Papers by M. Fariduddin Attar
Philosophy and the Abrahamic Religions: Scriptural Hermeneutics and Epistemology, eds. T. Kirby, R. Acar, and B. Bas, 2013
Ilmu Ushuluddin, 2015
Makalah ini adalah terjemahan dan penjelasan mengenai bab pertama dari Bagian V Metafisika Kitāb ... more Makalah ini adalah terjemahan dan penjelasan mengenai bab pertama dari Bagian V Metafisika Kitāb al-Syifā‘, yang merupakan karya utama Ibn Sīnā (w. 1037 .)Pada bagian ini, Ibn Sīnā mengembangkan fondasi dari epistemologi realisnya. Salah satu doktrin yang ia bahas dalam bab pertama ini adalah argumen bahwa esensi dari sesuatu itu terpisah dari eksistensinya. Termasuk dalam eksistensi bukan hanya benda -benda konkret di dunia luar, tetapi juga konsepsi-konsepsi pikiran, yakni, bagaimana bahasa menyusun makna. Sebuah esensi memunyai status ontologis yang netral, tidak pada hakikatnya berada secara konkret dan tidak pu la berada secara konsepsual, meskipun iadapat eksis sebagai benda konkret dan/atau konsep pikiran. Fakta bahwaapa yang ada di pikiran dan apa yang ada di luar dapat sama-sama memiliki obyek yang sama adalah basis epistemologi realis Avicennian: demikianlah bahwa antara pikiran dan pengalaman indrawi kita berkorespondensi terhadap dunia itu sendiri.
This paper is a translation and commentary on the first chapter of Book V of the Metaphysics of Avicenna"s (d. 1037) major philosophical work, the Shifāʾ. In this particular section of this work and the rest of the chapters of Book V, Avicenna lays out the metaphysical foundations to his realist epistemology. One central doctrine that he develops in the first chapter is the idea that a thing"s essence is distinct from its existence. By existence, Avicenna includes concrete existence in the outside realm and also conceptual existence in the mind (i.e. the way things are said or structured in concepts.) A thing"s essence has a neutral ontological position, neither primarily outside nor primarily conceptual, though it can exist as a concrete thing and/or as a concept. The fact that the mind and the concrete world may share a common object is the basis of Avicennian realist epistemology: this is how our thoughts and impressions about the world actually correspond to the world.
Conference Presentations by M. Fariduddin Attar
MESA Annual Meeting, 2021
The central cosmogonic principle in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy is the elegant rule that “from what is ... more The central cosmogonic principle in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy is the elegant rule that “from what is essentially one, only one thing may proceed.” Paradigmatically, this “Rule of One” describes the unique circumstances that regulate the atemporal ‘creation’ of the first creature, which Ibn Sīnā calls the First Intellect. It is only by the mediation of this single entity that God can be said to be the origin of multiplicity without compromising His transcendence and oneness. This theory became immediately controversial in the post-Avicennian phase of Islamic philosophy and theology. Modern studies on this issue tend to focus on the challenge the Rule of One posed on kalām creationism and divine voluntarism. However, some of the most compelling criticism of the Rule to emerge during this period seem to regard it not only as a cosmogonic principle; rather they hold Rule of One as a general causal principle that permeates the entirety of Ibn Sīnā’s cosmic system, including the lower strata of the physical world. Accordingly, their critique touched on broader issues related to metaphysics and natural sciences. One of the first thinkers to propose this interpretation is the Jewish philosopher Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdadī (d. 1165). He initiated a line of inquiry that became highly influential during the period, especially for the Sunnī polymath and theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209). They argue that the Rule is operative in Ibn Sīnā’s account of the origination and inner structure of the human soul, i.e., in his theory of faculty differentiation, the soul’s governance of the body, and its transcendental origin in the Active Intellect. This paper will focus on this psychological dimension of the critique of the Rule of One and argue that it forms the starting point of Abū al-Barakāt and al-Rāzī’s reasoning for alternative models of the cosmic system, and ultimately of the doctrine of Divine Oneness itself.
MESA Annual Meeting, 2021
I will discuss how the emerging field of Islamicate occultism can contribute to the study of Isla... more I will discuss how the emerging field of Islamicate occultism can contribute to the study of Islamic philosophy. Current scholarship has developed a detailed appreciation for the complex symbiosis between the disciplines of kalām, falsafa, and the natural sciences (such as astronomy and medicine), especially during the post-Avicennian period. In relation to these disciplines, the seemingly motley collection of “occult” sciences stands awkwardly out of place. However, during this period, we find many philosophers and theologians who engaged seriously with astral magic, letter magic, judicial astrology and other divinatory techniques. How should we regard this phenomenon? Based on the works of Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), I will highlight one model of this engagement, in which “occult” knowledge—in their case the astrological cosmology of the Harranian Sabians—was integrated into philosophical discourse through the need of providing a comprehensive theory of prophecy, on the one hand, and a unified account of the cosmic system that respects both theological and naturalistic exigences, on the other. I propose that the study of these two philosophical authorities would be incomplete if it did not address this largely neglected aspect of their thought.
After Avicenna Conference; Epistemic Transitions in Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, 2021
The central cosmogonic doctrine in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy is the principle that “from what is esse... more The central cosmogonic doctrine in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy is the principle that “from what is essentially one, only one thing may proceed.” Paradigmatically, the “Principle of Unity” describes the unique circumstances that regulate the atemporal ‘creation’ of the first creature, that is the First Intellect. However, does this principle also underlie Ibn Sīnā’s cosmic system as a whole? While a number of studies have discussed the Principle from the perspective of metaphysics, none have examined its possible relevance in other areas of his philosophy. Yet it is precisely on this extended deployment that the most compelling evaluations of the Principle emerge in the Post-Avicennian period. Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdadī’s critique initiated a line of inquiry that became highly influential, especially for the Sunnī polymath Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. They argue that this principle is operative in the context of psychology, in particular Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation and the soul’s transcendent governance of the body. This paper will focus on the psychological dimension of the critique and show how it forms the starting point of Abū al-Barakāt and al-Rāzī’s reasoning for alternative models of the cosmic system.
Islamic Occult Studies on the Rise, International Working Group, 2021
In the pre-modern Islamic world, the question of the “occult” was a major field of inquiry within... more In the pre-modern Islamic world, the question of the “occult” was a major field of inquiry within the dominant philosophical framework of the period—Avicennism. The Tenth Section of Ibn Sīnā’s Pointers and Reminders constitutes the first sustained and comprehensive philosophical account of occult phenomena, grounded, on the one hand, in a robust theory of the powers of the human soul and, on the other, in a metaphysics of Divine Governance. But a theoretical account of the ability to discern and manipulate hidden channels of causality within the cosmic system does not make an occultist out of a philosopher—a rule that holds true of Ibn Sīnā himself. Yet, as recent studies have shown, many philosophers of the Avicennian tradition were occultists in their own right. What motivated this broader and more active commitment to the occult sciences? This paper will discuss some of the salient theoretical issues that in my view compelled certain thinkers of the mainstream scientific-philosophical tradition to integrate principles of occult thought in their respective systems. In the works of Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (547/1152) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (606/1210), two outstanding thinkers of the 12th century, we see how in the process of critiquing perceived weaknesses in Avicenna’s theories of celestial mediation and psychology they took recourse to the cosmological doctrines of the so-called Hermetic-Sabian astro-magical tradition. I will try to elucidate the nature of this curious synthesis between Avicennism, Ashʿarism (in the case of al-Rāzī), and “Hermetic” astrological theories, and evaluate whether it led to a coherent framework of an integrated “cosmic system.”
Arabic Pasts: Histories and Historiographies, organized by the Aga Khan University and School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, 2020
One of the most important historiographical works to emerge from the Safavid period was Maḥbūb al... more One of the most important historiographical works to emerge from the Safavid period was Maḥbūb al-qulūb, written by the shaykh al-Islām of Lāhijān and reported student of Mīr Damād, al-Sharīf Quṭb al-Dīn Ashkevārī al-Lāhījī al-Daylamī (d. between 1677-1684). This work presents a ‘history of philosophy’ from Greek Antiquity up until the author’s lifetime in the form of bibliographical entries on figures involved in the preservation and transmission of “wisdom” or “philosophy” (ḥikma). These figures include philosophers, Sufis, legal thinkers, and theologians from both the Shiʿī and Sunnī traditions. In comparison to the ‘classical’ works of ḥikma-historiography, the latter-day representatives of the genre have only begun to receive their due attention by modern scholarship. Not only were these works highly influential for subsequent generations of Muslim thinkers, they also present highly innovative historiographical techniques. In the case of Maḥbūb al-qulūb, I shall focus on what I consider to be the author’s signature approach in history-writing, namely the “substitution of states” (ibdāl al-aḥwāl). Being an extended application of a Sufi praxis, the “substitution of states” is an imminent category that the author uses to overcome the atomistic nature of bibliographical entries. By showing the underlying complementarity between the sages (ḥukamāʾ)—in their individual flaws and virtues—the author discerns a contiguous meta-narrative in the transmission of ḥikma from its origins in the antediluvian prophets to his day. And where these flaws are sectarian in nature, the method also allows the author to domesticate the transmission of philosophical knowledge in Islam, whose pivotal figures included a great deal of non-Shiʿī scholars. The author thereby affirms both the vagaries and reality of individual agency in history, while at the same time making this historicity worthy and consistent with the (pre)determinations of the divine order, specifically in its contemporary embodiment in the Safavid polity.
Religious Ideas and Scientific Thought: CREOR (Center for Research on Religion) McGill Conference, Montreal, 2013
In this paper I discuss the contributions of the famous Sunni theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.... more In this paper I discuss the contributions of the famous Sunni theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209 CE) to the development of the natural sciences in the Islamic East (al-mashriq) during the 12th century CE. I focus on two related subjects. The first is his critique of Avicenna’s psychology and the second is his doctrine of the human soul’s transcendental causation. I examine in detail what I take to be the centrepiece of a Rāzian psychological theory, namely his critique of the Avicennian doctrine that human souls are homogenous in their being ‘rational animals’. In its place al-Rāzī develops a pluralistic conception, in which individual human souls, or classes thereof, are essentially different from each other. What is more, in his later philosophical works, al-Rāzī extends this pluralistic model to the transcendental (sublunary) realm by developing a theory of causation of human souls that involves not only the Active Intellect but also the direct influence other planetary Intellects, disregarding the famous principle that ‘from one comes only one’. My discussion of these topics focus not only the actual substantive claims, but also on the philosophical methods involved in asserting them. In both his critique and formulation of new doctrines, al-Rāzī reworks the methodological framework of the natural sciences as this was inaugurated by Avicenna. He raises questions regarding how far one can take the procedure of philosophical abstraction in the systematic observation of natural phenomena and entertains the idea of a paradigmatic conception of scientific theories that expands the role of probabilistic reasoning in areas where demonstration was deemed necessary.
Books by M. Fariduddin Attar
A Comprehensive, Annotated, and Indexed Bibliography of the Modern Scholarship on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (544/1150—606/1210). Leiden: Brill, 2023
The Introduction contains a biography of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a survey of the modern scholarship... more The Introduction contains a biography of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a survey of the modern scholarship on him, and a discussion of the major issues discussed by contemporary scholars. It also features a guide on how to use the Bibliography.
Chief Editor, Armando Salvatore, 2018
Book Reviews by M. Fariduddin Attar
Thesis Chapters by M. Fariduddin Attar
This thesis discusses Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) reception of Avicenna’s principle that... more This thesis discusses Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) reception of Avicenna’s principle that “only one may proceed from the one” (lā yaṣduru ʿan al-wāḥid illā wāḥid). It pursues two lines of inquiry. First, I argue that this “Rule of One” (qāʿidat al-wāḥid) belongs to a broader theory of efficient causality, which Avicenna developed in the Ilāhiyyāt of the Shifāʾ, and which was systematized in later works, such as al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, al-Taʿliqāt, and al-Mubāḥathāt. While Avicenna famously used the principle to show that only a single effect may proceed directly from the Necessary Being, it was also designed to operate beyond this local context of Divine “creation.” Indeed, it was by complying to the Rule that Avicenna was able to deduce through a priori principles the triadic structure of celestial procession, the nature and capacity of celestial entities, and the doctrine of the Active Intellect as the governor of the sublunary realm. The second aspect of this thesis is to show how Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was the first thinker to recognize that the Rule of One is one of the defining aspects of his predecessor’s metaphysics of the efficient cause. By critically examining its underlying theoretical principles, Rāzī attempted to show that the Rule is false on two counts: that it is based on a problematic conception of causality and that it proposes a very rigid account of causal relations that has little explanatory power. I offer a detailed analysis of Rāzī’s arguments based on his early philosophical works, namely al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, alMulakhkhaṣ fī al-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma, and his commentary on Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt. Criticizing this pivotal principle of causation is a strategic maneuver on Rāzī’s part. In one fell stroke, he intended to undermine the metaphysical basis of Avicenna’s naturalism, the Peripatetic framework of scientific analysis underlying it, and the substantive content of his cosmology, from his theory of celestial mediation to his account of psychic action performed by sublunary souls. The result is a comprehensive revision of the Avicennian cosmic system from the ground up. Finally, I offer a preliminary reconstruction of Rāzī’s picture of the cosmos that emerges in the wake of his criticism of the Rule of One, focusing on three doctrines: God as a voluntary agent, celestial mediation based on Hermetic astrology, and a monadic theory of soul.
-
Cette étude traite de la réception de l’axiome avicennien que « de l’un ne procède que l’un » (lā yaṣduru ʿan al-wāḥid illā wāḥid) dans l’œuvre de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 606/1210). Deux questions seront explorées. Premièrement, nous proposons que cette « règle de l’Un » appartient à une théorie plus vaste concernant la cause efficiente et développée par Avicenne (m. ca. 428/1037) dans l’ « Ilāhiyyāt » de la Shifāʾ et systématisée dans ses œuvres tardives tels que al-Ishārāt wa-ltanbīhāt, al-Taʿliqāt, et al-Mubāḥathāt. Bien qu’Avicenne a notamment employé ce principe pour démontrer que de l’Être Nécessaire seul un effet peut procéder, l’applicabilité de la règle dépasse le sujet de la « création » divine. En effet, c’est grâce à cette règle qu’Avicenne a pu déduire, sur la base de principes a priori, la structure triadique des émanations célestes, la nature et la capacité des entités célestes, et la doctrine de l’intellect agent en tant que gouverneur du monde sublunaire. En second lieu, ce mémoire cherche à démontrer que Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fut le premier à reconnaitre que la « règle de l’Un » constitue une des caractéristiques déterminantes de la métaphysique de la cause efficiente de son prédécesseur. En examinant de manière critique les principes théoriques sous-jacentes à cette Règle, Rāzī tente de démontrer qu’elle est fausse pour deux raisons : elle est basée sur une conception problématique de la causalité et sa conception très rigide des liens causals a un pouvoir explicatif limité. Il s’agira ici d’étudier les arguments que Rāzī propose à cet égard dans ses premières œuvres philosophiques, notamment al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma, et son commentaire sur al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt d’Avicenne. La critique de ce principe de causalité fondamental dans la pensée d’Avicenne est une décision stratégique de la part de Rāzī. Elle lui permet à la fois de saper la métaphysique à la base du naturalisme d’Avicenne, le cadre péripatéticien de l’enquête scientifique qui la soutient, et une grande partie de sa cosmologie, de la théorie de la médiation des corps célestes jusqu’à son compte des activités psychiques des âmes sublunaires. Cette critique entraine une révision compréhensive de la cosmologie avicennienne. Finalement, nous offrons une reconstruction préliminaire de la conception de l’univers de Rāzī en fonction de sa critique de la « règle de l’Un ». Plus précisément cette reconstruction s’appuie sur trois doctrines de Rāzī : Dieu en tant qu’agent volontaire, la médiation céleste basée sur l’astrologie hermétique et sa théorie monadique de l’âme.
Master Thesis, McGill University, 2013
This thesis is a study of the psychological theory of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210) as advance... more This thesis is a study of the psychological theory of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210) as advanced in the psychology section of his early philosophical work, alMabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya fī ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt (Mabāḥiṯ II.2.2.5). In this section of the Mabāḥiṯ, Rāzī evaluates central aspects of Avicennian psychological doctrines, especially those that are presented in the Psychology of the Šifāʾ. Though Rāzī adopts the traditional, Avicennian arrangement of this text, he uses it as a template through which he assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments, and advances his own alternative theories. We argue that Rāzī, in critically evaluating Ibn Sīnā’s psychological doctrines, was motivated by a consistent philosophical approach, one that concerns less the content of these doctrines as the epistemology by which Ibn Sīnā advances them. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we closely examine how Rāzī evaluates the Avicennian doctrines of the human soul’s immateriality, the univocity of its essence, its temporal generation, and the nature of its unity vis-à-vis the diverse functions it performs. At the heart of his discussion are the issues of the human soul’s quiddity and the theory of faculty differentiation. In his treatment of these two issues, Rāzī develops a critique of the epistemic claims of abstraction (taǧrīd), which is the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s theories regarding the nature of human souls and the faculties that they possess. In Chapter 3, we attempt to reconstruct from Rāzī’s critical evaluation of these issues his own psychological theory, which consists of the soul’s immateriality, its essential differentiation among individuals, and its direct agency over the corporeal organs. We argue that these doctrines are central elements of what can be referred to as Rāzī’s simplified psychological theory. Furthermore, in asserting these doctrines, he develops a method of investigating the nature of the human soul that does not presume to have access to its ontological structure. By understanding the philosophical basis by which Rāzī critically evaluated Avicennian psychological doctrines and asserted his own alternative theories, we are be able to gain a deeper understanding of his role and influence in the Avicennian tradition and contextualize his investigation of psychological issues in later works.
Drafts by M. Fariduddin Attar
Cilt (Vol)7, Sayı (Iss) 1, Değerlendirmlr(Reviews) by M. Fariduddin Attar
Nazariyat Journal, 2021
The Hand Extending Beyond the Cosmos: Discussions on the Khalā' [Void] Between the Baṣran and Bag... more The Hand Extending Beyond the Cosmos: Discussions on the Khalā' [Void] Between the Baṣran and Baghdād Schools of Mu'tazila Attempts by Avicenna and Ibn al-Nafīs to Expand the Field of the Transference of Demonstration in the Context of the Relationship Between Geometry and Medicine
Uploads
Papers by M. Fariduddin Attar
This paper is a translation and commentary on the first chapter of Book V of the Metaphysics of Avicenna"s (d. 1037) major philosophical work, the Shifāʾ. In this particular section of this work and the rest of the chapters of Book V, Avicenna lays out the metaphysical foundations to his realist epistemology. One central doctrine that he develops in the first chapter is the idea that a thing"s essence is distinct from its existence. By existence, Avicenna includes concrete existence in the outside realm and also conceptual existence in the mind (i.e. the way things are said or structured in concepts.) A thing"s essence has a neutral ontological position, neither primarily outside nor primarily conceptual, though it can exist as a concrete thing and/or as a concept. The fact that the mind and the concrete world may share a common object is the basis of Avicennian realist epistemology: this is how our thoughts and impressions about the world actually correspond to the world.
Conference Presentations by M. Fariduddin Attar
Books by M. Fariduddin Attar
Book Reviews by M. Fariduddin Attar
Thesis Chapters by M. Fariduddin Attar
-
Cette étude traite de la réception de l’axiome avicennien que « de l’un ne procède que l’un » (lā yaṣduru ʿan al-wāḥid illā wāḥid) dans l’œuvre de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 606/1210). Deux questions seront explorées. Premièrement, nous proposons que cette « règle de l’Un » appartient à une théorie plus vaste concernant la cause efficiente et développée par Avicenne (m. ca. 428/1037) dans l’ « Ilāhiyyāt » de la Shifāʾ et systématisée dans ses œuvres tardives tels que al-Ishārāt wa-ltanbīhāt, al-Taʿliqāt, et al-Mubāḥathāt. Bien qu’Avicenne a notamment employé ce principe pour démontrer que de l’Être Nécessaire seul un effet peut procéder, l’applicabilité de la règle dépasse le sujet de la « création » divine. En effet, c’est grâce à cette règle qu’Avicenne a pu déduire, sur la base de principes a priori, la structure triadique des émanations célestes, la nature et la capacité des entités célestes, et la doctrine de l’intellect agent en tant que gouverneur du monde sublunaire. En second lieu, ce mémoire cherche à démontrer que Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fut le premier à reconnaitre que la « règle de l’Un » constitue une des caractéristiques déterminantes de la métaphysique de la cause efficiente de son prédécesseur. En examinant de manière critique les principes théoriques sous-jacentes à cette Règle, Rāzī tente de démontrer qu’elle est fausse pour deux raisons : elle est basée sur une conception problématique de la causalité et sa conception très rigide des liens causals a un pouvoir explicatif limité. Il s’agira ici d’étudier les arguments que Rāzī propose à cet égard dans ses premières œuvres philosophiques, notamment al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma, et son commentaire sur al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt d’Avicenne. La critique de ce principe de causalité fondamental dans la pensée d’Avicenne est une décision stratégique de la part de Rāzī. Elle lui permet à la fois de saper la métaphysique à la base du naturalisme d’Avicenne, le cadre péripatéticien de l’enquête scientifique qui la soutient, et une grande partie de sa cosmologie, de la théorie de la médiation des corps célestes jusqu’à son compte des activités psychiques des âmes sublunaires. Cette critique entraine une révision compréhensive de la cosmologie avicennienne. Finalement, nous offrons une reconstruction préliminaire de la conception de l’univers de Rāzī en fonction de sa critique de la « règle de l’Un ». Plus précisément cette reconstruction s’appuie sur trois doctrines de Rāzī : Dieu en tant qu’agent volontaire, la médiation céleste basée sur l’astrologie hermétique et sa théorie monadique de l’âme.
Drafts by M. Fariduddin Attar
Cilt (Vol)7, Sayı (Iss) 1, Değerlendirmlr(Reviews) by M. Fariduddin Attar
This paper is a translation and commentary on the first chapter of Book V of the Metaphysics of Avicenna"s (d. 1037) major philosophical work, the Shifāʾ. In this particular section of this work and the rest of the chapters of Book V, Avicenna lays out the metaphysical foundations to his realist epistemology. One central doctrine that he develops in the first chapter is the idea that a thing"s essence is distinct from its existence. By existence, Avicenna includes concrete existence in the outside realm and also conceptual existence in the mind (i.e. the way things are said or structured in concepts.) A thing"s essence has a neutral ontological position, neither primarily outside nor primarily conceptual, though it can exist as a concrete thing and/or as a concept. The fact that the mind and the concrete world may share a common object is the basis of Avicennian realist epistemology: this is how our thoughts and impressions about the world actually correspond to the world.
-
Cette étude traite de la réception de l’axiome avicennien que « de l’un ne procède que l’un » (lā yaṣduru ʿan al-wāḥid illā wāḥid) dans l’œuvre de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 606/1210). Deux questions seront explorées. Premièrement, nous proposons que cette « règle de l’Un » appartient à une théorie plus vaste concernant la cause efficiente et développée par Avicenne (m. ca. 428/1037) dans l’ « Ilāhiyyāt » de la Shifāʾ et systématisée dans ses œuvres tardives tels que al-Ishārāt wa-ltanbīhāt, al-Taʿliqāt, et al-Mubāḥathāt. Bien qu’Avicenne a notamment employé ce principe pour démontrer que de l’Être Nécessaire seul un effet peut procéder, l’applicabilité de la règle dépasse le sujet de la « création » divine. En effet, c’est grâce à cette règle qu’Avicenne a pu déduire, sur la base de principes a priori, la structure triadique des émanations célestes, la nature et la capacité des entités célestes, et la doctrine de l’intellect agent en tant que gouverneur du monde sublunaire. En second lieu, ce mémoire cherche à démontrer que Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fut le premier à reconnaitre que la « règle de l’Un » constitue une des caractéristiques déterminantes de la métaphysique de la cause efficiente de son prédécesseur. En examinant de manière critique les principes théoriques sous-jacentes à cette Règle, Rāzī tente de démontrer qu’elle est fausse pour deux raisons : elle est basée sur une conception problématique de la causalité et sa conception très rigide des liens causals a un pouvoir explicatif limité. Il s’agira ici d’étudier les arguments que Rāzī propose à cet égard dans ses premières œuvres philosophiques, notamment al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma, et son commentaire sur al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt d’Avicenne. La critique de ce principe de causalité fondamental dans la pensée d’Avicenne est une décision stratégique de la part de Rāzī. Elle lui permet à la fois de saper la métaphysique à la base du naturalisme d’Avicenne, le cadre péripatéticien de l’enquête scientifique qui la soutient, et une grande partie de sa cosmologie, de la théorie de la médiation des corps célestes jusqu’à son compte des activités psychiques des âmes sublunaires. Cette critique entraine une révision compréhensive de la cosmologie avicennienne. Finalement, nous offrons une reconstruction préliminaire de la conception de l’univers de Rāzī en fonction de sa critique de la « règle de l’Un ». Plus précisément cette reconstruction s’appuie sur trois doctrines de Rāzī : Dieu en tant qu’agent volontaire, la médiation céleste basée sur l’astrologie hermétique et sa théorie monadique de l’âme.