Go Ecological - NatEvolMindsConf

Miguel Segundo-Ortín ([email protected].
au)
Naturally Evolving Minds Conference
University of Wollongong
23rd February, 2018
 REC’s account of perception is incomplete
 The missing details can be filled up by adopting the Gibsonian

approach
 H&M’s analysis of EP is misguided  EP is not incompatible with

REC
 (1) REC’s take on basic cognition and perception
 (2) Ecological Psychology
 (3) REC & EP - friends of foes?

 REC has to be understood as a philosophical framework
for an embodied, and partly non-representational cognitive
science (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017, Hutto, 2015)
 REC’s aims to clarify, consolidate and unify different

varieties of enactivism and enactivism-friendly approaches into
a single, unified framework for cognitive science
Basic Cognitive Functions / Non-basic (scaffolded) Cognitive
Functions
“Fundamentally, by REC’s lights, basic cognition is a matter of
sensitively and selectively responding to information, but it does
not involve picking up and processing information or the formation
of representational contents. REC’s account of basic cognition is
thus given in terms of active, informationally sensitive, world-
involving engagements, where a creature’s current tendencies
toward active engagement are shaped by its ontogenetic and
phylogenetic history. … Basic minds target, but do not contentfully
represent, specific objects and states of affairs” (Hutto and Myin,
2017, p. 92)
(1) Perception is primarily for action:
 “The senses do not have the job of telling us “how things stand
objectively with the world” but rather of trying to ensure … that
organismic activity satisfies specific, narcissistic organismic
needs” (2017, p. 71)
(2) Perception is non-contentful (non-representational) – albeit it
can be affected by contentful thoughts (2017, p. 172):
 “Although the senses are sensitive to information in the
environment, they can do their action-guiding work in a strong
and silent manner” (2017, p. 71)
(3) Both the what and the how of perception can be explained by
appealing to our phylogenetic and ontogenetic history of the
organism and the species (2017, p. 172)
What is the information that perceivers are to be
sensitive and responsive to?
How can perception be for action and non-

representational at the same time?
 The “ecological stance” (Carello & Michaels, 1981;
Raja, 2017)
 Perception and action are to be studied at the
ecological scale  The scale of the mutual, co-
determining, dynamical and self-organizing relation
between organism and environment (Richardson et al. 2008)
 The minimal unit of analysis is the O-E System (not
the brain)
Raja, V. (2017). A Theory of Resonance: Towards an Ecological Cognitive Architecture

 Along with the ecological stance, EP commits to three
main theses:
 Perception and action are two sides of the same

(reciprocal) process
 Perception is direct
 Perception is of affordances
 Three intertwined claims:
 (1) Perception is primarily for the control of action (perception

guides behavior)
 (2) Perception occurs in the context of active, goal-oriented

sensorimotor engagements with the environment  Action-
Perception Loops
Action Perception
 (3) Perception is something animals do  It is not a passive

process, but involves exploration and scanning
“So when I assert that perception of the environment is
direct, I mean that it is not mediated by retinal pictures,
neural pictures, or mental pictures. Direct perception is
the activity of getting information from the ambient
array... I call this a process of information pickup”
(Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 139)
 Information is in the structural patterns of the
ambient array, not in the stimuli!
“In particular, the light converging

on some point of observation is in
a particular relationship to the
surfaces in the room, that of
having bounced off those
surfaces and passed though a
relatively transparent medium
before arriving at the point. The
information in the light just is this
relation between the light and the
environment [at the point of
observation]” (Chemero, 2009, p.
108)
 Some of the patterns are invariant and specific
 That a sensory pattern is invariant means that it remains stable
along time, underlying other sensory changes
 That a sensory pattern is specific means that it (lawfully? 1:1?)
corresponds to the presence of certain property of the
environment and/or the organism  The presence of certain
patterns in the sensory array guarantee the presence of
certain properties in the environment
 Perception consists of detecting these patterns:

 Since these patterns (lawfully?) correspond to properties of
the O-E System, there is no need of disambiguation
 Therefore, no internal reconstructions or inferences are needed –
Detecting these patterns is enough for perception!
Motion Parallax
Doppler Effect
 But Recall: Perception is something we do!
 The presence of information does not suffice for perception.

Perception occurs when the agent detects/picks up/pays
attention such information
 Perception requires training and learning (E. J. Gibson,

2000; Jacobs & Michaels, 2007)  We need to learn what
patterns are useful to perceive what we want perceive
(education of attention)
 The argument:
 If perception guides behavior, and

 If perception is the direct detection of information, then
 The information that is detected must suffice to guide behavior
– Perceptual information must specify opportunities for
interaction (affordances)
Detects
O-E
Information
Interaction
Regulates
“[A]ctive perception is controlled by a search for the affordances of

the environment and … active behaviour is controlled by perceiving
those affordances” (Gibson, 1974, pp. 387-388).
“[B]ehavior is regular without being regulated” (Gibson,

1979/2015, p. 225)
Turvey, M. & Carello, C. (1986). “The Ecological Approach to Perceiving-Acting. A pictorial
Essay”. Acta Psychologica 63: 133-155.
r(t)/v(t)=Z(t)/V(t)
If V is constant,
then:
Τ = Z(t)/[Z(t)/t]
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive

Science. MIT Press
“Sensitivity to the ratio of optical angle to the expansion of
optical angle is sensitivity to the timing of approaching collision”
(Chemero 2009, p. 125)  Being sensitive to this information
is enough to coordinate a goal-oriented behavior
Example 1: Derivate of Tau (Tau-Dot)

specifies the levels of deceleration to
which individuals have to adjust if they
want to avoid collision (Lee, 1976). It
can be used to predict how individuals
regulate braking to stop in front of an
object (Yilmaz and Warren, 1995)
Example 2: Another derivate of Tau

(Tau/Rho) can also be used to predict
how climbing beans regulate their
movements of circumnation in order to
hook a stick (Calvo, Raja, Lee, 2015).
 Hutto and Myin are skeptical:
“[A] major obstacle to a thoroughgoing

integration of Chemero’s version of an
ecological dynamical [ecological
psychology + Dynamic Systems
Theory] approach with REC is that the
former – despite itself – remains
committed to the language, if not
the framework, of information
processing. Some of Chemero’s ways
of talking – when he speaks of the
“provision”, “use”, “gathering”, and
“pickup” of information “about”
affordances – are anathema to a
nonrepresentational rendering of
Gibson. Such talk suggests an
underlying commitment to an
information processing story that is
inconsistent with REC” (Hutto &
Myin, 2017, p. 86)
 However, Hutto’s and Myin’s analysis is (radically)
misguided
 The ecological notion of information is totally unproblematic
regarding REC’s standards:
 The structural patterns of the ambient sensory array are informational
because they (lawfully?) correspond to properties of the O-E System
 Ecological Specificity is a kind of covariance
 No content is posited in the explanation
“The term information [as used by Gibson] cannot have its familiar
dictionary meaning of knowledge communicated to a receiver. … The
world does not speak to the observer. … The assumption that
information can be transmitted and the assumption that it can be stored
are appropriate for a theory of communication, not for a theory of
perception” (Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 231)
 Therefore, EP and REC are not enemies after all!

You don’t have to choose your weapon after all…
 H&M’s criticism to EP is based on a mischaracterization of the
theory
 EP’s account of perception is not based on the gathering of contents
 Therefore, EP is totally unproblematic for REC
 REC’s account of perception is incomplete, but these details can

be filled up by adopting the Gibsonian account
 EP gives REC a concrete account of perceptual  Not moment by
moment stimuli but spatiotemporally patterns in the ambient sensory
array
 EP’s account of information can support a non-representational
account of perception Information is specific (lawfully?
correspondent) to properties of the O-E System, therefore non-
ambiguous
 EP offers an account of how perception can guide action without
representations
Manuel Heras- Vicente Raja
Escribano (University of Cincinnati,
(Universidad Alberto USA)
Hurtado, Chile)
[email protected]
https://uow.academia.edu/MiguelSegundoOrtin
Congrats to the organizers!

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Miguel Segundo-Ortín ([email protected].

 The missing details can be filled up by adopting the Gibsonian

 H&M’s analysis of EP is misguided  EP is not incompatible with

 (2) Ecological Psychology

 (3) REC & EP - friends of foes?

 REC’s aims to clarify, consolidate and unify different

How can perception be for action and non-

Raja, V. (2017). A Theory of Resonance: Towards an Ecological Cognitive Architecture

 Perception and action are two sides of the same

 (1) Perception is primarily for the control of action (perception

 (2) Perception occurs in the context of active, goal-oriented

 (3) Perception is something animals do  It is not a passive

“In particular, the light converging

 Perception consists of detecting these patterns:

 The presence of information does not suffice for perception.

 Perception requires training and learning (E. J. Gibson,

 If perception guides behavior, and

“[A]ctive perception is controlled by a search for the affordances of

“[B]ehavior is regular without being regulated” (Gibson,

Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive

Example 1: Derivate of Tau (Tau-Dot)

Example 2: Another derivate of Tau

“[A] major obstacle to a thoroughgoing

 Therefore, EP and REC are not enemies after all!

 REC’s account of perception is incomplete, but these details can

Congrats to the organizers!

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