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    9 Should Numbers Count

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    Sasha Farid
    The document discusses an argument made by John M. Taurek about whether it is morally required to save the greater number of lives or if it is permissible to save someone you know, like David, even if it means fewer lives overall will be saved. Taurek believes the principles of "required to save the greater number" and "it is permissible to save someone you know like David" are inconsistent. He argues that knowing and liking David is not a relevant special consideration and that sacrificing someone else's life for another is not morally required if that person is not required to make that sacrifice themselves. The document explores different scenarios and implications of Taurek's argument.

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    9 Should Numbers Count

    Uploaded by

    Sasha Farid
    58 views12 pages
    The document discusses an argument made by John M. Taurek about whether it is morally required to save the greater number of lives or if it is permissible to save someone you know, like David, even if it means fewer lives overall will be saved. Taurek believes the principles of "required to save the greater number" and "it is permissible to save someone you know like David" are inconsistent. He argues that knowing and liking David is not a relevant special consideration and that sacrificing someone else's life for another is not morally required if that person is not required to make that sacrifice themselves. The document explores different scenarios and implications of Taurek's argument.

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    The document discusses an argument made by John M. Taurek about whether it is morally required to save the greater number of lives or if it is permissible to save someone you know, like David, even if it means fewer lives overall will be saved. Taurek believes the principles of "required to save the greater number" and "it is permissible to save someone you know like David" are inconsistent. He argues that knowing and liking David is not a relevant special consideration and that sacrificing someone else's life for another is not morally required if that person is not required to make that sacrifice themselves. The document explores different scenarios and implications of Taurek's argument.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
    58 views12 pages

    9 Should Numbers Count

    Uploaded by

    Sasha Farid
    The document discusses an argument made by John M. Taurek about whether it is morally required to save the greater number of lives or if it is permissible to save someone you know, like David, even if it means fewer lives overall will be saved. Taurek believes the principles of "required to save the greater number" and "it is permissible to save someone you know like David" are inconsistent. He argues that knowing and liking David is not a relevant special consideration and that sacrificing someone else's life for another is not morally required if that person is not required to make that sacrifice themselves. The document explores different scenarios and implications of Taurek's argument.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
    of 12

    Should the Numbers Count?

    John M. Taurek
    Life-Saving Drug

    Give drug to Total


    David utility:
    +100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -400

    Give drug to Total


    the five utility:
    -100 +100 +100 +100 +100 +100 +400
    Required: “Special considerations apart, one ought to save the greater
    number” (p. 294).

    Taurek’s thesis: Required is false.


    “Suppose this one person, call him David, is someone I know and like,
    and the others are strangers to me. I might well give all of my drug to
    him. And I am inclined to think that were I to do so, I would not be
    acting immorally” (p. 295).

    Friend: If I know and like David, it would not be wrong to give all of the
    drug to him.
    Taurek believes that these two claims are
    inconsistent:
    Required: “Special considerations apart, one ought to save the greater
    number” (p. 294).

    Friend: If I know and like David, it would not be wrong to give all of the
    drug to him.
    Why knowing and liking David is not the
    relevant kind of “special consideration”:
    • It doesn’t make David’s death worse, nor does it make the deaths of
    the five better.
    • Saving David does not seem to be “morally required”—rather, it
    seems permissible.
    • If the five had rights to the drug—so that it was morally required to
    give them the drug—this moral requirement would not be canceled
    or overrideen by the fact that John Taurek knows and likes David.
    An argument for “Friend”:
    (1) “It would not be morally impermissible for … David to use all of his
    drug to save himself” (p. 301).
    (2) If it would not be morally impermissible for David to use all of his
    drug to save himself, then “it cannot be morally impermissible for
    me … to use it all to save David” (p. 301).
    (3) Therefore, it is not morally impermissible for me to use it all to save
    David.
    The moral principle that underlies premise 2:
    Sacrifice: If A is not required to sacrifice something to help B, then a
    third party is not required to sacrifice something of A’s to help B (p.
    301).
    Testing Sacrifice:
    • The loss of an arm versus the loss of a life?
    • Would you have to make this sacrifice? Would a third party have to make this
    sacrifice for you?
    • A headache versus the loss of a life?
    • Would you have to make this sacrifice? Would a third party have to make this
    sacrifice for you?
    • The loss of a life versus the loss of a life?
    • Would you have to make this sacrifice? Would a third party have to make this
    sacrifice for you?
    What should we do?
    • Save the 5?
    • Save David?
    • Flip a coin?
    • Use a weighted lottery?
    What if the numbers were different?
    • 5 vs. 1
    • 50 vs. 1
    • 100 vs. 1?
    • A million vs. 1?
    Why Taurek thinks the concept of “better” or
    “worse” is not morally significant:
    “I cannot but think of the situation in this way. For each of these six
    persons it is no doubt a terrible thing to die. … His loss means
    something to me only, or chiefly, because of what it means to him. It is
    the loss to the individual that matters to me, not the loss of the
    individual. But should any one of these five lose his life, his loss is no
    greater a loss to him because, as it happens, four others (or forty-nine
    others) lose theirs as well. And neither he nor anyone else loses
    anything of greater value to him than does David, should David lose his
    life. Five individuals each losing his life does not add up to anyone’s
    experiencing a loss five times greater than the loss suffered by any one
    of the five” (p. 307).

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