Papers by Jennifer Hornsby
Time in Action, 2022
I argue that, as the event ontology has been understood in most analytic philosophy, which makes ... more I argue that, as the event ontology has been understood in most analytic philosophy, which makes use of a Fregean idea of predication, it isn't possible to make such distinctions as need to be made between different aspects of verbs, between, for instance, perfect past (F-d) and imperfect past (was F-ing). This is an impediment to a correct philosophy of action.
Philosophical Topics, 2016
Frederick Stoutland's 1 early work in philosophy of action was critical of Donald Davidson. In St... more Frederick Stoutland's 1 early work in philosophy of action was critical of Donald Davidson. In Stoutland's last published piece (2011c), he brought together Davidson's accounts of action and of perception. He took both accounts to belong in a picture "of how we are related to the world" which "has its roots in the Cartesian revolution". And he contrasted Davidson's picture with a different one. I think myself that Stoutland's early criticisms of Davidson show up faults in Davidson's picture, not just in his account of action, so that they point to the attractions of the different picture. In the present paper, I explore how this thought bears on the case of perception, specifically the case of vision. At one time perception was understood along the same sort of lines as the account of action that Stoutland criticized: we had "the causal theory of perception". It can be a question what might replace this causal theory if Davidson's picture is rejected. I shall say just a little towards an answer in what follows, and shall connect what I say with some of Stoutland's thinking over the years.
Time in Action, 2022
I argue that, as the event ontology has been understood in most analytic philosophy, which makes ... more I argue that, as the event ontology has been understood in most analytic philosophy, which makes use of a Fregean idea of predication, it isn't possible to make such distinctions as need to be made between different aspects of verbs, between, for instance, perfect past (F-d) and imperfect past (was F-ing). This is an impediment to a correct philosophy of action.
Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain (broadly Humean) conception of caus... more Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain (broadly Humean) conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different (broadly Aristotelian) conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
ProtoSociology, 2006
One of the reasons of life shortening of pavements operation is designing regardless of their adm... more One of the reasons of life shortening of pavements operation is designing regardless of their administrative facts. The amount of transferred load between the layers depends on various factors such as the degree of adhesion and internal friction between the layers. If these layers limit by using proper bonding and sufficient density between the layers, they act integrated. In this study we evaluate the various pavement failures due to the possibility of friction under various loadings. Flexible pavement failure criteria are intended the vertical strain on the subsoil and analytically calculate the strain tolerance and pavement life of this strain were compared. According to these studies, shortening the life of pavements with limited layers and without internal friction has been determined compared to the pavement with internal friction.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016
Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition.... more Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.
Journal of Philosophy, 1986
The Philosophical Review, 1984
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in The philosophy of Donald Davidson, edi... more This is an author-produced version of a paper published in The philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Lewis E. Hahn (ISBN 0-8126-9399-X. This version has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof corrections, published layout or pagination.
Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in …, 1997
APA PsycNET Our Apologies! - The following features are not available with your current Browser c... more APA PsycNET Our Apologies! - The following features are not available with your current Browser configuration. - alerts user that their session is about to expire - display, print, save, export, and email selected records - get My ...
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2017
I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something – an account which might be supposed ... more I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something – an account which might be supposed to uncover ‘the nature’ of such knowledge – can't be got by considering what linguists tell us is expressed in ascriptions of knowing how. Attention must be paid to the knowledge that is actually being exercised when someone is doing something. I criticize some claims about ascriptions of knowledge-how which derive from contemporary syntactic and semantic theory. I argue that these claims can no more provide an understanding of what it is to intend to do something than of what it is to know how to do something. Philosophy, not linguistics, must be the source of such understanding.
Legal Theory, 1998
What one ought to mean by "speech," in the context of discussions of free speech, is wh... more What one ought to mean by "speech," in the context of discussions of free speech, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. What one ought to mean, it may be argued, includes illocution, in the sense ofJ.L. Austin.1 Some feminist ...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018
I take issue with whether Hyman's conception of acts is compatible with a good account of the... more I take issue with whether Hyman's conception of acts is compatible with a good account of the progressive tense (imperfective aspect)
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Papers by Jennifer Hornsby