleged confusion about principles is resolved by a distinction between principles of common sense and first principles as such.
It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but ... more It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be classed as a mental ability, not a belief-system. Common sense is to be distinguished from theoretical understanding which, in Berkeley’s view, is frequently corrupted either by learned prejudice, or by language that lacks meaning or camouflages contradiction. It is also to be distinguished from the deliverances of divine revelation, which—however enlightening Berkeley supposed them to be—are not necessarily available to all people. This interpretation of common sense is supported both by attention to Berkeley’s own texts, including his sermons, letters and philosophical writings, and by attention to the views of John Locke and René Descartes, who also understand ‘common sense’ as susceptibility to the ‘natural light’. In addition, this interpretation renders Berkeley’s appeal to common sense in support of his immaterialism a straightforward appeal to the reader’s native reason. No longer, then, are we forced to see Berkeley as improbably maintaining that the denial of matter is really the view of ‘the common people’, but rather that those who have least attachment to theory and doctrine will be best able to grasp the case for immaterialism.
The notion of “common sense” in Thomas Reid
The article interprets the not of “common sense” as p... more The notion of “common sense” in Thomas Reid The article interprets the not of “common sense” as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid’s epistemology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid’s use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the “principles of common sense”. The “principles of common sense” play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The “principles of common sense” are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term “common sense”, on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience.
The article presents a first part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractat... more The article presents a first part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgensteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely ractical exercise, however without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. The first part considers the preface and the motto of the book
The article presents a second part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tracta... more The article presents a second part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgenteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however, without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. This second part continues with interpretation of Wittgenstein’s correspndence with Russell, Frege, Ficker and comes to the conclusion for both parts considering mutual relation of all the sources
The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candi... more The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candidates for being the counterpart to the modern concept of common sense, and it introduces them in their mutual relatedness. Aristotle works with the term endoxos, particularly in his logical and rhetorical texts, which he uses for statements and persons which are recognised in a given community. In epistemology he works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
The essay examines Charles Taylor’s latest book The Secular Age (2007) by unveiling its Hegelian ... more The essay examines Charles Taylor’s latest book The Secular Age (2007) by unveiling its Hegelian roots together with its debt to other critics of modernity and by considering some objections as well as Taylor’s answers.
Taylor sketches two types of contemporary ethical projects. On the one hand he considers exclusive humanism, on the other the immanent antihumanism. The moral of Taylor’s story of modern secularism comes to his claim that the anti-humanism is enabled by humanism and humanism again by religiosity. According to him this comes to indispensability of religion: namely, some notion of transcendence is necessary for coherence of any set of values available to western man. Actually the originality inspiring its following is what he understands as the key element that is shared by the central claim of Christianity embodied in the notion of love (agape) overcoming the rigorism of explicit rules on the one hand and modern art as Ersatzreligion.
(Not only) this aspect of Taylor’s recent work is rooted in his lifelong interest in Hegel, who looked for such pairing of the ethics of authenticity with a sense for community that could overcome the limits of reflective rationality. We can interpret Taylor’s amendement to Hegel as a substitution of „support for differentiation in unity“ (or simply „culture“) for „love for neighbour“.
Nejsem ten pravý člověk, který by měl recenzovat novou knihu Petra Koťátka Interpretace a subjekt... more Nejsem ten pravý člověk, který by měl recenzovat novou knihu Petra Koťátka Interpretace a subjektivita. Musím totiž přiznat velkou zaujatost. Petr Koťátko nejen patřil mezi mé učitele, ale byl dokonce mým školitelem při práci na disertaci, a pokud o problematice, které se věnuje jeho nová kniha, něco vím, má to svůj prapůvod z valné části u něj. Četba jeho nové knihy ve mně také vyvolává nostalgii po (jak s údivem zjišťuji, už vzdálených) letech studií, kdy jsem navštěvoval jeho přednášky a poprvé od něj slýchal popperovské nabádání, s nímž si ho od té doby spojuji a které mimochodem jeho nové kniha vrchovatě realizuje: je třeba přicházet s odvážnými hypotézami, jež vyvolávají plodnou diskusi tím, jak se vystavují falsifikaci.
The book contains a translation of De nostri temporis studiorum ratione by Giambattista Vico (166... more The book contains a translation of De nostri temporis studiorum ratione by Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). This early text based on a speech of a professor of rhetorics to his students at the university of Naples is perhaps a most accessible introduction to Vico’s thought. Vico compares modern studies with their ancient counterpart using this for his critique of Cartesianism as a overly theoretical attitude detaching students from common life and making them incompetent in practical, especially civil, matters. However Vico leads his reader through his comparision in various disciplines, including theology, art or law theory. The translation is supplemented by an extensive introduction by the translator. The preface provides a context for understanding Vico’s philosophy, its cultural frame, Vico‘s life and works to focus subsequently on a central notion of his thought, namely sensus communis, tracing its origin to Roman Stoic philosophy, poetry and rhetorics.
The Significance of Karl Kraus in Wittgenstein's Philosophy, 2023
The Nature of Karl Kraus' Influence on Wittgenstein's Philosophy The article concerns the influen... more The Nature of Karl Kraus' Influence on Wittgenstein's Philosophy The article concerns the influence of Karl Kraus, the Austrian cultural critic, on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It starts by pointing out the significance attributed to the influence of Kraus by Wittgenstein himself, and this is then compared with the inspiration he took from other authors. Then the mottos to both central books by Wittgenstein are identified as the key Krausian indicators. And, interpreting both mottos, the article comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, Wittgenstein was inspired by Kraus to conceive his own work as a linguistic satire. The end of the article uses examples of Wittgenstein's use of comical elements to show satire as a key aspect of his philosophy.
The Origin of the Concern for Common Sense: The Genesis of Shaftes-bury’s Essay “Sensus Communis”, 2019
The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by... more The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, so as to fix its place in Shaftesbury’s body of work. Shaftesbury himself did not employ the eponymous term elsewhere in his works and the author argues that its introduction in the essay did not present a significant conceptual enrichment of Shaftesbury’s doctrine. The introduction of the term is interpreted as a tool for answering Shaftesbury critics. First, Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a Tub is proposed as a stimulus for Shaftesbury’s concern with raillery in his Letter concerning Enthusiasm. Second, Mary Astell is singled out among the critics of the Letter as the one who put forth the most elaborate analysis, including an argument from common sense against Shaftesbury’s test by raillery.
The author operates from the assumption that early modern philosophers’ reflections on common sen... more The author operates from the assumption that early modern philosophers’ reflections on common sense were substantially shaped by Seneca’s texts (which belonged to the common reading of the scholars of the time) in the course of their treatment of the Latin terms “sensus communis”, “bona mens” and “recta ratio” and the French and English counterparts of these terms. From this he concludes that it is entirely appropriate to take a closer look at Seneca’s own treatment of these terms to see if we can find material there that would help us better understand early philosophical reflections about common sense. The next part of the article attempts therefore to show what in Seneca’s treatment of such terms as “bona mens”, “recta ratio“ and “sensus communis” can justify, when they are explicit, the early modern references to him, and the suspicion of his influence when they are not explicit.
The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s... more The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s philosophy, as proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff who claims that Reid was not clear about the concept of common sense, or about the principles of common sense. In contrast, this paper presents Reid’s conception as a clear and traditional Aristotelian notion of common sense and its principles as presuppositions of particular sense judgments, usually taken for granted. The alleged confusion about principles is resolved by a distinction between principles of common sense and first principles as such.
It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but ... more It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be classed as a mental ability, not a belief-system. Common sense is to be distinguished from theoretical understanding which, in Berkeley’s view, is frequently corrupted either by learned prejudice, or by language that lacks meaning or camouflages contradiction. It is also to be distinguished from the deliverances of divine revelation, which—however enlightening Berkeley supposed them to be—are not necessarily available to all people. This interpretation of common sense is supported both by attention to Berkeley’s own texts, including his sermons, letters and philosophical writings, and by attention to the views of John Locke and René Descartes, who also understand ‘common sense’ as susceptibility to the ‘natural light’. In addition, this interpretation renders Berkeley’s appeal to common sense in support of his immaterialism a straightforward appeal to the reader’s native reason. No longer, then, are we forced to see Berkeley as improbably maintaining that the denial of matter is really the view of ‘the common people’, but rather that those who have least attachment to theory and doctrine will be best able to grasp the case for immaterialism.
The notion of “common sense” in Thomas Reid
The article interprets the not of “common sense” as p... more The notion of “common sense” in Thomas Reid The article interprets the not of “common sense” as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid’s epistemology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid’s use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the “principles of common sense”. The “principles of common sense” play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The “principles of common sense” are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term “common sense”, on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience.
The article presents a first part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractat... more The article presents a first part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgensteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely ractical exercise, however without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. The first part considers the preface and the motto of the book
The article presents a second part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tracta... more The article presents a second part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgenteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however, without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. This second part continues with interpretation of Wittgenstein’s correspndence with Russell, Frege, Ficker and comes to the conclusion for both parts considering mutual relation of all the sources
The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candi... more The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candidates for being the counterpart to the modern concept of common sense, and it introduces them in their mutual relatedness. Aristotle works with the term endoxos, particularly in his logical and rhetorical texts, which he uses for statements and persons which are recognised in a given community. In epistemology he works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
The essay examines Charles Taylor’s latest book The Secular Age (2007) by unveiling its Hegelian ... more The essay examines Charles Taylor’s latest book The Secular Age (2007) by unveiling its Hegelian roots together with its debt to other critics of modernity and by considering some objections as well as Taylor’s answers.
Taylor sketches two types of contemporary ethical projects. On the one hand he considers exclusive humanism, on the other the immanent antihumanism. The moral of Taylor’s story of modern secularism comes to his claim that the anti-humanism is enabled by humanism and humanism again by religiosity. According to him this comes to indispensability of religion: namely, some notion of transcendence is necessary for coherence of any set of values available to western man. Actually the originality inspiring its following is what he understands as the key element that is shared by the central claim of Christianity embodied in the notion of love (agape) overcoming the rigorism of explicit rules on the one hand and modern art as Ersatzreligion.
(Not only) this aspect of Taylor’s recent work is rooted in his lifelong interest in Hegel, who looked for such pairing of the ethics of authenticity with a sense for community that could overcome the limits of reflective rationality. We can interpret Taylor’s amendement to Hegel as a substitution of „support for differentiation in unity“ (or simply „culture“) for „love for neighbour“.
Nejsem ten pravý člověk, který by měl recenzovat novou knihu Petra Koťátka Interpretace a subjekt... more Nejsem ten pravý člověk, který by měl recenzovat novou knihu Petra Koťátka Interpretace a subjektivita. Musím totiž přiznat velkou zaujatost. Petr Koťátko nejen patřil mezi mé učitele, ale byl dokonce mým školitelem při práci na disertaci, a pokud o problematice, které se věnuje jeho nová kniha, něco vím, má to svůj prapůvod z valné části u něj. Četba jeho nové knihy ve mně také vyvolává nostalgii po (jak s údivem zjišťuji, už vzdálených) letech studií, kdy jsem navštěvoval jeho přednášky a poprvé od něj slýchal popperovské nabádání, s nímž si ho od té doby spojuji a které mimochodem jeho nové kniha vrchovatě realizuje: je třeba přicházet s odvážnými hypotézami, jež vyvolávají plodnou diskusi tím, jak se vystavují falsifikaci.
The book contains a translation of De nostri temporis studiorum ratione by Giambattista Vico (166... more The book contains a translation of De nostri temporis studiorum ratione by Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). This early text based on a speech of a professor of rhetorics to his students at the university of Naples is perhaps a most accessible introduction to Vico’s thought. Vico compares modern studies with their ancient counterpart using this for his critique of Cartesianism as a overly theoretical attitude detaching students from common life and making them incompetent in practical, especially civil, matters. However Vico leads his reader through his comparision in various disciplines, including theology, art or law theory. The translation is supplemented by an extensive introduction by the translator. The preface provides a context for understanding Vico’s philosophy, its cultural frame, Vico‘s life and works to focus subsequently on a central notion of his thought, namely sensus communis, tracing its origin to Roman Stoic philosophy, poetry and rhetorics.
The book deals with the overall aim of Wittgenstein’s early (and only) book known under the title... more The book deals with the overall aim of Wittgenstein’s early (and only) book known under the title Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Wittgenstein’s prominent but problematic place in the analytic tradition together with the obvious impact of his philosophy in the wider context calls for reinvestigation of his background and original intent. The starting point is a close reading of the preface and motto of Tractatus in the immendiate context of correspondence with Frege, Russell, and Ficker. This not only helps to establish the insufficiency of the context of the early analytic philosophy for interpretation of early Wittgenstein, but in the first place clearly it presents Wittgenstein’s leading idea of dissolving philosophy as a rationalisation of the perplexities based on linguistic misunderstanding. His aim was to get clear about the root of the problem by the conceptual distincion between what can be said and what is merely manifested via the use of words. Understanding language as a tool for representation of reality Wittgenstein worked out the key distinction following ideas concerning the interpretation of scientific theories that emerged in discussion of German and Austrain philosophers of science, mostly Heinrich Hertz. Along the way Wittgenstein’s gets recontextualised into his original Viennese intelectual tradition with its ethos of demasking false pretentions by the analysis of language by methods independent of the early analytic philosophy. And this includes foremost interpreting his style, his choice of subjects and his overall philosophical position on the background of his intelectual upbringing in the enviroment filled with the impact of Schopenhauer. Actually the book presents a portrait of a young Wittgenstein as a Schopenharian who reinvented his original position by focusing on the analysis of language with the aid of the conceptual distinction of saying and showing based on Hertzian philosophy of science.
On the genealogy of common sense
In general the book presents an idea of irreducible variety in ... more On the genealogy of common sense
In general the book presents an idea of irreducible variety in the meaning of common sense since Aristotle to the 18th century philosophy. However the focus is on reflections of common sense in the early modern philosophy.
In the first part deals with the roots of the modern notions of it in the ancient Greek and Roman thought. One of the chapters lists different notions preᘀguring the modern idea of common sense, as one can ᘀnd it in Aristotle’s work: the communal agreement of endoxa, the practical prudence of fronésis, the sensibility of koiné aisthésis. The next chapters supplements this by the evolution of some of the ideas in Roman rhetorics and philosophy. Besides the clue term of the rhetorical theory it mostly concerns the central notion of Seneca’s project, namely bona mens.
The early modern period is approached first from the perspective of Descartes’s project, centered on development of the faculty to judge, modelled on Seneca’s bona mens. It is followed by a treatment of Berkeley’s notion of common sense, presenting it as a variant of the Cartesian notion. Berkeley’s appeal to common sense, it is argued, however important to him, does not stress simply widely shared beliefs, but rather simple rationality: Berkeley asks his reader to judge his works with aention and without prejudice. With Descartes (as well as with Locke) he shares a background in the theological distinction of natural light of reason as opposed to divine light of grace and revelation. Next two chapters consider a communal notion of common sense. First in the philosophy of Giamba汭ista Vico, who proposed the view of common sense as a shared set of values, relying on the classical theory of rhetorics. Ȥen in the philosophy of Anthony Cooper, the earl of Sha esbury, who used the term as an alias of a central concept of his ethical theory, namely the benevolent affection. Shaftesbury came to use the expression in answer to objections (foremost by Mary Astell) concerning his test by ridicule, as presented in his Le汭er on Enthusiasm. It seems that it is Shaftesbury who was mainly responsible for the popularity of the expression „common sense“ in the philosophy of the 18th century wri汭en in English. Surprisingly, it appears to happen by accident as a consequence of Shaftesbury’s interest in re砯ection on ridicule motivated by an attempt to cope with a satire of his early book Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit by Jonathan Swift, which was implied in his highly popular A Tale of a Tub.
Two chapters are devoted to the so called Scottish school of common sense. It is argued that the very idea of an organized group spreading a common doctrine comes originally from Joseph Priestley’s polemics with Sco汭ish thinkers. Priestley’s construction was motivated by Oswald’s appeal to common sense in religious ma汭ers together with Bea汭ie’s popularity. Nevertheless the notions of common sense in their respective writings are close and prominent enough to justify the label of Sco汭ish school of common sense. However, as the analysis in the later chapter suggests, Reid’s popularity may overshadow the substantial ifluence of his teachers Alexander Gerard and George Turnbull.
The last section of the book is a Kantian one. Kant is presented here as an opponent of common sense philosophy, who was nevertheless influenced, via Johannes Nikoalus Tetens, by the Reidian notion of common sense in his concept of sensibility. His late notion of sensus communis aestheticus is presented here as mostly Humean in牥uence, mediated by an idiosyncrasy of the •rst German translation of Hume’s Essays. lis is followed by a presentation of Kantian ingluence on Hannah Arendt and Jean -Francois Lyotard.
Uploads
Papers by Petr Glombíček
The article interprets the not of “common sense” as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid’s epistemology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid’s use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is
confused with the “principles of common sense”. The “principles of common sense” play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and
thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The “principles of common
sense” are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism,
and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term “common sense”, on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment
in the area of sensory experience.
main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely ractical exercise, however without stripping the book
of its therapeutic side. The first part considers the preface and the motto of the book
main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however, without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. This second part continues with interpretation of Wittgenstein’s correspndence with Russell, Frege, Ficker and comes to the conclusion for both
parts considering mutual relation of all the sources
works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general
ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of
a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their
fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
Taylor sketches two types of contemporary ethical projects. On the one hand he considers exclusive humanism, on the other the immanent antihumanism. The moral of Taylor’s story of modern secularism comes to his claim that the anti-humanism is enabled by humanism and humanism again by religiosity. According to him this comes to indispensability of religion: namely, some notion of transcendence is necessary for coherence of any set of values available to western man. Actually the originality inspiring its following is what he understands as the key element that is shared by the central claim of Christianity embodied in the notion of love (agape) overcoming the rigorism of explicit rules on the one hand and modern art as Ersatzreligion.
(Not only) this aspect of Taylor’s recent work is rooted in his lifelong interest in Hegel, who looked for such pairing of the ethics of authenticity with a sense for community that could overcome the limits of reflective rationality. We can interpret Taylor’s amendement to Hegel as a substitution of „support for differentiation in unity“ (or simply „culture“) for „love for neighbour“.
Books by Petr Glombíček
The translation is supplemented by an extensive introduction by the translator. The preface provides a context for understanding Vico’s philosophy, its cultural frame, Vico‘s life and works to focus subsequently on a central notion of his thought, namely sensus communis, tracing its origin to Roman Stoic philosophy, poetry and rhetorics.
The article interprets the not of “common sense” as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid’s epistemology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid’s use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is
confused with the “principles of common sense”. The “principles of common sense” play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and
thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The “principles of common
sense” are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism,
and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term “common sense”, on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment
in the area of sensory experience.
main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely ractical exercise, however without stripping the book
of its therapeutic side. The first part considers the preface and the motto of the book
main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however, without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. This second part continues with interpretation of Wittgenstein’s correspndence with Russell, Frege, Ficker and comes to the conclusion for both
parts considering mutual relation of all the sources
works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general
ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of
a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their
fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
Taylor sketches two types of contemporary ethical projects. On the one hand he considers exclusive humanism, on the other the immanent antihumanism. The moral of Taylor’s story of modern secularism comes to his claim that the anti-humanism is enabled by humanism and humanism again by religiosity. According to him this comes to indispensability of religion: namely, some notion of transcendence is necessary for coherence of any set of values available to western man. Actually the originality inspiring its following is what he understands as the key element that is shared by the central claim of Christianity embodied in the notion of love (agape) overcoming the rigorism of explicit rules on the one hand and modern art as Ersatzreligion.
(Not only) this aspect of Taylor’s recent work is rooted in his lifelong interest in Hegel, who looked for such pairing of the ethics of authenticity with a sense for community that could overcome the limits of reflective rationality. We can interpret Taylor’s amendement to Hegel as a substitution of „support for differentiation in unity“ (or simply „culture“) for „love for neighbour“.
The translation is supplemented by an extensive introduction by the translator. The preface provides a context for understanding Vico’s philosophy, its cultural frame, Vico‘s life and works to focus subsequently on a central notion of his thought, namely sensus communis, tracing its origin to Roman Stoic philosophy, poetry and rhetorics.
In general the book presents an idea of irreducible variety in the meaning of common sense since Aristotle to the 18th century philosophy. However the focus is on reflections of common sense in the early modern philosophy.
In the first part deals with the roots of the modern notions of it in the ancient Greek and Roman thought. One of the chapters lists different notions preᘀguring the modern idea of common sense, as one can ᘀnd it in Aristotle’s work: the communal agreement of endoxa, the practical prudence of fronésis, the sensibility of koiné aisthésis. The next chapters supplements this by the evolution of some of the ideas in Roman rhetorics and philosophy. Besides the clue term of the rhetorical theory it mostly concerns the central notion of Seneca’s project, namely bona mens.
The early modern period is approached first from the perspective of Descartes’s project, centered on development of the faculty to judge, modelled on Seneca’s bona mens. It is followed by a treatment of Berkeley’s notion of common sense, presenting it as a variant of the Cartesian notion. Berkeley’s appeal to common sense, it is argued, however important to him, does not stress simply widely shared beliefs, but rather simple rationality: Berkeley asks his reader to judge his works with aention and without prejudice. With Descartes (as well as with Locke) he shares a background in the theological distinction of natural light of reason as opposed to divine light of grace and revelation.
Next two chapters consider a communal notion of common sense. First in the philosophy of Giamba汭ista Vico, who proposed the view of common sense as a shared set of values, relying on the classical theory of rhetorics. Ȥen in the philosophy of Anthony Cooper, the earl of Sha
esbury, who used the term as an alias of a central concept of his ethical theory, namely the benevolent affection. Shaftesbury came to use the expression in answer to objections (foremost by Mary Astell) concerning his test by ridicule, as presented in his Le汭er on Enthusiasm. It seems that it is Shaftesbury who was mainly responsible for the popularity of the expression „common sense“ in the philosophy of the 18th century
wri汭en in English. Surprisingly, it appears to happen by accident
as a consequence of Shaftesbury’s interest in re砯ection on ridicule
motivated by an attempt to cope with a satire of his early book
Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit by Jonathan Swift, which was
implied in his highly popular A Tale of a Tub.
Two chapters are devoted to the so called Scottish school of common sense. It is argued that the very idea of an organized group spreading a common doctrine comes originally from Joseph Priestley’s polemics with Sco汭ish thinkers. Priestley’s construction was motivated by Oswald’s appeal to common sense in religious ma汭ers together with Bea汭ie’s popularity. Nevertheless the notions of common sense in their respective writings are close and prominent enough to justify the label of Sco汭ish school of common sense. However, as the analysis in the later chapter suggests, Reid’s popularity may overshadow the substantial ifluence of his teachers Alexander Gerard and George Turnbull.
The last section of the book is a Kantian one. Kant is presented here as an opponent of common sense philosophy, who was nevertheless influenced, via Johannes Nikoalus Tetens, by the Reidian notion of common sense in his concept of sensibility. His late notion of sensus communis aestheticus is presented here as mostly Humean in牥uence, mediated by an idiosyncrasy of the •rst German translation of Hume’s Essays. lis is followed by a presentation of Kantian ingluence on Hannah Arendt and Jean -Francois Lyotard.