Natasa Mavronicola
I am Reader in Law at the University of Birmingham. My research focuses on human rights, criminal law and criminal justice, public law, and legal theory.
I hold the following qualifications:
2014: PhD in Law, University of Cambridge
2010: Cyprus Bar Qualification (Distinction) - first place in national examinations
2009: Linklaters Legal Practice Course, College of Law (Distinction)
2008: Bachelor of Civil Law, University of Oxford (Distinction)
2007: LLB (Hons) Law, University College London (First Class)
You can find more information on my university profile: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/law/mavronicola-natasa.aspx
You can find me on Twitter at: https://twitter.com/NMavronicola
I hold the following qualifications:
2014: PhD in Law, University of Cambridge
2010: Cyprus Bar Qualification (Distinction) - first place in national examinations
2009: Linklaters Legal Practice Course, College of Law (Distinction)
2008: Bachelor of Civil Law, University of Oxford (Distinction)
2007: LLB (Hons) Law, University College London (First Class)
You can find more information on my university profile: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/law/mavronicola-natasa.aspx
You can find me on Twitter at: https://twitter.com/NMavronicola
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Papers by Natasa Mavronicola
My submission relates to the intersection between violations of the right to life and individual criminal liability. In summary, I argue that the Human Rights Committee must clarify that circumstances triggering State liability for arbitrary deprivations of life should not be seen as entirely coterminous with circumstances giving rise to individual criminal liability. This is because equating, or appearing to equate, the two can lead to either coercive overreach or dilution of the right to life.
An edited version of this paper is forthcoming in the Human Rights Law Review.
In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.
This case comment is forthcoming in the Cyprus Human Rights Law Review.
Yet what of rights that are not strictly tied to the procedural fulfilment of democratic decision-making – particularly if such rights claim ‘absolute’ status? This paper addresses this issue. It considers what an absolute right entails and zooms in on the right enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which establishes that no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, outlining two broad areas in which such a right can operate to protect marginalised, unpopular or voiceless minority groups against majoritarian will or executive ‘public interest’ arguments.
It then assesses how the nature and implications of an absolute right such as Article 3 ECHR can be seen to relate to democracy and examines the potential for defining democracy in a way that encompasses respect for such rights, or for reconsidering the limits of democracy in light of such rights. It is suggested that the account provided indicates that the relationship between human rights and democracy must cease to be viewed through broad-brush references to inter-dependence and mutual reinforcement. This entails that public lawyers must confront the need to address precisely and unequivocally what we mean when evoking the idea(l) of democracy, and notably ‘constitutional democracy’,3 particularly if we wish to have a lucid and honest account of its relationship with fundamental rights. In the European context, the European Court of Human Rights is called upon to provide such an account in its interpretation of human rights within ‘democratic societies’.
Blog posts by Natasa Mavronicola
In this short piece, focusing on positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), I underline the following: (a) the State bears positive obligations to protect, rather than coerce; (b) the State’s positive obligations do not extend to duties to act unlawfully under the Convention; and (c) positive obligations must be responsive to, and entail ancillary obligations to determine, the relevant context and risk.
My submission relates to the intersection between violations of the right to life and individual criminal liability. In summary, I argue that the Human Rights Committee must clarify that circumstances triggering State liability for arbitrary deprivations of life should not be seen as entirely coterminous with circumstances giving rise to individual criminal liability. This is because equating, or appearing to equate, the two can lead to either coercive overreach or dilution of the right to life.
An edited version of this paper is forthcoming in the Human Rights Law Review.
In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.
This case comment is forthcoming in the Cyprus Human Rights Law Review.
Yet what of rights that are not strictly tied to the procedural fulfilment of democratic decision-making – particularly if such rights claim ‘absolute’ status? This paper addresses this issue. It considers what an absolute right entails and zooms in on the right enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which establishes that no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, outlining two broad areas in which such a right can operate to protect marginalised, unpopular or voiceless minority groups against majoritarian will or executive ‘public interest’ arguments.
It then assesses how the nature and implications of an absolute right such as Article 3 ECHR can be seen to relate to democracy and examines the potential for defining democracy in a way that encompasses respect for such rights, or for reconsidering the limits of democracy in light of such rights. It is suggested that the account provided indicates that the relationship between human rights and democracy must cease to be viewed through broad-brush references to inter-dependence and mutual reinforcement. This entails that public lawyers must confront the need to address precisely and unequivocally what we mean when evoking the idea(l) of democracy, and notably ‘constitutional democracy’,3 particularly if we wish to have a lucid and honest account of its relationship with fundamental rights. In the European context, the European Court of Human Rights is called upon to provide such an account in its interpretation of human rights within ‘democratic societies’.
In this short piece, focusing on positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), I underline the following: (a) the State bears positive obligations to protect, rather than coerce; (b) the State’s positive obligations do not extend to duties to act unlawfully under the Convention; and (c) positive obligations must be responsive to, and entail ancillary obligations to determine, the relevant context and risk.
You can find a blog post that covers the topic post-referendum here: https://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2016/07/28/natasa-mavronicola-what-are-the-implications-of-the-brexit-vote-for-human-rights/
You can find the audio of the panel discussion here:
https://echo360.city.ac.uk/ess/echo/presentation/3658ce57-4f64-49a3-8e52-e8fd3fb3e30e/media.mp3
The collection explores four interlocking themes surrounding the issue of coercive human rights:
First, the key threads in the doctrine of the ECtHR on duties to mobilise the criminal law as a means of delivering human rights protection.
Secondly, the factors that contribute to a readiness to demand coercive measures, including discrimination and vulnerability, and other key justificatory reasoning shaping the development of coercive human rights.
Thirdly, the most pressing challenges for the ECtHR's coercive duties doctrine, including:
- how it relates to theories and rationales of criminalisation and criminal punishment;
- its implications for the fundamental tenets of human rights law itself;
- its relationship to transitional justice objectives; and
- how (far) it coheres with the imperative of effective protection for persons in precarious or vulnerable situations.
Fourthly, the (prospective) evolution of the coercive human rights doctrine and its application within national jurisdictions.