IS Unit 6
IS Unit 6
IS Unit 6
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Firewalls
Effective means of protecting a local system or n/w of systems from n/w-
based security threats
Also afford access to the outside world via WANs and the Internet
Overview of Firewalls Firewall Design Principles Characteristics
Capabilities Limitations
Location: The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the
Internet
The firewall may be a single computer system or a set of two or more systems
that cooperate to perform the firewall function
Firewall Characteristics
1.All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall
2.Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to pass.
Various types of firewalls are used, which implement various types of security policies
3.The firewall itself is immune to penetration(this implies the use of Trusted system with
a secure OS)
The following are the four general techniques taht firewalls use to control access and enforce
security policy.
Service control: Determine the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound(filters
based on IP address and TCP port no)
Direction Control:Determines the direction in which particular service requests may be initiated and allowed to
flow through the firewall.
User control: Controls access to a service according to which user is attempting to access it.
Behavior Control:Controls how particular services are used.For example, the firewall may filter e-mail to
eliminate spam.
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Capabilities of the firewall
3.A firewall is convenient platform for several Internet functions that are not security
related (e.g., network address translator and network management function)
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Types of Firewalls
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1.Packet-Filtering Router
Advantages : simplicity.
transparent to users and are very fast
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2.Application-Level Gateway
Also called a proxy server, acts as a relay of application-level traffic
The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or
FTP, and the gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed
When the user responds and provides a valid user ID and authentication
information, the gateway contacts the application on the remote host and relays
TCP segments containing the application data between the end points
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3.Circuit-Level Gateway
This can be a stand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed
by an application-level gateway for certain functions
It does not permit an end-to-end TCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up
two TCP connections,
1. between itself and a TCP user on an inner host and
2. between itself and TCP user on an outside host
Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP
segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents
Typical Use: A system where system administrator trusts the internal users
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Bastion Host
A bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical
strong point in the network’s security
Bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level
gateway
Firewall Configurations
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In the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration, the firewall consists of
two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host
Here, if the packet-filtering router is completely compromised, traffic could flow directly
through the router between the Internet and other hosts on the private network
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Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically prevents such a
security breach
Advantages of dual layers of security of the previous configuration are present here too
Again, an information
server or other hosts can
be allowed direct
communication with the
router
In this, 2 packet-filtering routers are used, 1-between BH and Internet & 2 - between BH
and Internal n/w
This creates an isolated
subnetwork, which may
consist of simply the BH
but may also include
1/more information
servers and modems for
dial-in capability
Both the Internet and the internal network have access to hosts on the screened subnet, but traffic across
the screened subnet is blocked 12
Trusted Systems
One way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and
malicious programs is to implement trusted system technology
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-Object: Anything to which access is controlled. Examples include files,
programs, and segments of memory
-Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject. Examples are
read, write, and execute
One axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data
access other axis of the matrix consists of objects that may be accessed
Each entry in the matrix indicates the access rights of that subject for that object
In practice, an access matrix is usually sparse and is implemented by
decomposition in one of two ways
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The matrix may be decomposed by columns, yielding access control lists (Fig
10.3b). Thus, for each object, an access control list lists users and their permitted
access rights
Decomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Fig 10.3c). A capability list
specifies authorized objects and operations for a user
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A multilevel secure system must enforce the following:
-No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. This
is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property
-No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal
security level. This is referred to in the literature as the *-Property
For a data processing system, the approach is based on the reference monitor
concept
This approach is depicted in Fig 10.4
The reference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel
database, that lists the access privileges (security clearance) of each subject and
the protection attributes (classification level) of each object
The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no read up, no write down)
and has the following properties:
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-Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, for
example, when a file is opened
-Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized
modification
-Verifiability: The reference monitor’s correctness must be provable.
A system that can provide such verification is referred as a trusted system
A final element in Fig 10.4 is an audit file. Important security events, such as
detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel database,
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are stored in the audit file
Trojan Horse Defense
One way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is use of a secure, trusted operating system
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Fig 10.5 illustrates an example
In this example, a user named Bob interacts through a program
with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string
“CPE170KS”
User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided
only to programs executing on his own behalf: that is, only
processes that are owned by Bob may access the file
The Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice,
gains legitimate access to the system and installs both a Trojan horse
program and a private file to be used in the attack as a “back
pocket”
Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file and gives
Bob write-only permission (Fig 10.5a)
Alice now induces Bob to invoke the Trojan horse program, by
advertising it as a useful utility
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When the program detects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads
the sensitive character string from Bob’s file and copies it into
Alice’s back-pocket file (Fig 10.5b)
Now consider the use of a secure operating system in this scenario
(Fig 10.5c)
Security levels are assigned to subjects at logon time
In this example, there are two security levels, sensitive and public,
ordered so that sensitive is higher than public
Processes owned by Bob and Bob’s data file are assigned the
security level sensitive
Alice’s file and processes are restricted to public
If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Fig10.5d), that program
acquires Bob’s security level. When the program attempts to store
the string in a public file (the back-pocket file), however, the *-
property is violated and the attempt is disallowed by the reference
monitor
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Intrusion Detection Systems
If an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be identified and
ejected from the system before any damage is done or any data are compromised
Audit Records: A fundamental tool for intrusion detection is the audit record.
Some record of ongoing activity must be maintained by users as input to an
intrusion detection system.
Basically two plans are used:
1. Native audit records
2. Detection-specific audit records
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-Native audit records: Virtually all multiuser operating systems include
accounting software that collects information on user activity.
-Detection-specific audit records: A collection facility can be implemented that
generates audit records containing only that information required by the intrusion
detection system
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Rule-based detection
Involves an attempt to define a set of rules that can be used to decide that a
given behavior is that of an intruder
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