Published Papers by Magdalena Antrobus
In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delu-
sions i... more In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delu-
sions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions
constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively
biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential
for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological
costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s
overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epistemically innocent.
Purpose of review What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering ... more Purpose of review What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism, it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about the style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial. Summary We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.
AISB50 Conference Proceedings, 2014
This paper contemplates the possible existence of positive characteristics in Manic Depressive Il... more This paper contemplates the possible existence of positive characteristics in Manic Depressive Illness (Bipolar Disorder / MD). Being one of the most acute mental diseases of our times, MD is associated with numerous deficits that span the everyday lives of people who suffer from the illness, including but not limited to memory, attention and learning. Surprisingly at the time of this paper there has been nearly no research published in respect of examining the cognitive traits of the illness, which could be viewed as positive or beneficial in any way. Considering the important gap in the literature, this paper inspects and helps to understand the role of five of the main positive factors: realism, empathy, spirituality, resilience and creativity. It is concluded that these qualities can constitute a significant beneficence in the outcome of Manic Depressive Illness and in the long term can contribute towards the strength of one's character. It is argued here that, in this particular sense, Bipolar Disorder can be a valid part of human personal growth. 12
Conference Presentations by Magdalena Antrobus
In this paper, I ask whether depressive mood has epistemic and psychological benefits for the sub... more In this paper, I ask whether depressive mood has epistemic and psychological benefits for the subject, and what is a character of the relation between such benefits.
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely. In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood carries also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
Msetfi, R. M., Murphy, R. A., Simpson, J., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2005). Depressive realism and outcome density bias in contingency judgments: the effect of the context and intertrial interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 134, 10–22. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.10
In this paper, I ask whether depressive mood has epistemic and psychological benefits for the sub... more In this paper, I ask whether depressive mood has epistemic and psychological benefits for the subject, and what is a character of the relation between such benefits.
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Abramson, Alloy and Rosoff, 1981; Dobson and Pusch, 1995; Presson and Benassi, 2003; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely.
In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood has also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism).
Defensive pessimism is a type of cognitive strategy performed by an agent in an attempt to take cognitive control over experienced anxiety, so that own performance is unimpaired (Norem and Cantor, 1986)
The notion of defence applies when the cognitive act of pessimism takes place in order to prevent greater harm from occurring (e.g. the level of anxiety becomes debilitating). The notion of pessimism applies to the cognitive strategy of setting unrealistically low expectations for the success of one’s own performance (a situation that is a source of anxiety). Setting low expectations, in turn, plays a motivational role for the subject, who then takes an adequate action in order to protect herself from potentially greater psychological harm.
Here is an example of a defensive pessimism:
“Think, for instance, of straight-A students who have never failed a test in their lives but repeatedly insist that they are, without question, going to ‘bomb’ an upcoming exam. Nothing their friends can say reassures them; indeed, reminding them of their past success seems only to lead to more anxiety or confusion. These persons proceed to rush home, drink gallons of coffee, study furiously throughout the night and, annoyingly but not surprisingly, receive the highest score in the class. This success does not come without considerable effort devoted to preparation, however, and the anxiety, although perhaps unjustified, is very real.” (Norem and Cantor, 1986b, p.1209).
Defensive pessimism has been evidenced as an effective cognitive strategy used in situations of high anxiety by healthy individuals, but largely ineffective when used by people suffering from clinical depression (Norem and Cantor, 1986a, 1986b). In the latter group, experiencing high levels of anxiety lead to increased depressive symptoms rather than motivates people to take a positive action. Here I argue that whilst severe forms of depression may prevent individuals from successful implementation of defensive pessimism strategy and whilst healthy individuals are often subjects to positive illusions, which might affect the efficiency of their actions, milder symptoms of depression (in form of depressive mood) can contribute to defensive pessimism success in such a way that thanks to more accurate perception of herself, the subject is likely to take a more effective action.
Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 108(4), 441–485. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.108.4.441
Dobson, K. S., & Pusch, D. (1995). A test of the depressive realism hypothesis in clinically depressed subjects. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 19(2), 179–194. doi:10.1007/BF02229693
Msetfi, R. M., Murphy, R. A., Simpson, J., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2005). Depressive realism and outcome density bias in contingency judgments: the effect of the context and intertrial interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 134, 10–22. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.10
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986a). Anticipatory and post hoc cushioning strategies: Optimism and defensive pessimism in “risky” situations. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(3), 347–362. doi:10.1007/BF01173471
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986b). Defensive pessimism: harnessing anxiety as motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1208–1217. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1208
Presson, P. K., & Benassi, V. A. (2003). ARE DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL? Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal. doi:10.2224/sbp.2003.31.5.483
In my research I argue that depressive mood has several epistemic and psychological benefits for ... more In my research I argue that depressive mood has several epistemic and psychological benefits for the subject as well as I attempt to explain a character of the relation between these benefits.
Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely (depressive realism). Furthermore, based on empirical evidence I argue, that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a novel, more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
Paper accepted for presentation at Cognitive Futures 2015 — Forging Futures from the Past: Histor... more Paper accepted for presentation at Cognitive Futures 2015 — Forging Futures from the Past: History and Cognition, University of Oxford 2015
This paper presents the evolution of the notion of Depressive Realism, starting from its first discovery by Alloy and Abramson (1979) up to today, where it has become one of the issues investigated by Project PERFECT, at the Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham.
Alloy and Abramson first introduced the notion of Depressive Realism in 1979, when one of their experiments gave rise to a significant result: people with moderate or sub-clinical depression turned out to present a more accurate perception of their cognitive control over reality than non-depressed participants. The phenomenon, repeatedly confirmed in a series of successive experiments and nicknamed “sadder, but wiser” by its discoverers, sparked both world-wide interest and controversy, as well as inspired new trends in literature (e.g., novels by Michel Houellebecq and Susan Sontag).
Throughout last three decades, researchers have tried to address the following questions, to name a few: why would being depressed make people see the reality in a more objective way? What is it exactly that people with depression see more accurately? What are the costs and benefits of this cognitive inclination?
The ERC funded Project PERFECT focuses on addressing the potential costs and benefits of cognitions in the clinical and non-clinical population, and is interested in the relationship between unrealistic optimism and depressive realism. This presentation summarises the state of debate on the phenomenon of depressive realism, and identifies implications for its future study and for clinical practice.
Title of oral presentation: Project PERFECT on pragmatic and epistemic benefits of inaccurate cog... more Title of oral presentation: Project PERFECT on pragmatic and epistemic benefits of inaccurate cognitions: the case of manic-depressive disorder Aim: In order to reduce the stigma associated with mental illness we should be prepared to acknowledge and investigate both negative and positive aspects of the effects that a mental disorder is likely to have on a person's life. The main aim of the ERC-funded project entitled PERFECT, Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (www.projectperfect.eu), is precisely to emphasise the positive aspects.
This paper contemplates the possible existence of positive characteristics in Manic Depressive Il... more This paper contemplates the possible existence of positive characteristics in Manic Depressive Illness (Bipolar Disorder / MD). Being one of the most acute mental diseases of our times, MD is associated with numerous deficits that span the everyday lives of people who suffer from the illness, including but not limited to memory, attention and learning. Surprisingly at the time of this paper there has been nearly no research published in respect of examining the cognitive traits of the illness, which could be viewed as positive or beneficial in any way. Considering the important gap in the literature, this paper inspects and helps to understand the role of five of the main positive factors: realism, empathy, spirituality, resilience and creativity. It is concluded that these qualities can constitute a significant beneficence in the outcome of Manic Depressive Illness and in the long term can contribute towards the strength of one’s character. It is argued here that, in this particular sense, Bipolar Disorder can be a valid part of human personal growth.
Papers by Magdalena Antrobus
Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, 2019
Optimistically biased beliefs are beliefs about oneself that are more positive than is warranted ... more Optimistically biased beliefs are beliefs about oneself that are more positive than is warranted by the evidence. Optimistically biased beliefs are the result of the influence of cognitive and motivational factors on people’s capacity to acquire, retrieve, and use information about themselves, and they resist counterevidence due to biases in belief updating. From a psychological point of view, optimistically biased beliefs contribute positively to subjective wellbeing, mental health, resilience, motivation, caring behaviour, and productivity. This chapter argues that optimistically biased beliefs also have significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. In particular, they enhance socialization, leading to both exchanging information with one’s peers and receiving feedback from them, and they support one’s sense of self as that of a competent, largely coherent, and effective agent, helping sustain one’s motivation in the pursuit of one’s goals.
In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in ... more In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epistemically innocent.
Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2), 194-198, 2015
Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering... more Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health.
Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial.
Summary: We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.
Uploads
Published Papers by Magdalena Antrobus
sions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions
constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively
biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential
for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological
costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s
overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epistemically innocent.
Conference Presentations by Magdalena Antrobus
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely. In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood carries also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
Msetfi, R. M., Murphy, R. A., Simpson, J., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2005). Depressive realism and outcome density bias in contingency judgments: the effect of the context and intertrial interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 134, 10–22. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.10
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Abramson, Alloy and Rosoff, 1981; Dobson and Pusch, 1995; Presson and Benassi, 2003; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely.
In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood has also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism).
Defensive pessimism is a type of cognitive strategy performed by an agent in an attempt to take cognitive control over experienced anxiety, so that own performance is unimpaired (Norem and Cantor, 1986)
The notion of defence applies when the cognitive act of pessimism takes place in order to prevent greater harm from occurring (e.g. the level of anxiety becomes debilitating). The notion of pessimism applies to the cognitive strategy of setting unrealistically low expectations for the success of one’s own performance (a situation that is a source of anxiety). Setting low expectations, in turn, plays a motivational role for the subject, who then takes an adequate action in order to protect herself from potentially greater psychological harm.
Here is an example of a defensive pessimism:
“Think, for instance, of straight-A students who have never failed a test in their lives but repeatedly insist that they are, without question, going to ‘bomb’ an upcoming exam. Nothing their friends can say reassures them; indeed, reminding them of their past success seems only to lead to more anxiety or confusion. These persons proceed to rush home, drink gallons of coffee, study furiously throughout the night and, annoyingly but not surprisingly, receive the highest score in the class. This success does not come without considerable effort devoted to preparation, however, and the anxiety, although perhaps unjustified, is very real.” (Norem and Cantor, 1986b, p.1209).
Defensive pessimism has been evidenced as an effective cognitive strategy used in situations of high anxiety by healthy individuals, but largely ineffective when used by people suffering from clinical depression (Norem and Cantor, 1986a, 1986b). In the latter group, experiencing high levels of anxiety lead to increased depressive symptoms rather than motivates people to take a positive action. Here I argue that whilst severe forms of depression may prevent individuals from successful implementation of defensive pessimism strategy and whilst healthy individuals are often subjects to positive illusions, which might affect the efficiency of their actions, milder symptoms of depression (in form of depressive mood) can contribute to defensive pessimism success in such a way that thanks to more accurate perception of herself, the subject is likely to take a more effective action.
Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 108(4), 441–485. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.108.4.441
Dobson, K. S., & Pusch, D. (1995). A test of the depressive realism hypothesis in clinically depressed subjects. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 19(2), 179–194. doi:10.1007/BF02229693
Msetfi, R. M., Murphy, R. A., Simpson, J., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2005). Depressive realism and outcome density bias in contingency judgments: the effect of the context and intertrial interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 134, 10–22. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.10
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986a). Anticipatory and post hoc cushioning strategies: Optimism and defensive pessimism in “risky” situations. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(3), 347–362. doi:10.1007/BF01173471
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986b). Defensive pessimism: harnessing anxiety as motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1208–1217. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1208
Presson, P. K., & Benassi, V. A. (2003). ARE DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL? Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal. doi:10.2224/sbp.2003.31.5.483
Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely (depressive realism). Furthermore, based on empirical evidence I argue, that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a novel, more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
This paper presents the evolution of the notion of Depressive Realism, starting from its first discovery by Alloy and Abramson (1979) up to today, where it has become one of the issues investigated by Project PERFECT, at the Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham.
Alloy and Abramson first introduced the notion of Depressive Realism in 1979, when one of their experiments gave rise to a significant result: people with moderate or sub-clinical depression turned out to present a more accurate perception of their cognitive control over reality than non-depressed participants. The phenomenon, repeatedly confirmed in a series of successive experiments and nicknamed “sadder, but wiser” by its discoverers, sparked both world-wide interest and controversy, as well as inspired new trends in literature (e.g., novels by Michel Houellebecq and Susan Sontag).
Throughout last three decades, researchers have tried to address the following questions, to name a few: why would being depressed make people see the reality in a more objective way? What is it exactly that people with depression see more accurately? What are the costs and benefits of this cognitive inclination?
The ERC funded Project PERFECT focuses on addressing the potential costs and benefits of cognitions in the clinical and non-clinical population, and is interested in the relationship between unrealistic optimism and depressive realism. This presentation summarises the state of debate on the phenomenon of depressive realism, and identifies implications for its future study and for clinical practice.
Papers by Magdalena Antrobus
Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial.
Summary: We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.
sions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions
constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively
biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential
for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological
costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s
overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epistemically innocent.
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely. In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood carries also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
Msetfi, R. M., Murphy, R. A., Simpson, J., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2005). Depressive realism and outcome density bias in contingency judgments: the effect of the context and intertrial interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 134, 10–22. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.10
Symptoms of depression are commonly perceived as psychological difficulties that compromise wellbeing. Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Yet, it has been argued that in certain circumstances, depressive symptoms enhance more accurate beliefs about self and reality. One suggestion is that depressive mood enhances accuracy in respect of self-related judgments (depressive realism). This claim has been evidenced in numerous empirical studies over one’s sense of control in contingency tasks (that is, the tasks in which the outcome might be perceived as a result of the subject’s actions) (for ex. Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Abramson, Alloy and Rosoff, 1981; Dobson and Pusch, 1995; Presson and Benassi, 2003; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson and Kornbrot, 2005). Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely.
In this paper I endorse this claim in a light of the available evidence and argue, that by making a contribution to the acquisition of more accurate beliefs, depressive mood can be seen as epistemically beneficial.
Furthermore I argue that by contributing to better accuracy of beliefs with regards to self, depressive mood has also potential psychological benefits for the subject. Empirical evidence and real life observations show that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism).
Defensive pessimism is a type of cognitive strategy performed by an agent in an attempt to take cognitive control over experienced anxiety, so that own performance is unimpaired (Norem and Cantor, 1986)
The notion of defence applies when the cognitive act of pessimism takes place in order to prevent greater harm from occurring (e.g. the level of anxiety becomes debilitating). The notion of pessimism applies to the cognitive strategy of setting unrealistically low expectations for the success of one’s own performance (a situation that is a source of anxiety). Setting low expectations, in turn, plays a motivational role for the subject, who then takes an adequate action in order to protect herself from potentially greater psychological harm.
Here is an example of a defensive pessimism:
“Think, for instance, of straight-A students who have never failed a test in their lives but repeatedly insist that they are, without question, going to ‘bomb’ an upcoming exam. Nothing their friends can say reassures them; indeed, reminding them of their past success seems only to lead to more anxiety or confusion. These persons proceed to rush home, drink gallons of coffee, study furiously throughout the night and, annoyingly but not surprisingly, receive the highest score in the class. This success does not come without considerable effort devoted to preparation, however, and the anxiety, although perhaps unjustified, is very real.” (Norem and Cantor, 1986b, p.1209).
Defensive pessimism has been evidenced as an effective cognitive strategy used in situations of high anxiety by healthy individuals, but largely ineffective when used by people suffering from clinical depression (Norem and Cantor, 1986a, 1986b). In the latter group, experiencing high levels of anxiety lead to increased depressive symptoms rather than motivates people to take a positive action. Here I argue that whilst severe forms of depression may prevent individuals from successful implementation of defensive pessimism strategy and whilst healthy individuals are often subjects to positive illusions, which might affect the efficiency of their actions, milder symptoms of depression (in form of depressive mood) can contribute to defensive pessimism success in such a way that thanks to more accurate perception of herself, the subject is likely to take a more effective action.
Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
References:
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgement of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35–45. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(81)90110-8
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Considerations about the psychological costs of depressive mood and its adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the possibility that ‘feeling low’ is linked to any benefits. Arguably, ‘feeling low’ can enhance the accuracy of one’s beliefs and help perceive the reality more precisely (depressive realism). Furthermore, based on empirical evidence I argue, that accurate judgments of own capabilities can increase efficiency of self-defensive psychological strategy in a situation of experienced anxiety (defensive pessimism). Re-considering the phenomenon of depressive mood in terms of its potential epistemic and psychological benefits leads to a novel, more balanced view of the role of depressive symptoms in a person’s cognitive and emotional life.
This paper presents the evolution of the notion of Depressive Realism, starting from its first discovery by Alloy and Abramson (1979) up to today, where it has become one of the issues investigated by Project PERFECT, at the Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham.
Alloy and Abramson first introduced the notion of Depressive Realism in 1979, when one of their experiments gave rise to a significant result: people with moderate or sub-clinical depression turned out to present a more accurate perception of their cognitive control over reality than non-depressed participants. The phenomenon, repeatedly confirmed in a series of successive experiments and nicknamed “sadder, but wiser” by its discoverers, sparked both world-wide interest and controversy, as well as inspired new trends in literature (e.g., novels by Michel Houellebecq and Susan Sontag).
Throughout last three decades, researchers have tried to address the following questions, to name a few: why would being depressed make people see the reality in a more objective way? What is it exactly that people with depression see more accurately? What are the costs and benefits of this cognitive inclination?
The ERC funded Project PERFECT focuses on addressing the potential costs and benefits of cognitions in the clinical and non-clinical population, and is interested in the relationship between unrealistic optimism and depressive realism. This presentation summarises the state of debate on the phenomenon of depressive realism, and identifies implications for its future study and for clinical practice.
Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial.
Summary: We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.