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Contract for necessaries
Under common law, a minor is liable on contracts for
necessaries. (Nash v. Inman [1908])
https://indiancaselaws.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/nash-v
-inman/
The case of Nash v. Inman was cited with approval by
Chang Min Tat J. in Government of Malaysia v.
Gurcharan Singh & Ors [1971] 1 MLJ 211.
‘If an infant is totally incompetent and incapable of
entering into a contract, there is no contract on which he
can be sued….Section 69 of our Ordinance…embodies
the English common law of the liability of an infant to
pay a reasonable sum for necessaries…’
Government of Malaysia v. Gurcharan
Singh & Ors [1971] 1 MLJ 211
The Govt. sued the first D as the promisor and the second
Ds as sureties for breach of contract. The claim was for
$11,500 alleged to be the sum actually spent by the Govt. in
educating the first D. At the time of the contract, the first D
was a minor.
The court held that the contract was void but ruled that since
education was necessaries, the first D was liable for the
repayment of a reasonable sum spent on him. The amount
was calculated as a proportion of the actual sum spent on his
education and since the first D had served the Govt. for 3
years and 10 months out of the contractual period of 5 years,
the sum of $2683 was ordered as payment to the Govt.
Section 69 of the CA 1950
In Malaysia, the common law of England regarding
liability for necessaries supplied to a minor is
embodied in section 69 of the Contracts Act 1950.
S.69 states:
‘If a person , incapable of entering into a contract, or
anyone whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied
by another person with necessaries suited to his
condition in life, the person who has furnished such
supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of
such incapable person.’
The legal interpretation of ‘necessaries’ includes goods
and services reasonably necessary to the minor’s actual
requirements such as food, shelter, clothing, medical
services and even education, but they must be tested
against the particular minor’s station in life.
The test of necessaries would necessarily depend on
the nature of the goods or services supplied, the
minor’s actual needs and his station in life.
For instance, clothes could well be necessaries, but
where the minor is already adequately stocked, they
may be treated as mere luxury.
Important points under section 69
1. The necessaries must have been actually supplied to a minor.
2. The minor’s liability includes necessaries supplied to anyone
whom he is legally bound to support such as his wife or
child. (Illustration (b))
3. The supplier of necessaries may claim only a reasonable
price which may not be the same as the contract price.
Government of Malaysia v. Gurcharan Singh & Ors. [1971]
The Court held that the contract was void but ruled that since
education was ‘necessaries’, the first defendant was liable for the
repayment of a reasonable sum spent on him.
4. The minor is not personally liable. He is obliged to pay only
if he has the property to do so.
Contract of Scholarship
Section 4(a) of the Contracts (Amendment) Act 1976
provides that no scholarship agreements shall be
invalidated on the ground that the scholar entering into
such agreement is not of the age of majority.
This provision is clearly intended to nullify the decision
in Government of Malaysia v. Gurcharan Singh & Ors.
[1971]
The Amendment Act is given retrospective effect i.e. it
is applicable to scholarship agreements entered into
before the commencement of the Act and not yet
expired.
Section 5(a) also modifies the law relating to penalties
in the event of breach.
Where an amount is named to be paid in the event of a
breach, the scholar and the surety, if any, will be liable
jointly and severally to pay the whole sum irrespective
of whether actual damage or loss has been caused.
Further, no deduction is allowed for any partial service
performed by the scholar. Such deduction being
previously applied in the case of Gurcharan Singh.
Insurance
Under the Insurance Act 1963 (Revised 1972), a minor
over the age of ten may enter into a contract of
insurance but if he or she is under sixteen years, the
written consent of the parents or guardians is essential.
Apprenticeship
Section 13 of the Children and Young Person
(Employment) Act 1966 provides the necessary
capacity for a minor to enter into a contract of
apprenticeship or service.
For the purpose of the section, a child is defined as any
person below the age of 14 and a young person as one
between the ages of 14 and 16.
Though the child or young person may sue or defend
under such contracts of service, no damages or
indemnity can be recovered from him for breach.
Capacity of person of sound mind
Section 11: ‘Every person is competent to contract…
who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from
contracting by any law to which he is subject.’
A person suffering from mental disability, either
permanently or temporarily, at the time of the contract
obviously lack the capacity.
Section 12: ‘A person is said to be of sound mind for
the purpose of making a contract if, at the time when
he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of
forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his
interests.’
Section 12 covers contracts entered into by a mentally disordered
person as well as those of a person incapacitated through sickness,
alcohol or other drugs.
The basis of incapacity is that of a person’s inability to understand
what he is doing.
Illustrations (a) & (b).
The Act does not specify if such contracts are void or voidable. In
the absence of an authoritative judicial pronouncement, the law
remains uncertain.
Under English law, the contract is voidable at the option of the
person of unsound mind if the fact of mental disorder or intoxication
can be proved, and provided the other party knows of his condition.
Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone [1892]
Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone [1892]
’A contract made by a person of unsound mind is not
voidable at the person’s option if the other party to the
contract believed at the time he made the contract that
the person with whom he was dealing was of sound
mind. In order to avoid a fair contract on the ground of
insanity the mental incapacity of the one must be
known to the other party. A D must plead and prove
both his insanity and the knowledge of the P; the
burden of proof of both lies on the D.’