Imola R Ilyes

York University, Philosophy, Graduate Student

Followers

Following

Public Views

I am PhD Candidate in Philosophy whose work focuses on the role of empathy and the emotions in moral competence. My work engages with both contemporary empirical studies in moral psychology, as well as early modern and Aristotelian theories of moral judgment and moral development.

less

InterestsView All (8)

Uploads

Papers by Imola R Ilyes

Empathy In Hume and Smith (forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy)

Empathy is central to Hume and Smith's accounts of moral motivation and moral judgment. In this c... more Empathy is central to Hume and Smith's accounts of moral motivation and moral judgment. In this chapter, I will situate their respective theories of empathy in their broader views on cognition and imagination, clarifying the different foci of empathy, the role of the imagination, and the unique evaluative dimension in Smithian empathy. Then, I will explore how empathy lies at the foundation of moral motivation, clarifying how differences between Humean and Smithian empathy explain differences in the nature of this motivation between thinkers, and the respective limitations that it has. Lastly, I will show how both Hume and Smith construct privileged points of view to reconcile the impartial demands of moral judgment with the potential partialities of empathy. I aim to clarify how the role of empathy in moral judgment differs from its role in moral motivation, with resources being available in the former case that are explicitly rejected in the later.

Download

Empathy and the Interpersonal Standpoint: Second and Third Personal Reasons in Darwall's The Second Person Standpoint

In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall argues that moral obligation is essentially boun... more In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall argues that moral obligation is essentially bound up with the second-person standpoint, that is, the interpersonal standpoint that we take up when we make and receive claims on each other's actions. At the heart of his recent work is the distinction between second-personal and third-personal moral reasons, a distinction that sometimes maps unto the distinction between deontology and consequentialism, and at others, between Humean and Smithean sentimentalism. While some of our moral interests are agent-neutral, involving a concern for outcomes related to the welfare of ourselves and others, the reasons that emerge from taking up and responding to the claims of others -second-person reasons -are necessary to understanding the force and priority of morality.

Download

Empathy In Hume and Smith (forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy)

Download

Empathy and the Interpersonal Standpoint: Second and Third Personal Reasons in Darwall's The Second Person Standpoint

Download

Imola R Ilyes

Uploads

Papers by Imola R Ilyes

Log In