Negligence Causation Factual Causation Intervening Acts (Novus Actus Interveniens) Peter Rhodes Gonzalo Villalta Puig Term 2 - 2011 Topic 5
Negligence Causation Factual Causation Intervening Acts (Novus Actus Interveniens) Peter Rhodes Gonzalo Villalta Puig Term 2 - 2011 Topic 5
Negligence Causation Factual Causation Intervening Acts (Novus Actus Interveniens) Peter Rhodes Gonzalo Villalta Puig Term 2 - 2011 Topic 5
Faculty of Law
Principles of Tort
LAWS 6023 A, B, D
Negligence
Causation
Factual Causation
Intervening Acts (Novus Actus Interveniens)
Peter Rhodes
Gonzalo Villalta Puig
Term 2 - 2011 Topic 5
Lord Wilberforce
“In my opinion ‘causing’ here must be given a common sense
meaning and I deprecate the introduction of refinements, such as
causa causens, effective cause or novus actus.”
Lord Wright
“The question is not whether there was new negligence, but whether there
was a new cause…To break the chain of causation it must be shown
that there is something which I will call ultraneous, something
unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events,
something which can be described as either extraneous or extrinsic”
Intervening Acts:
Innocent
Negligent
Reckless
Intentional or deliberate
Plaintiff’s
Lord Goff
Where the defendant created the source of the damage and it
was reasonably foreseeable that the third party would extend the
risk:
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146
Where the defendant knows or ought to know that a third party is
creating a danger on his property and fails to take reasonable
steps to bring it to an end:
Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645
Clark Fixing Ltd v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council
[2001] EWCA Civ 1898
Lord Reid
“But if the injured man acts unreasonably he cannot hold the defender
liable for injury caused by his own unreasonable conduct. His
unreasonable conduct is a novus actus interveniens. The chain of
causation has been broken and what follows, must be regarded as
caused by his own conduct and not the defendant’s fault or disability
caused by it.”
Principles of Tort Negligence - Causation (Interv
ening Acts) 2011
Causation
Plaintiff’s Intervening Acts
Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1006
Chun Yat-Nam v A-G [1995] 1 HKLR 390
Keeling v Hebe Haven Yacht Club [2005] 4 HKC 277
Cheng Kam Ian v Hong Kong Prime Printing Co
(2000) HCPI 143 of 1998
Lord Bingham
“The rationale of the principle that a novus actus interveniens
breaks the chain of causation is fairness. It is not fair to hold a
tortfeasor liable, however gross his breach of duty may be, for
damage caused to the claimant not by the tortfeasor’s breach of
duty but by some independent, supervening cause (which may or
may not be tortious) for which the tortfeasor is not responsible. This
is not the less so where the independent, supervening cause is a
voluntary, informed decision taken by the victim as an adult of
sound mind making and giving effect to a personal decision about
his own future…In such circumstances it is usual to describe the
chain of causation being broken but it is perhaps equally accurate to
say that the victim’s independent act forms no part of a chain of
causation beginning with the tortfeasor’s breach of duty……
Lord Jauncey
“Where such a duty is specifically directed at the
prevention of the occurrence of a certain event I cannot
see how it can be said that the occurrence of that event
amounts to an independent act breaking the chain of
causation from the breach of duty, even though it may be
unusual for one person to come under a duty to prevent
another person deliberately inflicting harm on himself. It
is the very thing at which the duty was directed.”
Principles of Tort Negligence - Causation (Interv
ening Acts) 2011
Causation
Plaintiff’s Intervening Acts (Suicide Cases)
Latham LJ
“There is no doubt that a custodian owes a duty of care to those taken into
custody…[T]he duty is to take reasonable care for that person’s health
and safety. In determining the extent of that duty, it is clearly relevant to
take into account the fact that there is an increased risk of suicide
amongst such prisoners. But that does not mean that suicide is a
foreseeable risk in relation to every prisoner….[S]uicide can be both
unforeseen and unforeseeable. Nor do we consider that it would be fair,
just and reasonable to impose upon either the police or the Prison
Authorities a general obligation to treat every prisoner as if he or she
were a suicide risk. The consequence would be an unacceptable level
of control and precaution, not only as an obligation placed upon the
authorities, but also as an imposition on the individual prisoner.”
Text Books
Glofcheski Tort Law in Hong Kong, pages 78-93