Stabilization Policy: MACROECONOMICS, 7th. Edition N. Gregory Mankiw Mannig J. Simidian
Stabilization Policy: MACROECONOMICS, 7th. Edition N. Gregory Mankiw Mannig J. Simidian
Stabilization Policy: MACROECONOMICS, 7th. Edition N. Gregory Mankiw Mannig J. Simidian
CHAPTER 15
Stabilization Policy
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The inside lag is the time between a shock to the economy and the
policy action responding to that shock. This lag arises because it takes
time for policymakers first to recognize that a shock has occurred and
then to put appropriate policies into effect to deal with it.
The outside lag is the time between a policy action and its influence
on the economy. This lag arises because policies do not immediately
influence spending, income, and employment.
Chapter 3
Fifteen
Some policies, called automatic stabilizers, are designed to reduce
lags associated with stabilization policy. Automatic stabilizers are
policies that stimulate or depress the economy when necessary
without any deliberate policy change. For example, the system of
income taxes automatically reduces taxes when the economy goes
into a recession, without any change in the tax laws, because
individuals and corporations pay less tax when their incomes fall.
Similarly, the unemployment insurance and welfare systems
automatically raise transfer payments when the economy moves
into a recession, because more people apply for benefits. One can
view these automatic stabilizers as a type of fiscal policy without
any inside lag.
Chapter 4
Fifteen
As we learned, since policy only affects the economy
after a long lag, successful stabilization requires the ability to predict
future economic conditions.
One way forecasters try to look ahead is with leading indicators. A
leading indicator is a data series that fluctuates in advance of the
economy. A large fall in a leading indicator signals that a recession
is more likely to occur in coming months.
Another way forecasters look ahead is with macroeconometric models,
which have been developed by both government agencies and by
private firms. They seek to predict variables such as unemployment and
inflation and other endogenous variables.
Chapter 5
Fifteen
Nobel laureate Robert Lucas emphasized that people form expectations
of the future. Expectations play a crucial role because they influence
all sorts of economic behavior. Both households and firms decide to
consume and invest based on expectations of future earnings.
These expectations depend on many things, including the policies of
the government. He argues that traditional methods of policy
evaluation such as those that rely on standard macroeconometric
models—do not adequately take into account this impact of policy on
expectations. This criticism of traditional policy evaluation is known as
the Lucas Critique.
Chapter 6
Fifteen
Policy is conducted by rule if policymakers announce in advance how
policy will respond to various situations and commit themselves to
following through on this announcement. Policy is conducted by
discretion if policymakers are free to size up events as they occur and
choose whatever policy the policymakers consider appropriate at the time.
The debate over rules versus discretion is distinct from the debate over
passive versus active policy. Policy can be conducted by rule and yet be
either passive or active.
An active policy rule might specify:
money growth = 3% + (Unemployment Rate – 6%)
This rule tries to stabilize the economy by raising money growth when
the economy is in a recession.
Chapter 7
Fifteen
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Chapter 8
Fifteen
Policymakers announce in advance the policy they will follow to
influence the expectations of private decision-makers.
But, later, after the private decision-makers have acted on the basis
of their expectations, these policymakers may be tempted to renege
on their announcement.
Chapter 9
Fifteen
1) To encourage investment, the government announces that it will not
tax income from capital. But, after factories are built, the government
is tempted to raise taxes.
LRAS
P Here we can see that this economy is
growing (LRAS is shifting rightward)
so continued increases in the supply of
P* money (via +AD) don’t necessarily
AD'' imply increases in inflation.
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Chapter
Y Y' Y'' Y 11
Fifteen
A second policy rule that economists widely advocate is nominal
GDP targeting. Under this rule, the Fed announces a planned path
for nominal GDP. If nominal GDP rises above the target, the Fed
reduces money growth to dampen aggregate demand. If it falls
below the target, the Fed raises money growth to stimulate aggregate
demand.
Chapter 12
Fifteen
In the late 80s, many of the world’s central banks adopted some
form of inflation targeting. Sometimes inflation targeting takes the
form of central bank announcing its policy intentions.
In the end, one must weigh the various political and economic
arguments and decide what role the government should play in
stabilizing the economy.
Chapter 14
Fifteen
Inside
Insideand
andOutside
Outsidelags
lags
Automatic
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Stabilizers
Lucas
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critique
Political
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Time
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Consistency
Monetarists
Monetarists
Inflation
InflationTargeting
Targeting
Chapter 15
Fifteen