Applications of Game Theory: M.Thivya & M.Shanmugarani Department of Mathematics

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APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY

M.THIVYA & M.SHANMUGARANI DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS PADMAVANI ARTS & SCIENCE COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, SALEM-11.

Nash equilibrium
Each players predicted strategy is the best response

to the predicted strategies of other players No incentive to deviate unilaterally Strategically stable or self-enforcing
Prisoner 2 Confess Prisoner 1 Confess Not Confess -3,-3 -9,0 Not Confess 0,-9 -1,-1

Nashs Theorem
Existence Any finite game will have at least one Nash equilibrium possibly involving mixed strategies

Finding a Nash equilibrium is not easy Not efficient from an algorithmic point of view

Dynamic games
Sequential moves One player moves Second player observes and then moves

Examples Industrial Organization a new entering firm in the market versus an incumbent firm; a leader-follower game in quantity competition Sequential bargaining game - two players bargain over the division of a pie of size 1 ; the players alternate in making offers Game Tree

Game tree example: Bargaining


(x1,1-x1) 1 x1 Period 2: B offers x2. A responds. 1 x3

(x3,1-x3) 1

N B (0,0)

B
A

x2 A N

Y
0 Period 1: A offers x1. B responds.

0
(x2,1-x2)

0 Period 3: A offers x3. B responds.

Economic applications of game theory


The study of oligopolies (industries containing only

a few firms) The study of cartels, e.g., OPEC The study of externalities, e.g., using a common resource such as a fishery The study of military strategies The study of international negotiations Bargaining

Mechanism design
How to set up a game to achieve a certain outcome? Structure of the game Payoffs Players may have private information Example To design an efficient trade, i.e., an item is sold only when buyer values it as least as seller

Second-price (or second-bid) auction

Arrows impossibility theorem No social choice mechanism is desirable

Akin to algorithms in computer science

Network example
C(x) = 1 C(x) = x

Simple network from s to t with two links Delay (or cost) of transmission is C(x) Total amount of data to be transmitted is 1 Optimal: is sent through lower link Total cost = 3/4 Game theory solution (selfish routing) Each bit will be transmitted using the lower link Not optimal: total cost = 1 Price of anarchy is, therefore, 4/3

Do high-speed links always help?


C(x) = x
C(x) = 1 C(x) = 1 C(x) = x

C(x) = x

C(x) = 1

C(x) = 0 C(x) = 1 C(x) = x

of the data will take route s-u-t, and s-v-t

Total delay is 3/2


Add another zero-delay link from u to v All data will now switch to s-u-v-t route

Total delay now becomes 2


Adding the link actually makes situation worse

Bidding up to 50
Two-person game Start with a number from 1-4 You can add 1-4 to your opponents number and bid

that The first person to bid 50 (or more) wins Example

3, 5, 8, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46, 50

Game theory tells us that person 2 always has a

winning strategy

Bid 5, 10, 15, , 50

Easy to train a computer to win

Game programming
Counting game does not depend on opponents choice

Tic-tac-toe, chess, etc. depend on opponents moves


You want a move that has the best chance of winning However, chances of winning depend on opponents

subsequent moves You choose a move where the worst-case winning chance (opponents best play) is the best: max-min Minmax principle says that this strategy is equal to opponents min-max strategy

The worse your opponents best move is, the better is your move

Chess programming
How to find the max-min move?

Evaluate all possible scenarios


For chess, number of such possibilities is enormous Beyond the reach of computers How to even systematically track all such moves? Game tree How to evaluate a move? Are two pawns better than a knight? Heuristics Approximate but reasonable answers Too much deep analysis may lead to defeat

Conclusions
Mimics most real-life situations well Solving may not be efficient Applications are in almost all fields

Big assumption: players being rational

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