CH10 Mish11ge EMBFM

Chapter 10
Economic
Analysis of
Financial
Regulation
20-1 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

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• This chapter develops an economic analysis

of financial regulation.

Learning Objectives
• Identify the reasons for and forms of a

government safety net in financial markets.
• List and summarize the types of financial
regulation and how each reduces
asymmetric information problems.

Asymmetric Information as a
Rationale for Financial Regulation
• Bank panics and the need for deposit

insurance:
– FDIC: short circuits bank failures and contagion
effect
– Payoff method
– Purchase and assumption method (typically
more costly for the FDIC)
• Other form of government safety net:
– Lending from the central bank to troubled
institutions (lender of last resort)

Government Safety Net
• Moral Hazard
– Depositors do not impose discipline of
marketplace
– Financial institutions have an incentive to take
on greater risk
• Adverse Selection
– Risk-lovers find banking attractive
– Depositors have little reason to monitor financial
institutions

“Too Big to Fail”
• Government provides guarantees of

repayment to large uninsured creditors of
the largest financial institutions even when
they are not entitled to this guarantee.
• Uses the purchase and assumption method
• Increases moral hazard incentives for big
banks

Financial Consolidation and the
Government Safety Net
• Larger and more complex financial

organizations challenge regulation:
– Increased “too big to fail” problem
– Extends safety net to new activities, increasing
incentives for risk taking in these areas (as has
occurred during the global financial crisis

Restrictions on Asset Holdings
• Attempts to restrict financial institutions

from too much risk taking:
– Bank regulations
• Promote diversification
• Prohibit holdings of common stock
– Capital requirements
• Minimum leverage ratio (for banks)
• Basel Accord: risk-based capital requirements
• Regulatory arbitrage

Capital Requirements
• Government-imposed capital requirements

are another way of minimizing moral hazard
at financial institutions
• There are two forms:
1. Based on the leverage ratio, the amount of
capital divided by the bank’s total assets: to be
classified as well capitalized, a bank’s leverage
ratio must exceed 5%; a lower leverage ratio,
especially one below 3%, triggers increased
regulatory restrictions on the bank.
2. Risk-based capital requirements

Financial Supervision: Chartering
and Examination
• Chartering (screening of proposals to open new
financial institutions) to prevent adverse selection
• Examinations (scheduled and unscheduled) to
monitor capital requirements and restrictions on
asset holding to prevent moral hazard
– Capital adequacy
– Asset quality
– Management
– Earnings
– Liquidity
– Sensitivity to market risk
• Filing periodic ‘call reports’

Assessment of Risk Management
• Greater emphasis on evaluating soundness of

management processes for controlling risk
• Trading Activities Manual of 1994 for risk
management rating based on:
– Quality of oversight provided
– Adequacy of policies and limits for all risky activities
– Quality of the risk measurement and monitoring systems
– Adequacy of internal controls
• Interest-rate risk limits:
– Internal policies and procedures
– Internal management and monitoring
– Implementation of stress testing and Value-at risk (VAR)

Disclosure Requirements
• Requirements to adhere to standard

accounting principles and to disclose wide
range of information
• The Basel 2 accord and the SEC put a
particular emphasis on disclosure
requirements
• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established
the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board
• Mark-to-market (fair-value) accounting

Consumer Protection
• Consumer Protection Act of 1969 (Truth-in-

lending Act)
• Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974
• Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974,
extended in 1976
• Community Reinvestment Act
• The subprime mortgage crisis illustrated the
need for greater consumer protection.

Restrictions on Competition
• Justified as increased competition can also

increase moral hazard incentives to take on
more risk.
– Branching restrictions (eliminated in 1994)
– Glass-Steagall Act (repeated in 1999)
• Disadvantages:
– Higher consumer charges
– Decreased efficiency

Macroprudential Vs. Microprudential
Supervision
• Before the global financial crisis, the regulatory
authorities engaged in microprudential
supervision, which is focused on the safety and
soundness of individual financial institutions.
• The global financial crisis has made it clear that

there is a need for macroprudential supervision,
which focuses on the safety and soundness of the
financial system in the aggregate.

Table 1 Major
Financial
Legislation in
the United
States

Table 1 Major
Financial
Legislation in
the United
States
(cont’d)

Figure 1 Bank Failures in the United
States, 1934–2013
Source: www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/index.html.

The 1980s Savings and Loan and
Banking Crisis
• Financial innovation and new financial

instruments increased risk taking
• Increased deposit insurance led to
increased moral hazard
• Deregulation
– Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980
– Depository Institutions Act of 1982

Savings and Loan Bailout: The Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989
• Financial Institutions Reform, Regulatory

and Enforcement Act of 1989
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
Improvement Act of 1991
– Cost of the bailout approximately $150 billion,
or 3% of GDP

Banking Crises Throughout the
World
• “ Déjà vu all over again” :
– Deposit insurance is not to blame for some of
these banking crises.
– The common feature of these crises is the
existence of a government safety net, where the
government stands ready to bail out troubled
financial institutions.

Figure 2 Banking Crises Throughout
the World Since 1970
Sources: Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, “Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,”
IMF Working Paper No. WP/10/46 ( June 2010), and Luc Laeven, Banking Crisis Database at
http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm.

Table 2 The Cost
of Rescuing
Banks in a
Number of
Countries

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Chapter 10

20-1 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• This chapter develops an economic analysis

1-2 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Identify the reasons for and forms of a

1-3 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Bank panics and the need for deposit

1-4 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

1-5 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Government provides guarantees of

1-6 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Larger and more complex financial

1-7 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Attempts to restrict financial institutions

1-8 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Government-imposed capital requirements

1-9 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

1-10 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Greater emphasis on evaluating soundness of

1-11 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Requirements to adhere to standard

1-12 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Consumer Protection Act of 1969 (Truth-in-

1-13 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Justified as increased competition can also

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• The global financial crisis has made it clear that

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1-17 © 2016 Pearson Education Ltd. All rights reserved.

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• Financial innovation and new financial

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• Financial Institutions Reform, Regulatory

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