The Challenger Disaster: Risk Management

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The Challenger Disaster

Risk Management

Jameson Smieja
Andrew Tilstra
Kurt Butz
William Schaffer
Fall 2004, University of Minnesota
Risk Management

The art and science of identifying, analyzing,


and responding to risk
The Challenger Mission 51L
• 10th mission for the
Challenger Shuttle
• TISP – Teachers In Space
Program
– Christa McAuliffe
• Politically Charged Launch
– Christa was to appear via
television link during Reagan’s
State of the Union Address in
1986
Challenger Delays
• Liftoff Initially Scheduled for 15:43 EST on Jan. 22, 1986
• Delays in 61-C mission pushed liftoff to Jan. 23, then Jan. 24
• Reset to Jan. 25 due to weather
• Postponed another day due to launch processing problems
• Rescheduled for 9:37 EST Jan. 27 due to weather
• Delayed again due to equipment failure for 24 hours
• Final 2 hour delay due to hardware interface module problems

Liftoff: 11:38 EST January 28, 1986


The Challenger Disaster
73 Seconds After Liftoff
What Went Wrong??
• Failure of an “O-ring”
seal in the solid-fuel
rocket on the Space
Shuttle Challenger's
right side
• Flames cut into main
liquid fuel tank
Four Main Causes of O-Ring Failure

• Pre-flight Leak Tests


• O-Ring Erosions
• Joint Rotation
• Low Temperatures
Poor Risk Management
• Risks were managed using Critical Items Lists
– Criticality 1-Loss of Life or Ship
– Criticality 2-Mission Aborted
• CIL Flaws
– Unreliable
• In previous missions, criticality1 issues occurred but loss of
life/ship did not
– Negotiable
• Identified risks could later be waived
Known Potential Problems

• O-rings were “Criticality 1” feature


• O-ring seal failure on previous missions
– Launch Constraint placed on subsequent
launches
• These constraints had been imposed and
regularly waived by the SRB Project
Manager
Known Potential Problems
• Very low ambient temperatures recognized as
concern by Tiokol
– O-ring performance at this temperature not understood
• NASA officials pressured Tiokol to withdraw its
concerns
• Upper officials at NASA were unaware of these
discussions and ignorantly approved launch
References
• “Space Shuttle Challenger 1986”
(http://www.jlhs.nhusd.k12.ca.us/Classes/Social_Science/Challenger.ht
ml/Challenger.html), (1996)
• “Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster-A NASA Tragedy”
(http://space.about.com/cs/challenger/a/challenger.htm)
• “Expert Panel Recommends Improvements for Space Shuttle Safety
Program”,
(http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/NI000494?OpenDo
cument), (March 3, 1988)
• “An Accident Rooted In History”
(http://spacelink.nasa.gov/NASA.Projects/Human.Exploration.and/De
velopment.of.Space/Human.Space.Flight/Shuttle/Shuttle.Missions/Flig
ht.025.STS-51-L/An.Accident.Rooted.in.History), (June 6, 1986)
• “The Challenger Accident”
(http://www.me.utexas.edu/~uer/challenger/chall2.html#mechflaw),
(1997)

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