Columbia Space Shuttle Engineering Disaster
Columbia Space Shuttle Engineering Disaster
Columbia Space Shuttle Engineering Disaster
DISASTER
BY:
FAKHRUL ANIQ
KHAIRUNISA JAAFAR
KHAIRUNISA MOHMAD
KASMA DIANA
HUSNA MARDHIYAH
TIMELINE 1.00pm - NASA
8.56am sensor
G8.15am 9.16am shuttle announces the loss of
detect rise in
- took does not land on the shuttle and all
temperature and
flight schedule aboard
pressure
1kg weight of insulating foam tore up the tank and hit the left
wing
The hole allowed super heated air to pass through
The heat penetrated and destroyed the left wing
CT
Safety
Death of seven astronauts aboard the
shuttle.
Labour,Ti Investigation
Clean up effort
SOLUTION ?
Rescue option was considered which is rescuing
the crew with another shuttle .It is challenging but
feasible mission.
Prepared a high budget for making a shuttle so
that the quality is in high level and can save
someone life.
Mission management team need to train for
unexpected challenges such as crew loss and
shuttle loss.
Adding more sensor technologies to the shuttle so
that the crew can recognize early if something had
occur.
Things need to be
considered
The suit
Endurance to extreme external condition
Ground impact resistance
Seating parachute system
Depressurization resistance
The imaging
Upgrading imaging system
Additional imaging angle of the shuttle
Imaging the orbiter while in orbit
A suggestion from
Starburst
Foundation
To avoid another space shuttle
disaster, he suggest that a high
voltage charge is apply to the space
shuttle hull during reentry ,in
particular to the leading edge of its
wing.
The ion sheath so formed would
create a buffer zone around the
craft, ionizing, repelling and
deflecting oncoming air molecule
and thereby preventing them from
directly impacting and heating the
ENG IN EE RI
NG ET H IC S
AP P LIE D
1)NEGLIGENCE
)Space shuttle
problem caused by
foam insulation brok a piece of
e off from the shuttle
propellant tank and s
damaged the edge o
shuttles left wing af f
ter launching
)Prove; this pro
blem (foam) had be
years, and NASA ca en known for
me under intense sc
but the launching st rutiny
ill continue due to th
affected shuttles m e
ission before had be
completed successf en
ully
2 ) RE S P O N S IB I LTY
t h e r e w a s a r e p o r t
es t ig a t io n b o a rd ,
Based on inv n p o s s ib le e ith e r
g t h a t h a v e b e e
revealin re w o r c re w b e e n
e n re p a ire d b y c
Columbia be
rescued
1 6 d a y s in s p a c e ,
d u r in g t h e c re w s
Because s t rik e d u r in g t h e
v e s tig a t in g a f o a m
NASA was in
launch
t a y e d in o r b it u n t il
b ia c o u ld h a v e s
Colum le A t la n t is c o u ld
la u n c h o f t h e sh u t t
February 1 5 1 0 le a v in g
s e a r ly a s F e b r u a r y
e d a
have been mov in g t h e w in g o r g e t tin g
o w f o r r e p a ir
a short wind mbia
3)WEAK IN FLIGHT R
I SK
MANAGEMENT
NASA manage
ment failed to respo
engineers request a nd the
bout status of astron
inspection of left win a ut
g
NASA stop the
Department of Defe
nse (DOD)
from assisting
CAIB recomme
nd for shuttle flights
while in orbit using g be imaged
round-based or spac
e-based
remain s
E O R G AN IS A T I O N
4) T H
P T S A H A N D - O F F
AD A
ATTITUDE
b eli ef t ha t c ou l d
infl u en c e d b y
NASA managers e d e tec t e d d u e to la c k
a m a g e w e r
be done even d
of power
a le re c a ll e d th a t
N A S A , W a y n e M
Prove; retired a t io n s J o n c a l re a d y
f M is s ion O pe r
Director o n d le t t h e a s t r o na u t to
t o ig n o re a
mention to him e s uc c es s f u l fl ig h t a n d
no w in g t h
be happy k
5) POOR MODE
S OF
COMMUNICATIO
N DU R IN G
ASSESMENT
Assesment
have been mad
e on the ground
before Columbi
a reentry
NASA and
Boeing favored
for conveying in Microsoft Power
formation which Point
complex scient not ideal for
ifc and enginee
lead to draw inc ring reports whic
orrect conclusio h
ns
Flight controllers had just lost contact with the Space Shuttle
Columbia