Introduction Linguistics research is filled with observations such as the following: 'There are t... more Introduction Linguistics research is filled with observations such as the following: 'There are three green books on the table' is an acceptable sentence, but 'There are green three books on the table' is not. Such judgments-as well as judgments about co-reference, ambiguity, pronounceability, and more-form a significant part of the evidence base for linguistics. This is in large measure due to Chomsky, whose work has exemplified the fruitfulness of such evidence and whose Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965, chapter 1) is a locus classicus for theorizing about their status. The prominence of judgment data in contemporary linguistics is crucially tied to Chomsky's mentalist reconception of the field. Judgment data were not completely absent prior to Chomsky's work. For example, field linguists did not always prescind from asking informants whether such-and-such was something they would say, and Chomsky's teacher Zelig Harris emphasized the importance for phonology of speakers' judgments concerning sound differences (Harris 1951). But the positivist, behaviorist, and structuralist positions that dominated American linguistics in the first half of the 20 th century tended to view the use of judgment data with suspicion and focused rather on produced sentences. The methodological strictures in part arose in reaction to problems encountered in earlier introspectionist psychology (discussed in section 3). But the focus on produced utterances reflected as well a particular conception of what languages are and thus what linguistics is about. Though linguists of this period differed in many ways, they shared a tendency to view languages as consisting in the totality of utterances speakers of that language can produce (an E-language in Chomsky's (1986) terminology); and much work focused on describing, analyzing, and taxonomizing languages so conceived-for example, the many Native American languages so apparently different from the Indo-European languages which were then more familiar to linguists. While such a conception does not of itself preclude the use of speakers' judgments (cf. the remarks on Devitt's (2006) views in section 2), it is more naturally combined with an emphasis on corpus data, especially given the methodological scruples already mentioned. Conversely, judgment data find a natural home in Chomsky's mentalist reconception of linguistics-a reconception, according to Chomsky (1966), that is in fact a recovery and development of earlier ideas about language. On this approach, linguistics aims, not just to describe linguistic products, but to provide a cognitive explanation of various of their distinctive features. One of Chomsky's core hypotheses is that there is an innately constrained computational procedure realized in the mind-brain-so-called I-language-that is implicated specifically in linguistic phenomena and whose character explains some of their distinctive features. As with aspects of our cognition more generally, we cannot directly observe I-language but must infer it from the effects to which it contributes. The methodological claim relevant to this chapter is that judgment data prove particularly useful in this endeavor.
This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to proposition... more This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to propositional content is context-sensitive and that attention to this fact allows for an attractive solution to the sorites paradox.
Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” ef... more Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena – belief polarization and the size-weight illusion – that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?
Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues tha... more Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. Before turning to the argument, I quickly review some Burgean themes that frame his discussion. As far as possible, I will be granting this framework, so that the objections raised later will have force even by Burge's own lights. Accordingly, I here simply lay out the framework sans defense. Burge distinguishes among mere functional sensory registration of information, perception, and propositional thought. (e.g., 104-5, 315-9, 421-36) Sensory registration of information involves a sensorily-mediated statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, or causal dependence of a mind-brain state with, or on, something external. But mere sensory registration of information, even if functional, does not suffice for a state's having representational content, according to Burge. So, perception, the most basic form of representation, differs from mere sensory registration of information: only the former possesses genuine correctness, or accuracy, conditions. Burge thus sets himself against those-such as Fodor (1990), Dretske (1988), Millikan (1989), and Gallistel (1990)-who would naturalize representational content by reducing it to the obtaining of correlational, causal, counterfactual, or bio-teleological relations. (292-308) Perception differs as well from propositional thought. For example, the latter's role in inference underwrites the ascription of propositional structure, while with perception, though we are warranted in ascribing a demonstrative and an attributive aspect, we are not, according to Burge, warranted in ascribing propositional structure. 2 Burge argues, further, that a capacity for perception-and thus for being in states with representational content-does not require a capacity for propositional thought, far less a
Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive pene... more Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn's claim is correct-but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn's requirements that the effects be direct and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism.
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2009
This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowl... more This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it's necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it's part of an empirical theory that would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question: how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers and their varying philosophical and empirical commitments.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental, 2012
My fact-talk follows Davidson and, following him, Lepore and Ludwig (2005). Davidson, however, do... more My fact-talk follows Davidson and, following him, Lepore and Ludwig (2005). Davidson, however, does not admit fact-entities into his ontology, so this fact-talk should not be so construed.
In this note, I clarify the point of my paper "The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments... more In this note, I clarify the point of my paper "The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments" (NS) in light of Ray Jackendoff's comments in his "Linguistics in Cognitive Science: The State of the Art." Along the way, I amplify my remarks on unification. 1
This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to proposition... more This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to propositional content is context-sensitive and that attention to this fact allows for an attractive solution to the sorites paradox.
tion.There are a variety of ways one might respond. First, one could question whether such minima... more tion.There are a variety of ways one might respond. First, one could question whether such minimal interaction suffices to enable the speaker so to use the term. Pettit might prefer, however, a
According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguist... more According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth-theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much contextsensitivity speakers' languages contain, the cognized truth-theories themselves can be adequately characterized context-insensitively-that is, without using in the metalanguage expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.
Should a theory of meaning state what sentences mean, and can a Davidsonian theory of meaning in ... more Should a theory of meaning state what sentences mean, and can a Davidsonian theory of meaning in particular do so? Max Ko¨lbel answers both questions affirmatively. I argue, however, that the phenomena of non-homophony, non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, semantic mood, and context-sensitivity provide prima facie obstacles for extending Davidsonian truth-theories to yield meaning-stating theorems. Assessing some natural moves in reply requires a more fully developed conception of the task of such theories than Ko¨lbel provides. A more developed conception is also required to defend his positive answer to the first question above. I argue that, however Ko¨lbel might elaborate his position, it can't be by embracing the sort of cognitivist account of Davidsonian semantics to which he sometimes alludes.
In chapter 7, Mele presents the Zygote Argument, which is based on a case of "engineering in uter... more In chapter 7, Mele presents the Zygote Argument, which is based on a case of "engineering in utero" (188). Diana, who is a goddess in a deterministic universe, creates a zygote with exactly the right characteristics and in exactly the right circumstances so that the person into whom the zygote eventually develops will at some future time perform some desired action. Readers are invited to have the intuition that the person who developed from the zygote, Ernie, does not freely perform and is not morally responsible for performing the action Diana engineered him to perform. But given that there is no relevant difference between Ernie's development and the way any of us would develop in an ordinary deterministic world, it follows that determinism is equally threatening to freedom and moral responsibility. Of course, the Zygote Argument probably won't convince a committed compatibilist, but it does do a nice job of cleanly capturing a fundamental disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists over this question: could someone else also be morally responsible for your morally responsible actions? It's an interesting question why intuitions diverge so sharply on this issue, and the Zygote Argument does a nice job of making that question salient. Given Mele's agnostic autonomism, one might initially think that his theories would be, as "best-of-both-worlds" solutions tend to be, equally unappealing to both sides. But Mele is a sincere agnostic who feels the strength of all the arguments, and so does not attempt any sort of foolish reconciliation. Far from pleasing no one, the truth is just the opposite: both compatibilists and incompatibilists can claim Mele as an ally, and a valuable one at that.
Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Dev... more Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the psychology of such judgments, that linguists themselves are. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the relevant divide is not between linguists and non-linguists, but between subjects with and without minimally sufficient task-specific knowledge. In particular, we show that subjects with at least some minimal exposure to or knowledge of such tasks tend to perform consistently with one another—greater knowledge of linguistics makes no further difference—while at the same time exhibiting markedly greater in-group consistency than those who have no previous exposure to or knowledge of
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about... more Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus on grammaticality intuitions, rather than acceptability intuitions, distances his discussion from actual linguistic practice. We close by questioning a demand that drives his discussion-viz., that, for linguistic intuitions to supply evidence for linguistic theorizing, a better account of why they are evidence is required. 1 Introduction 2 Acceptability and Grammaticality 3 Our Prima Facie Inconsistency 4 Our Experimental Results 5 Explaining why Intuitions are Evidence
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009
Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Dev... more Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the psychology of such judgments, that linguists themselves are. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the relevant divide is not between linguists and non-linguists, but between subjects with and without minimally sufficient task-specific knowledge. In particular, we show that subjects with at least some minimal exposure to or knowledge of such tasks tend to perform consistently with one another-greater knowledge of linguistics makes no further difference-while at the same time exhibiting markedly greater ingroup consistency than those who have no previous exposure to or knowledge of such tasks and their goals.
Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Centra... more Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing-in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of 'gist' properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory as involving declining capacity across a series of stores. We conclude by discussing the relation of probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness.
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2014
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Introduction Linguistics research is filled with observations such as the following: 'There are t... more Introduction Linguistics research is filled with observations such as the following: 'There are three green books on the table' is an acceptable sentence, but 'There are green three books on the table' is not. Such judgments-as well as judgments about co-reference, ambiguity, pronounceability, and more-form a significant part of the evidence base for linguistics. This is in large measure due to Chomsky, whose work has exemplified the fruitfulness of such evidence and whose Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965, chapter 1) is a locus classicus for theorizing about their status. The prominence of judgment data in contemporary linguistics is crucially tied to Chomsky's mentalist reconception of the field. Judgment data were not completely absent prior to Chomsky's work. For example, field linguists did not always prescind from asking informants whether such-and-such was something they would say, and Chomsky's teacher Zelig Harris emphasized the importance for phonology of speakers' judgments concerning sound differences (Harris 1951). But the positivist, behaviorist, and structuralist positions that dominated American linguistics in the first half of the 20 th century tended to view the use of judgment data with suspicion and focused rather on produced sentences. The methodological strictures in part arose in reaction to problems encountered in earlier introspectionist psychology (discussed in section 3). But the focus on produced utterances reflected as well a particular conception of what languages are and thus what linguistics is about. Though linguists of this period differed in many ways, they shared a tendency to view languages as consisting in the totality of utterances speakers of that language can produce (an E-language in Chomsky's (1986) terminology); and much work focused on describing, analyzing, and taxonomizing languages so conceived-for example, the many Native American languages so apparently different from the Indo-European languages which were then more familiar to linguists. While such a conception does not of itself preclude the use of speakers' judgments (cf. the remarks on Devitt's (2006) views in section 2), it is more naturally combined with an emphasis on corpus data, especially given the methodological scruples already mentioned. Conversely, judgment data find a natural home in Chomsky's mentalist reconception of linguistics-a reconception, according to Chomsky (1966), that is in fact a recovery and development of earlier ideas about language. On this approach, linguistics aims, not just to describe linguistic products, but to provide a cognitive explanation of various of their distinctive features. One of Chomsky's core hypotheses is that there is an innately constrained computational procedure realized in the mind-brain-so-called I-language-that is implicated specifically in linguistic phenomena and whose character explains some of their distinctive features. As with aspects of our cognition more generally, we cannot directly observe I-language but must infer it from the effects to which it contributes. The methodological claim relevant to this chapter is that judgment data prove particularly useful in this endeavor.
This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to proposition... more This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to propositional content is context-sensitive and that attention to this fact allows for an attractive solution to the sorites paradox.
Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” ef... more Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena – belief polarization and the size-weight illusion – that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?
Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues tha... more Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. Before turning to the argument, I quickly review some Burgean themes that frame his discussion. As far as possible, I will be granting this framework, so that the objections raised later will have force even by Burge's own lights. Accordingly, I here simply lay out the framework sans defense. Burge distinguishes among mere functional sensory registration of information, perception, and propositional thought. (e.g., 104-5, 315-9, 421-36) Sensory registration of information involves a sensorily-mediated statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, or causal dependence of a mind-brain state with, or on, something external. But mere sensory registration of information, even if functional, does not suffice for a state's having representational content, according to Burge. So, perception, the most basic form of representation, differs from mere sensory registration of information: only the former possesses genuine correctness, or accuracy, conditions. Burge thus sets himself against those-such as Fodor (1990), Dretske (1988), Millikan (1989), and Gallistel (1990)-who would naturalize representational content by reducing it to the obtaining of correlational, causal, counterfactual, or bio-teleological relations. (292-308) Perception differs as well from propositional thought. For example, the latter's role in inference underwrites the ascription of propositional structure, while with perception, though we are warranted in ascribing a demonstrative and an attributive aspect, we are not, according to Burge, warranted in ascribing propositional structure. 2 Burge argues, further, that a capacity for perception-and thus for being in states with representational content-does not require a capacity for propositional thought, far less a
Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive pene... more Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn's claim is correct-but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn's requirements that the effects be direct and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism.
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2009
This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowl... more This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it's necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it's part of an empirical theory that would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question: how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers and their varying philosophical and empirical commitments.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental, 2012
My fact-talk follows Davidson and, following him, Lepore and Ludwig (2005). Davidson, however, do... more My fact-talk follows Davidson and, following him, Lepore and Ludwig (2005). Davidson, however, does not admit fact-entities into his ontology, so this fact-talk should not be so construed.
In this note, I clarify the point of my paper "The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments... more In this note, I clarify the point of my paper "The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments" (NS) in light of Ray Jackendoff's comments in his "Linguistics in Cognitive Science: The State of the Art." Along the way, I amplify my remarks on unification. 1
This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to proposition... more This paper argues that whether an utterance of a vague term makes any contribution to propositional content is context-sensitive and that attention to this fact allows for an attractive solution to the sorites paradox.
tion.There are a variety of ways one might respond. First, one could question whether such minima... more tion.There are a variety of ways one might respond. First, one could question whether such minimal interaction suffices to enable the speaker so to use the term. Pettit might prefer, however, a
According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguist... more According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth-theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much contextsensitivity speakers' languages contain, the cognized truth-theories themselves can be adequately characterized context-insensitively-that is, without using in the metalanguage expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.
Should a theory of meaning state what sentences mean, and can a Davidsonian theory of meaning in ... more Should a theory of meaning state what sentences mean, and can a Davidsonian theory of meaning in particular do so? Max Ko¨lbel answers both questions affirmatively. I argue, however, that the phenomena of non-homophony, non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, semantic mood, and context-sensitivity provide prima facie obstacles for extending Davidsonian truth-theories to yield meaning-stating theorems. Assessing some natural moves in reply requires a more fully developed conception of the task of such theories than Ko¨lbel provides. A more developed conception is also required to defend his positive answer to the first question above. I argue that, however Ko¨lbel might elaborate his position, it can't be by embracing the sort of cognitivist account of Davidsonian semantics to which he sometimes alludes.
In chapter 7, Mele presents the Zygote Argument, which is based on a case of "engineering in uter... more In chapter 7, Mele presents the Zygote Argument, which is based on a case of "engineering in utero" (188). Diana, who is a goddess in a deterministic universe, creates a zygote with exactly the right characteristics and in exactly the right circumstances so that the person into whom the zygote eventually develops will at some future time perform some desired action. Readers are invited to have the intuition that the person who developed from the zygote, Ernie, does not freely perform and is not morally responsible for performing the action Diana engineered him to perform. But given that there is no relevant difference between Ernie's development and the way any of us would develop in an ordinary deterministic world, it follows that determinism is equally threatening to freedom and moral responsibility. Of course, the Zygote Argument probably won't convince a committed compatibilist, but it does do a nice job of cleanly capturing a fundamental disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists over this question: could someone else also be morally responsible for your morally responsible actions? It's an interesting question why intuitions diverge so sharply on this issue, and the Zygote Argument does a nice job of making that question salient. Given Mele's agnostic autonomism, one might initially think that his theories would be, as "best-of-both-worlds" solutions tend to be, equally unappealing to both sides. But Mele is a sincere agnostic who feels the strength of all the arguments, and so does not attempt any sort of foolish reconciliation. Far from pleasing no one, the truth is just the opposite: both compatibilists and incompatibilists can claim Mele as an ally, and a valuable one at that.
Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Dev... more Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the psychology of such judgments, that linguists themselves are. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the relevant divide is not between linguists and non-linguists, but between subjects with and without minimally sufficient task-specific knowledge. In particular, we show that subjects with at least some minimal exposure to or knowledge of such tasks tend to perform consistently with one another—greater knowledge of linguistics makes no further difference—while at the same time exhibiting markedly greater in-group consistency than those who have no previous exposure to or knowledge of
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about... more Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus on grammaticality intuitions, rather than acceptability intuitions, distances his discussion from actual linguistic practice. We close by questioning a demand that drives his discussion-viz., that, for linguistic intuitions to supply evidence for linguistic theorizing, a better account of why they are evidence is required. 1 Introduction 2 Acceptability and Grammaticality 3 Our Prima Facie Inconsistency 4 Our Experimental Results 5 Explaining why Intuitions are Evidence
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009
Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Dev... more Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the psychology of such judgments, that linguists themselves are. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the relevant divide is not between linguists and non-linguists, but between subjects with and without minimally sufficient task-specific knowledge. In particular, we show that subjects with at least some minimal exposure to or knowledge of such tasks tend to perform consistently with one another-greater knowledge of linguistics makes no further difference-while at the same time exhibiting markedly greater ingroup consistency than those who have no previous exposure to or knowledge of such tasks and their goals.
Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Centra... more Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing-in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of 'gist' properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory as involving declining capacity across a series of stores. We conclude by discussing the relation of probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness.
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2014
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Much contemporary thinking about language is animated by the idea that the core function of langu... more Much contemporary thinking about language is animated by the idea that the core function of language is to represent how the world is, and that therefore the notion of representation should play a fundamental role in any account of meaning or language use. This volume brings together leading thinkers in the field who explore ways in which this idea may be challenged as well as obstacles to developing various forms of anti-representationalism. Particular attention is given to deflationary accounts of truth, the role of language in expressing mental states, and the normative and the natural as
they relate to issues of representation. The chapters further some fundamental debates in metaphysics—for example, concerning the question of finding a place for moral properties in a naturalistic world-view—and illuminate the relation of the recent neo-pragmatist revival to the expressivist stream in analytic philosophy of language.
The analysis of the connection between truth, meaning, thought, and action poses a myjor philoso... more The analysis of the connection between truth, meaning, thought, and action poses a myjor philosophy challenge—one that Donald Davidson addressed by aaetablishing a unified theory of language and mind.
This volume offers a reappraisal of Davidson's intellectual legacy. Twelve specially written essays bya leading philosophers in thze field illuminate a range of enduring philsoophical problems, and engage in particular with Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig's interpretation of Davidson's philosophy.
The collection affirms Davidson's continuing influence on the study of language, mind, and action, and offers a variety of new perspectives on his work.
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they relate to issues of representation. The chapters further some fundamental debates in metaphysics—for example, concerning the question of finding a place for moral properties in a naturalistic world-view—and illuminate the relation of the recent neo-pragmatist revival to the expressivist stream in analytic philosophy of language.
This volume offers a reappraisal of Davidson's intellectual legacy. Twelve specially written essays bya leading philosophers in thze field illuminate a range of enduring philsoophical problems, and engage in particular with Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig's interpretation of Davidson's philosophy.
The collection affirms Davidson's continuing influence on the study of language, mind, and action, and offers a variety of new perspectives on his work.
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