European Integration

JEAN MONNET European Module
History and Theory of European

Integration

Marina V. Larionova
Lecture 9

Theorizing the new Europe
Changing Context of European Integration
the old and new paradigms and theoretical synthesis

Contents:
Institutionalism
Multi level governance
Policy networks
Actor based models
Readings for the lecture
Rosamond Ben. (2000) Theories of European Integration. The European
Union Series. Palgrave; chapter 5;
Pierson P. The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional
Analysis (1996). The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice
of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.),
Palgrave, 1998;
Marks G., Hooge L., Blank K. European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-Level Governance (1996). The European Union. Readings
on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and
Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998;
Nugent N. Decision-Making in Developments in the European Union,
edited by Cram L., Dinan D. and Nugent N., Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999.
Competing or complementary approaches?
a brief reminder of the basics
Socio political and academic contexts
Scientific progress
Ontological and epistemological foundations

Methodology
Scope
Purpose
Perspective

Functions of the Theory
Explaining (why) and understanding (how):
focus on reasons and causes
Describing and analyzing:
focus on the definitions and concepts / create the
vocabulary
Criticizing and developing norms and principles:
focus on the normative assessments

Area
Polity: political community and its institutions
Examples, analyzing and explaining the community
institutional structure; trying to find constitutional
alternatives

Policy: analyzing critically and reflecting on actual
measures, policy styles

Politics: processes of policy making

International Relations
versus
Comparative Politics Paradigms

From the study of Integration to the study of
Governance?
Governance
continuous political process of setting explicit goals for
society and intervening in it in order to achieve these
goals
setting goals and making decisions for an entire collectivity,
including individuals and groups who have not explicitly
agreed to them. ..involves a rather high level of
intervention which may stabilize or alter given status quo
Yachtenfuchs M. and Kohler-Koch B. (2004) Governance and Institutional Development in
Theories of European Integration.
a pattern or structure that emerges in socio-political
systems as commonoutcome of the interacting
intervention efforts of all involved actors.
Kooiman J. (ed.) Modern Governance: New Government Society Interactions.

Governance functions
have drifted out of national control in the
evolving EU system.
Ben Rosamond. Theories of European Integration
Structure Agency debate
Questions on the role of supranational institutions
Why a group of principles would delegate powers to
supranational institutions?
Under what conditions might powers be delegated to the
agents?
What conditions are definitive for the pattern of
delegation?
What if the agent behaves in a way divergent from the
preferences of the principles?
Can control mechanisms be effectively employed?
Institutions
provide contexts where actors can conduct a relatively
higher proportion of positive sum bargains.
offer information-rich venues where transparency prevails
and where trust is high.
Act as intervening variables between actor preferences and
policy outputs.
Act as a comprehensive institution in which the member-
states are embedded in a system of information and
assessment, creating pressure for compliance or norms
abiding behavior

Institutionalisms
Mid level theories focused on
the effects of institutions as intervening variables
in politics
Broad Sociological Institutionalism:
definition and approach
Institutions include informal norms and conventions as well
as formal rules.
Institutions are shapers of behavior and cognition.
Institutions constitute actors by providing cognitive scripts and
templates.
Actors follow logic of appropriateness.
Interests and identities are endogenous to the institutional
interaction process.
Discourse and communicative actions are employed as
powerful strategic tools for shaping and deploying ideas,
beliefs, knowledge, norms.
Rational choice / Transaction costs approach
Institutions are defined as formal legal entities and sets of
decision making rules imposing obligations on the self
interested political actors
Political institutions are designed deliberately and
systematically to minimize the transaction costs associated
with making public policy.
Institutions act as agents/ preference formation is exogenous to
institutions.
Institutions operate within the boundaries set by the member
states but can exploit the differences between the member
states preferences for supranational entrepreneurship.
Institutions ensure equilibrium and stability.
Historical Institutionlizm
Evolution of rules and policies along with social
adaptations creates an increasingly structured polity
that restricts the options available to all political
actors.
Paul Pierson.
The Path to European Integration:
A Historical Institutional Analysis

Historical Institutionlizm: approach
Institutions defined as formal rules, compliance procedures
and standard operating practices structuring relationships
between actors.
Analysis of the EU as an emergent multi tiered system of
governance where the member states power is not only pooled,
but, increasingly constrained by the dense institutional
environment.
Rejection of functionalist explanation for institutional design.
Emphasis on the effects of institutions on politics over time.

Historical Institutionlizm: focus on account of
member states constraints
Why gaps emerge in member states control over the
evolution of European institutions and public policies, why
these gaps are difficult to close, and how these openings
create room for actors other than member states to influence the
process of European integration while constraining the room for
maneuver of all political actors.

Paul Pierson. The Path to European Integration:
A Historical Institutional Analysis

Historical Institutionlizm: Method
Historical analysis of the processes unfolding over
a long period of time
Analysis of the evolution of processes embedded
in the institutions
Historical Institutionlizm: key assumptions
Actors carry out institutional and policy reforms that
fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of their
successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired.
Institutional choices taken can persist, shaping and constraining
actors later in time.
Institutions possess the capacity to mold the goals and
preferences of the principles and thus influence political
outcomes.
Divergences between the institutional and policy preferences of
member states and actual functioning of the institutions and
policies can not be closed.

Factors Causing the Gaps
Restricted time horizons of the national actors
Autonomous actions of the supranational
institutions
Significant potential for unintended consequences
Changes in the decision makers preferences over
time
Barriers to bridging the gaps
Resistance of the EC institutions and their
expanding authority
Institutional obstacles to reform
Sunk costs incurred in the previous actions
Path dependence in which policy decisions
inherited from the past provide incentives to
perpetuate in institutional and policy choices
Multi level governance perspective
Seeking to avoid state centrism and sui generis
treatment of the EU
Treating the EU system as a polity with authority
dispersed between levels of governance
Linking policy making and institution building
Integrating competition for political power into
analysis
Allowing normative consideration on political
order

Governance
Continuous political process of setting goals
for society and intervening in it in order to
achieve these goals

Yachtenfuchs M. and Kohler-Koch B. in
Governance and Institutional Development

Multi level governance model
decision-making competencies are shared by actors at
different levels
collective decision-making among states involves a significant
loss of control for individual member states executives
national political arenas are interconnected rather than
nested; states are an integral and powerful part of the EU, but
they no longer provide sole interface between supranational and
subnational arenas
Marks G., Hooge L., Blank K. European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance
Boundaries between different levels of governance become less
and less clear cut.
The European Union Policy Making
Who Decides What in the EU?
EC role in overcoming transaction costs and
acting as a broker
EC legislative initiative authority and consensus
building capacity
EP legislative powers and advisory capacity
Influence of the transnational interest groups

Policy Initiation
Commission setting the agenda
Formal power to initiate and draft legislation
EC and EP right to request the Commission to produce proposals
Advisory / management / regulatory committees
EC ratifying common opinions/ resolutions/ agreements/ recommendations
Regional governments initiatives
Private and public interest groups demands
Process manager
Interlocutor
Expertise and competences / information bearer and manager
Provider of infrastructure for information and knowledge exchange
Hub for networks

Decision making
European Council and the Council of Ministers main
legislative body
QMV
Right of Council President and Commission to call a vote
Amendments to councils Rules of procedure July 1987
Transformation of the vital national interest notion
Unanimity decision making principle perseverance

Levels of Implementation
Supranational
National
Regional
Local
Adjudication
ECJ
Serves the principles long term interests of EU law
enforcement.
A means to solving problems of incomplete contracting.
Monitoring compliance with the EU obligations.
The Council, Commission and Parliament interact within a
legal order which has been transformed into a
supranational one through the innovative jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice.

Marks G., Hooge L., Blank K. European Integration from the 1980s:

ECJ
Commission
National courts
National authorities

Directly binding legal authority and supremacy are attributes of
sovereignty, and their application by the ECJ indicates that the
EU is becoming a constitutional regime

Marks G., Hooge L., Blank K European Integration from the 1980s:

Legislative procedures
Consultation

EP puts forward an opinion
Council acts as the sole final decision maker

Co-decision
Extensive inter-institutional formal and informal
liaising and bargaining
EC and EP agree on a text of amendments
One reading provision
ESC and CoR are consulted
Council unanimous support to amendments Commission does
not agree with

EC and EP do not agree at first reading
Second reading provision
Council adopts a common opinion by QMV
Council provides its position explanation to the EP
Commission provides its position explanation to the EP
EP right to approve/ take no action
EC adopts the common position as a legislative act in case of EP approval or
inaction
EP right to amend/reject by the absolute majority of the MEPs
EC refers the proposal to a conciliation committee comprised of equal
number of EC and EP representatives
+) a conciliation committee agrees on a joint text
proposal is approved by QMV of the EC and majority voting in the EP
-) a conciliation committee can not agree on a joint text
proposal is dropped
Assent
EP absolute majority assent to
membership agreements
International agreements

Decision-making authority shared by
Intergovernmental and Supranational institutions
with the member states retaining a very substantial role
in decision making, including the exclusive power to
extend or reduce EU policy making competencies.

John Petersons approach based on
sudivision into levels of analysis
Level Decisive variable Best model
Super-systemic
History making
decisions
Change in the wider
political /economic
environment
Macro theories
(intergovernmentalism,
Neofunctionalism)
Systemic
Policy setting
Institutional change Institutionlism
Meso level
Policy shaping
Resource dependencies Policy network analysis
Peterson J. Decision making in the European Union: Towards a framework for
analysis, Journal of European Public Policy 2(1)
Jeremy Richardsons approach
A toolkit for analyzing development of a piece of legislation or emergence of EU
policy competence?

Richardson. J. (1996) Policy making in the EU: Interests, Ideas and Garbage
Cans of Primeval Soup in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and
Policy Making (London: Routleadge).
Stage of the policy process Theoretical tools
Addenda setting Epistemic communities
Policy formation Policy communities / networks
Policy decisions Institutional analysis
Policy implementation Interorganizational / behavioural
analysis
Policy network analysis actor based approach
Policy networks
a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest or stake in a
given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy
success or failure
Peterson J. in Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making

Serve as venues for pooling and exchanging information /
exerting influence
Facilitate reconciliation, mediation, compromise
Facilitate policy making by reinforcing / creating norms

Policy network analysis: main propositions
Policy networks structures affect policy outcomes in
the discreet EU policy sectors.
Federal and quasi federal polities give rise to
governance by policy networks.
Governance by policy networks may result in
legitimacy deficit.
Policy network analysis: level of analysis and scope of
application
Meso (sub systemic) level of decision making
Cohesion policy
Research policy
CAP

A repertoire of adaptable network systems at the EU level
rather than a single pattern
Peterson J. in Policy Networks
EU policy networks
Relatively stable if insular & resources independent

Highly discrete and disconnected sectors/policies
Expertise / knowledge based - epistemic communities
Policy goals based advocacy coalitions
Technocratic - Comitology system
More horizontal than vertical in structure
Brussels based and linked to national networks
Critique
Policy network does not constitute a model or a
theory
Policy making in EU is fluid, uncertain, diverse
and too overpopulated to constitute stable
networks
Policy network analysis lacks the theory of power
Policy network debate is vague and faces the
challenge of empirical verification
Agenda for development
Describe, explain predict the outcomes stemming from
the use of new EU policy methods
Generate clear hypotheses on networks success factors
Develop normative propositions on EU networks
structures and management

Thank you!
Lecture 10
Theorizing the new Europe
Contents:
New (liberal) intergovernmentalism.
Two level games, influence of domestic policies
Union Series. Palgrave; chapter 6;
Moravcsik A. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community (1991). The European
Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Nelsen
B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998;
Hix S. The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to
Comparative Politics (1994). The European Union. Readings on the Theory
and Practice of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G.
Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998;
Schimmelfennig F. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (2004) in European
Integration Theory. Wiener A. and Diez Th. (eds). Oxford;
Dinan Desmond, Treaty Change in the European Union: The Amsterdam
Experience, in Developments in the European Union, edited by Cram L.,
Dinan D. and Nugent N., Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999.
Why do states invest into an enterprise that
results in a de facto clipping of policy
autonomy?
Overview of liberal intergovernmentalism
by Frank Schimmelfennig
Level of
abstraction
Preferences Cooperation Institutions
High IR rationalist institutionalism: state actors in
international anarchy, rational choice of
international institutions
Medium Liberal theory
of state
preferences
Bargaining
theory
Functional theory
of institutional
choice
Low Domestic
economic
interests
Intergovern
mental
assymetrical
interdepende
nce
Credible
commitments
Hard core neo realist paradigm
States are the primary actors
European integration - intensification of interstate cooperation
in the face of a common threat
Integration outcomes reflect the balance of power of the
member states
Imbalances in the gain from cooperation result in suspicion and
conflict
European Community - a mechanism for interstate
cooperation that fulfilled the survival imperatives of a group
of western states in the context of emerging bipolar order
Ben Rosamond .Theories of European Integration
European integration will loose momentum in a multipolar
context
Liberal state centered paradigm
Continued emphasis on the centrality of the states
Centrality of the relative bargaining power to the
intergovernmental negotiations outcomes
Understanding of domestic politics as a precondition to the
analysis of strategic interaction among states
Exploration of the interaction between the domestic and
international
Emphasis on strategic rationality of states
Integration of institutions as facilitators of positive sum
bargaining into the analysis
Liberal intergovernmentalism: assumptions
1. States are the major actors (unitary actors)
2. Foreign policy goals shift in response to changing pressures from
domestic interest groups
3. State preferences are neither fixed nor uniform
4. Governments relative bargaining power is the result of asymmetric
distribution of information and benefits of a specific agreement
5. International institutions are designed and established to overcome
first order (achieving coordination) and second order problems (control
over observing rules for distribution of gains):
Institutions design reflect the functions and specific problems of the
cooperation;
Institutions reduce the costs for achieving the outcomes and
controlling the behavior of states.

Object of study
Actors - states
Actors preferences and sources of their
change
Institutional design
Actors
National polity not the member states executives are primary
actors in the EU system

EU can be best understood as a series of rational choices made
by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and
opportunities stemming from economic interests of powerful
domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the
international system, and the role of institutions in
bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments
(Moravcsik A. (1998) The Choice for Europe:
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht.
Cornell University press)
National executives play games in
two arenas
At the domestic level seeking power and building coalitions for
support
At the international level seeking bargains to meet the demand
of domestic constituencies
Membership of organizations such as the EU strengthens the
domestic autonomy of the governments
States respond rationally to the domestic demands in
formulating agendas for bargaining
States act rationally in interstate bargaining responding to the
supply side constraints of possible bargaining outcomes
Preferences
Domestic preferences reflecting the competitiveness of
national economy act as a filter between the structural
incentives of international economy and the national
preferences
(Schimmelfennig F. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (2004) in
European Integration Theory. Wiener A. and Diez Th. (eds). Oxford)
Ideological geopolitical preferences can influence national
preferences
Preferences are issue specific
International interdependence can serve as a catalyst of
societal demand for integration through powerful domestic
coalitions of actors that have been liberated by the intensification
of national economic interdependence and whose preferences
coincide with the widespread of EU economic space
Ben Rosamond. Theories of European Integration
Integration
a means to secure economic and political advantage
through intergovernmental bargaining on
distribution of gains

a means of solving common problems emanating from
the domestic and global problems
Institutions
Institutional arrangements can affect state actions by
influencing
the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate;
the ability of governments to monitor others compliance and
to implement their own commitments hence their ability to
make credible commitments in the first place; and
prevailing expectations about the solidity of international
agreements
Keohane R. (1989) Neoliberal Institutionalism:
A Perspective on World Politics,
in Keohane R. International Institutions and State Power:
Essays in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview)
Institutional design
driven by governments objective to overcome high transaction
costs and information assymetries
supranational institutions assigned role in the second order
issues
the degree of pooling of sovereignty or delegating to
supranational institutions dependant on the value placed on
the outcome
delegation to supranational institutions as a safeguard against
short term preferences of the governments
Three assumptions about EU integration
process
states enter the integration process voluntarily
interstate bargaining takes place in information rich
environment
transaction costs are low

Summing up the key presumptions for the EU
integration process
EC politics is the continuation of domestic policies and result of national
initiatives
! Nation states change as the result of their participation in the integration.
EU embeds itself in the domestic policies of the member states which leads to
changes in domestic policies and institutions.

Bargains reflect the relative power positions of the member-states and
converge toward the minimum common denominator principle
! Emerging decision:
are unlikely to satisfy any particular state preference
do not amount to a rational optimum of the various preferences
represent a local optimum in the cost benefit calculations of all
participants
Summing up of the key presumptions for
the EU integration process
Threat of exclusion as a tool coercing a state to accept
the outcome it does not prefer to the status quo
! States are prepared to compromise to ensure their
influence over future decisions shaping

Unanimity as the key tool of sovereignty protection
! QMV

Summing up of the key presumptions for the EU
integration process

Member states define the institutional arrangements without
granting of open ended authority to central institutions
! International regime contributes to shaping interstate politics by
providing a common framework that reduces uncertainty and
transaction costs of interstate interactions
! Supranational institutions (Commission) possess the ability to
gain advantage from the diversity of preferences among member
states and their ability to play off divided domestic interests on
the other
! Supranational Institutions (ECJ) possess the capacity to gear the
integration process
The intergovernmental approach:
limitations and dilemmas
1. reflects the understanding of the process held by the national political actors
themselves;
2. reflects political preferences of a range of actors within the EU
3. some assumptions preempting conclusions:
chosen level of analysis is national governments acting within the
intergovernmental setting applied to grand bargains;
integration outcomes studied as the product of intergovernmental games;
case selection (EC, IGC, Treaty amendments) excludes alternative
explanations;
4. difficulties gaining ex ante information, hence problems of empirical refutation
5. poses question on the capacity to explain other phenomena than the
intergovernmental bargains
6. neglect of integration dynamics (ECJ)
Lecture 11: From Copenhagen Criteria (1993)
to the largest enlargement (May, 2004)
The facts and figures on enlargement. The Copenhagen criteria,
the dates and procedures of application, the pre accession
strategies, the accession partnerships, the methodology and
instruments of accession, the condition of ability to take on
acquis communautaire, compromises, schedules and aid
programs
The budget and institutional reform, the Nice Treaty.
Grabbe H. and Hughes K. (2000). Enlarging the EU Eastwards. The Royal
Institute of International affairs. London;
Kok Wim. (2003). Report to the European Commission. Enlarging the
European Union: Achievement and Challenges. European University
Institute;
Nugent Neill. (2004). The EU and the 10+2 Enlargement Round:
Opportunities and Challenges in
European Union Enlargement edited by Nugent Neill. Palgrave Macmillan.
.. (2003) . .
. 10, 12.
Seminar 5: The Study of European integration:
A Challenge to Contemporary International
Relations theory or Comparative politics
Two presentations:
Liberal Intergovernmentalist - International Relations
paradigm.
MLG / Policy Network / Institutionalism -
Comparative Politics paradigm.
Discussion.
Readings for the seminar
Union Series. Palgrave; chapter 7 and chapter 8;
Hix S. The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to
Comparative Politics (1994). The European Union. Readings on the
Theory and Practice of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and Alexander
C G. Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998;
Yachtenfuchs M. and Kohler-Koch B. (2004) Governance and
Institutional Development in Theories of European Integration. Oxford
university press.


Thank you!

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JEAN MONNET European Module

History and Theory of European

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