Papers by Alexandra Couto
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2021
According to the dominant account of forgiveness, to forgive is to overcome the reactive attitude... more According to the dominant account of forgiveness, to forgive is to overcome the reactive attitudes warranted by a wrongdoing. On one version of this ‘reactive attitudes’ account, forgiveness involves cognitive dissociation, while on another it involves affective dissociation. In this paper, I will argue that reflection on cases of repeated offences—where a wrongdoer is forgiven but then keeps repeating an offence—raises two challenges to this account of forgiveness. First, I will argue that, on either way of developing the account, it has the implausible implication that those who forgive must avoid considering the forgiven wrongdoing in their deliberations. Second, I will argue that the reactive attitude account of forgiveness is vulnerable to the objection that it is epistemically vicious. But the reactive attitudes account of forgiveness needn’t be abandoned: I will examine possible ways in which the account can be revised or clarified in order to address the problem of repeated offences.
Journal of Moral Philosophy
Faced with a national tragedy, citizens respond in different ways. Some will initiate debate abou... more Faced with a national tragedy, citizens respond in different ways. Some will initiate debate about the possible connections between this tragedy and broader moral and political issues. But others often complain that this is too early, that it is inappropriate to debate such larger issues while 'the bodies are still warm'. This paper critically examines the grounds for such a complaint. We consider different interpretations of the complaint—cynical, epistemic and ethical—and argue that it can be resisted on all of these readings. Debate shortly after a national disaster is therefore permissible. We then set out a political argument in favour of early debate based on the value of broad political participation in liberal democracies and sketch a stronger argument, based on the duty to support just institutions, that would support a political duty to engage in debate shortly after tragedies have occurred.
Philosophical Studies
I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial duty ascriptions. Acco... more I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial duty ascriptions. According to one account, the beneficiary account, individuals who benefit innocently from injustices ought to bear remedial responsibilities towards the victims of these injustices. According to another account, the causal account, individuals who caused injustices (even innocently) ought to bear remedial duties towards the victim. In this paper, I examine the relation between the principles central to these accounts: the Beneficiary Pays Principle (henceforth, Beneficiary Principle) and the well-established principle of Strict Liability in law. I argue that both principles display a strong yet unexplored similarity as they make certain kinds of causal connection sufficient for incurring liability. Because of this similarity, I suggest that insights into the Beneficiary Principle can be gained from exploring its relation with Strict Liability. In particular, I examine two new positive arguments that could be adapted to support of the Beneficiary Principle: the Minimising Injustice Argument and the Normative Connection Argument. However, I'll show that only one of those arguments, namely the Normative Connection Argument, can truly support the Beneficiary Principle. So if you endorse the Normative Connection Argument for Strict Liability, you have at least a strong prima facie reason to endorse the parallel argument for the Beneficiary Principle.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiven... more Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn't repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain preconditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall's second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Luck egalitarianism originated in an attempt to respond to the conservative objection that egalit... more Luck egalitarianism originated in an attempt to respond to the conservative objection that egalitarianism fails to respect the value of responsibility. In response, luck egalitarians have introduced a distinction between choice and circumstances and recommend redistribution only when inequalities are not the result of choice. I will argue, however, that this standard formulation of the luck egalitarian aim is problematic, and ought to be revised. Valuing responsibility requires more than redistribution—it requires giving priority to ensuring equality of opportunity for advantages at the level of institutions. Preventing unfairness has normative priority over efforts to alleviate it. Compensation’s role is secondary to the prior normative importance of ensuring that people are responsible for the advantages they have.
Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 90, 2014.
Disdain and contempt have often been taken to be vicious attitudes. This view has been further de... more Disdain and contempt have often been taken to be vicious attitudes. This view has been further defended by Stephen Darwall in his ambitious and elaborate second-personal account of morality. In The Second-Person Standpoint, Darwall argues that disdain is problematic to the extent that it fails to recognize the authority and moral freedom of its object. In this paper, I will develop two answers to Darwall’s claims about disdain. First, I will argue that, if we take Darwall’s account to be ultimately grounded on what hypothetical members of the moral community would do, it would be difficult to argue that anything said at this level would justify an evaluation of what actual individuals should do. Second, even if we granted that the Second-Personal Standpoint could have such normative implications, I will argue that disdain, as a moralised attitude towards others who fail to behave morally, can not only be justified but can also be shown to presuppose the moral freedom of the wrongdoer. Finally, I will introduce a distinction between normative and empirical expectation to further clarify this point.
Res Publica, Jan 1, 2006
In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the... more In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel's claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their 'control of the culture'. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel's desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls' conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions.
In Secular Religion, his posthumously published book, Kelsen intended to defend the prevalent the... more In Secular Religion, his posthumously published book, Kelsen intended to defend the prevalent theories in the social sciences from the threat of discredit. The drawing of analogies between the social sciences and religion was indeed quite common at that time among intellectuals (such as Eric Voegelin, Raymon Aron and Erst Cassirer) and Kelsen thought that this analogy presented a grave risk to the credibility of the social sciences. I argue that 1) the drawing of analogies between religion and the social sciences is not necessarily bad for the credibility of the social sciences 2) this rethorical war among historians of ideas might have been less dangerous for the survival of the social sciences than Kelsen estimated 3) the method used by Kelsen to defend the social sciences, conceptual analysis, might not be the best method for the purpose.
Book by Alexandra Couto
Monograph, De Gruyter, 2014
Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections t... more Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections to this view. This book adopts a different approach: It attempts to highlight the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism by presenting a positive prima facie argument in its favour. The book starts by clarifying the relation between political perfectionism — a conception of politics — and prudential perfectionism and ethical perfectionism — a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. It is crucial to start by selecting a plausible form of ethical perfectionism, as it makes an important difference to the plausibility of the political conception based upon it. Once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed, many of the standard objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target. Different arguments in favour of liberal perfectionism are then proposed and critically examined, but the resilience of some pragmatic arguments against liberal perfectionism is conceded. The book ends by showing that perfectionism can be surprisingly relevant for discussions of social justice and proceeds to draw a sketch of the perfectionist implications for questions of distributive justice.
Chapters in Books by Alexandra Couto
Chapter in Being Social edited by Brownlee K., Jenkins D. and Neal A. (OUP)
I argue here a) that we have a right to have opportunities to meaningful relationships, b) that s... more I argue here a) that we have a right to have opportunities to meaningful relationships, b) that such a right is distinct from a right focusing only on protecting access to more basic social interactions, and c) that to the extent that we have rights to both kinds of social interactions, the one focused on more meaningful relationships should have priority because it secures an interest of greater importance for us.
Chapter in Information, Freedom and Property: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology, ed. by Hildebrandt M. and Van den Berg B. (Routledge)
Chapter in Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, edited by Gosseries A., Marciano A. and Strowel A. (Palgrave)
Reviews by Alexandra Couto
Basic Income Studies, Jan 1, 2006
eds) Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2002, 226 pp ISBN 0-333-91984-X Environment and Welfare can be... more eds) Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2002, 226 pp ISBN 0-333-91984-X Environment and Welfare can be divided into three parts. The first part, consisting of the first four chapters, is the most theoretical. The first chapter by Tony Fitzpatrick and Michael Cahill introduces three main green criticisms raised against social policies: a criticism of economic growth and of consumer society, a criticism of the full-time full-employment target and a criticism of full-bodied political centralization. The second chapter by John Barry draws some distinctions necessary for understanding the different schools of green thought. On one hand, the anthropocentric view attributes intrinsic value only to human lives and treats the environment as valuable instrumentally. On the other hand, the ecocentric view holds that the environment is valuable in itself, independently of its effects on human lives. The third chapter by Mathew Humphrey attempts to pin down what constitutes green ideology and
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Papers by Alexandra Couto
Book by Alexandra Couto
Chapters in Books by Alexandra Couto
Reviews by Alexandra Couto