Richard Klaus
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Papers by Richard Klaus
Written for a graduate class--Philosophical Theology--at Biola University (April 2024).
I examine Laurence BonJour's conception of Indirect Representational Realism and note some critical problems for his views, thus opening up the possibility for a form of direct realism.
David Hume’s essay “On Miracles” continues to garner competing interpretations as to what Hume was arguing. The Traditional Interpretation argues that in Part I of the essay Hume is providing an a priori, “in-principle” argument against the possibility of ever justifying a miracle claim on the basis of human testimony. A Revisionary Interpretation championed by Antony Flew and others calls this Traditional Interpretation into question. This paper examines the case for and against the Traditional Interpretation and finds that the Revisionary Interpretation lacks sufficient evidential basis to overthrow the Traditional Interpretation.
In a series of exchanges David K. Johnson has challenged the Argument from Reason as defended by Victor Reppert.1 As part of that challenge, Johnson has alleged that Reppert has "loaded the die" in terms of defining naturalism to necessarily exclude the mental from the "basic level of reality." The purpose of this paper is not to defend the Argument from Reason, but, rather, to critically examine Johnson's conception of naturalism. Johnson's articulation of naturalism is underdeveloped and lacks appropriate specificity thus allowing him to help himself to ontological realities that do not fit well within more developed and robust conceptions of naturalism.
Written for a graduate class--Philosophical Theology--at Biola University (April 2024).
I examine Laurence BonJour's conception of Indirect Representational Realism and note some critical problems for his views, thus opening up the possibility for a form of direct realism.
David Hume’s essay “On Miracles” continues to garner competing interpretations as to what Hume was arguing. The Traditional Interpretation argues that in Part I of the essay Hume is providing an a priori, “in-principle” argument against the possibility of ever justifying a miracle claim on the basis of human testimony. A Revisionary Interpretation championed by Antony Flew and others calls this Traditional Interpretation into question. This paper examines the case for and against the Traditional Interpretation and finds that the Revisionary Interpretation lacks sufficient evidential basis to overthrow the Traditional Interpretation.
In a series of exchanges David K. Johnson has challenged the Argument from Reason as defended by Victor Reppert.1 As part of that challenge, Johnson has alleged that Reppert has "loaded the die" in terms of defining naturalism to necessarily exclude the mental from the "basic level of reality." The purpose of this paper is not to defend the Argument from Reason, but, rather, to critically examine Johnson's conception of naturalism. Johnson's articulation of naturalism is underdeveloped and lacks appropriate specificity thus allowing him to help himself to ontological realities that do not fit well within more developed and robust conceptions of naturalism.
Is There Meaning in the World? Religion or Secular Humanism: That is the Question?” (October 23, 2018)