Shuja 3 Final Investigation Report - Amp

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3
Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator
Investigation report
MV SHUJJA 3 GROUNDING OFF PORBANDAR, INDIA 25.06.2007
R-011-07/DISAM
This investigation report was written to improve safety and to prevent new accidents. The report does not address possible responsibility or liability caused by the accident. The investigation report should not be used for purposes other than the improvement of marine safety.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3 USED ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 5 FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................... 6 1 EVENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS......................................................................7 1.1 The ship ............................................................................................................... 7 1.1.1 Ships Particulars ............................................................................................ 8 1.1.2 Manning .......................................................................................................... 9 1.1.3 Wheelhouse and the navigation equipments ................................................. 10 1.1.4 Data items recorded ...................................................................................... 11 1.1.5 Cargo ............................................................................................................. 12 1.1.6 Fuel ............................................................................................................... 12 1.1.7 Fresh Water ................................................................................................... 12 1.1.8 Ballast Water................................................................................................. 12 1.2 Voyage Incident ............................................................................................... 12 1.2.1 Voyage and its planning................................................................................ 12 1.2.2 Scene ............................................................................................................. 14 1.2.3 Weather conditions ....................................................................................... 15 1.2.4 Ships damages ............................................................................................. 16 1.2.5 Actions after the accident.............................................................................. 17 1.3 Rescue operation ............................................................................................... 18 1.3.1 Alerting actions ............................................................................................. 18 1.3.2 Rescue operation ........................................................................................... 18 1.3.3 Actions by the crew ...................................................................................... 18 1.4 Relevant directions and rules guiding the operation ......................................... 19 1.4.1 Rules and guidelines issued by the authorities ............................................. 19 1.4.2 Company procedures .................................................................................... 19 2 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 20 2.1 Bridge ................................................................................................................ 20 2.2 Stability ............................................................................................................. 20 2.3 Anchoring ......................................................................................................... 20 2.4 Effect of Weather .............................................................................................. 20 3 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................... 21 3.1 Chain Sequence ................................................................................................ 21 3.2 Contributing factor ............................................................................................ 21 3.3 Other safety observation ................................................................................... 21 4 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................... 22 REFERENCE.................................................................................................................... 23
Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine Marine Casualty Investigation Branch Panama, Republic of Panama
SUMMARY
M/V SHUJJA 3, GROUNDING OFF PORBANDAR PORT, INDIA, 25/06/2007. General cargo ship M/V Shjujja 3 arrived 21 .06.207 at Porbandar Port, India, from her last port of call, Kandla, to load soda ash cargo for Kuwait. On 24.06.2007 while she was still waiting for berthing at anchorage, the weather deteriorated and she started dragging anchor. Upon contacting, Porbandar Port informed the vessel about approaching cyclonic weather, and advised her to proceed to safe place. M/V Shujja 3 planned her passage to Gulf of Kutchh to take shelter from approaching Cyclone. On 24.06.2007 at 2010LT, she weighed anchor and set sail towards Gulf of Kutchh, heading 250 deg. to have safe distance off shore. The atmospheric pressure dropped more than 6mb in 4hrs with wind force reaching 7 Beaufort scale by midnight. With best of the efforts, vessel could not be steered on desired course of 310 deg. true and drifted towards shore making good course over ground 330 deg. On 25.06.2007 at 0030LT, vessel started to drift more to starboard in spite of keeping wheel hard to port. By 0100hrs the sea/swell height was more than 6 meters and wind gushing to force 8 at Beaufort scale. Vessels maneuvering was hampered badly due to strong wind, heavy sea/swell and strong current. It was not possible to maintain intended course. At 0330hrs, in order to turn the ships bow towards open sea with starboard turn and prevent drifting on shore, the wheel was put hard starboard. However, at heading 130 deg. the strong wind and sea condition once again prevented her turn on desired course to keep away from shore, and she continued to drift towards shallow waters. The wind force was 8 at Beaufort scale, and her speed over ground was about 2 knots. At 0400LT, vessel was unable to maneuver in severe weather, the Master decided to anchor at 0400hrs in position lat 21 43.09N long 069 27.06E with 7 shackles in water. At 0430hrs, the starboard anchor was let go, but due to excessive strain anchor chain snapped at 5th shackle length. After having lost starboard anchor, the vessel steered her way with full engine power but her drift towards shallow water continued. At 0600hrs wind force was 8 at Beaufort scale and swell height was 7 to 8 meters. Vessel contacted Indian Coast Guard for assistance to save vessel from potential stranding. Due cyclonic weather timely assistance could not be rendered. At 0800hrs vessel was pounding and rolling heavily and drifting towards shore 7 cables off from land. Once the grounding of vessel was imminent the main engine was stopped, and port anchor was dropped to minimize impact of grounding. General alarm was raised to abandon ship and distress messages were transmitted.
The vessel ran aground at 0830hrs on 25.06.2007 in position lat 21 44.6N long 069 7.80E. Twelve (12) crew members abandoned ship on 25.06.2007 while others continued to stay on vessel. Vessel sustained severe damages to her steering system, and ingress of water in double bottom tanks, engine room and cargo holds was observed. One (1) crew member disembarked from ship on 13.07.2007 due to minor illness. From 13.07.2007 to 23.07.200, ships oil bunkers were pumped out to shore facilities. Remaining fourteen (14) crew members on ship also disembarked the vessel on 23.07.2007. There was no pollution reported until the date of investigation of incidence. On 30/07/2007 the death of one crew member was reported who was swept into the sea. This crew member along with five (5) other crew members, had volunteered to guard the ship from pilferages. Vessels damages did not cause any danger for immediate sinking, stability of ship, or any environmental pollution threat. The reasons which lead to the accident were the impaired maneuverability of ship in cyclonic weather condition. However, more heavy ballast on ship could have given additional submersion, better maneuverability with more effective engine power and steerage to avoid being broad-on to sea and subsequently causing lesser damages to ships hull and machinery.
USED ABBREVIATIONS
PMA ARPA COG DPA GPS IMO ISM MF/ HF OOW SOLAS VHF UTC LT IST AIS Panama Maritime Authority Automatic Radar Plotting Aid. Course Over Ground. Designated Person Ashore Global Positioning System. International Maritime Organization. International Safety Management (Code). Medium Frequency / High Frequency Officer on Watch Safety of Life at Sea. Very High Frequency Universal Coordinated Time Local Time Indian Standard Time ( UTC + 0530) Automatic Identification System
FOREWORD
On 26.06.2007 the Accident Investigation Board got information about the grounding of M/V SHUJJA 3. Accident Investigation Board received brief information about the accident, and was in contact with the Indian maritime authorities and shipping company. On 27.06.2007 the Marine Casualty Investigation Branch of Panama Maritime Authority appointed investigation commission to investigate the accident. Captain C.D.Mathur was appointed as Principal Investigator to submit the report to the Panama Maritime Authority. Indian investigation authorities acted in accordance to IMO Resolution A.849(20), as amended, concerning casualty investigation as the leading party to the investigation, and invited the Panama Maritime Authority investigation unit to be an observer in the investigation. On site inspection of vessel was carried out and statements of ship crew members were recorded by Capt.C.D.Mahur. By this method the investigators were able to collect realistic data and events of accident. Available photographs of vessel and her damaged structure and machineries were recorded. The investigators heard the Master and crew at Porbandar Port hotel accommodation on 6/09/2007 about the events which lead to the accident. The investigators collected the statements made by Master and crew members. Vessels crew list, incident report of Master, casualty reports, bunker transfer report, passage plan, GPS position of ship, Navigation chart abstract, weather reports, Stability data, cargo stowage plan, tank sounding log, etc., were the supporting documents of the investigation.
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1.1
EVENTS AND INVESTIGATION

The ship
Image 1
M/V SHUJJA 3
1.1.1 Ships Particulars Name Homeport Identification IMO number Type Nationality Year and place of construction Length overall Breadth (without wings) Extreme draught (=1,000) Deadweight Engine power Service speed M/V SHUJJA 3 PANAMA H9IY 7723455 General Cargo Panama 1978 / Jurong Shipyard, Singapore 124.0 m 19.60 m 8.714 m 10468 MT 6000 Hp 10 knots
1.1.2 Manning Vessels manning certificate dated 24 Feb, 2004 required thirteen (13) crew members. There were on board twenty-one (21) crewmembers (including master) + six (6) apprentices at the time of the accident. Master had received captains license in 1984. His present license is valid until 27.07.2007. He commenced his sea career in 1976 and served at various ranks and became master in 1984. He served as master on different types of vessels and joined the M/V Shujja 3 on 18.12.2006. This was his second tenure on board this ship. He took over command and had handing over formalities and familiarization with the previous master as per technical managers SMS (ISM code) guidelines and procedures. Chief Officer obtained first mate license on 20.03.2007. He joined vessel on 31.05.2007. He sailed as mate first time on the ship. He had worked on the M/V Shujja 3 earlier for six months as Second Officer. Second Officer obtained Second Mate license on 6.03.2005 and joined this vessel for the first time on 19.12.2006. Third Officer had his Deck Officer certificate issued on 27.02.2007. He joined vessel on 15.04.2007. Chief Engineer had received Class 1 Certificate in 1998. He served on various ranks on naval ships for 10 years and 11 years on merchant shipping vessels. He joined this vessel on 15.06.2006. He was familiarized with ship specific operations, also the handing over - taking over procedures were followed as per technical managers SMS (ISM) guidelines. Second Engineer obtained Class 2 certificate of competency in 1983 and worked on various ranks for more than 28 years. He joined the vessel as Second Engineer on 4.06.2005. Third Engineer held certificate of competency as Third Engineer since 15.05.2006. He had three (3) years experience at sea. He joined subject vessel on 4.07.2006. Deck and engine ratings as per manning certificate held their valid watch keeping certificates to perform their duties. Refer exhibit 1 for manning document.
1.1.3 Wheelhouse and the navigation equipments 1 Autopilot GYLOT 2 S-Band 10 cm Radar ICOM 3 X-Band, 3 cm Radar JRC 4 GPS position device FURUNO GP 31 5 GPS position device GARMIN GPS 75 6 Gyro Compass GYLOT 7 Magnetic Compass SMITH AND BROTHERS 8 Echo sounder FURUNO 9 AIS FURUNO 10 VHF Radio FURUNO FM S 500, 2 Sets 11 MF/HF/DSC/TLX FURUNO FS1562-15/25/AA-50/DP-5 12 GMDSS VHF Radio 3 x Navico Axis 250 GMDSS 13 Inmarsat C SATCOM C, FURUNO II 14 GMDSS VHF Radio 3 x ICGM 1500E 15 NAVTEX ALDEN AE900 16 Inmarsat C FURUNO Felcom 11 17 GMDSS VHF Radio 3 x ICGM 1500E 18 Anemometer SMITH AND BROTHERS 19 Loadicator Class Approved software on desktop
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1.1.4 Data items recorded Date and time Date and time mentioned in report is local time maintained in India, referring to UTC+0530. Vessels position Vessels position indicated in latitude and longitude derived from GPS system plotted on British Admiralty chart for approaches to Porbandar Port. Speed Speed over ground is determined from GPS positions. Heading As indicated by the ships compass. Radar data Radar Data indicate by electronic signal information from one of the vessels radar installations. This includes range rings, bearing markers, and electronic plotting symbols. Echo sounder Echo sounder display and record indicate depth under keel. Main alarms This includes all mandatory alarms on the bridge as per SOLAS requirements. Rudder, order, and response Indicators show rudder status and its response. Engine orders Engine orders are recorded manually.
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Wind speed and direction Wind speed and direction are taken from anemometer.
1.1.5 Cargo Vessel was carrying 1000.266 MT of Carbon Steel submerged arc welded pipes, 42 pieces loaded at Kandla Port for discharge at Kuwait. 1.1.6 Fuel At the time of incident, the vessel had following fuel on board. a. Fuel Oil 193.8 MT b. Gas Oil 50.8 MT c. Lube Oil 11.0 MT 1.1.7 Fresh Water Vessel had 190 MT fresh water. 1.1.8 Ballast Water Vessel was loaded with 800.6 MT ballast water.
1.2
Incident voyage
1.2.1 Voyage and its planning After determining the vessel was not holding ground at Porbandar anchorage, the master planed the voyage for vessel from Porbandar anchorage to Gulf of Kutchh, to take shelter from approaching low pressure and associated cyclonic weather conditions. The passage from Porbandar anchorage to Gulf of Kutchh of Okha Port was planned with 5 various courses and total passage distance of 98 nm. Due allowance for set and drift was allowed for southwesternly monsoon, strong wind and current from southwestern direction. Various courses steered were in 3-digit notation card of gyro compass. GPS position fixing equipment was used for determining position during voyage, and the radars were in use for verification of GPS equipment as well for avoidance of local traffic (close quarter situations).
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Echo sounder was in use for checking available depth of water in course of the voyage. Barometer and Anemometer readings were recorded to determine wind direction and low pressure depression. VHF sets were in use for communication between ships, shore, and other vessels in vicinity. Inter-ship communication between navigating bridge and forward station was maintained on 2-way VHF (walky-talkies). British Admiralty Navigation Chart for Porbandar Port approaches was used, which was corrected to latest notices to mariners. Engine movements were recorded in movement book, in notation of local time. Sea and weather conditions were recorded in vessels log. Departure and heavy weather checklist were followed as per technical managers SMS (ISM) guidelines. The navigation bridge was manned by certified officers and helmsmen. Engine room was manned with certified engineers and watch-keeping ratings. One hundred per cent (100%) propeller was submerged, as vessel was drawing aft draft at 5m. Vessel had trim of 2.2 m with forward draft reading 2.80 m.
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1.2.2 Scene
Image 2
Porbandar Port approaches with site of incident
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1.2.3 Weather conditions The following weather conditions were received on SAT-C, EGC messages: On 24.06.2007 EGC message from CES Perth, Australia, issued for 24 hours commencing 0900UTC indicate Alert for sea conditions to be very rough to extremely rough. Wind speed reaching up to 33 knots. On 25.06.2007 EGC message issued from CES Perth, Australia, indicated Alert Message A well marked LOW PRESSURE over North Arabian Sea. Sea conditions very rough to extremely rough in Arabian Sea. Wind speed occasionally gushing to 47 knots and state of sea very rough to extremely rough with sea height high. A deep low pressure of 988mb, wind force 8 at Beaufort scale and height of sea 8 meters was recorded in ships log of M/V Shujja 3. On 24.06.2007 and 25.06.2007 vessel experienced rain and thunder storms. On her passage from Porbandar to Gulf of Kutchh, vessel was pounding and rolling heavily associated with 20-30 deg yawing of ships bows restricting her steer required course. At the time of grounding, the weather conditions recorded in ships log were as follows: Wind force: 8 at Beaufort scale. Sea height: 8 meters Atmospheric pressure: 988mb.
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1.2.4 Vessels damages The shell plating of No.2 and 3 double bottom ballast tanks was breached resulting in ingress of water in the tanks. The ingress of water was also observed in engine room from damaged pipelines leaking from joints. Port side shell plating and frames were damaged due to continuous stroking of high sea waves. In view of rocky sea bed, the vessels bottom is also suspected to be ruptured but extent of damage can not be assessed in present condition of the vessel being aground with water in tanks. The steering gear was severely damaged. Rudder stock was uprooted from its foundation, damaging allied machinery.
Image 3. Damage to rudder stock and allied machinery There were damages apparently not seen, but expected to be in cargo hold No. 2 and 3 with presence of sea water in the In view of monsoons until the end of September. Vessels structure cannot be assessed in detail.
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1.2.5 Actions after the accident Master called for abandonment of ship and instructed to lower the starboard side life boat and life raft into the sea. The depth of water around the ship was measured. All bottom tanks and cargo hold bilges were sounded. Communication link with Indian Coast Guard on VHF could not be established. However, vessels grounding position was relayed through another vessel, M/V Arcadia Progress, that had also run aground in the vicinity. Incident about grounding of vessel was communicated to technical managers/owners/DPA. Twelve (12) crew members abandoned the ship. Chief Officer calculated the damage stability of the vessel using worst case scenario, which was not found endangering the safety of life and property.
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1.3
Rescue operation
1.3.1 Alerting actions Vessel called Indian coast guard by VHF Radio on 25.06.2007 at 0600LT, and informed about the situation of the vessel and requested their assistance to save her from potential stranding. At about 0800hrs. the vessel transmitted SOS distress signal via GMDSS/DSC. Master raised general alarm and gave verbal instructions to abandon ship. 1.3.2 Rescue operation Starboard side life boat was lowered. Twelve (12) crew members abandoned the vessel. On 26.06.2007, Indian Coast Guard sent a helicopter to rescue the crew. As there was no imminent danger for remaining 15 crew members on board, the evacuation of crew was suspended. On board crew members carried out damage control and dealt with any potential pollution threat. One crew member, Chief Cook, was injured while disembarking the vessel. He was taken ashore for treatment. 1.3.3 Actions by the crew The crew sounded ships tanks and inspected cargo holds for ingress of water. The depth of water around the vessel was checked by lead line. The ships crew assisted in pumping out bunkers to shore facility which was carried out by a salvage team.
Image 4
Pumping out bunkers to shore facilities

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1.4
Relevant directions and rules guiding the operation Owners/Technical Managers SMS guidelines procedures in compliance with ISM code were followed.
1.4.1 Rules and guidelines issued by the authorities IMO Resolution A.741(18) ISM-Code. The objective of the code is to be of international standard of safe managing, operation, and environmental protection. The code is based on general principles and objectives. The goals of the code are to ensure safety at sea, prevent personnel injuries, loss of life, and to prevent damages to the environment and to property. The safety management system of owners/technical managers follows the principles, objectives, and goals set forth by the Code. 1.4.2 Company procedures Companys procedures and guidelines laid down in SMS for various contingencies, e.g., heavy weather, grounding, abandonment of ship, human casualties and structural damages, were followed.
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2
2.1
ANALYSIS
Bridge While planning the intended voyage, all pertinent information should be given due consideration and any course lay for the voyage should be checked keeping in mind the prevailing weather conditions, available depth of water and safe distance from shoals and shallow waters. When planning the passage from Porbanadar to Gulf of Kutchh, such planning was not effectively done. The vessel should have steered the course to avoid sea and wind broad - on which would have minimized the drift of vessel.
2.2
Stability The vessel should proceed to sea with heavy ballast in stormy weather, to minimize pounding and bottle screw effect to the vessel in heavy sea/swell. The ballast tanks, as well as fuel tank, if possible, should have no free surface effect.
2.3
Anchoring When anchoring in increased effects of wind and current, there can be difficulty if the vessel is in light condition. There was a scope of taking more ballast so that the vessel could steer better and make her way to a shelter.
2.4
Effect of Weather In severe weather conditions, the vessel should as far as possible steer a course keeping wind and sea four to five points on either bow, to minimize bodily drift of the vessel. This will also minimize pitching and rolling effect of the vessel and have less racing of the engine, as well as loss of speed.
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3
3.1
CONCLUSIONS
Sequence chain 1. The vessel arrived at Porbandar Harbour in fairly good weather, as the wind was at Beaufort scale 3/4. The anchoring ground chosen was considered safe in prevailing weather conditions. 2. Vessels departure preparation and plans were carried out and heavy weather check list was followed. 3. On receiving the instructions to move to a safer place to avoid approaching cyclonic conditions, the first way point from anchorage shouldve been farther off the coast to keep vessel in deeper waters. 4. Taking into consideration prevailing wind force and direction, the engine power was not used to the full extent possible as the vessel steered on a course having wind and sea broad-on causing heavy rolling and pitching of vessel. Factors which led to the incident were the adverse weather conditions affecting prevailing ships light displacement condition.
3.2
Contributing factor Severe weather, inadequate ballast, and low propulsion power are the main contributing factors for vessel running aground.
3.3
Other safety observation Vessels crew should not be deployed ashore for the purpose of guarding vessel for pilferages while she is aground with no power of her own. Also, vessels crew members venturing out to sea to embark or disembark must don a life jacket.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Frequent weather observations should be made and weather warnings must be monitored by all means available. If vessel has to proceed to sea in stormy weather, she should have heavy ballast in order to have higher bodily submersion for better maneuverability.
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REFERENCE
Following reference material is stored in Accident Investigation Board premises. 1. Masters and Chief Officers interview records 2. Masters marine accident declaration 3. Crew list. 4. Ships particulars 5. Capacity Plan 6. Stowage Plan 7. Weather Information 8. Passage plan 9. Abstract of ships log 10. Ships tank sounding log 11. GPS log 12. Bunker salvage report 13. Crew casualty report
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Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

MV SHUJJA 3 GROUNDING OFF PORBANDAR, INDIA 25.06.2007

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

EVENTS AND INVESTIGATION

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Porbandar Port approaches with site of incident

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Pumping out bunkers to shore facilities

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

Grounding - M/V Shujja 3

Captain C.D. Mathur Accidents Investigator

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