Metaphysics by Christopher Tomaszewski
Toward the end of his classic treatise An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen offers a modal ar... more Toward the end of his classic treatise An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen offers a modal argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason which he argues shows that the principle “collapses all modal distinctions.” In this paper, a critical flaw in this argument is shown to lie in van Inwagen’s beginning assumption that there is such a thing as the conjunction of all contingently true propositions. This is shown to follow from Cantor’s theorem and a property of conjunction with respect to contingent propositions. Given the failure of this assumption, van Inwagen’s argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as stated, cannot succeed.
Kathrin Koslicki argues that ordinary material objects like tables and motorcycles have formal pr... more Kathrin Koslicki argues that ordinary material objects like tables and motorcycles have formal proper parts that structure the material proper parts. Karen Bennett rejects a key premise in Koslicki's argument according to which the material ingredient out of which a complex material object is made is a proper part of that object. Koslicki defends this premise with a principle motivated by its power to explain three important phenomena of material composition. But these phenomena can be equally well explained by a weaker principle that doesn't support the questioned premise in Koslicki's argument, Bennett argues. I show that Bennett's weaker principle, together with an appropriate strengthening of a different premise in Koslicki's original argument, still yields a sound argument for the existence of formal parts.
Philosophy of Religion by Christopher Tomaszewski
Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God, 2023
Classical theism's commitment to the doctrine of Divine simplicity is alleged to result in a moda... more Classical theism's commitment to the doctrine of Divine simplicity is alleged to result in a modal collapse. But a simple argument aimed at demonstrating that the doctrine of Divine simplicity entails a modal collapse is invalid. Nevertheless, a fundamental worry that motivated this argument remains: the doctrine of Divine simplicity does entail that God is really, intrinsically the same across all possible worlds. So how is it possible for a Cause that is really, intrinsically the same across all possible worlds to create all the creatures in those possible worlds with all the differences in each one among those creatures? In this paper, I show that just as with the original argument against the doctrine of Divine simplicity, this is a difficulty that confronts virtually all theists and even some atheists, not just classical theists, and point to a solution to the difficulty that can reconcile a deterministic causal relation between the Divine creative act and the effects thereof with the doctrine of Divine simplicity.
One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly... more One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly termed a ‘modal collapse’, whereby all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition rendered necessarily true. In this paper, I show that a common form of this argument is in fact famously invalid and examine two ways in which the opponent of Divine simplicity might try to repair the argument. I conclude that there is no clear way of repairing the argument that does not beg the question against the doctrine of Divine simplicity.
In their recent paper, Brandon Rickabaugh and Derek McAllister object to Paul Moser's rejection o... more In their recent paper, Brandon Rickabaugh and Derek McAllister object to Paul Moser's rejection of natural theology on the grounds that Moser is committed to a principle, Seek, which commits Moser to another principle, Access. Access in turn can be rationally motivated for at least some nonbelievers only by the arguments of natural theology. So Moser is in fact committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology. In this paper, we show that Seek by itself does not commit one to Access, and that even if Moser is committed to Access, he is not thereby committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology for all nonbelievers. While we find this argument offered by Rickabaugh and McAllister lacking, we do not deny their conclusion that natural theology is epistemically useful to all nonbelievers.
Philosophy of Mind by Christopher Tomaszewski
One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of in... more One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of intentionality. As many non-materialists of various stripes have pointed out, it is very difficult to say, if the human mind is a purely material thing, how this material thing can be about or represent another thing wholly distinct from itself. However, for their part, these same non-materialists have relied heavily or exclusively on this intuition that one material thing cannot be about another. In this paper, that hole in the intentionality objection to materialist theories of mind is filled by way of providing the germ of a new (though quite old in some respects) theory of the metaphysics of intentionality. On this view, intentionality just is partial identity. Partial identity is a concept introduced by David Armstrong and used by Donald Baxter to give a metaphysics of instantiation. The aboutness exhibited by our mental activity is simply a partial identity relation between the mind and the object of thought. This thesis, I contend, is a faithful interpretation of Brentano's "intentional in-existence," which the objects of thought have in the mind and which he held to be characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. Some interesting and fortuitous consequences, including an elucidation of precisely why one material thing can never be about something distinct from itself, are then examined, and finally a defence against some objections is given.
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Metaphysics by Christopher Tomaszewski
Philosophy of Religion by Christopher Tomaszewski
Philosophy of Mind by Christopher Tomaszewski