THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

AiR Campaigns OF

The

Pacific

War

Military Analysis Division

July 1947

^;

'J

M L

THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Air Campaigns OF

The

Pacific

War

Military Analysis Division

July 1947

For

sale by the Superioiendent of

Documents, U.

S.

Government Printing

Office,

Washington 25, D. C

Price 60 cents

\/

g. 8.

DOCUWtHXS SUPtRINTENOENT Of

AUG 28

1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conckisions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

FOREWORD
The United States Stategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the Its mission was to late President Roosevelt. conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of
military strategy for planning the future develop-

The Survey's complement provided

civilians,

for

300

350

officers,

and 500

military segment of the

The organization was drawn

enlisted men.

from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing port,

men, supplies, trans-

The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in

and information.

ment of the United States armed forces and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some 200 supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have been
published.

September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign,

August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against
15

On

Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the

Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were

and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the
civilian

population,

the

effectiveness

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice Chairmen.

of

the

Harry L. Bowman,
Kenneth Galbraith, Rensis Likert,
J.

Frank A. McNamee, Jr., Fred Searls, Jr., Monroe E. Spaght, Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,
Theodore P. Wright, Directors. Walter Wilds, Secretary.

Japanese civilian defense organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study. The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for other Arrangements have been made to turn studies.
over the Survey's
files

to the Central Intelligence

Group, through which they will be available for further examination and distribution.

The present report was prepared by the Military Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey as a supporting study for the Chairman's over-all evaluation of airpower as employed in the war against Japan.

IV

. .

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction

Section

I.

F.\ctors Establishing the

1.

General Pattern of the War Against

Jap.^n.

Scope
Factors Influencing the Pattern of the War Against Japan E.xtraneous or Variable Factors Wliich Influenced the Pattern of the Pacific War...
a.

2. 3.

2
--3

c^

Concepts of Warfare
Structure Evaluation of the Capabilities of the

^
'

b.
c.

Command

Weapons Available

4 5
^

d.
e.
f.

Theater Priority
Political Considerations

"
_

Prematurely Pronounced Objectives

g.
4.

Summary

a.

Fixed or Invariable Factors Which Influenced the Pattern of the Pacific War Logistical Potential and Vulnerability of tlie United States, Including Manpower and
teriel

Ma7
7
'

b.
c.

Japanese Logistical Potential and Vulnerability

Geography and Weather

II.

Organiz.vtion op Material for Analysis. '" 1. General 2. Chronological Phasing Around Japan's Perimeter of 3. Operational Area Groupings, Progressing Counterclockwise
E.xpansion
4. Interrelation of
5. 6.

Chronological Phases
^'--'

Interrelation of Operational Area Groupings

10

7.

Consideration of Each Phase Evaluation

I,

^^

III.

Phase
1.

December 1941-July

1942,

The Period of Japanese Expansion.

12 12 12 13
14 15

Pearl Harbor

2.
3. 4.

5.
6. 7.

8.

China India-Burma Southwest Pacific Area The South Pacific The Central Pacific Area The Aleutian Area Major Significance of the Action of Phase

15
I

16

IV. PH.4.SE II,

1

July 1942-Xovember

1943,

The Defeat of the Japanese Naval Aib Force.

1-7

General

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

China India-Burma Southwest Pacific South Pacific

Central Pacific Aleutian Area Results of the Action of Phase II Major Significance of the Action of Phase II
III,

17

17 18 19

8.
9.

20 20 20 20
23 23 23 24 25

V.

Phase
1

November 1943-April

1944,

the Defeat op the Japanese Army Air Force.

2.

General China.-

3. 4. 5.

India-Burma Southwest Pacific South Pacific Area

Section

V.

Phase
6.

III,

Novembeb 1943-April

1944,

the Defeat of the Japanese Abmy Aie Force

Con.

7. 8.

9.

Central Pacific a. General b. Gilbert Islands Invasion c. Invasion of the Marshall Islands d. The Invasion of Eniwetok e. Operations in the Caroline Islands Aleutian Area Results of the Action of Phase III Significance of the Action of Phase III
IV, Apbil 1944-Apbil 1945, Exploitation of

Page 25 25 26
28

29
29

3q 30 31

VI.

Phase
1.

the Defeat op Japanese Aibpower.

32 32 34 35 35 35
41

General

2. 3. 4.

China India-Burma Southwest Pacific a. Advance to Morotai b. Leyte Operation and Second Battle of the Philippine Sea
c.

Balance of the Philippine Campaign

5.

Central Pacific a. General

6.

7. 8.

9.

Marianas Operation Invasion of Iwo Jima d. Invasion of Okinawa Japanese Home Island Area a. General b. Land-Based Air Attacks, Phase IV c. Carrier-Based Attacks, Phase IV Aleutian Area Results of the Action of Phase IV Significance of the Action of Phase IV
b.
c.

42 42 42 43 44 45 45 45 47 47 47 48

VII.

Phase
1.

2.

3. 4.
5. 6. 7.

V, April 1945-August 1945, Period or Intense Direct Air Attack on Japan Proper. China India-Burma Southwest Pacific Forces

5O 50
51 5I

8.

Central Pacific Forces Japanese Home Islands Results of the Action of Phase V Significance of the Action of Phase The Antishipping Campaign

52 53 53 53
55 55 56 57 58

VIII.

The Significance of the Areas of Operation and Possible Alternate Use of Forces.
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

China India-Burma Southwest Pacific and South

Central Pacific The Aleutian Area

Pacific

IX.

An Evaluation
1.

or the Over-all Operation. Limited Concepts

Logistics

2. 3. 4. 5.

Intelligence

Training Capacity for

War

59 62 62 63 64

X. Signposts. 1 Faulty Inferences Which

2.

May Be Drawn From

the

War

against Japan

65

Signposts

68

Map Map Map Map

VI

No. 1 Phase I, Japanese Expansion. No. 2 Phase II, The Defeat of the Japanese Naval Air Force. No. 3 Phase III, The Defeat of the Japanese Army Air Force. No. 4 Phase IV, Air Victory Exploited by Rapid Surface Advances, and Phase V, Intense Direct Air Attack on Japan Proper.

MAPS

INTRODUCTION
In the historical treatment and evahiation of any war, the victor may easily be led into platitudes and innocuous analyses. Observing the results of his work the defeat of his enemies the

we seldom look

critically within for evidence of

the same weaknesses.

Actually, the United States of America overvirtue of the greater depth in our technological echelon, our much greater logistical potential for war, and the geographic disadvantage of the Japanese economic sti'ucture. Many of those weaknesses which we condemn in the Japanese war machine were found in our own

whelmed Japan by

victor has the strong

human tendency

to believe

that his methods were right and proper, because he was the victor. The mistakes of the defeated foes, however, stand out in bold relief. His national structure, strained to the limit and then finally collapsing, clearlj' reveals the flaws in his thinking and in his

organization.

our

own

In fact, many were patterned after thinking and establislmients.

military pattern.

However, those same basic flaws

may have
tor

existed within the sti'ucture of the vic-

but were never spotlighted nor clearly revealed because the structure was never critically
strained.

Thus, glibly and with a sense of righteousness virtue, numerous writings today point out the weaknesses in the Japanese national structure and the deficiencies of the Japanese war machine. We recognize that his Army and Navy efforts were not well coordinated either in the production echelon or the combat echelon that his concepts of aerial warfare were limited and faulty; that his logistic support plan was incapable of meeting the

overwhelmed Japan by sheer physical Japan inherently lacked the capacity to wage a successful war on the United States of America. However, had we faced an enemy whose logistical potential for war appi'oximated our own and who did not suffer from geographic disadstrength.

We

and

vantages, the weaknesses in our

own

structure

might soon have been tragically apparent.

There powers whose logistical potential will exceed our own and whose geographic position will be advantageous. It is therefore imperative that, basking in the glow of victory, we honestly examine some of our
exists, in the future, a possible coalition of

derelictions.

demands of

his strategy; that his concept of de-

This document, therefore, passes over rather

quickly those things which were done without serious fundamental flaws, and attempts to emphathose features, functions, and operations which point up the need for change in thinking, organization, or employment of military forces.
size

fense in depth

was limited

to

two dimensions that

;

he consistently violated the principles of concentration of effort and economy of force that he overestimated the importance and the value of the
;

Pearl Harbor attack and

many

others.

However,

SECTION

FACTORS ESTABLISHING THE GENERAL PATTERN OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1.

Scope.

( 1 )

Primarily, this report deals with the air effort

against

Japan

in

World War

II.

However, an

evaluation of the air effort requires a corollary appreciation of the over-all strategy evolved for

prosecution of the

war and a

corollary treatment

(2)

of the actions of the surface forces, both land and sea, which were related to the air action.

Extraneous or variable factors, which depended on decisions made by human beings and influenced, not only by rationality, but also by custom, tradition, precedent, and service-pride. Fixed or invariable factors, which could not be altered by decisions of human
beings.

In order
the

to evaluate the strategy

and

tactics of

b.

The extraneous

or variable factors affecting,

war against Japan and

to assess the role of

airpower in that war, it is necessary to assume a point of departure with respect to time. American prewar strategy traditionally has had for its objective the avoidance of war if such

major degree, the pattern of the war against Japan were as follows:
in a

Concepts of warfare embraced by our military

leaders.

Command

structure, resulting

from decisions
influenced

could be accomplished without sacrificing our national security

made by human beings and

and way of

life.

With

the benefit

strongly by tradition and precedent.

of hindsight,
tion,

we now know

that firm political ac-

years preceding undertake.

and possibly minor military action, in the World War II would have obviated the major campaigns we later were forced to
Hence, we are led to the conviction

Evaluation, by responsible leaders, of the capabilities and limitations of weapons.

Theater priority, as influenced by other military or political commitments.

Political considerations.

that our prewar strategy failed.

and military concept and structure during the interval between World War I and World War II formed the basis from which we mounted our military effort beginning 7 Decempolitical strategy

Our

Prematurely pronounced objectives. Japanese position or reaction with respect to

these
c.

same factors

listed above.

The major

fixed or invariable factors

affected the pattern of the

as follows

which war against Japan were

ber 1941.

An
is

analysis of this interim period,

however,

a problem in itself and requires treatinto

Logistical potential and vulnerability of our

ment running

many volumes.

own

country,

including

manpower and
and
vulnermateriel.

This paper, therefore, deals with the position in which we found ourselves at the outbreak of actual armed hostilities and the strategy and conduct of the war from that point forward.
2.

materiel.

Japanese
ability,

logistical

potential

including

manpower and

Factors

Influencing

the

Pattern

of

the

War

Against Japan.
a. The general pattern of the war against Japan was established by a combination of several factors. These factors may be broken down into two groups,

Geography and weather. Space and time. Capabilities and limitations of weapons, which in tuni were functions of technology and
science.

State of military preparedness at the outset of

the
ing,

as follows

war with respect and logistics.

to intelligence, train-

Nevertheless, even though naval tactics and strat-

adopted, thus, was not developed purely from logical processes in the solution of a military problem. Eather, thronigh a process of evolution a strategy- was adopted which met most of the requirements growing out of the
d. Tlie

strategy

several factors, both real

and extraneous.
order

These

factoi-s will be discussed briefly in

that the specific influence of each on the pattern of the Pacific War may be more fully appreciated.
3.

Extraneous or Variable Factors

the Pattern of the Pacific
a.

Which

Influenced

egy were modified more fully to exploit the Naval Air Arm, construction and training programs for powerful surface units other than carrier and submarine were continued. This diversion of national resources and civilian and military manpower to the production, operation, and protection of heavy surface wai*ships logistically and tactically weakened the major Pacific offensive operations, including Na^^' carrier power and the Navy submarine strength, which played such a vital role in the interdiction of Japan's life lines of communication.

War.

major factor influencing the pattern of the Pacific War was the automatic adherence of military leaders to two concepts of warfare which had become outmoded prior to our entry into the war through the rapid evolutionary advance in the power of air weapons. These concepts were
Cancepts of Warfare.
(1)

With
cepts
tial

respect to the second of these surface con-

that physical invasion of Japan was essento victory theoretical discussion on this point
Only the

had been continuing for a generation.

rectly at the vital points of

visionary dared predict that airpower, applied di-

That the course of the war in the Pacific would be decided bj' naval surface engagements.

(2)

That physical invasion of the Japanese homeland was essential in achieving the
victory.

an enemy's national structure, could achieve victory without surface invasion. Likewise, only the visionary dared predict that an adequate fleet of submarines, less the resource-consuming heavy battleships and cruisers, could, in this particular war defeat Japan by cutting her line of communication to the Indies. Hence, the core of our strategy in the Pacific, as in the European theater, was to move ground forces
into the

With
to the

respect to the first of these concepts, prior

it

enemy homeland

for the decisive struggle.

war

was generally believed

made accordingly that in the event of war with Japan, the decisive action would take
plans were
place in great naval surface battles, as the result

and strategic

of which one belligerent would emerge victorious

and would dominate the sea. Dominating the sea would assure victor}', as it would impose economic blockade on the enemy, limit his troop movement, reinforcement, and supply, and eventually permit concentration of friendly troops when and where
desired.

This basic concept dominated our military thinking during the war and during the years preceding the war, and was thus responsible for our strategy, our military organization, and for the weapons we were to use. Our air weapons, being considered in prewar years as ancillary weapons, were developed under this influence. This concept served to retard, rather than to accelerate, the development of range and firepower in combat aircraft and the
over-all capability of airpower.

Fortunately for the United States of America,

myth was soon exploded. With the greater number of our key battle-line ships on the bottom at Pearl Harbor as the result, not of naval surthis

face action, but of carrier air attack

our defeat

would have been assured if this concept had been true. Later action in which the British Repulse and Prince of Wales were sunk by air attack and in which the major engagements of our Navy with

"Wlien the order of battle was drawn, it was this same concept which defined the relative roles of the three main forces and which governed their employment. In order to move ground forces into Japan for the final and decisive battle, we needed staging areas within reasonable range of the Japanese homeland and free movement of our Navy to effect and guard the transport of troops and supHowever, our fleet could not move freely plies. until it had won domination of its own element,

the Japanese

Navy were won or lost

in the air with-

and

it

out the surface elements ever making contact

further emphasized that this concept of naval surface action could not survive in the Air Age.

vancing
bases

could not achieve such control without adits line of bases for fleet support. These
to be

land, sea, and air action. dictated the need for air control Early experience

had

won by

748024

47-

lines of

over our advancing surface forces and over our communication. To gain and maintain air

forward bases were required from which the sustained force of our land-based aircraft could be brought to bear. Each element had its
control,

own logic of action and

basic

its

own requirements. The

aim of our strategy was invasion of the enemy homeland by ground forces but, since seapower and airpower had to be enlisted to accomplish this aim, their strategies and logistic requirements had to be met along with those of tJie invasion itself. Thus the simple need for ground force staging areas, for fleet bases, and for advance airsnowballed into a full-fiedged steppinghad to be expanded and modified to fill the needs of the forces enlisted in support of that strategy. It is important that we distinguish between the
fields

one axis was predominately Army and was under the command of an Army officer and the other axis was predominately Navy and was commanded by a Navy officer. These two axes of advance were parallel and competing and, throughout the war, were never placed under a single commander for Pacific operations. Thus, there were two major surface thrusts aimed at Japan each under its own commander coordination between the two being the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

The major

thrust under

at Port Moresby, in southeastern

moved up the

Army Command began New Guinea, northeastern coast of New Guinea

stone campaign as the central strategy

through Hollandia, Wakde, and Biak to Noemfoor and Morotai, and thence to the Philippine Islands. The forces employed were designated as Southwest Pacific Area Forces. Movement of
elements of these forces to Okinawa was started
in July 1945, after this island

and the strategic needs of the assigned to carry it out. The over-all strategy called for invasion and we committed air
over-all strategy

forces

power and

sea power to prepare for and support the invasion. By committing these forces, we also

had been seized by Central Pacific Forces. The first thrust under Naval Command was launched in the lower Solomons and advanced
from Guadalcanal to Bouganville, Green Island, and Emirau Island. These forces were designated as South Pacific Forces. However, it was obvious from the beginning that the Solomons campaign and the New Guinea campaign would be exi^loited along the same axis toward Japan as the New Guinea action, if successful, would pinch

committed ourselves to the stepping-stone campaign which is the most conspicious feature of the
early stages of the Pacific

War.

In the later stages of the war, while our fullscale amphibious invasion force was being readied, our long-range bombers, based 1,500 miles from Japan and outside the operating radius of her

bombs

land-based aircraft, carried sufficient tonnage of to Japan to destroy her principal cities and

and to convince her leaders of the Japan surrendered because her intact home army could no longer protect her people from destruction by air attack, even though it should repel the surface invasion.
industries
futility of further resistance.

Thus, concepts of warfare which visualized the

decisive military action as occurring either in a fleet battle line action or in a major land battle

through the Solomons. After almost 2 years of Army-Navy-Air Force hammering in the New Guinea-Solomons area had established a breach in the Japanese defenses, there was a choice between several courses of action for employment of our Pacific Forces. One possibility lay in merging the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific Forces under a single command
off the thrust

for a continuation of the thrust toward the Philippines.

The

logistical organization

and resources

in the Japanese

formed the pattern for each of the two major drives aimed at Japan. That there would be two major drives had been authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and established in the command structure. This 'factor
islands
will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph.

home

building up behind the South Pacific Forces were

greater than that behind Southwest Pacific Forces

C'ommand Structure. The major military Japan was mounted through two axes of advance. Each axis of advance was comb.

effort against

posed of elements of all three of our military forces Army, Navy, and Air Force. However,

and much greater power could thus have been thrown against the enemy at one spot along his shaky perimeter. A second possibility was to exploit the New Guinea-Solomons breakthrough and in a combined Army-Navy-Air operation drive directly through the Admiralties toward Truk and the Marianas, bypassing the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and the Philippines. Still a third possibility existed. This was to route the

forces under Naval

through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and thence to the Marianas, Iwo Jiina, and Okinawa while the forces under

Command

d.

Theater Priority.

The fourth major

factor

influencing the general nature of the Pacific

War

Army Command
the Philippines

continued in their drive toward by way of New Guinea. This third course of action, which effectively divoi'ced the major Army and Navy Commands in the Pacific and which compi'omised unity of command and control, was followed. As a result of this decision, the South Pacific area drive through the Solomons was terminated at Emirau Island and the forces employed under Naval Command in succeeding operations shifted their major effort to the Central Pacific and became
generally
Pacific
c.

was the basic top level strategic decision to defeat Germany first and Japan second. That this decision was sound is beyond dispute. The industrial and scientific potentiality of Germany was so much greater than that of Japan that any inordinate

Germany could have been extremely costly. Had the strategy been reversed, and had the decision been made to defeat Japan
delay in attacking
first,

German development
aircraft

of V-weapons and jet-

propelled

would

have

increased

the

probability of a
the collapse

Europe and of England before our Air Foi'ces

victory in

German

known

as Central Pacific Forces of the

could

have been deployed effectively in that

priority for

Ocean Area Command.

theater.

Evaluation of the Capabilities of the WeapAvailable.

The number one Army

ons

third

major

factor

influenced the pattern of the Pacific

War is

which hinged

materiel having been assigned to the

men and European

War, early Pacific action was necessarily conducted

with
less resources

closely to the second factor discussed above, but

than desirable.
of

This third factor was the restricted appreciation, on the

part of military leaders, of the full military potentiality of airpower.

warrants some individual consideration.

indicated
Pacific

the

desirability

This fact alone combining all

resources available
into

for offensive action in the a single powerful striking force.

However, in Japan we faced an enemy weak in

industrial

Even though the Marianas were captured before

the
first

production

capability

Philippine landing

thus providing the

of the Philippines

and,

even

in

splitting our forces,

we achieved such overwhelm-

base from which

direct air attack

occupation

Japan could be brought under

eventually

was considered necessary to provide staging bases for the invasion of Japan proper and to establish complete interdiction of Japan's life lines of communication to the Netherlands East Indies.
ever,

it was possible two full-scale attacks. Against an enemy whose strength approximated our own, such strategy would have invited

ing superiority in materiel that

to

launch

disaster.

How-

Early action

with the greater part of our Navy

mining been grasped a year earlier, the one wing of B-29s (operational from China bases in June 1944) in night mining of Japanese harbors from the Marianas would have severed these life lines of communication just as completely as they were severed by the blockade from the Philippine area and at a much smaller cost. Similarly, an early large-scale submarine offensive could have accomplished the same results.
aerial

had the potentiality of

Harbor and only remnants of Army air and gi-ound forces scattered from Australia to Hawaii was necessarily limited to efforts to stop Japanese expansion. From these resistance points, where the Jaj^anese expansion was stopped, initially sprang
battle-line strength incapacitated at Pearl

small Allied counterattacks and, later, as the

perimeter defenses were breached, full-fledged offensive thrust were aimed at the heart of the

Japanese empire.

Thus, lack of appreciation of the capabilities of

Of

great significance in the conduct of the

weapons available and failure

nese

to appreciate that

Pacific

War was the fact that this early action had

minimum
of resources.

sustained air attack directed against the Japa-

to be conducted with a

home

islands

was capable of inducing uncon-

ditional surrender, without invasion, led to the

acquisition of land masses for interdiction purposes

This led to an immediate dependence on airpower, both land- and carrier-based, because even a limited

amount of

and

sufficient in size

and

at suitable distance to

permit staging a large-scale surface invasion of the Japanese home islands.

power could penetrate surand begin to cari-y the fight to an enemy vastly superior in naval and ground force
air striking

face defenses

strength.

Hence, while navies were being rebuilt

and ground forces were being mobilized and trained for a final decisive invasion of Japan at some future distant date, airpower was, of necessity,

With respect to the Philippines, the viewpoint that military advantages would accrue from reoccupation was reinforced by the political requirement to free the Philippine people from Japanese domination. This sense of a national obligation to
the Philippine people coupled with the military evaluation fore-ordained the reoccupation of the
Philippines.
f.

given a greater chance to demonstrate

it

its

otherwise might have been given. Even though only very limited airpower was available, the results of early air
military potentialities than
action were so conclusive that, subsequently, both

Army and Navy

more
tives.

tactics

were adjusted to exploit

Prematurely Pronounced Objectives.

fully the air

arm

in the attainment of objec-

early in the war, various objectives, which

established.

Very had not

However, the evolutionary process, which

been processed along lines of sound strategy, were

modified tactics, stopped short of full maturity. The basic strategic concept of surface warfare
invasion

was

never

seriously

questioned

by

The surface invasion of Japan was scheduled for November 1945 when as an unexpected byproduct of air action Japan surmilitary leaders.

rendered in August, 3 months before the planned assault on the home islands.

Thus, a condition of
force unpreparedness

Army and Navy surface and inadequacy and a low

it

theater priority forced an evolution in tactics

in the Pacific

War

in that

forced an extensive

These objectives had a profound on the evolutionary development of Pacific strategy and a continuing impact on all operations. The unconditional surrender policy and the Allied intermediate objectives to go back into Burma, the Philippines, and Singapore are examples of prematurely pronounced objectives which had a major influence on the conduct of the war in that they hampered the development of an objective strategy pointed solely toward the effective removal of Japan as a military and political threat to our national security.
effect

employment of airpower. Because of the surface concepts of warfare, which dictated our Pacific strategy, it is questionable that airpower would have been given the opportunity to kill the enemy before invasion had we possessed the surface force strength in 1942 which we possessed in late 1945.

Personalities also affected the establishment of

objectives and, further, acted to perpetuate the

cleavage in the command structure. Our prewar military structure and system tended to develop
specialists trained primarily

under the influence of

the doctrine and tradition of their

It

own

service.

The over-all course war against Japan was less influenced by political considerations than was the war against Germany. Campaigns in which political cone.

Political Considerations.

of the

was therefore imavoidable that many senior military leaders suffered from an excess of service pride and adhered to doctrine not sufficiently
broad to meet the requirements of integrated landsea-air warfare.

This condition resulted in con-

siderations did have a profound effect were the

stant maneuvering within the military structure

for positions advantageous to particular services

Central and South

Burma campaigns and

the re-

occupation of the Philippines.

and

In the China-Burma-India theaters, American and British National interests were widely divergent. The objective of United States Forces was primarily to utilize India as a springboard for forwarding supplies to China. This action was intended to keep China in the war and to provide attrition and holding operations against Japanese

led to strategic solutions and engagements in consonance with limited, rather than over-all,

military appreciations.
g.

Summary.

Therefore, the general nature of

the Pacific

War was not

military analysis.

purely the result of sound Rather:

The primary objective of British was to recapture Burma and Singapore, for postwar political reasons, before the end of hostilities. In a compromise of national interests, American forces were committed to the Central and South Burma campaigns for which there was no real military requirement.
forces in China.
forces in India

Surface concepts of warfare, which were hinged to the belief that the decisive military actions of the war would occur in land and sea battles, led to the invasion and acquisition of many militarily unnecessary islands and land masses, and to the logistic preparation for a surface assault of the Japanese home islands. These same surface concepts of warfare led to a division of our forces between two axes of advance. Failure to evaluate correctly the capabilities of air-

power and the submarine further supported the acquisition of militarily unnecessary land masses and islands. Low theater priority and the paucity of surface military force available, at the outset of the war, led to an esten-

sive employ meut of airpowor which forced an evolution in tactics and a partial cvolntioii in military concept. Political consideratiiin.s supported stratcfric plans to reoccupy Central and South lUirniu and the I'liilippine Islands. The personal views and objectives of individuals in responsible positions were, at tilues, limiting factors in the development of an objective stiategy and freipiently led to intermediate niilitary operations not fully consistent with the over-all objective of the war.
4.

civilian

condition also put a high premium on both the and military components who were trained
to a satisfactory proficiency level.

up

Once

lost,

they were almost irreplacable. From the standiDoint of war industry and economy Japan was in a very precarious geographical

Fixed or Invariable Factors

Pattern of the Pacific War.

Which

Influenced the

a. Logistical Potential and VulnerdbiUty of the United States^ Including Manpoioer and Materiel. Even though our governmental and military

structure

had barely started mobilization at the

beginning of armed conflict with Japan, our potential military power was the greatest in the world at that time. In addition, we were not starting entirely from a peacetime economy. Prior to 7 December 1941, British and other foreign orders had served to expand and develop our aircraft engine and airframe industries and lend-lease had stimulated both basic and end-product industries.

Her basic and end-product industries were concentrated largely in the home islands, while the bulk of her natural resources lay almost exclusively in the Netherlands East Indies Area, in northern China, and in Manchuria. Connecting the industrial facilities and the raw materials areas required that Japan establish and secure sea lines of communication long, tenuous, and inherently vulnerable. Japan's geographic position, with respect to her war economy, was so weak and her' industrial potential, at peak load, was so far below that of the United States that, at best, she could plan only for a war of short duration and limited
position.

objective.
c. Geography and Weather. The effects of geography on the economic vulnerability of Japan and the United States have been mentioned above. In addition to providing a natural target in the Japanese life line of communications, geography also

Our great potential military strength lay in the great depth of our technological echelon, in the
ready
availabilit}',

with few exceptions, of basic

materials, in the existence of our transportation

affected our strategy in other ways.

and communication systems, in the existence of basic mechanical facilities and equipment, in the
proximity of our national resources to our basic industries, in the managerial capacity of American business, and in the mechanical and scientific ingenuity of American people. This American industrial complex was, at that
time, relatively safe

The geography of the axis of advance of the Southwest Pacific Forces through New Guinea and the Philippine Islands provided stepping stones of sufficient land mass to accommodate effective land based airpower and large-scale troop staging areas. This axis of advance was not entirely suitable to support by carrier aviation due to the vulnerability
of the carrier
aviation.

from crippling

attack.

The

and the

fleet to

land-based enemy
Central

weapons and the military organizations which had been produced by our enemies were incapable of
destroying our industry or our domestic training establishments before the raw materials and the raw manpower could be welded into combat units.
b.

On the other hand, the geography of the

Pacific Forces' axis of advance

hility.

Japanese Logistical Potential and VulneraJapan's emergence from a medieval culture

fairly recent.

through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to the Marianas was ideal for carrier action. After the effective striking power of the Japanese Naval Air Force had been
broken, principally by a combination of the Fifth Air Force sustained air offensive against Kabaul,
the air battles in the

had been

"While she had

made rapid

mechanical and technological strides under goverimtental direction, tlie great mass of the Japanese people had not been associated from birth with the products or the processes of a mechanical civilization.

New Guinea-Bismarck

area,

the air battles in the Solomons, and the Battle of

Midway, the

fleet

could advance on the series of

little effective

small, nonreinforceable atolls with an overwhelm-

depth.
difficult

Hence, her technological echelon had no This made her training problem relatively

ing carrier air superiority and meet

air opposition.
It

as she was forced to conscript agrarian

which they were
ill

peoples and plunge them into occupations and

activities for

in the war that the strategic mobility of the carrier the floating air base was limited by its vulnerability

was recognized early

prepared.

This

to air attack.

Thus, land masses basing an

effective

air striking force

were

necessai'ily

avoided until a

reasonable degree of air superiority over the area

Inclement weather has been the bane of military commanders from time immemorial, and weather

had been insured. Geography also affected theater organization and command problems. While it was militarily logical and workable to combine the entire Pacific offensive against Japan under one command and into one powerful thrust, it was not feasible to include within that command India, Burma, and China. In this area and in the Aleutian area only holding operations and limited offensives were at
that time logistically practicable.

power one of the greatest challenges it Air operations were restricted by bad weather in many ways. The problems of locating and hitting the target, formation control, navigating to and from the taroffered air

encountered in the war against Japan.

Because of the great distances involved, the short range of air equipment available at the time, the isolated nature
of the operations in these areas with respect to Pacific action, and the political aspects of the

back down to base, of search and reconnaissance, and of rendering close support to the surface forces were all complicated by the weather factor. However, steady advances were
get, of getting safely

made throughout

the war.

The

extension of the

range of aircraft, the utilization of airborne radar, and the development of electronic aids to navigation

and aircraft control lessened the

of the earlier crippling restrictions.

effect

of

China-Burma-India Area, separate commands on Separate commands on the theater level in China-Burma-India and the Aleutians did not lead to parallel and major competing military operations, as did the division between Southwest Pacific and Central
the theater level were justifiable.
Pacific Forces.

many
d.
ties

The real factors of time and space, capabiliand limitations of weapons, and state of Amerwar

ican military preparedness at the outset of the

have been treated in connection with other factors discussed in the paragraphs above and will not be
repeated here.

SECTION

II

ORGANIZATION OF MATERIAL FOR ANALYSIS

1.

General.

command
to correlate the various actions against
b.

of the opposing force in such form as

this report follows

In order

to achieve capitulation.

Japan and present

all effort, this

a composite picture of the over-

The phasing of

paper will consider the war under

Stepl:
Phase IDecemher lO^l^vly 19ii2. period of Japanese expansion.

chronological phases and under seven opera-tional area groupings as indicated in the following
five

The

paragraphs.
2.

Chronological Phasing.
a.

Step 2: This step has been broken down into two phases for the sake of clarity in presenting the use of our own forces and the enemy's use of
his forces in the decisive battles of the war.

no exact date is established as the end of one phase and the beginning of another. In general, the months selected as transition periods from one phase to another include action which terminated one j^hase

For the purpose of

this report,

Phase

IIJuly 19Jt2-Novemher WiS. The

defeat of the Japanese Naval Air Force.

Phase IIINovember 1943-Apnl 19UThe defeat of the Japanese Army Air

Force.

and embarked upon another.

significant to observe that

It

is

particularly

no phase of air activity started full scale, from scratch, at the beginning of a particular phase. Preliminary and pioneering

Step 3:

-,

Phase

IVApril

19U-April 1945.

Ex-

operations inevitably occurred in the latter part of

ploitation of the defeat of Japanese air-

each phase, setting the stage for the next important

series of operations

and

events.

power by rapid surface advances to the Marianas, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and
Okinawa.
Step 4:

The phasing selected below is a realistic and not an arbitrary arrangement. It defines the progress of the war in a form which is applicable to any war ever fought with any type of weapon. The basis of this phasing is as follows Step 1 : The expansion of one of two opposing forces the threat to the security of one foi'ce by the action of another; concessions and/or withdrawals by one force initial action to stop the re-

Phase

VApril

1945-Auffiist 1945.

In-

tense direct air attack on

Japan proper

inducing unconditional surrender without invasion.

3.

Operational Area Groupings, Progressing Counterclockwise

sion.

Around Japan's Perimeter

of Expan-

surgence or expansion of the other. Stef 2: The struggle between opposing forces at the decisive time and place during which the

military potential of one belligerent

is

damaged

beyond

its

future capability for rebuilding and

rehabilitation.

Step 3: The exploitation of the decisive victory,

Area. The Fourteenth AF and a. China Chinese ground forces fought a holding operation against Japan's attempt to neutralize and dominate all of China. The Fourteenth AF obtained air superiority over China, attacked Japanese

by one force destroying in detail the disorganized and ineffective remnants of the opposing military
power.

shipping in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Yangtze River, and the South China Sea and interdicted North

Step If.: The overwhelming application of power by one belligerent at the seat of government or

China and French Indo-China railroads. The Tenth AF, Royal b. India-Bwmia Area. American, and Chinese Air Force, and British,

ground forces expelled the Japanese from Burma. Tenth AF and Royal Air Force units achieved air superiority over Burma, interdicted Burma and Siam lines of communication, provided close battle strike air support to advancing infantry, and supplied and transported the bulk of the military effort in Burma by air transport. The Air Transport Command, based in India, provided the only lino of communications affording military assistance to China from the outside
world. The air supply operation across the Himalayan "hump" from India to China was the
greatest air transport effort yet attempted.
c.

for the greater part of the campaign.

airpower of the Seventh AF and based aviation of Navy and Marine units spearheaded this advance. The Eleventh AF, and f. The Aleutian Area. Navy and Army surface forces stopped the Japanese advance in the Aleutian chain and expelled the Japanese from Kiska and Attn Islands. Subsequently, the Eleventh AF continued minor harassing raid against Kurile Island targets. The Twentig. Japanese Home Islands Area. eth AF principally, assisted by the Fifth and
carrier-

Land-based and land-

The Southwest

Pacific Area.

The Fifth

AF

(and Thirteenth AF after June 1944) and ground and naval forces advanced from Port Moresby to the Philippines by way of the northeast coast of New Guinea, Biak, Noemfoor, and Morotai, thence to Okinawa after its seizure by Central Pacific Forces. The effective power of the Japanese naval force was destroyed in air attacks and air battles in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Rabaul area and by simultaneous operations of South Pacific Forces in the Solomons area. The Japanese Army Air Force was destroyed as an effective striking force in the air battles over

Seventh Air Forces and fleet and carrier action, brought the Japanese home islands under decisive aerial attack which ended the war.
4.

Interrelation of Chronological Phases.

The chronological phasing selected

is

in this paper based on significant results of air and surface

action which

mark

against Japan.

a definite milestone in the war However, no chronological phase

may

be considered independently of the phase preceding and following it, and the action of each phase must be evaluated with respect to its relationship to the over-all objective of the

war

New

the

bases, particularly

Guinea and in the air attacks against New Guinea "Wewak and Hollandia. All of Japan's sea lines of communication to the Netherlands East Indies and to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands were brought under the domination of land-based aircraft. Air attacks isolated the battle area from reinforcement, neutralized numerous beachheads before invasion, and subsequently provided close battle strike assistance in
securing objectives.

defeat of Japan. Only by such approach can a proper correlation be established and possible
alternate uses of the forces available be considered.

And, these possible alternate uses of the must be considered in any realistic evaluation of the Pacific War.
forces available
5.

Interrelation of Operational

Area Groupings.

Like the clu'onological phasing, the action occurring in any one operational area cannot be
realistically as an isolated campaign. Action in each area profoundly affected the action

South Pacific Area. The Thirteenth AF, under naval operational command until June 1944, and Marine and Naval air and surface forces fought the Battle of the Solomons from Guadalcanal to Emirau Island. South Pacific Area air units, jointly with Southwest Pacific Area air
d.

treated

in all other areas, if only

point.

from

a logistical stand-

Likewise, both the enemy's and our

own

local area strategies were influenced by the developments in other areas, and target systems con-

units, participated in the destruction of the

Japa-

tiguous to two general operational

areas

fre-

nese Naval Air Force.

e.

quently

Central Pacific Area.

Central Pacific Forces

mounted a major effort in the surface advance through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and the Marianas to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The Seventh AF was under operational control of the Navy for the greater part of this operation and
actually served as a land-based Naval air

came under attack from both. This analysis will show at the appropriate places the interrelation of both chronological phasing and
area action.
6.

Consideration of Each Phase.

arm

In tlie text which follows, each of five chronological phases is considered in separate sections and

10


an attempt has been made to focus on the action and devekipments which were significant to the
over-all conduct of the
7.

Evaluation.

Sections III to VII, inclusive, which cover in

brief form the history of the war against Japan by the phases defined above, are followed by

war against Japan and

strategy.

significant

to

future

military

As

general pattern for presentation, the chronological

phasing will be followed and, within each phase, the action will be considered, by areas, in the same
order as listed in Paragraph 3 of this section so
far as practicable.

The significance of the areas of operation. Section X Signposts.

Section VIII

operation and possible alternate use of forces. Section IX An evaluation of the over-all

748024

47

11

SECTION

III

PHASE I, DECEMBER 1941-JULY 1942 THE PERIOD OF JAPANESE EXPANSION

1.

Pearl Harbor.

Confident of a German victory in Europe and goaded by the strangulation of the American embargo which was drastically impairing the development of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere Japan rightly assessed that her capa-

bombs. In this first action of the war it was clearly demonstrated that airpower would dominate naval
warfare.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl HarJapanese drives around her entire perimeter were rapidly developed. This Japanese expansion
bor,

bilities

could only wage a successful war of short duration and limited objective. Jaj^anese strategists, like

phase will be considered briefly in the order of area groupings given in Paragraph 3 of Section II.
2.

many Americans,
war
in the Pacific

believed that the

China.

course of the

would be decided

by naval surface action. Consequently, the attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor, was designed
to reduce our naval surface strength to a relatively

impotent force. In the attack, launched from Japanese carriers some 300 miles to the northwest, the United States lost five battleships out of action for 1 year or more, three battleships out of action for 3 months or more, three light cruisers out of action for 3 months or more, three destroyers and five miscellaneous ships out of action for 1 year or more, and approximately 200 grounded Army and

During the years 1931-40, Japan had penetrated China to the extent that virtually all Chinese industry and communications were under Japanese domination. Japan had occupied Manchuria, industrial North China, the Yangtze River Valley Corridor, and key coastal areas. Japanese occupation of French Indo-China in July 1941 and the seizure of Hongkong in December 1941, shortly after Pearl Harbor, sealed China off from the Pacific. By May 1942 China's only remaining surface
line of

Navy aircraft out of a total of 402 in the area. Enemy losses were approximately 30 aircraft. The
Japanese attack was carried out in two waves.
Significantly, initial elements attacked the airfield
installations

Burma Road, was

of

conomunication to the outside world, the lost in the Japanese occupation

Burma.

Air action during Phase I, by the American Volunteer Group, forerunner of the Fourteenth

and the aircraft on the ground and

AF,

consisted of

the succeeding elements attacked the ships.

tions

This was a surprise attack of crippling proporand indicated immediately tliree lessons of
a.

Air defehse of the Kunming base area, which was being developed into the Air Supply Terminal for China. Air attacks in the Salween area against Japanese troops which were attempting to invade China through the back door from Burma.
3.

continuing value

India-Burma

That war or attack may develop suddenly and

without the formalities of Congressional action.

The

JajDunese attacked
in Thailand.

Burma

in

December 1941
at-

That exact intelligence of a potential enemy, in peace and war, is of incalculable value. Without exact intelligence on our fleet and airfield disposition and our psychology of preparedness at the moment, the Japanese raid could not have been so
b.

from bases
tack, they

Spearheading their

employed 300 to 400 Army airplanes which were followed by approximately 100,000 ground troops. In initial air battles over Rangoon between the American Volunteer Group and the attacking Japanese Air Force, our limited Air Forces
maintained local air superiority
sufficiently

devastatingly successful.
c.

long

That

capital surface ships are extremely vul-

nerable to air attack, with or without atomic

12

to permit an orderly evacuation of the inadequate Rangoon defense forces.

Mergui and Tavoy were captured by quick Japanese thrusts in January 19i2, and Kan<2;oon was

A grave weakness in our national security strucEven though is apparent in this operation. commanders of the Philippine Forces were aware
ture

evacuated in March. Gen. Joseph Stilwell and Britain's General Alexander unsuccessfully attempted to block the Japanese drive between Toungoo and Lasliio with a combination of Chinese, British, and Indian troops. They were badly defeated and, with their forces disorganized and
separated, both the British

of the attack on Pearl Harbor, no offensive action

and American Com-

mand Headquarters were

India.

forced to abandon their

troops and retreat back over the China Hills into

was taken until war had been declared officially. Delay in waiting for Congressional action in a future war may prove to be fatal. b. Malaya. Spearheading with tactical air attack, as in Burma, Japanese forces landed on the rugged Malaya peninsula and moved south on
both sides of the peninsula.

By May l'J42 Jajianese ground forces had advanced to Mandalay and Myitkyina. In June their advance was stopped, not by effective Allied resistance, but by the mountain barrier between Burma and India and bj' supply line difficulties. In this campaign, the Japanese demonstrated that they understood the employment of tactical air power in direct support of surface operations. From advance air bases the enemy attacked air
and surface objectives in strength. When air domination had been won, it was quickly exploited b}' surface penetration and isolation of objective areas which provided air bases from which the
process could be repeated.

Singapore in coordinated air-ground salients on The British, having relied on the rugged terrain to the north for protection, had faced Singapore defenses to the sea. Singapore fell in February 1942 to these forces moving down the Peninsula from the north.

On

10

December 1941 the British battleships

Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk by Japanese air attack in the Gulf of Siam, where
they were attempting to prevent Japanese amphib-

teams These two British ships were not covered by defending aircraft and were unable to repel the enemy air attack with the antiaircraft guns aboard. Japanese postious

reinforcement

of

their

air-ground

moving down the Malaya Peninsula.

During

this period the

few available aircraft of

war reports

indicate that, despite the fact that all

the nucleus of the Tenth

AF and KAF were active

Burma
to retreating

attacking aircraft were obsolescent types, only

four attacking aircraft were destroyed by the antiaircraft fire of the
c.

principally in evacuating personnel from

and

in flying in

emergency supplies

two

battleships.

forces.

Local air defense of the Calcutta area,

Netherlands East Indies amd

negligible air opposition,

New

Guinea.

Imphal, and Upper Assam was established with the few AAF and EAF fighter aircraft available.
4.

With

exploited her air dominance of the

Japan rapidly waterways and

into

moved approximately
Southwest Pacific Area.
a.

355,000

troops

the

Philippine Islands.

Even though the Pearl

Harbor attack was known,

the Japanese air attack on our Manila air installations on 8 December 1941 caught our aircraft on the ground. A high per-

centage of American aircraft was destroyed and

the
ploiting the air victory, the

enemy soon dominated the air. Quickly exenemy reinforced his air and surface forces and eliminated Philippine defenses in most of the area. United States and
Philippine forces withdrew to an area in which
terrain protected

them from much of the air attack. from logistic support and communications, their ultimate capitulation was assured. Bataan fell in April and Corregidor in
There, cut
off

May

of 1942.

Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea. Inadequate allied garrisons in the advance of the Japanese assault inevitably were attacked by air if they offered determined resistance. The United States, Dutch, and British navies, operating in the area substantially without carrier or land-based air protection, were driven from the area back to Australia with heavy losses. Added to the destruction of our fleet at Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, numerous allied war and service ships were sunk by air attack in the Netherlands East Indies and Northern Australia Area in the next few months. These losses included the carrier Langley which went down before a Japanese task force that included at least one aircraft carrier and a niunber of land-based medium bombers.
13

By this time, it was fully understood that air power would dominate naval warfare that domination of the sea required, first, domination of the air above the sea. And, it was further understood that in World War II domination of the air above the sea could be achieved only through

predominately

area

reconnaissance

conducted

from bases in tlie Fiji Islands and New Caledonia. The most significant action in the South Pacific
during this period occurred in the Battle of the Coral Sea. This battle was fought between a United States carrier task force and a Japanese carrier task force which was covering an enemy invasion fleet heading for Port Moresby. Exceptional intelligence gave our forces time to prepare and insured that the United States task forces would not be surprised. During the battle, all offensive firepower by both friendly and enemy
forces

air action.

Coupled with our naval

battle of the

losses to air action,

our

forces suffered a serious reverse in the surface

Java Sea, 28 February 1942, in which Houston and Exeter were damaged and withdrew and in which the light cruisers De Renter and Java and the destroyers Jupiter, ETectra, and Kortenar were sunk while inflicting negligible damage on the enemy. By 1 March 1942 Allied surface units had been withdrawn toward Perth, southwestern Australia, outside the reach of Japanese air power. Japanese air power had established an effective interdiction of the waterways over the entire area of operations of the Netherlands East Indies. During the balance of this period. United States Naval action in the Netherlands East Indies area was confined to submarine offensive patrols in enemy held waters and in air patrols of the approaches to
the heavy cruisers

was delivered by

posing naval surface craft participated in the battle only in defending themselves from air attack. By the second day of the
operation, 8

Opnever made contact and

carrier aviation.
.

May

1942, the carrier

western Australia.
Significant

Army Air

Force action during this

period began in February 1942, when the nucleus started its counter-air offensive of the Fifth

AF

against Eabaul, from Port Moresby.

Rabaul was

been heavily damaged, 1 destx'oyer, 66 aircraft had been lost and the Yorktown had been damaged. The Japanese force had lost 1 carrier, 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, 5 miscellaneous ships and approximately 100 aircraft and 1 of her 2 remaining carriers had been damaged. Both forces subsequently withdrew the American units heading due south, and attempting to save the damaged Lexington. However, the night of 8 May, fire broke out aboard and the Lexington was lost. The enemy failed to capitalize on the United States Fleet's withdrawal, which left open the approaches to Port Moresby, and likewise withdrew to the

Lexington had 1 fuel ship, and

the pivotal base for Japanese supply, reinforce-

northeast.

ment, and maintenance for the New GuineaSolomons area and became a focal point of the action in Phase II. During Phase I, the Fifth AF also undertook the air defense of Darwin and soon inflicted such heavy losses on the attacking

This battle was of major significance to naval

strategy and tactics in the followings

ways

Japanese Air Force that they gave up their mass air attacks on the area. Local air superiority was established and our forces were able to start the reconstruction of our shattered Dai'win bases.

(1) It demonstrated that the carrier was the primary striking force of both the Japanese and American navies. Both opponents chose carriers as their primary targets in the interchange of air blows and both sides withdrew when their carrier potential was seriously reduced.
(2)

By July
lands

1942, Japanese conquest of the Nether-

It set the pattern for subsequent operations

East Indies was virtually complete. Sumatra, Java, Borneo, the Celebes, and the northeast coast of New Guinea were securely in enemy
hands.

for our

Navy

in that

light naval surface

from this time forward, dayengagements normally were

not risked so long as the enemy possessed even

limited air strength in the area.
(3)

The

vulnerability of heavy surface ships to

5.

The South

Pacific.

air attack

at

had been demonstrated beyond question Harbor and off Malaya where heavy and Pearl

Shortly following the Japanese invasion of New Guinea, the enemy took possession of the Solomon

well protected capital ships were incapacitated.

The

Air effort by the nucleus of the Thirteenth AF, under naval operational control, was
Islands.

action in the Battle of the Coral Sea further demonstrated, beyond question, the ineffectiveness

of the air protective

"CAP", Combat Air

Patrol,

over the carriers. Carriers were to remain extremely vulnerable targets, because air attack could penetrate the air protection. Wliile the lighter
cover and
antiaircraft guns intercepted

surface engagement with tho

more powerful

sur-

face battle line of the Japanese Fleet.

The

withdis-

drawals separated the two forces by such

carrier air groups were not possible
scale action

and de-

tance that, subsequently, major air strikes by our

stroyed a great percentage of the attacking aircraft it failed to prevent a few getting through

and large

was not resumed.

and only a very few getting through to the target would cripple or sinli the carrier.
to the target,
(4) The relatively limited capability of carriers for sustained operations was demonstrated in the carrier's withdrawal from the area for fuel be-

their withdrawal

before the battle, and again from battle on S May after only 36 hours in the combat area. In later operations the carrier capability for sustained operations was increased by developing techniques for refueling and rearming at sea. (5) This battle again emphasized that airpower dominated naval operations.

tween

4:

May-6 May,

This great battle reiterated in detail the condrawn from the Battle of the Coral Sea. It also established one additional significant point. The Japanese surface fleet was much more powerful than the United States surface fleet, outnumbering our forces by 4 battleships, 1 cruiser, and approximately 22 destroyers. However, the size of the surface fleet had nothing to do with the outcome of the battle. Superior intelligence permitted the proper timing of our air attack, in which approximately one-third of our carrier aii"craft available, in their initial attack, knocked out three of the four Japanese carriers while the air
clusions

striking force of the

6.

enemy was

either

still

in

The

Central Pacific Area.

de-

flight or in process of re-servicing

from an attack

The enemy overwhehned Guam and Wake

fenses in

December 1941 and likewise occupied the Gilbert Islands in a thrust from the Marshalls. In June 1942, a close parallel to the Coral Sea
action developed in the Battle of

Having lost his air potential, the enemy was compelled to retire. Our forces not only had air superiority remaining in carriers still afloat, but we possessed land-based aircraft at Midon Midway.

Midway

way which would

carriers in

still

be operational even
incapacitated.

if all

Island.

Again exceptional

the area were

intelligence allowed time for

The

our forces to prepare. A Japanese Fleet of approximately 86 ships, including 5 carriers and 4 battleships, 9 heavy cruisers, and 36 destroyers, heading for Midway, was engaged by a United States Fleet which included 3 aircraft carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 14 destroyers. Navy, Marine, and Army Air Forces land-based In the resultaircraft at Midway also took part. ing air duel, surface forces again avoided contact and the engagement was decided entirely by air action. Japanese forces lost the four carriers committed to the action and other miscellaneous craft while the United States Navy lost the carrier Torktoum, and one destroyer. The Yorhtown was first immobilized by Japanese air attack and later finished off by an enemy submarine. One Japanese carrier, known to be in the general area, was not contacted and did not participate in the battle. Having lost its carrier air arm, and thus exposing its vastly superior surface fleet to destruction from our remaining airpower, the Japanese Fleet rightly elected to withdraw. As night was coming on, our striking force also executed a temporary withdrawal, in order to avoid a night

Japanese, having intended quickly to seize Midway, had carefully avoided damaging our one air

This proved to be a mistake on the strip ashore. part of the enemy. Our resulting overwhelming
air potential in the area, landleft the

and carrier-based,

Japanese Fleet in an untenable position, hence the withdrawal. During this pei-iod, the Seventh AF, based at Oahu and at Midway, performed reconnaissance duty under naval operational control. Seventh

AF

aircraft participated in the search for the

Japanese convoy heading for Midway and a small

AAF B-17 force participated in the attack, although the significant damage inflicted on the Japanese carrier force was the result of carrier
air action.
7.

The Aleutian

Area.

Islands in the Aleutian Area.

In Jime 1942, Japan occupied Kiska and Attn Coincidental with

air.

the attack on Midway, the enemy also attacked

Eleventh AF fighters from Island intercepted the destroyed a number of second attack wave and

Dutch Harbor by
the

new base

at

Umnak

15

enemy

Surprised by air resistance in and having suffered heavy operational losses due to weather, the enemy abandoned the attack and diverted his efforts in this area to the development of new bases at Kiska and Attu.
aircraft.

New

Guinea; Dutch Harbor, Alaska; and on naval

this area,

surface units in the South and Central Pacific

was

accomplished by airpower in counter-air action.

8.

Major Significance of the Action of Phase

Airpower Dom,inated Naval Warfare. Our Navy suffered heavy damage at Pearl Harbor as a result of air attack. The Allied Fleet was
b.

I.

During the period of Japanese expansion and our initial operations to halt the enemy advance,
the following significant facts were demonstrated

Japanese

driven out of the Netherlands East Indies by air domination. The major naval

battles of Coral

Sea and Midway were air battles

air threat.

exclusively, with the surface forces never daring

to

by the actions which took place Dominated its Own Element. a. Airpower Only air weapons defeated air weapons. Wliile surface antiaircraft weapons were capable of
registering a percentage of hits at final defense
points, only airpower

c.

make contact in the face of the Around the entire perimeter

of Japanese ex-

pansion, in both land and naval action, the

attack.

enemy

normally preceded surface operations with air

d. Area interdiction of the entire Netherlands East Indies Area, which closed the waterways to Allied naval operations, was accomplished by Japanese airpower.

had the capability of deeffective

stroying airpower.

The
:

disruption of
;

Japanese air attacks on Kunming, China Rangoon, Burma Darwin, Australia Port Moresby,
;
;

16

SECTION IV

PHASE II, JULY 1942-NOVEMBER 1943 THE DEFEAT OF THE JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE
1.

General.

3.

India-Burma

A study only of the surface map showing xVllied

gains during this 17-month period cannot reveal the magnitude or the importance of the action which took place. The almost microscopic surface advances were the results of American efforts to contain the Japanese expansion and to breach the

The ground situation in India-Burma also remained relatively static during this period. Limited gains were made in the Naga Hills, separating Northern Burma and the Assam Valley, in connection with General Stilwell's campaign. This road was intended to support the American
trained Chinese armies in the surface offensive

enemy

defenses.

The

resulting attrition of Japa-

nese forces during the period

effects in the action of

had far reaching

subsequent phases. Action in each operational area will be considered beginning with China and moving counterclockwise around the Japanese perimeter.
2.

Burma and was further intended to link up eventually with the old Burma Road near Bhamo thus giving China a surface connection
through

China.

The ground

situation in

tively static during this period.

China remained relaJapan, preoc-

cupied with defending her outer ring of bases in the Pacific, made only limited "rice-bowl" drives
in the

with the outside world. Initial estimates of the logistical potentiality of this road were proved by subsequent events to be excessively optimistic. This will be more fully treated in connection with the operations of succeeding phases. Operations of the Tenth AF and the Royal Air Force from Bengal and Assam bases were directed

Yangtze Eiver Area.

The China Air Task Force (4 July 1942-10 March 1943) and the Fourteenth AF, after 10 March 1943, offered the only effective resistance to
Japanese domination of China.
sisted of defense of the

Air action conair

Kunming Base Area

supply terminal, which Japanese bombers unsuccessfully attempted to neutralize, offensive air
strikes against the Japanese surface lines of communication within French Indo-China and China, attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Yangtze River, the Formosa Straits, and South

China Sea, and attacks against Japanese air and military installations within the area between
Saigon and Shanghai, including Formosa. Japanese daylight attacks against the Kunming Base Area resulted in such heavy losses to the attacking

enemy abandoned daylight raids and turned to harassing night operations with smaU numbers of aircraft.
forces that the

mainly at enemy air installations and lines of communication in Burma and Siam, interdiction of Japanese shipping to the ports of Mergui, Tavoy, Moulmein and Rangoon, protection of the "Hump" air supply route to China, and defense of our Bengal, Arakan, Imphal, and Assam areas from air attack. By the end of this period, our Air Forces had established air superiority over our base areas, the "hump" route was substantially freed from enemy air attack, 65 percent of the railway and road system in Burma had been disrupted, and the terminals of the sea lines of communication to Burma were under attack. During the same period, emergency air supply by the Tenth AF to General Stilwell's road engineers and advance troops in Northern Burma set the pattern for later Burma campaigns. The Air Transport Command relieved the Tenth AF on the "Hump" route to China in December 1942, and built the deliveries to China up to 6,490 tons per month by November 1943.

17


4.

Southwest

Pacific.

In July 1942, Japanese forces landed at Buna, on the northeast coast of New Guinea and advanced across the Owen Stanley Mountains toward Port Moresby. In August a second thrust at Port Moresby through Milne Bay was thrown back into the sea by defending air and ground Meanwhile, the enemy forces advancing forces. on Port Moresby from the Buna area were isolated by air attack, and a well coordinatedJFifth A'F and Australian groimd force operation stopped the enemy in September and recaptured Buna in

steady stream of replacement aircraft and highly trained crews of their Naval Air Forces, land bas-

ing them. Our occupation of Buna, November 1942, permitted construction of an air base at Dobodura, on the north side of the Owen Stanley

From this base Rabaul was brought under decisive air attack between NovemRange of mountains.
ber 1942 and
battles over

November

1943.

Concurrently, air
the Bismarck area

New Guinea and

November of

1942.
air,

Following this success,

ground, and amphib-

ious forces successively neturalized and occupied

Salamaua, Lae, and Finschafen.

During

this

period, the general pattern for the Southwest Pacific operation was developed which resulted in General MacArthur's statement that the purpose of his surface operations was to advance his bomb line. From advance airfields, airpower

In the course of these augmented by Thirteenth AF and Naval and Marine land and carrier based air operations in the Solomons area, the experience level of the Japanese Naval Air Force was fatally reduced. According to Japanese records obtained after the war ended, by November 1943 the Japanese Naval Air Force in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Solomons
paid high dividends.
attacks,

Maintained
objective area.

air superiority over the surface

area lost 70 percent of the total of their experienced pilots having between 500-600 hours' flying time and combat experience. From this loss of experience, the Japanese Naval Air Foi'ce never recovered. Japanese aircraft carriers, less their air groups, were withdrawn to Truk and then to Japan for complete remanning and reequipping of
their air components.

Neutralized the more distant enemy air

installations within range.

Provided general area reconnaissance. Isolated Japanese forces from reinforcement by sea. Attacked military objectives prior to surface advance.

Provided close battle strike support to surforces during beach landings and ground movement. By air transport operations, provided logistic support to air and ground forces where' surface lines of commimication could not be used by virtue of terrain or the time element. Transported troops, as well as supplies, in airborne and paratroop operations thus immeasurably increasing the tactical mobility
face

of the surface forces.

Developed new air bases

tive area

tending the air penetration

to continue exas each objec-

The final Fifth AF attack on Rabaul occurred on 2 November 1943. So complete was the destruction of the enemy air force that the attacking flights ran out of air targets and attacked and burned the shore installations as an alternate. In all subsequent operations through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Japan proper, the lack of experienced leaders and air crews in the Japanese Naval Air Force insured their quick destruction at small cost in any encounter with American Navy or Army Ait Force air units. Thus, air action in the New Guinea-Rabaul-Solomons area broke the back of Japanese Naval airpower insured the ineffectiveness of Japanese Naval Air Forces in the area of operations of our Central Pacific Forces and thereby insured the success of all subsequent operations of our forces

was occupied.

During this surface advance from Port Moresby Rabaul was the main air base from which the Japanese, with their Naval Air Arm, could disrupt our operations. Hence Kabaul became the primary target of Fifth AF counter-air operations. Into Rabaul the Japanese poured a
to Finschafen,

toward Japan. Also during this phase of operations, preparations were being made for the decisive action of Phase III. A string of Fifth AF air bases was developed in the interior of Now Guinea in the area west of Lae, Salamaua, and Finschafen. The sites were seized by airborne troops, airborne engineers developed the fields, and air transport oper-

18

ations provided logistic support for the

eclielons.

combat

and Midwaj'
fire,

in the

airpowcr delivered

all

offensive

From

these

new

bases,

Wewak was

heavily attack in August 19-13 and the bulk of Japanese Army aircraft then in the area were destroyed on the ground. Attacks against the Wewak-Hollandia area were continued into Phase HI for the decisive defeat of the Japanese Army Air Force.
5.

South

Pacific.

The American surface

offensive in the

Solomons

area was begun on 7 August 1942 with a landing of

United States Marines at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Preceding the invasion, the nucleus of the Thirteenth AF. under Naval operational control, based in the Fiji Islands, Efate, and New Caledonia and staging through Espiritu Santo, directed maximum though limited effort in softening up the landing areas by air attack. The landing was made under carrier air cover, though the carriers were forced to retire southward the night of 8 August due to the presence of enemy land-based aircraft in the area. That same night, an enemy surface force attacked our screening force of
cruisers
flicted

and the by air action. The Japanese lost one carrier and one destroyer and suffered heavy damage to two battleships. The United States carrier Enterprise was damaged and was forced to withdraw. Having bruised each other severely in the exchange of air blows, both sides withdrew at approximately the same time. During this phase, various skirmishes developed in the Solomons area between our own and enemy naval surface forces as each attempted reinforcement and supply to their island garrisons. These surface actions, in general, were significant in that they normally took place at night. Neither our own naval forces nor the enemy could risk a daytime surface engagement within range of either
the surface units never
contact,
battle

made

was decided

entirely

land- or carrier-based airpower.

The
was

Battle of
typical of

Cape Esperance,

11 October 1942,

and destroyers off Savo Island and inheavy damage on our forces, sinking four cruisers and several destroyere. This left our

transports, discharging cargo at the beachheads,

without naval surface protection. However, the enemy failed to capitalize on his success and did not attack the transports. Probably fearing air retaliation at daybreak, the Japanese task force retired at high speed, having suffered only negligible damage. Even though our carriers were within 150 miles of the action at the time, no at-

this kind of action. In position beyond range of Japanese land- and carrier-based aircraft, our forces made a dash under cover of darkness, engaged the enemj, and withdrew before daybreak. In this section the Japanese forces lost two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, five desti-oyers and one miscellaneous ship while our forces lost one destroyer, suffered heavy damage to one heavy cruiser, and moderate damage to one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. Damaged Japanese ships were left for land-based aircraft to finish off on the

following day.

tempt was made to attack the enemy task force on the following morning. The enemy land-based
air threat to our

The seizure of Guadalcanal permitted the land basing of Navy, Marine, and Thirteenth AF aircraft at Henderson Field and extended their range to the Northern Solomons. In the months which followed, Japanese air, supply, and military installations at Munda, Vila, Kahili, Ballale, and Bougainville Island came under constantly increas-

own

carriers, if they entered the

the enemy force^whose presence would have risking our own carriersundoubtedly
fied

area,

and the

fact that there were

no carriers in
justi-

in-

fluenced the decision not to attack with our carrier

forces on the following morning.

In the latter part of August 1942, the Japanese a major effort to retake Guadalcanal. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons resulted when the Japanese convoy was brought under air attack by our carrier aviation, assisted by Thirteenth AF and Marine land based aircraft. Our carrier task forces were also attacked by the Japanese Naval Air Arm. The action paralleled that of Coral Sea

made

Japanese naval airpower in the away steadily and amphibious landings followed. Each landing permitted establishment of a more forward air base from which the range of land-based air operations could be extended and from which the next objective area could be brought under sustained air attack. Our
ing air attack.
area was whittled

series of

landing operations were always successful

because air domination was always established in

the objective area before a landing was attempted.

In November 1943, a landing was made on Bougainville Island, at Empress Augusta Bay, and the Solomon Islands campaign was virtually complete.
19

74802

In this connection,
in their

it is

significant to observe
tlieir first

that the Japanese encountered

reverses

own

surface thrusts
to Port

when they attempted

Moresby
in

the operation without air domination in the area.

The convoy en route

was thrown back by

May

1942

air attack in the Battle of the

and Jaluit and Mille Islands in the MarThese operations, coupled with extensive area reconnaissance, were a prelude to the Gilbert Islands Invasion, for which the Southern Assault Force was being assembled in the Ellice and New Hebrides Islands area.
Islands,
shalls.
7.

Coral Sea; the assault on Midway in June 1942 was likewise repulsed; the Milne Bay attack was thrown back into the sea and the overland drive on Port Moresby from Buna was defeated because the Japanese had lost air domination in the objective area
;

Aleutian Area.

in the Battle of the

Eastern Solomons,

carrier air,

and

in the Battle of the

Bismarck Sea,

land-based

frustrated Japanese attempts to land their troops. Air domination was

air, likewise

recognized as an essential to landing operations. Throughout the reconquest of the Solomons, a considerable portion of the Thirteenth AF, and

was directed to interdiction of Japanese efforts to reinforce and supply their garrisons by sea. The "Tokyo Express" fast destroyer run from Rabaul to the enemy's Solomons garrisons became a primary target. Airpower immediately denied the enemy the capability of naval surface movement in the area in the daytime. Hence, for months the enemy attempted
air effort

Navy and Marine

Eleventh AF aircraft, operating from Kodiak, Cold Bay, Umnak Island, and Adak conducted a counter air offensive over the Japanese bases at Kiska and Attn Islands and by March 1943 had driven Japanese aircraft entirely from the area. Air attacks against Japanese military installations at Kiska and Attn followed, and Attn was reoccupied by American Army, Navy, and Marine Forces in May 1943. In August 1943, Kiska was assaulted by our forces but there were no Japanese left on the Island. Convinced of their inability to maintain troops in this area and being sorely pressed in the more important Southwest and South Pacific Areas the Japanese had taken advantage of the poor weather to evacuate their entire garrison under cloud cover. Thereafter, Eleventh AF air effort was shifted

to attacks against shipping, airfields, military installations, fishing canneries,

during the hours of darkness and to hide during the daytime. The Japanese were prevented from substantially reinforcing
to negotiate the
tri^D

and fishing boats in

the Kurile Islands.

8.

by this land-based air action and by carrier air action in the Battle of the Eastern
their garrisons

Results of the Action of Phase

II.

Solomons and the Battle of Santa Cruz Island. In the Battle of Santa Cruz Island, 26 October 1942,
Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons, a Japanese assault convoy was turned back entirely by air action. Again carrier aviation fought the battle without naval surface
like the Battles of

the Japanese Naval Air Force in Guinea-Rabaul-Solomons area, predominantlj' by land-based aircraft, but materially assisted by carrier-based aircraft, was the most the

The defeat of

New

significant result of this phase of the war.

This

action insured not only local air superiority, but

In this engagement our Hornet but the enemy, having been discovered and recognizing that air attack in the restricted waters around Guadalcanal would lead to destruction of the convoy, withdrew
units
contact.

making

forces lost the carrier

our air domination of any area in which only Japanese Naval Air Force units would be encountered during the balance of the war.
9.

Major Significance of the Action of Phase

a.

II.

without attempting the landing.

6.

With

respect to air domination of

its

own

element, the experience of Phase I was borne out.

Central Pacific.

There was

little

action of great significance in

the Central Pacific area during this period.

Baker

Surface forces, by their inherent nature, were utterly incapable of coping with the enemy air arm. American airpower alone established local air
superiority in all operational areas, launched a constantly increasing

Island and sites in the Ellice Islands were developed as staging bases and the Seventh AF, under

program of counter

air action

Naval operational

control,

began

strikes of limited

over the enemy's more distant bases, and destroyed

the effective fighting power of the Japanese Naval

size against the Gilbert Islands,

Nauru and Ocean

20


Air Force in the decisive Rabaul-Solomons Air campaign. b. Dnring Phase II, airpower continued to dominate naval warfare. The experiences of the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway were borne out in the Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Island. In addition to the items of significance listed in Paragraph 5 of Section III, pertaining to Coral Sea and Midway, two more points significant to naval operations were established by the action of this period. (1) Even though there was only very limited air power in the area, Navy surface engagements
occurred ahnost exclusively at night.
time, radar
c.

During the Japanese expansion. Phase I, the enemy showed an appreciation of the fact that airpower dominated land warfare. Our own pattern of conquest through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, during Phase II, verified this principle. Without air support, surface forces were either incapable of movement, or experienced prohibitively heavy losses. Airpower dominated
laud warfare by

At

that
tech-

and low-altitude blind-bombing

nique had not yet been developed to the point that night air attack against shipping had a reasonable chance of success. It is important for the future to appreciate that this limitation on airpower no longer exists. In the action of succeeding phases

Counter air action, rendering our own from enemy air attack. Isolation of the battlefield, denying the enemy reinforcement, supply, and mobility. Direct attack on enemy troops, installations, and equipment in the immediate battle area, depot areas, and on lines of communication.
forces free
d. During Phase II, the logistical potential of airpower as a transportation force became apparArmy Air Force air transport operations ent. supplied the entire war effort in China from India bases, began to supply the North Burma Forces,

World War II, blind-bombing techniques were developed to the point that shipping might be hit at night or through the overcast with accuracy approaching visual bombing standards. Future development by our potential enemies, as well as ourselves, will undoubtedly perfect this technique to achieve even better than the visual daytime results of the past war. In other words,
of
surface craft could

to Finschafen, and materially assisted in the logistical support of the Solomons campaign. Logistic support by an air line of communications offered the following advantages to surface forces
(1)

made Buna

possible the

New Guinea campaign from

at

one time

safely venture

Logistic support by air expanded the

scope of surface operations.

tions

within enemy aircraft range under cover of clouds or darkness. Technological advances have eliminated these security factors and ships have now

now became
lines of

feasible in

Surface operarough and un-

develoj^ed areas to or within which there were

become vulnerable targets to air attack even in fog and darkness. (2) Naval surface operations, as has already been indicated, were strongly influenced by the range of the opposing aircraft available. Facing an enemy with short range air equipment, it was
possible to lurk outside aircraft range, but
close
still

communication. support and troop movement by air increased the tactical mobility of sur-

no land

(2) Logistic

face forces.
(3) Air evacuation of casualties from the battle area insured a minimum of losses in

operations.
(4)

enough to an objective area to get in and out or through an air blockade during the hours of darkness. Both the Japanese and United States forces took advantage of this fact. However, the present range of our aircraft and potential enemy
aircraft has increased so radically over the range

Air supply reduced the requirement for In Burma cam-

the reserve logistical build-up in the immediate rear of surface forces.

paigns, the traditional 30 days' supply requirement in the Army Service Area progressively

was reduced from the previous 30 days'

re-

of aircraft available during this phase of

World

War II that these tactics will no longer work. Land-based aircraft, in any future war, will have range to cover such a large area that surface vessels

quirement to 11/2 supply developed. This requirement was likewise reduced in the other areas dependent ujion an air line of communication. Unencumbered with tremendous masses of supplies,
the surface forces achieved a

days, as confidence in air

may,

if desired,

be kept days, rather than

objective area.

maximum

degi-ee

hours,

away from an

of mobility

and further

seourity of surface

21

lines of

communication was not necessary. This permitted penetration tactics and obviated dragging the Army Service Area and the resource consuming surface lines of communication behind an advance. Wastage of supplies was also greatly reduced by concentrating supplies at the air supply depots,
well to the rear, and delivering directly to the

combat forces

to satisfy their daily needs.

Likewise, the conventional time period between phases of surface advance which, prior

e. Airpower efficiently interdicted Japanese sea and land movement within aircraft range during daylight hours. During this phase, land-based airpower isolated the Japanese overland drive on Port Moresby from Buna and land- and carrierbased air power brought the terminal areas of the Japanese sea lines of communication under surveillance so effective that enemy ship movement in critical areas was confined to the hours of darkness. Later technological developments have ex-

to air logistic support,

logistical

had been required for build-up for the next phase was

greatly reduced.

tended this area interdiction potential of airpower to eliminate much of the limitations earlier imposed by weather and darkness and short range of equipment.

22

SECTION V

PHASE III, NOVEMBER 1943-APRIL 1944 THE DEFEAT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE
1.

General.

3.

India-Burma.

This period vras marked by American victory in

the Air-versus-Air phase of operations in

The

Jajjanese

Burma
in the

defeated

Aimy Air Force in Burma was during Phase III. Tenth AF units
main

and

New

Guinea and by an exploitation

mounted

a vigorous counter air offensive over

Gilbert and Marshall Islands of the Phase II air victory over the Japanese Naval Air Force.
tion in each area
-will

Ac-

Japanese air bases to and including Rangoon. By May 1944 our forces had destroyed the greater

with China and round Japan's perimeter.

2.

again be considered starting progressing counterclockwise

number of enemy
areas.

aircraft in

Burma and had

established air domination over the operational

China.

Japanese air penetration to American rear bases Kunming area was practically stopped during this phase. Enemy air attacks were confined, for the most part, to our advance bases at Hengyang, Lingling, Kwelin, Luichow, and Nanning which lay along the old railroad corridor joining French Indo-China and tlie Hankow area. The Fourteenth AF successfully defended these forward bases and continued counter air action against enemy bases in nortliern French IndoChina, at Hongkong and Canton, in Formosa, and in the Yangtze and Yellow River areas. The air campaign against coastwise shipping in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea was accelerated and north French Indo-China railroads were disrupted by air attack. The attacks on this railway system were designed to prevent movement of a
in the

Reinforcements for tlie Japanese Army Air Force in Burma thereafter were never in sufficent quality or quantity to impair our control of the air. This was undoubtedly due to the more IDressing nature of tlie Japanese Army Air Force reverses in the Southwest Pacific Area. All subsequent air and groimd operations in Burma were an exploitation of this air victory as the Burma campaigns were to be air supplied and air domi-

nation was necessary to air transport operations.

Interdiction of Japanese shipping to
intensified

Burma was
attacks on

by Tenth

AF

and

RAF

the port facilities and ships at anchor at Bassein,

troop concentration which was considered a threat

Kunming. Day and night harrassing of river and road supply lines to the enemy forces in the Changsha area was also continued. During this period, the Japanese attempted one surface thrust west of Tung Ting Lake, in the direction of Chungking. This force met little ground resistance from the Chinese armies in the area but retired with heavy losses in the face of direct air attack on their lines of communication and front line elements.
to

Bangkok, Tavoy, Mergui, and Rangoon. Both Rangoon and Bangkok were abandoned by the Japanese as ports of entry early in 1944. The Burma-Siam railway and road system was long, tenuous, indefensible, and offered few alternate routes. Air attacks on these lines over an area from Bangkok to Myitkyina materially reduced the logistic support of Japanese military power in Burma during this period. Significant action occurred in the Arakan and Imphal areas in February and March 1944. The Japanese Arakan offensive was launched in an attempt to capture the Port of Chittagong, India, while the Imphal thrust was intended to cut the Bengal-Assam rail line of communications between Calcutta and the Assam air bases from which China was being supplied. Both Japanese attacks encircled and isolated the defending forces, which were subsequently relieved and turned potential

23

defeats into significant victories

air

by

large-scale

combat support and

in

air supply.

These cam-

naissance in force encountered no opposition and seized Los Negros Island in Admiralties. This

paigns marked the turning point in the surface

war

India-Burma and

so conclusively

demonlater

advance provided immediate air interdiction of the water approaches to Rabaul and completed its
isolation.

strated the potentiality of air supply on a scale

suitable to this particular situation that

campaigns

in the interior of

Burma were planned

detail in the

upon air supply and upon air movement of troops. During the same period, in North Central Burma, an airborne long range penetration group, under the command of Major General Wingate, was flown more than 100 miles into the interior of Burma, behind Japanese lines, and commenced operations on the Japanese surface lines of communication. At the same time, in Northern Burma, General Stilwell's American trained Chinese, paced by a regiment of American infantry, closed in on Myitkyina. Like the Arakan-Imphal operations, this campaign daily became more dependent upon
to be entirely dependent

air forces had been defeated in Solomon Islands and Rabaul area during Phase II, Japanese Army air units had

As enemy naval

largely dependent

been advanced into

New Guinea.

Initially,

Wewak

was built up as a major base and into Wewak the enemy poured the best of his Army Air Force experience as he had done with his Navy Air Force
experience at Rabaul.

The

destructive Fifth

AF

raid of mid-August 1943, covered in Phase II,

Wewak to HolHollandia was then brought under sustained Fifth AF heavy and
caused the enemy to shift from
landia, farther

up the

coast.

medium bombardment and

past 2 years of

strafing attack.

Here

the cap was put on the accumulated attrition of the

air transport operations for logistical support.

The muddy and impassable trace of the Stilwell Road could not logistically maintain its own engineers, much less tlie combat troops proceeding in advance. The capture of Myitkyina air strip
early in

New Guinea air fighting. By 6 April 1944 Hollandia as an airbase had been destroyed and the Japanese Army Air Force was
knocked out of the war as an effective air fighting force. In the carrier strike and amphibious landing which followed, later in April, only negligible air opposition was encountered. The effect of Fifth AF attacks on the Japanese Army Air Force in the Wewak-Hollandia area was immediate and lasting. The Japanese Army Air Force was disorganized to a point from which it never recovered. Later attacks by the Fifth AF in the Halmaheras and by Carrier Task Forces operating in the area were met with practically no Even organized and effective air resistance. though the enemy's available aircraft strength was high, the pilot quality was gone. The experienced leaders and ci-ews had been killed and a large percentage of the component technicians and mechanics, of which Japan had only a very limited number, had been overrun in the landings and had taken to the hills with no chance of evacuation. According to Japanese records obtained after the war, by early April 1944 the Japanese Army Air Force had lost more than 95 percent of its experienced pilots having between 300-600 hours
flying time.

May

1944 terminated this phase of slow

and

difficult

ground campaigning.

The defeat of the Japanaese Army Air Force in Burma, during Phase III, opened the way for
greatly accelerated air action in interdiction, close

support, and air supply operations and thereby

made

possible the rapid surface advance of the

succeeding phases.
4.

Southwest

Pacific.

After November 1943, the responsibility for maintaining the neutralization of Eabaul was passed to the Thirteenth AF and Navy and Marine air units operating from the Northern Solomons. The Fifth AF then directed the major portion of its effort against the Japanese Army Air Force in New Guinea and in support of further surface advances in New Britain and along the northeast coast of New Guinea. Landings by Southwest Pacific forces were successfully made at Arawe and Cape Gloucester in December 1943, after heavy and effective air neutralization of prepared defenses. A further amphibious move was made up the New

The

over-all experience level of the

Japanese

Army Air

Force had been reduced to 30

percent of the level existing at the start of the war.

Guinea coast in early January 1944, when Saidor was captured to provide a valuable new advance airdrome. Shortly thereafter, a ground recon24

In all subsequent action by our own Army Air Force units, air domination was insured because the enemy's air experience had been reduced below

the miuiimim for effective operations. He had numbers, but he never again had quality and thus
in desperation

for sustained operations.

Following these en-

was Uiter driven

to suicide or

Kami-

gagements, the Japanese aircraft carriers, less their air components, had been withdrawn to

kaze

tactics.

Trnk, November

April 1944 found Southwest Pacific Forces based as far north as Hollandia, extending tlie air preparation into the Halmaheras for the next move forward. During this phase, the Fifth AF units based in the Darwin area also continued operations against air, oil, and shipping

The

latter part of

and from there to the home and remanning. Meanwhile United States carriers, after the Battle of Santa Cruz Island in October 1942, had as a general
194'2,

islands for refitting

practice kept well out of range of land-based

aircraft.

enemy

The withdrawal

of the Japanese car-

riers left the series of small atolls of the Gilbert

targets in Borneo, the Celebes, Java,

and the

sur-

rounding waters.
5.

and Marshall Islands in, a precarious position because of their dispersion and inability to reinforce each other or to receive reinforcement from

South Pacific Area.

During Phase III Rabaul remained the primary

target of the Thirteenth
bility of

AF. The

offensive capa-

Rabaul air units had been effectively neutralized by November 1943, but it was necessary to maintain this neutralization by constant attrition of the enemy's relatively inexperienced air

New Guinea, or the home islands. Thus, the enemy had piecemealed his meager remaining air defenses on a series of small nonreinforceable and nonsupporting islands and had
the Solomons,
invited destruction in detail.

Air domination of the Solomons and Rabaul area was maintained by the Thirteenth AF and carrier- and land-based Navy and Marine Air Units. Air interdiction of the waterways was also maintained and this gradually sealed off enemy reinforcement and supplj- to the area. Following the pattern developed during the previous phase. Green Island was occupied in February 1944 and Emirau Island in March, terminating the thrust which had started at Guadalcanal and had been developed northwest through the Solomon Islands. Rabaul effectively had been bypassed and isolated, and since Rabaul was militarily useless to both the enemy and ourselves, it was not occupied.
reinforcements.
6.

Third: Pacific Ocean Area Forces had begun to profit by a large logistical build-up. Even though our over-all Allied strategy was pointed at the defeat of Germany first with only minimum resources for security intended to go to the Pacific the scheduled allocation of our national resources to the separate components of our military forces tended to upset the implementation of this strategy. Our fundamental concepts of warfare dictated that this force of personnel and materiel, which grew prematurely in the Pacific, be committed.
(3)

Central Pacific.
a.

Ocean Area Forces, in an exploitation of the air victory of Phase II over the Japanese Air Force, occupied the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and Eniwetok during this period. The stage was set for these operations by five
General.
Pacific

(4) Fourth: The defeat of the Japanese Naval Air Force in the preceding phase, in the RabaulSolomons area, insured that whatever air opposition was encountered on these atolls would be low in quality and, further, that it would be decisively outnumbered by the carrier aircraft available. Our carrier forces had approximately 900 aircraft approximately four times the number of combat aircraft possessed by the enemy in the

entire Gilbert-Marshalls area.

Due

to the

enemy

dispersion of this limited

number on

the various

factors
(1) First: The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to leave one component of Pacific Forces

mutual suppoi't, and the absence of an enemy carrier foi'ce, it was highly improbable that our carrier forces would
islands, their inability to render

under Army Command and another component under Navy Command. (2) Second The Battles of Coral Sea and Midway and numerous other engagements around the Solomons had demonstrated the vulnerability of the carriers to air attack, and had further demon:

encounter as

much

as 1 to 20 in air opposition.

Events in the Gilbert Islands operation fully substantiated this estimate

as the enemy

air effort

was

less

than

1 to

our 100 in number of sorties

Fleet, lacking carrier

encountered.
(5) Fifth:

The Japanese

strated the relatively limited capacity of carriers

groups, was almost certain to remain out of the

25

area and offer no opposition to the landing. If it did elect to offer Disposition, our Navy Forces

(3)

Defense Forces and Shore-Based Air: For

had an overwhelming advantage by virtue of their carrier power and would be in a favorable position to destroy the major portion of the enemy fleet.
These factors have been given in detail in order that the results of the Gilbert Islands operation

the Gilbert Islands oi^eration and for the majority of Central Pacific assaults, this Force was com-

posed of the Seventh AF, a Marine Base Air Defense Wing, and naval search and reconnaissance groups. This force was shore based at the most

and succeeding operations

be intelligently evaluated.

across the Pacific

may

In

this age of con-

and was responsible for bombardment of the objective area over a period of time, for search and reconnaisfields available

forward

pre-invasion
sance,

stantly expanding technology, an analysis of only

the results and the technique employed in any campaign may lead to conclusions dangerous to

future security.

The

results

must be studied

in

the light of cause

and

effect if

they are to be

properly evaluated.
b. Gilbert Islands Invasion. Plans for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands were crystalized in

and for air defense of its operating base area. as an air strip could be opened up or captured in the area under attack, elements of this force were moved rapidly forward to assist in the close air support operations being conducted by carrier and escort carrier forces in the area.

As soon

September and executed in November of 1943. The general pattern adopted by Central Pacific Forces for the assault and occupation of Japanese Central
Pacific bastions

was

fairly well defined in the

The major combat and their missions were as follows (1) The Assault Force (later designated as the Joint Expeditionary Force) This force was composed of the ground forces who were to be put ashore escort carriers whose mission was to provide air cover for the convoy en route and to give close air support to the landing and beach operations escorting battleships, cruisers, and destroyers accompanying the convoy whose mission was
Gilbert Islands
operation.
forces
:

For the Gilbert Islands operation the "Defense Forces and Shore-Based Air" were based on the islands of the Ellice, Phoenix, and Samoan Groups and on Baker Island. Daily strikes were made by these forces, between 13-19 November, on Japanese bases in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, but the weight of effort was relatively light between 350400 bombing sorties.

The Assault Force was broken down into two

at-

tack forces, the Southern and the Northern. The objectives of the Southern Attack Force were Tarawa and Abemama, and the objective of the

to increase the antiaircraft defenses of the convoy,

guard against surface or subsurface attack against the convoy en route and at the beachhead, and
participate in naval surface
objective area; miscellaneous service
vessels for the

bombardment of the and combat

Northern Attack Force was Makin Island. The Southern Attack Force was assembled in the New Hebrides area, as the 2d Marine Division was in New Zealand and the Marine defense battalions to be employed were in Samoa, Wallis, Nanomea, and Nukufetan. It is significant to observe that this force was not committed from Hawaii or the United States but was in the South Pacific and, with equal facility, could have been employed in exploiting the New Guinea-Solomons breakthrough.
the

purpose of minesweeping, underwater demolition, beach reconnaissance, landing

operations, air-raid warning, control, and logistic
services.

The Northern Attack Force was assembled in Hawaiian area. The 27th Infantry Division

(2)

The Carrier Force

This force included the

main force of large and small aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Its missions
were to launch air strikes before the arrival of the Assault Force for the purpose of neutralizing enemy air units and shipping in the area to shield the operation from interference by the Japanese
;

in Oahu, and the Army defense battalions were in the United States. The Northern Attack Force left Pearl Harbor on 9 November 1943 the

was

Southern Attack Force

left the

New

Hebrides on

12 November 1943. Both groups refueled at sea while en route and carried on additional intensive
training.

Fleet ; to assist, as required, in close support air and surface bombardment operations during and after

establishment of the beachhead.

Carrier strikes were made on 18 November at Nauru and Tarawa and on the 19th at Tarawa, Mille, and Makin. On 19 November the naval surface bombardment of Tarawa was also begun,

26

and on 20 November assault was made on Tarawa by the Southern Attack Force and on JMukin by the Northern Attack Force. In securing a beachhead on Tarawa, our hvnding forces suffered very heavy casualties from Japanese machine gun, mortar, and artillery firing from well-protected and dug-in positions. It is therefore appropriate that the factors which contributed
to these losses be analyzed.

to reinforce his garrison or

fleet in

oppose with his

the defense of this perimeter outpost,

surface

and that our land-based air, carrier air, and bombardment operations could be allowed the time necessary to effectively
in a preassault air

neutralize the defenses.

These factors resulted

and

First: Tarawa was on the fringe of the Japanese defensive perimeter and was fortified to the best of the enemy's ability. In New Guinea and later in the Philippines it was

many

times possible to select areas for the landing which were not heavily defended. In the Gilbert Islands this was not feasible.

naval surface bombardment which failed to effect a satisfactory degree of neutralization of the enemy defenses and was chiefly responsible for our heavy losses. We had the necessary force and capability to effect an acceptable neutralization, but our evaluation of the enemy's capability and probable reaction prevented our effectively employing the
forces available.

The Tarawa landing was marked by

Second: Only a very limited long range,

land-based pre-invasion air bombardment had

Minimum enemy

air defenses.

The

CVL

been undertaken.
established

time schedule had been

which did not permit more than

a token land-based air bombardment prior to Over 80 percent of the fire the assault.

enemy defenses was delivered by surface vessels, approximately 10 percent by land-based aircraft in the pre-invasion softening-up period, and not more than 10 percent by carrier aircraft. Third The Tarawa Atoll was flat and raised only a few feet above the sea. The Japanese dug-in positions on this flat surface offered a
directed at the
:

Independence was the only vessel damaged by enemy air attack being struck and damaged by an aerial torpedo from a Betty on 20 November. Enemy air attacks on our beach positions and ships at anchor were very limited. The first attack, by eight aircraft, occurred at about 0400 hours on 21 November.

The following night four

aircraft attacked

and on succeeding nights raids by only one or two aircraft developed. Official Navy documents list these attacks as of no more than
nuisance value.
opposition

very

diflBcult

target to naval gunfire, which,

The absence of effective air supports the conclusion drawn in Section IV that the Japanese Naval Air
Force had been defeated in the BismarckSolomons area by November 1943.

having high velocity, flat trajectory, and limited warhead, was actually a grazing fire. This flat surface offered a natural target to horizontal and dive bombing from the air.

Minimum
Our

enemy

submarine

activities.

forces sank one submarine

Had

the time schedule been

more

flexible,

the

carrier-based dive bombers with the force

had

destroyed another from Japanese submarines.

and probably while suffering no damage

the capability to neutralize the Japanese defenses before the landing was made.

No mines and no serious barriers at the landing beaches.

No
opposition from the Japanese Fleet.

Fourth
patently

the principle of surprise.

The time schedule was based on Even though it is impossible to make a major landing
:

positions

Vigorous fire from pillboxes and dug-in by machine guns and artillery re-

on a small defended coral atoll without alerting the defending garrison, the operation was geared to a time schedule which was calculated to minimize the chance of enemy reinforcement or interference from the Japanese Fleet. A more realistic evaluation would have recognized that, at this stage of the war, it was highly improbable that the enemy, lacking carrier groups, would attempt
748024

sulting
air

from the failure of the preliminary and naval bombardment to destroy these

positions.

A comparison of the landing operation at Tarawa with

that of the Southwest Pacific Forces at
is

from a military standpoint. 'V\niile it is impossible to find any two landing operations which are identical in deCapt Gloucester
significant

17-

27

it is

fenses encountered, and while

not assumed

was negligible and the Japanese

carrier group, failed to appear.

Fleet,

having no

that Tarawa and Cape Gloucester presented similar problems in full detail, enough similarity does exist to warrant a comparison of the tactics in-

Abemama was occupied against negligible resistOnly 24 Japanese were found on the island, and there were no fortifications. The limited number of Japanese involved in the Gilbert Islands operations tied up a large American force for months, requiring immense logistics compared to that required by the Japanese. The
ance.

volved and the results achieved. Cape Gloucester was defended by dug-in positions and the pre-

was delivered chiefly by air bombing. Approximately the same tonnage of bombs was delivered by air on Cape Gloucester as by naval gunfire on Tarawa. At Cape Gloucester, the invasion forces went ashore standing up with negligible opposition and casualties.
assault fire

An evaluation of the action of this phase strongand sustained air preparation for landing operations against well defended positions materially reduced the casualty rate and that air preinvasion preparation offered the following advantages over naval gunfire
ly indicates that methodical

Gilbert Islands were perimeter outposts of the Japanese prepared surface defense in depth. Inasmuch as our strategy elected to occupy these bastions by surface assault, preceded by a minimum

of air preparation,

it

was

inevitable that

the

attacking forces, to be successful, would require larger numbers and greater logistic support than

preparation
(1)

The

air

trated form

rather than over a period of time

blow could be struck in a concen-

would the entrenched defenders. In support of the Gilbert Islands landings, the Seventh AF, under Navy operational control, operated from Canton Island, Baker Island, and
the
Ellice

Islands.

Extensive

area

recomiaisof the

thus giving benefit of shock and providing minimum opportunity for the enemy to adjust to the
situation
(2)

sance, limited preinvasion

bombardment

Gilbert Islands group, and flank neutralization

raids against Kusaie, Nauru,

and seek protection.

of air domination required in

and Ocean Islands

The degree

the objective area was

surface attack, and

much less for air than for much less for land-based air-

craft than for carrier-based aircraft due to the

vulnerability of the carrier.

(3)

Measured in terms of national resources,

the logistic support required for each ton of air

delivered

were conducted. With occ. Invasion of the Marshall Islands. cupation of the Gilbert Islands, the Seventh AF was rapidly deployed to Tarawa, Makin, and Abemama Islands and immediately began sustained preinvasion attack against Japanese air and naval installations in the Marshall Islands.

bombardment was far

less

than that

re-

quired for each ton delivered by the guns of a

fleet.

The forces assembled for the Marshall Islands operation were organized basically as were the forces for the Gilbert Islands assault, with the
addition of a "Neutralization Group" whose task was to maintain neutralization of two enemy air-

(4)

tal area, offered a

fire

Prepared beach defenses, having little fronpoor target to the flat trajectory

of naval guns, and offered a suitable target

to air attack.

The Northern Attack Force encountered less Makin Island. Enemy resistance consisted chiefly of machine gun fire from the beach area and from two hulks in the lagoon. Casualties were light, however, and a beachhead was soon established. The advance
opposition in the assault on

enemy

met small, though tenacious, and our superior force reqviired 2 days to blast the battered enemy from entrenched positions. In connection with the operation, howacross the island
resistance
ever,

Wotje and Taroa from D-2 onward. The general plan of operations was to seize three key points Roi and Kwajalein Islands, about 45 miles apart, and Majuro Atoll, 250 miles to the southeast. Preinvasion neutralization was accomplished by Task Force 57 (largely Seventh AF) in attacks against enemy air bases and defenses beginning 15 January. These attacks were augmented by carrier strikes beginning 27 January 1944 on D-2. Thereafter, land- and carrier-based air and naval surface bombardment cooperated to comfields at

plete the neutralization.

enemy submarines succeeded

in destroying

one of our escort vessels the CVE Liscome Bay on 24 November. Enemy air reaction, however,
28

credited the Japanese with a

ci'aft

Preinvasion estimates maximum of 200 airscattered throughout the Marshalls. Naval

records credit the preliminary softening-up air

attacks with approximately 74 aircraft destroyed 2, leaving the balance to the 900-plus before

there would be no air or surface retaliation from

these Japanese island bases,
(1)

carrier aircraft available for covering the assault.

Neutralization of 7'?i/^.The atoll of

Truk

In the face of this array of power the enemy had little to offer. The Japanese fleet offered no opposition, the landing approaches were not obMajuro structed, and the beaches were not mined. Atoll offered no resistance and only minor opposition was offered by the 300-odd surviving Japanese
of the Roi-Namur garrison, the most heavily defended island of the Kwajalein Atoll. Between 31 January and 8 February 1944, our assault force thus reduced and occupied another perimeter

defense point.
d.

The Invasion of Eniwetok.

The

ease with

which the Marshall Islands were overrun resulted in advancing the date for the invasion of Eniwetok by 3 months. The Attack Force Eeserve Group had not been required in the Marshalls, hence these troops, with available warships and a portion of the carrier strength, were detailed to capture
Eniwetok.

had been built up as a tremendous "Bogey" in the minds of the American military and public. It was assumed that it had become an impregnable citadel which was the key to Japanese empire defenses. But with the loss of the air war in the Solomons and New Guinea, highly experienced pilots wore few in number. Japanese carriers had returned to Japan for a new complement of personnel and were out of the battle for the time being. The Japanese had some 550 aircraft in the entire Centrol Pacific at this time, approximately 200 of which were fighters, and against this, our carrier task forces could put up 900. The exact aircraft disposition at Truk is unknown, but considering the number of other islands known to have air defenses, it is improbable that as much as half the enemy's air defense was concentrated at Truk.

Early in February 1944, a reconnaissance

repoi-ted a concentration of

flight

enemy naval

vessels

The Eniwetok

Atoll

is

roughly circular, with a

at Truk.

A fast task force, including carriers and

was dispatched
to engage this force.

circumference of about 70 miles, and included some 30 small islands. The three main islands are Engebi to the north, which contained the only air
strip,

battleships,

Upon

arrival in the waters near Truk, an air

and Parry and Eniwetok Islands to the south. Engebi Island, containing the best enemy defenses, received most of the preinvasion bombing and bombardment. The defenses and installations of all three islands were reduced to rubble

by the time of invasion.

Enemy

opposition

consisted

of

shore-based
inflicted

coastal defense

and antiaircraft
;

which

no casualties on our forces one enemy submarine located ^but no submarine attack; two enemy aircraft located but no attack.

sweep showed that the enemy fleet had fled, leaving only a small naval force, some commercial vesIn fighter-to-fighter sels, and Truk's air defenses. engagements, our carrier aircraft claimed 123 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air and 82 on the ground, for the loss of three Amei"ican aircraft to fighters, 13 to antiaircraft, and 8 operational causes. The score of 123 enemy to 3 United States aircraft losses in the air engagements is a fair measure of the relative quality of the Truk air defenses and the degree to which the Japanese Naval Air Forces had deteriorated.
Carrier torpedo planes and dive bombers attacked and crippled or sunk the Japanese ships remaining at Truk, but the major elements of the

Eniwetok Atoll had been captured against small enemy resistance. The naval and air preparation at Eniwetok represented nearly one ton of projectiles for each Jap defender on the islands. This preinvasion preparation so
19 February 1944,

By

badly decimated Japanese defenses that our assault casualties were relatively light.
e.

Japanese Fleet had made good their escape. While a strong force of heavy surface warships accompanied our assault force, they remained throughout the air strikes at a conservative distance from the objective and did not participate in the attack.

Operations in the Caroline Islands.

Concur-

rent with the operations in the Gilbert

shalls, neutralization raids in

and Marforce were carried

out by Seventh AF and carrier units against the Caroline Islands. These operations ostensibly
served as flank support to both the Central Pacific

On 25 February 1944, the Seventh AF, operating from Kwajalein, began attacking Truk, principally by night, their Liberators being unescorted.
These attacks continued until the fall of the year. Formation daylight attacks by the Thirteenth AF, operating from Los Negros in the Admiralties
29

and

Southwest

Pacific

thrusts

insuring

that


and Bougainville, also unescorted, began in March and continued until June. On 30 April-1 May 1944, carriers again attacked Truk, bombing and
strafing airfields.
7.

Aleutian Area.

phase of operations there was no change in the ground situation in the Aleutian area.
this

During

The Destruction of Ponape. Ponape is only 362 miles from Eniwetok and 576 miles from Kwajalein. It was considered to constitute a
(2)

The Eleventh

AF

continued operations against

Kurile Island targets as indicated in Phase II.

8.

potential threat to the operations at Eniwetok,

Results of the Action of Phase

a.

III.

being the most important enemy base of the scores of islands in the Carolines group with the exceptions of Truk and Palau. It possessed a harbor,

The

defeat of the Japanese

Army Air

Force,

principally by Fifth

AF operations in the Wewak-

Hollandia area, was the most significant achieve-

a seaplane base, and a sizeable town of densely concentrated buildings extending half

an

airfield,

tains.

a mile back from the waterfront into the mounThe waterfront itself was approximately half a mile in length and was covered with ware-

houses and shops. Between 15-26 February 1944, the Seventh AF attacked Ponape in four heavy raids and the installations and village at Ponape were wiped out. These were the only attacks on Ponape except for an occasional bomb from a long-range reconnais-

ment of this phase. From this point forward, action by air and surface forces on the axis of the Southwest Pacific advance would be an exploitation of the air victory. Large numbers of Japanese Army Air Force aircraft would be encountered in
succeeding operations
pilots

was gone

and they could

Burma open
for

but

the quality of their

offer little effec-

tive opposition.

Similarly in

The gateway to Japan was open. Burma, defeat of the Japanese Army
and the Japanese
tlae

Air Force

in that area

inability

sance plane.
(3) Attacks at VlitKi^ Woleai, Palau, and Tap. Palau, the most important enemy base in the Carolines with the single exception of Truk, was at-

to reinforce laid

air-supplied

land campaigns to follow.

b.

The northeastern

coast of

New Guinea was

Wewak,
Aitape,

occupied to and including Saidor,

tacked on 30 March 1944 by a United States task

force which
Fleet.

and HoUandia.

had hoped to engage the Japanese The Japanese had fled, however, leaving
In 2 days of attack

only cargo ships in the harbor.

shipping.

at Palau, carrier aircraft sank virtually all of the

When

the task force retired

from the

This operation extended the range of land-based airpower to the Halmaheras and Celebes, thus widening the area of air interdiction of Japanese shipping and permitting concentration of sustained land-based airpower on
objective areas in preparation for the next step

ruins of Palau, they paused briefly to launch several attacks at Ulithi, Woleai,

and Yap. Ulithi was

forward.
c.

undefended, although

it is

one of the great natural

The occupation

of Western

New

Britain, the

harbors of the Pacific. Woleai and Yap offered only minimum defenses. Our carrier force claimed 111 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air and 40

Admiralties, and Green and

Emirau Islands

per-

mitted land-based airpower to operate from these points and com]3lete the isolation of Rabaul. With
the establishment of an air blockade of Rabaul and

on the ground for a loss of 3 aircraft to enemy fighters and 20 to enemy antiaircraft fire in the attacks on Palau, Yap, and Woleai. The entire Caroline group of islands thus fell without invasion solely to land- and carrier-based air penetration and domination. They could be bypassed or occupied as our forces desired but occupation was not necessar}' as they no longer offered a threat The conto our security or future operations. sistently ineffective Japanese air defenses encountered in the Carolines, the Gilberts, and the Marshalls was the direct result of the air war which had been fought and won in the New Guinea-Bismark-Solomons area.

other bypassed areas of less importance, their oc-

cupation was considered superfluous and was not

attempted.
d.

The Gilbert and Marshall Islands and Eni-

wetok were occupied by Pacific Ocean Area Forces in an exploitation of the Phase II air victory over the Japanese Naval Air Force.
Islands, from Palau to Ponape, by carrier- and land-based air atwere neutralized tack and thereafter could offer no serious threat t:) either the Southwest Pacific or the Central Pacific
e.

The Caroline

thrusts.

30

9.

Significance of the Action of Phase

a.

III.

the standpoint of military concept, the most significant event of this phase was a dawning recognition amono; military leaders that rodnction

From

bert and Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands operations even though they still possessed for-

and occupation of everj' enemy bastion was not necessary in the Air Age. This was a major evolutionary step in military concept. Kecognition of

may be found in Southwest Pacific Area plans which outlined the scope of operations for Phase III. This plan indicated that the objective of operations westward from the Finschafen area would be to advance the land-based bomber line rapidly westward along the land mass of New Guinea to the Philippine Islands by successive octhis principle

midable naval surface force strength. Having air domination, both in quality and numbers, our naval surface units moved freely on the series of Pacific atolls under carrier air protection though properly and wisely avoiding the remaining Japanese Army Air Force threat from the land mass of New Guinea until it had been reduced to impotency by the sustained action of land based

aircraft
d. Airpoioer Continued to Dominate Ground Warfare. The Japanese were defeated in the Arakan and Imphal thrusts in Burma because they failed to achieve air domination. Our own forces successfully made numerous landings in the Pacific after adequate air preparation and supported by

cupation of minimum bases required. Additional evidence of this evolution may be found in the Bismarcks, Carolines, and Gilbert and Marshall Island areas. Original plans had called for the occupation of Rabaul. With the demonstrated capability of airpower to maintain interdiction and domination over areas within range, plans for the occupation of Rabaul were abandoned. The same was true of many bypassed
islands in the Solomons, Carolines, the Gilberts and Marshalls, and bypassed enemy pockets in New

effective
e.

airpower in the objective area.

and Surface Forces hy Air Transport Continued to Grow. Wingate's

Logistical Support of Air

long range penetration behind Japanese lines in Burma was entirely dependent upon an air line of

Even though surface occupation was not consummated, airpower working in depth, in the third dimension provided the same security and domination which physical occupation would have
Guinea.

established.

If this concept had been further developed to its logical and ultimate conclusion, based on the dem-

Air supply came to the rescue of the beImphal and in the Arakan. New Guinea operations remained heavily dependent on the Air LOG and the constantly growing war effort in China was supplied entirely by air from India. f Japanese shipping and port facilities at Burma terminals, off the South China Coast, in the Yangtze River and Formosa Straits, in the Celebes, Halmaheras, and Rabaul terminal area came under
supply.
sieged forces at
.

onstrated capability of airpower, the invasion of Japan proper prior to her surrender might never

constantly increasing land based air attack. Army Air Force targets were, in large measure, coastwise

have been planned, b. Airpoioer Continued to Dominate Its Own Element. The Air-versus-Air Phase of the war in the New Guinea area was completed and the door was opened for exploitation of the air victory over the Japanese Army Air Force.

or river supply vessels whose loss immediately the garrison for which intended. affected Thousands of small ships under 500 tons were destroyed in maintaining air interdiction of the

c.

fare.

Airpoicer Confitiued to Dominate Naval WarHaving lost their carrier air components,

the Japanese

Navy was powerless to

resist the Gil-

waterways leading to the various garrisons. At the same time, our submarine forces were plying the Japanese sea lines of communication, beyond the range of our land-based airpower, and were making gigantic inroads into the shipping capabilities of the Japanese empire.

31

SECTION VI

PHASE IV, APRIL 1944-APRIL 1945 EXPLOITATION OF THE DEFEAT OF JAPANESE AIRPOWER
1.

General.

For the sake of background information

tial to

essen-

Force, by

The Phase II defeat of the Japanese Naval Air November 1943, paved the way for the

the later evaluation, action will again be

MarPhase III. Likewise, the Phase III defeat of the Japanese Army Air Force paved
exploitation operations in the Gilbert and
shall Islands of

considered in each operation area, beginning with China.

2.

China.

the

way

for a similar exploitation in the balance

Air operations in China throughout the entire

of the Pacific.

By

the end of Phase III, April

war were unique

living

in that here a small air force,

and campaigns of World War II in the Pacific had been fought. Since air domination was recognized as essential
1944, the decisive air battles
to all surface operations,
it

follows that these deci-

and fighting entirely on air supply from over the Himalayan "Hump," was compelled to fight both an enemy air force and an enemy ground army and largely without friendly ground force

campaigns were the decisive campaigns of the war. From this point forward our land, sea, and air forces were at liberty to exploit the air victory. We could adhere to the orthodox and accepted surface invasion pattern, or we could point our strategy toward a three dimensional domination which would obviate the necessity for
sive air

support.

The

status

of

training,

equipment,
offer

organization, and morale of the Chinese armies

was such

that, in general, they could

no

resistance to the Japanese

ground army.

Like-

wise, the matter of language, the loose Chinese

a surface assault of the home islands. Our military strategy adhered basically to the orthodox

organization, the spotty nature of troop deployment, and the status of training, precluded close air support of Chinese ground operations except
in a

few isolated

cases late in the war.

Chi-

Japan was increased rapidly but invasion of Japan was still considered necessary. Air power was an ancillary
concept.
air effort against

The

nese armies normally withdrew well in advance of Japanese surface thrusts

fight another

preferring to live to
to the in

day and trusting

the
invadei's

mass of

force to be utilized in obtaining staging areas for

China
custom.

to

absorb

traditional

marshalling the final invasion forces and to be

up the enemy for the final surface assault. However, the requirements for implementing both an air strategy and a surface strategy were met. The requirements for implementing an air strategy were met with the occupation of the Marianas and Iwo Jima from which what were visualized as softening up operations
utilized in softening

Testimony taken from Japanese commanders in North China after VJ-Day attributed at least
75 percent of the total resistance they encountered
to the Fourteenth

AF

alone.

The

nucleus of the

developed into conclusive operations. Therefore, the action of Phase IV of this report is a composite series of events, part of which represent an exploitation based on surface concepts of warfare and part of which i-epresent an exploitation based on

an over-all appreciation of the weapons available.

32

capabilities of the

Fourteenth AF started operating in 1942 with logistical support adequate to the needs of onetenth of one American inf anti-y division in combat. By April 1944 the tonnage of supplies going to the 14th AF M'ould have supported one-half of 1 infantry division, and by April of 1945 1% divisions. With these meager resources, the Fourteenth AF faced an enemy numerically superior in the air and possessing one and one-half million ground troops disposed around a 2,000-mile

front.

Although

this

meager force was

sufficient

success,

although excessively costly to the enemy

to so impair the logistical support of the Japanese

in forces committed.

The

ground forces that they failed to take Kumming and Chunking it was insufficient to expell or destroy the entire Japanese military effort in China. It was also insufficient to prevent surface movement of Japanese forces, largely bj' night, in their campaigns to reduce the eastern and central American air bases and to close the old railroad corridor from Xorthern China to French Indo-

resources opposing this thrust

limited American air made the enemy pay

heavily for his advances, but was not in sufficient

force to prevent the occupation

most of the moveBy

ment being confined

the middle of

to the hours of darkness.

May

1944 this corridor was in

Japanese hands. In the

latter part of

May, the enemy attack on

the southern segment of the railway corridor was

China.

launched, south of the

Hankow-Changsha

area,

In April 1944 Japanese forces started a series of campaigns designed to eliminate American air
operations from central and eastern China bases

Although the Japanese schedule for the operation was delayed 2 months by the air resistance, the less than one divisional
logistical effort available to the

toward

Hengyang.

and

at the

same time

to

occupy the old railway

Fourteenth

AF in

corridor between the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers

and between Hankow, Canton, and French IndoCliina. These campaigns were started for the following reasons
a. Japan feared an American landing on the East China coast and believed that air support for this landing would come from the central and eastern China bases. Capturing these bases would eliminate this threat and would at the same time allow Japanese forces to concentrate on the East China coast, fi-ee of our China based air attack, as desired to meet the invasion forces.

was insufficient to stop the 600,000 Japanese troops committed to the campaign. One after the other our central bases fell and the corridor between Hankow and Canton was occupied by the Japanese by December 1944. During this drive. Fourteenth AF fighters and medium bombers inflicted such punishment on Japanese lines of communication, troops, and installations that the movement lagged 2 months behind schedule and eventually winter weather, for which the Japanese were unprepared, coupled with
this operation

b.

The

central

and eastern American bases in

the never ending air attacks, caused the failure of the extension of the drive toward Kunming and

China were a thorn in the side of all Japanese China, in the South China Sea, Formosa Straits, and in the Gulf of Tonkin. From these forward bases, enemy air installations, coastwise and river shipping, and Japanese lines of communication to her troop dispositions were constantly harassed. The most effective of these American bases were located in the old railway corridor between Hankow and Canton.
efforts in

Chungking.

Air operations against Japanese forces did not

cease with the loss of the Eastern China bases.
lines of

Constant pressure was maintained on the enemy's communications, supply dumps, and air and military installations. These operations effectively prevented the enemy from consolidating his position and exploiting his gains and eventually forced him to withdraw back to the Canton

Completing the inland line of communication between industrial North China and French IndoChina had long been a part of the Japanese strac.

and Hankow

areas.

The significance of this campaign is not that airpower, unaided by competent ground troops, was incapable of stopping the advance of Japanese
Forces, but, rather, that insufficient military force

tegic plan.

The

serious

enemy

losses of coastwise

shipping during 1943 reemphasized the need for an inland line of commimications.

Having knocked out the eastern and central bases Japan planned to drive overland to Kunming, the air supply terminal for China, and
d.

Chimgking, the seat of the National Government, and to thereby knock China entirely out of the war.

was available. No ground forces commander would normally attempt to stop a force of 600,000 well armed and trained troops when his own logistical support was adequate for only one division. Yet, this operation has been misinterpreted and
generalized to sustain the faulty conclusion that

The Japanese campaign

to close the northern

airpower, shorn of ground support,

is

incapable of

segment of the old railroad corridor, between the Yellow and Yangtze Eivers, achieved a temporary

coping with surface forces.

Contravention of this
is

viewpoint does not mean that there

no rule for
33


ground forces
in

any future foreseeable

conflict.

With

the occupation of the Philippine Islands,

Certainly, a force of well trained ground troops in

China capable of exploiting the advantage which our general air domination over the battle area gave us would have assisted materially in arresting the Japanese advance. In this connection, air forces and surface forces should not be placed on a competitive or comparative status. Each has specific capabilities, limitations, and functions. The principle of economy of force, and a clear recognition of the capabilities and limitations of weapons, if applied with sound logic to each problem, will clearly indicate the employment of each
type of force.
Aerial mining from China bases by the Fourteenth

in the latter part of 1944, Japanese shipping in

the South China Sea and Formosa Straits could be brought under land based air attack from the
Pacific side at a lower logistical cost than

from

the China side.

Hence, in the latter part of 1944, the bulk of Fourteenth AF strategic effort was reoriented toward North China against the railroad system. This railroad system was an integral part of the over-all Japanese economic organization for war as it permitted exploitation of industrial North China and provided direct support by transporting coal, iron, and food for shipment to the home islands.

Between January and

May

1945, the Fourteenth

AF

and

XX

Bomber Command was

ac-

AF

threw the bulk of

its logistical

support into

celerated during this period and produced excellent results at relatively low logistical cost. Harbor areas mined and periodically closed to Japanese shipping included Haiphong, Canton, Hongkong, and Shanghai. An intensive mining of the Yangtze River also paid high dividends. This operation seriously affected the entire Japanese war economy by shutting off the transport of one of Japan's main sources of iron ore.

operations against bridges, locomotives, and shops of the North China railways and so disrupted the

system

That the Japanese exploitation of indusNorth China came virtually to a stop. That a planned Japanese campaign to take Kumning and Chungking was abandoned partially due to inability of the lines of communitrial

American
established

cations to provide logistic support for the

air superiority over the

Japanese Air

operation.

Force in China, from Shanghai to Haiphong, was

January 1945. It is significant to observe that China was the last of the original operational areas to be brought under our air domination. Air superiority had been secured over our own local base areas in China early in Phase II, but the logistical support was not available to run the long range, sustained, offensive
by
1

operations against Japanese air installations in suflScient strength to crush the enemy Air Force
quickly and permanently.

Hence the
out affair
trition

air

war

in

Japanese forces suffering gradual

AF

China was a long, drawn

at-

by Fourteenth

operations and being

unable to provide replacements of adequate quality,

due to the more pressing demands of the Pacific Area. By 1 January 1945 this gradual attrition and withdrawal of some units to other more critical areas had so reduced the effectiveness of Japan's China based airpower that enemy air raids on our own forward installations ceased entirely and our own attacks, on even the most vital enemy installations in the China area, were only sporadically and weakly intercepted.
34

Concurrently with the attacks on the North China railways, the French Indochina rail system, north from Vinh to the China border, was attacked in strength and rendered largely unserviceable. These operations isolated the Japanese Forces in French Indo-China from those in China. Thus, the Japanese inland line of communications from industrial North China, through Central China, to French Indo-China was broken in two places north of the Yellow River and south from Hanoi making large-scale troop movements or reinforcement impossible and multiplying the Japanese logistical difficulties in supporting their extended garrisons. Later, during Phase V, these logistical difficulties and the constant harrassing by air caused the Japanese to retreat from east Central China and give back to our forces the eastern bases that the enemy had so dearly bought the previous year.

3.

India-Burma.

Between April and October

1944,

American,

Chinese, and British positions in the Myitkyina,

Imphal, and Arakan areas were strengthened,

and preparations were completed for the rcconquest of Burma. In August, the town of Myitkj'ina, adjacent to the airport, was finally reduced by dive bombing and was occupied. In June, the

4.

Southwest
a.

Pacific.

Advance

to

Morotai.

Rapid surface ad-

Imphal garrison living and fighting on air supply was relieved and the Japanese were expelled from tenaciously held positions on the perimeter of the Imphal Plains. Simultaneously, forces in the Arakan secured their lines and prepared for amphibious operations down the Arakan coast. Meanwhile, Tenth AF and Royal Air Force heavy and medium bombers and fighters ranged over Burma and Siam as far south as Bangkok, attacking air and militarj' installations, jjorts and lines of conununication. By 15 October 1944, when the offensive surface campaigns in the Arakan, Imphal, and Myitkyina areas w^ere resumed with vigor, the enemy was isolated, devoid of air support, and tactically immobilized. Between October 1944 and March 1945 the air victory in Burma was rapidly exploited in an air supplied and air supported surface campaign over some of the most difficult terrain in the world. Air operations of the previous phases had destroyed the Japanese air capability and had isolated the enemy ground forces from supply and reinforcement. The enemy was buried in the jungle short on medical supplies, food, and ammunition, devoid of air support, and even denied air reconnaissance intelligence. Three Allied armies converged on the relatively helpless enemy and easih^ crushed his defeases though he fought

vances in the Southwest Pacific Area now became possible because air domination had been won. Following the air-ground-amphibious pattern dis-

cussed in

more

detail earlier, the

Southwest Pacific

Forces, including the Fifth

AF, advanced from

Hollandia to Morotai in the Halmaheras by 15 September 1944. In this operation Biak, the Gelvink Bay area, and Noemfoor successively were neutralized and occupied. From Morotai, the range of land-based aircraft could now be extended to Mindanao and Borneo, and the waterways of the Netherlands East Indies, from Borneo to New Guinea, came under the surveillance of land-based
aircraft.

Thirteenth AF units participated in these operaBiak and Noemfoor in strength before the invasion of May and July of 1944, and in flank attacks against Truk, Woleai, Palau, and Ceram. On 15 June 1944, the Thirteenth AF was transferred from the South Pacific Forces to the
tions, attacking

Far Eastern Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, and westward movement of its units from the Solomons and Admiralties to New Guinea was commenced.
Leyte Oj)eration and Second Battle of the Original plans of the Southwest Pacific Force for occupation of the Philippine Islands provided for an intermediate landing at Sarangani Bay (15 November 1944), a diversionary operation in Misamis Occidental (7 December) and the assault of Leyte on 20 December 1944. The Island of Yap was also to be occupied by Pacific Ocean Area Forces on 5 October. This plan would have provided the intermediate air bases from which Leyte and the Visayan area could have been brought under sustained land-based air attack and would have permitted covering the Leyte Beach operations with land-based airpower. Even this proposed disposition of air bases was not entirely satisfactory to the Commanding General, Allied Air Forces, Soutliwest Pacific Area, who, before the occupation of Morotai, pointed out that the distances between Sansapor, Morotai, Sarangani, and Leyte were too great for effective air support from one to the others. It was recognized that these bases were not mutually supporting, that the enemy might select any one for attack without being interfered with from adjacent bases. It was fully understood by Southwest Pacific Area
b.

Philippine Sea.

with suicidal determination. By April 1945 the enemy was evacuating Rangoon as our forces approached its gates.
Aerial mining of Southeast Asia ports had been
started by

AAF and RAF units in February

in

1943.

program against Japanese held ports supplying Burma was intensified. India based B-29s also participated in this
1944, this

Commencing

March

program.
sealed

These operations, coupled with those

off

against shipping on the Pacific side, eti'ectively

Burma

from

logistic

support by deep sea

vessels.

Also, during Phase IV, the Air Transport

Com-

mand

continued to build up the air deliveries across the Himalayan "Hump" to China, deliver.ing 46,545 tons

during the month of March 1945, and 44,254 tons during the month of April 1945.

35

Forces that the Japanese distribution of separated bases had exhibited this same weakness to our
advantage.

the Visayan area, exclusive of Leyte and Samar, as soon as heavy bombers could be established at
ISIorotai;

However, between 9-14 September, carrier aircraft of Task Force 38 attacked shipping, airdromes, and land targets in the Davao, Visayan, and Zamboanga areas and met such little opposition that the Third Fleet Commander recommended elimination of the Yap, Sarangani, and Misamis operations and a direct attack on Leyte. It was generally recognized that an additional risk would be entailed in depending on carrier air cover for the Leyte landing due to the transitory and uncertain nature of such support in the face of

extending neutralization attacks to inSamar upon departure of escort carriers; providing air cover for convoys within range of land-based aircraft.
clude Leyte and

The Thirteenth (Supporting Air Force) was assigned the missions of neutralizing enemy air forces on the east coast of Borneo and supporting the operations of the Assault Air Force as requested.

AF

However, the additional risk was considered acceptable, because the remaining Japanese Air Forces definitely had been reduced to a low level of efficiency and because it could not be predicted that they would discard orthodox tactics and adojjt suicide or kamikaze tactics. Nevertheless, at this stage of the war, the time was past in which it was necessary to accept great risks and it remains problematical that the acceptance of the additional risk was justifiable. Based on the information (relative to the inadequacy of Japanese air and naval defenses) contained in the message from the Third Fleet Commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 15 September
sustained air attack.
1944, authorized the

Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area (Seventh Fleet), was assigned responsibility for providing air cover for the convoys and direct air support of the landing operations until relieved by land-based aviation. The Commander, Seventh

was also designated as the coordinating agency for requesting carrier strikes from the Third Fleet for operations in the objective area.
Fleet,

The Third Fleet (Task Force 30) was to neuenemy air forces on Okinawa, Formosa, and Northern Luzon from 10 to 13 October to attack enemy air forces in the Luzon-Bicol area on 16 and 17 October to neutralize enemy air forces
tralize
; ;

in the

Visayan area on 18 and 19 October; to support the landing operations in coordination with Seventh Fleet.

Pacific

west Pacific Area, Ocean Area, to proceed against Leyte on 20 October. On the same date the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, that the Leyte assault would be moved up to 20 October, accepting the additional risk in order to accelerate the tempo of our operations.

Commander in Chief, Southand the Commander in Chief,

The Seventh was assigned the task of operating in the Bicol area (Southern Luzon) as directed by the Commander, Third Fleet.

AF

The Fourteenth AF and Bomber Command were to support the Leyte operation by attacks against Formosa and China Coast air installations.

XX

On
the

29 September a conference was held between Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southwest

Pacific Area, Allied

cific

cific

Naval Forces Southwest PaArea (Seventh Fleet), and Third Fleet, PaOcean Area. This conference was for the purfor the Leyte operation.

Operation instructions for the assault on Leyte GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, summarized the missions agreed upon for the Third Fleet and assigned missions to the Seventh Fleet. In general, the Third Fleet was responsible for containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet; for air attacks against shipping and enemy airpower in the Formosa, Luzon, Visayan, and Mindanao
issued by

pose of assignment of tasks for neutralization of

enemy airpower

The con-

ference agreed as follows

The Fifth (Assault Air Force) was assigned the responsibility for destroying hostile air forces in the Celebes Sea Area; protecting the western
flank of the operation

AF

areas from A 9 to A +30; for destruction of ground defenses and installations in the objective area from A 2 until escort carriers of the Seventh Fleet assumed the mission of direct support; and for providing direct support of the landing and

subsequent operations as required.

attacking enemy air forces in the Mindanao area south of 845' from 10 Octo;

ber on

extending neutralization strikes to include

In general, the Seventh Fleet was assigned the missions of transporting and establishing the landing forces ashore providing the air protection
;

^k


for convoys and for direct support of landing

operations in coordination with Third Fleet and

lund-based xVllied Air Forces; denying Japanese

iXao Strait

Commander, Third Fleet that the enemy might reorganize his forces and throw all available air and naval power against the Third Fleet.
notified

reinforcement of the Leyte area ; clearing the Suriof hostile shipping and mines provid;

The Commander, Third Fleet, then immediately the Commander in Chief, Southwest

ing submarine offensive recomiaissance along probable routes of

Pacific Area, that, except for operations being con-

enemy naval

forces and waterborne

reinforcements.

The Seventh Fleet was part of the Allied Naval Forces of Southwest Pacific Area and was in the direct command chain. However, the mission of the Third Fleet was based on concurrence of the commanders concerned, since our division of authority in the Pacific required cooperation rather than command in operations involving
major components of

ducted on 15 October, A 5, no fast carrier force would be available to support the Leyte landing. This notice of intent to withdraw came 5 days before the scheduled landing. This meant that the neutralization strikes in the Visayan area, agreed upon for Task Force 38 for 18 and 19 October,

would not be run. It also indicated that Task Force 38 would not be available for the initial
critical stages of the landing.

SWPA and POA forces.

The

The Seventh Fleet Commander immediately

requested additional reconnaissance of the San

became apparent when the Third Fleet Operations Order was issued. This order indicated that the Commander, Third Fleet, considered the destruction of the Japanese Fleet as his primary objective. This difference of concept between the Commander, Third Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area whether the success of the Leyte landing was primary or the destruction of the Japanese Fleet was primary subsequently greatly endangered the Leyte landing operations, and ironically, gave the Seventh, rather than the Third Fleet, the major naval surface engagement of the war.
results of these conditions again

Bernardino and Surigao Straits, which mission was assigned to and performed by Fifth AF units from the distant Halmaheras and New Guinea
Bases.

On

17 October, a landing was

made on Dinagat

Island, at the south end of Leyte Gulf, in order

On 10 October, A 10, strikes were conducted by Task Force 38 against shipping, airdromes, and land targets in the Kyukyus area. This inaugurated Third Fleet participation in the planned assault on Leyte. On
the

approaches to the Gulf. On the same day the Fifth AF and the Thirteenth AF were advised that the Third Fleet had withdrawn from the operation and that Far East Air Forces must support the landings as a first priority mission. The Fifth AF was assigned the mission of neutralizing Visayan airdromes by long range attacks and the Thirteenth AF was directed to expedite staging of bombers through Morotai.
to secui'e
airfields

Between 17-19 October, Task Force 38 attacked and shipping in Luzon though it did

Convoy left Admiralty Islands and New Guinea bound for

11 October, the Seventh Fleet

not

launch

the

neutralization

attacks

in

the

Leyte with the invasion forces.

Between

11-16

October,

Task Group

77.4,

Seventh Fleet, with escort aircraft carriers covered the Seventh Fleet and Amphibious Forces en route from Manus and HoUandia toward Leyte. At the same time. Task Force 38, with four carrier groups, attacked airfields, shipping, and industrial targets on Formosa, Northern Luzon, and Nansie
Shoto.

Visayan areas as originally planned. A large percentage of the effort of Task Force 38 was being devoted to search for the Japanese Fleet, and to maintaining combat readiness for the expected engagement.

On 18-19 October, Task Force 77, Seventh Fleet,

covered the convoy and in addition attacked airto northern

dromes and small shipping from southern Luzon Mindanao, including installations on

Commander of the Third Fleet warned the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, that
14 October the

On

Leyte Island.

On

20 October, A-day, the landing on Leyte was

enemy naval vessels were assembling at Singapore and off the northern coast of Borneo. On the same day the Commander in Chief, Pacific, warned

accomplished under air cover of Task Force 77. From 20-22 October, the Third Fleet, standing

by east of Luzon, launched air attacks against airdromes and shipping from Luzon to northern
37

Mindanao, and provided a limited amount of support to the ground operations on Leyte.

air

The Japanese

forces were organized as follows

off

Southern Attack Force, which formed

The uncertainty of the operation is apparent Even though the Third Fleet had given here. notice that it would not be available, the Japanese Fleet had not yet appeared and, consequently,
limited assistance

the coast of Borneo and approached Leyte by way of the Sulu Sea, Mindanao Sea, and Surigao
Straits.

This force was composed of 2 battle-

ships, 2

heavy

cruisers, 2 light cruisers,

and 10

was being given the landing

destroyers.

operations by Task Force 38.

(Task Japanese Fleet, one gi'oup refueled, and two groups headed for Ulithi. One of these groups (Task Group 38.4) reversed course during the day and returned to the Philip-

On 23 October one group of Task Force 38

38.3) searched for the

Group

A Central Attack Force, which came from the Singapore area through the Sibuyan Sea and San Bernardino Straits and approached Leyte from the north, off Samar. This force was composed of 4 battleships, 7 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser,
and 11 destroyers. A Northern Attack Force, which came south from the Empire to a position off Luzon. This force was composed of 1 aircraft carrier, 3 small
aircraft
carriei-s,

pines.

Seventh Fleet aircraft continued to sup-

port operations at the Leyte beaches.

24 October the Japanese Fleet was committed to action against the Philippine Invasion

On

converted battleships with

cruiser, 4 light cruisers,

Forces.

The Japanese

Fleet was in desperate

flight decks, 1

heavy

and
a

plight, due to previous reverses,

and was dispersed

islands areas.

10 destroyers.
after the

Interrogation of Japanese

officials

in the Borneo, Singapore, and

home

war

established the fact that this

was

From this unsound

due to the urgency of the situation, the enemy fleet was committed piecemeal in three salients toward the
tactical disposition,

decoy force, intended to pull our heavy screening forces away from the Leyte area. Aircraft of the

enemy

Pliilippines, inviting destruction in detail.

Two

an inland passage waters, depending on land-based through restricted aircraft of the debilitated Japanese Air Forces for air support which could not be provided by
of these salients

had

to accept

were to shuttle to the Philippines, was such that the pilots could not land back on the carriers. The Japanese Southern and Central Forces had suicide orders. Had the Japanese admiral comcarriers
as their status of training

reasons of poor communications, inadequate logistics, lack of planning, and low operational effi-

manding the Central Fleet followed these orders, as the battle developed, his force had the capability to seriously disrupt our landing operations and to inflict heavy damage on our assault forces on the
beach and standing
off the

These two forces were committed by the Japanese High Naval Command with full knowledge of the suicidal nature of the operation, but
ciency.
it

beach.

was

also recognized that

no further war mission

for the Japanese Fleet remained if the Allied

Leyte invasion were successful. These two forces "were compelled to traverse restricted waters due
to the air blockade of the Celebes Sea,
critical

and the

time element involved which precluded

their journey

around the Philippines, through the South China Sea, for an approach from the north. The third force was in position to approach through open waters from the Empire and was
intended to act as a decoy to our screening forces

on the desperate gamble that one of the three salients would be able to j)enetrate to the Leyte beachhead before meeting destruction, and seriously disrupt our invasion attempt.
ate

During the day of 24 October 1944, aircraft of Task Force 77 and Task Group 38.4 attacked the Japanese Southern Force and the major Seventh Fleet surface units were moved to Surigao Straits to intercept the enemy in the narrow waters. The balance of Task Force 38 meanwhile located and attacked by air the Central Japanese Force in the Sibuyan Sea. This Central Force was apparently In heading for the San Bernardino Straits. October, Task Group 38.4 the afternoon of 24 headed north to join the balance of Task Force 38, and Task Force 38 located the approaching Japanese Northern Force which was reported to contain some carriers. The Commander of the Third Fleet then recovered his aircraft, which had been attacking the Central Force, and headed north
to attempt to engage the Northern Japanese Force. The entire Task Force 30, the major component of which was in the afternoon of 24 October

This desper-

gamble almost succeeded.

38


Task Force
38.

was pulled out of the

area, includ-

ing the heavy surface units, leaving the San Bernardino Straits unguarded. The message of the Commander, Third Fleet, to the Commander, Seventh Fleet, made no mention of withdrawing the heavy capital ships and leaving San Bernardino Straits unguarded. The Seventh Fleet Commander immediately messaged hack an inquiry on this point but established ineffective precautions in the form of reconnaissance and guard. He received the answer from the Commander, Third Fleet after he was under fire the next day.

ployed for the Surigao action, were low on ammunition and fuel after the battle of the previous night and were not in position to support the CVKs or the assault forces. Our escort carriers covering

Leyte were shielded only a light destroyer screen. Many aircraft were airborne in search of the retreating cripples of the enemy Southern Force and others were in the air participating in Leyte support operations. Coincident with these difficulties,

the

enemy stepped up the tempo

of his land-

based air attack

utilizing

suicide tactics.

The

Against the Japanese Northern Force, the Commander. Third Fleet, had at least 5 aircraft carriers, 6

destroyer screen and the escort carrier air components fought against what appeared to be hopeless

odds.

Soon out of torpedoes and bombs,

car-

small aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, 2

rier aircraft pilots

made dummy runs on

the Jap-

heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 41 destroyers, outnumbering the Japanese Forces in eveiy way by more than three to one. During the night of 24-25 October, the Japanese
Central Force,
its

an attempt to turn them. Also many missions were run without bombs or torpestrafing does. Unable to land on damaged escort carriers
anese
fleet in

battle strength oiJy slightly re-

scores of carrier-based fighters were compelled to land on the unfinished strip at Tacloban resulting

duced by the Third Fleet air attacks of the 24:th, reformed and undetected passed through the San Bernardino Straits and headed south, off Samar, for Leji;e Gulf. Meanwhile, Third Fleet Forces steamed northward to prepare for a dawn attack and possibly a battle line action with the Northern Forces. During the same night, the Seventh Fleet blocked and engaged the Japanese Southern Force in a night surface action as it emerged in single file through the mouth of Surigao

in the loss of

many

aircraft.

Two American
made

de-

stroyers

and

one destroyer escort

a suicide

torpedo run against the heavy units of the Japanese fleet and were immediately sunk. The battle was going well for the Japanese Forces when, at about 0924 in the morning either as a result of coward-

Straits, sinking or heavily

part of the enemy force.

damaging the greater Fleeing cripples were

sunk by land- and carrier-based aircraft and surface units during the next 2 days. The Third Fleet attack on the Japanese Northern Force began earlj^ on 25 October and went well. Air attacks were launched between 0840 and 1750, 25 October, sinking several ships and damaging practically the entire fleet. Surface units closed on and sank one crippled small aircraft carrier and one crippled light cruiser or destroyer. In all, one

Japanese commander ordered a withdrawal. At that time his forces were at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Two of the escort carriers of the Northern Carrier Group had been sunk, the balance had been damaged, the destroyer screen had been sunk or driven off, and destruction apparently awaited our transports, crippled carriers, and beach forces. But for the poor decision of this Japanese admiral, his forces were capable of seriously disrupting our first invaice,

stupidity, or confusion

the

sion of the Philippines.

enemy
riers,

aircraft carrier, three small aircraft car-

one light cruiser, and one destroyer were definitely sunk and the balance of the fleet was

damaged. Meanwhile the Seventh Fleet was in difficulty. The enemy Central Force approached undetected
to within 17 miles of the northermnost carrier

After the Japanese Central Force turned back and was retreating north off the coast of Samar, elements of the Third Fleet, which had been sent back from the attack on the Northern Enemy Force and Task Group 38.1, returning from Ulithi, entered into the pursuit and assisted in the air attack on the retreating enemy. The Seventh Fleet had borne the brunt of the

enemy

assault.

On

the afternoon of 25 October

the Commander of Task Force 77 notified the Com-

mander

group, standing

Leyte beaches, and opened The heavy surface ships fire shortly after dawn. of the Seventh Fleet, all of which had been deoff the

Southwest Pacific Area, that his escort aircraft carriers had been seriously crippled by air and surface attack, that there had been no ficrhter cover for Leyte on that date, and in some
in Chief,

39


cases none for the escort aircraft carriers, and that the escort aircraft carriers' maximum effort had been expended in defending themselves. He fur-

ther stated that apparently a large

enemy

aircraft

had been flown

in

number of and that it was

Original

remaining air potential and failed to attack our only air base in sufficient strength to render it inoperable. By 3 November our force of landbased fighters dominated the air over the Leyte area and turned their attention to isolation of the
battlefield

of the utmost importance for land-based aircraft

to be flown

and the destruction of Japanese forces

In order
to expedite clearing the

into Leyte immediately.

in the local area.

plans had called for land-based aircraft to be operational and take over the defense of Leyte on 5 November. However, due to the inability of the Seventh and Third Fleets to break up the enemy air opposition which was taking heavy toll of our destroyers and escort carriers in suicide attacks Fifth AF P-38s were flown into the area on 27 October, just as soon as the Tacloban strip could take them. At 1600, 27 October, the Fifth

entire island, our forces

made

additional landings

on the west side of Leyte on the flank of the enemy Ormoc garrison. These operations were given air support by Fifth AF and the battle for Leyte was successfully completed on 26 December 1944.

In order to understand the decision of the Comto leave the northern approach to Leyte unguarded, it is necessary to appreciate five factors which bore heavily on the

mander of Task Force 30

assumed the responsibility for the air defense of Leyte and and for air support to the surface forces with a total of 33 P-38s. By 31 October all carriers of Task Force 38 had been

AF

decision
First. ^A battle line action had been desired during the first battle of the Philippine Sea while Task Force 58 (later designated Task Force 38) was guarding the Marianas landing against the Japanese Fleet. It will be recalled that the Fifth Fleet Commander had decided, on 18 June, against heading westward toward the enemy fleet during the night of 18-19 June because such action might lay the Saipan landing operations open

withdrawn toward Ulithi. The 33 P-38s had been built up to 66 and this force of land-based figliters, 6 days after arrival, had established

AAF

local air superiority.

The

loss of air superiority in the area prior

to the arrival of land-based fighters

was not

due to a rebirth of Japanese air power. Actually, of the thousands of enemy aircraft in
the Philippines at the time, only a small

num-

ber were operable.

Enemy

aircraft sorties in

the Leyte area averaged less than 100 per day during the critical period of the Leyte operation.

The enemy's adoption

tics increased

of suicide tacthe vulnerability of our car-

and to this was added the damage inby the Japanese surface fleet. The air power of the fleet, being dependent upon the floating airbase, found itself unable to reassert
riers
flicted

a sufficient degree of air domination.

Between 25 October and 12 December, the

enemy attempted
across the island
different convoys.

to land troops at

Ormoc Bay

from our beachhead in eleven Eight of the eleven convoys were decimated by land- and carrier-based air action. It was estimated that in the reinforcement attempts the enemy landed approximately 25,000 troops most of them before 1 November. Following the establishment of land-based airpower on Leyte, the next 6 days witnessed a battle

if portions of the enemy fleet outflanked Task Force 58 during the night. Actually, the enemy launched his carrier planes for a shuttle to the Marianas Islands the next morning and withdrew. Task Force 58 got close enough to launch one attack by carrier aircraft at the retreating enemy but could not effect a surface closure. On 24 October the Third Fleet Commander was faced with essentially the same problem. Task Force 30 could remain in position to guard the Leyte operation against both the Central and Northern Forceor it could close during the night to destroy what appeared to the Commander, Third Fleet, to be the most important Japanese Force the Northern Group. If the Third Fleet did not close on the Northern Force, the enemy again might launch his aircraft for shuttle to the

to attack

Philippine Islands while

still

outside range of

Third Fleet aircraft (which had to make a round trip) and again the northern component of the enemy fleet might escape.
Japanese Central Fleet had no experience up to this time when our naval forces and the Japanese naval forces had bruised each other with air blows, the unfortunate

Second

The
In

carriers.

all

for air superiority over the area. The enemy very foolishly piecemealed and frittered away his

40


fleet

whose carrier potential was depleted had withdrawn. In many instances both sides, having suffered damage to air strength, had withdrawn. It was not customary for a fleet devoid of air components to keep plowing ahead. Consequently, when, on 24 October, Third Fleet carrier pilots reported heavy damage on the Central Fleet in the Sibuyan Sea and the enemy Central Fleet was reported to have reversed course it was assumed that they had suffered crippling damage and lacking air groups that they would attempt to escape. Hence the enemy's intentions and not his capabilities were assessed. Actually, the enemy forces did a 300 turn, reformed, and in the darkness headed full speed for Leyte through the San Bernardino Straits. Third The Conmiander. Third Fleet probably regarded the Northern Japanese Force as more dangerous than the Central Fleet, because the Northern Attack Force contained the carriers. Hindsight sliows that this actually was not the case as the enemy carriers shot their air groups toward the Philippines with no intention of recovering them. The status of training of Japanese carrier pilots was such that, in general, they could take off but could not get safely back on the car(Result of the air war in the New Guineariers. Solomons area.) Fourth Time in the war was running short. If the surface battle line action, which had been de-

the Marianas assault,

tion under one

operation the forces were not so employed. For command structure placed

employed in the operacommander. In the Leyte operation, there was no over-all commander, short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in command of and responresponsibility for all forces
sible for all the forces essential to the success of

the operation.
direct

This faulty command structure, which excluded the Third Fleet from the chain of

command of the forces involved, may have contributed to the decision which was the exact opposite of the decision taken at the Marianas. The command structure compromised the principle
of objective, as the primary objective of Southwest Pacific Forces was the security of the Leyte beach-

head and the overriding objective of the Third Fleet was the destruction of the enemy fleet. With c. Balance of the Philippine Campaign.
the establishment of land-based aircraft in the

Leyte, 3

Philippines and attainment of air superiority over November 1944, the success of the Philippine

Campaign was

assured.

Systematic neutralization of air installations, Japanese reinforcement convoys, and prepared defenses by Fifth and Thirteenth AF and carrier air attacks over the Philippine Islands

from Luzon

to

Mindanao paved the way

for,

and

subsequently supported landings on Mindoro, 15 December, Lingayen, 9 January 1945, Corregidor

veloped as Navy doctrine prior to hostilities, was to be tested in war, it would have to be soon. In this connection, it may be noted that the original concept of battle line action visualized such action as essential to gain control of the seas. At the time of these operations, our forces already had control of the seas, in that, lacking the support of an effective land-based air force, and lacking effective carrier groups, the enemy's fleet was utterly incapable of successfully dealing with our The preponderant air and surface strength. enemy fleet had attempted to avoid an engagement in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines,

and Palawan in February, and Mindanao in March 1945. Following each series of landings the air
support operations constantly increased as the stubborn Japanese defenders were blasted out of their island fortifications with high
effort in close

explosives,

Napalm,

rockets,

and strafing

attacks.

The airborne assault on Corregidor again demonstrated the advantages of three dimensional warfortified,
it demonstrated that a heavily dug-in surface position could be neutralized by preinvasion air attack to the point that vertical envelopment could be accomplished with

fare.

Tactically,

relatively light casualties.

and Halmaheras, apparently fully aware of the probable suicidal nature of any engagement. This control had been established without the battle
line action ever

After refueling, rearming, and reorganizing, carrier task groups again came back into the area, striking Luzon in force on 14 December and

taking place.
itself

Fifth
in the

A similar situation had presented

Formosa, Okinawa, and the Indo-China coast early in Januaiy 1945.

Marianas operation. At the Marianas, however, the forces were properly employed to insure the security of the beacliliead, while in the Leyte

During

this period Thirteenth

AF

aircraft also

attacked Japanese naval units and shipping in the Brunei Bay area, blockaded the Sulu Sea, and

41


attacked Japanese
oil

resources

and

installations

at Balikpapan, Borneo.

D-day, destroyers continued harassing Saipan and Tinian.

fire

on

Only once during the Philippine Campaign invasion) was our position seriously jeopardized and this occured when carrier-based airpower in the face of strong enemy surface and air attack failed to maintain air superiority
(Leyte

over the area of our landing operations. The strategic mobility of the carriers, in this case, could not compensate for the disadvantages of vulnerability

On D-day, 15 June, the amphibious assault on Saipan was made by the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51) The assault was preceded and supported throughout the day by heavy air strikes and naval gun fire by Task Force 51. Initial landings met only light resistance. Twenty thousand assault troops were put ashore
.

the

first

day.

Enemy resistance stiffened after the

and

inability to maintain a relatively

high

operational rate in the face of determined opposi-

lery,

The decision which took the Third Fleet out tion. of the area at a critical time also materially contributed to the loss of air superiority in the area.
5.

had been secured artilmortar, and machine gun fire harassing the beach area, ships, and unloading operations aloriginal beach positions

though the

fire

was not of

sufficient intensity to

stop the assault.

On D-day Task
Central Pacific.
a.

Force 58 struck Iwo Jima and

General.

Following the pattern adopted in

Chichi Jima in fighter sweeps to neutralize air opposition or reinforcement from these bases. On

the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Pacific Ocean Area Forces occupied Saipan, Tinian, and Guam

between June and August 1944. From bases in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, the Seventh AF continued to supjDort these operations in neutralizing attacks against Truk, Ponape, Wake, and Nauru Islands. In the latter part of the period. Seventh AF units were moved to the Marianas and cooperated with Naval and Marine Forces in close support operations in the occupation of Tinian and Guam. From the Marianas the Seventh AF also initiated, during this period, neutralization strikes against the Bonin Islands and Iwo Jima. Following the seizure of the Mariana Islands, Pacific Ocean Area Forces occupied Ulithi Island and Palau Island in September 1944. A more
detailed account of these operations
is

D-fl Task Force 58 again sent fighter sweeps against Iwo Jima and immediately thereafter was ordered by the commander of the Fifth Fleet to return to a position westward of the Mariana Islands. The Japanese Fleet was reported as assembling in the Philippine Sea and Task Force 58 had been assigned the responsibility for preventing the enemy fleet's interference with the
occupation of Saipan.

Between 16 June and 21 June Task Force 58 maneuvered in the waters west of the Marianas and repulsed the Japanese Fleet again by air

action.

In anticipation of a battle-line surface action,

Task Force 58 had been reorganized to provide a separate strong surface battle-line group at the expense of the carrier components.
tleships

given below.

In order to save
carrier groups This force was

b. Marianas Operation. Pacific Ocean Area Forces occupied the Marianas between 15 June-10 August 1944 in the manner outlined below.

the time necessary to form the battle-line, the bat-

had been removed from the

arid placed in a separate force.

Carrier Task Force 58 made a long range fighter sweep of Guam, Eota, Tinian, Pagan,

On D 4,

placed toward the direction of the enemy from the

carrier groups at
tance.
It

maximum communications
this action

dis-

and Saipan Islands primarily aimed

destruction of the Japanese air defenses.

at

the

was realized that

would

re-

On D 2
and the

the carrier air strikes were continued

duce the antiaircraft protection of the carriers but it provided maximuin opportunity to engage
the

and destroyers of Task Force 58 bombarded the defenses and air installations of Saipan and Tinian. On D 1 air attacks were continued and air cover was maintained for mine sweeping and beach reconnaissance by underwater demolition teams. No mines or obstacles were encountered in the approaches to Saipan. During the night preceding
fast battleships

enemy surface

force with our

more powerful

battle line.

the decision of the Fifth Fleet

The surface battle might have taken place but for Commander not to
This decision not to head westward toward

seek a night surface engagement on the night of 18

June.
the

enemy fleet was influenced by the possibility (if Task Force 58 did head west) that the enemy fleet

42

iiiin:ht

outflank our forces in the darkness, and get between Saipau and our Task Force. The security

While the maneuvering for

ing place, on IG June,

this battle

was takin-

D + 1, the

invasion date for

of the
;

knding operations could not be jeopardized tlieref ore, the Fifth Fleet Commander made the decision to remain between tlie enemy fleet and the beachhead and not to seek the surface engagement until a carrier strike had been launched. This decision was made on IS June. On 19 June the air battle developed, as enemy aircraft, shuttling from the enemy fleet to the Marianas bases, assisted by additional enemy aircraft operating from the island bases, attacked our air and surface
In the course of this action the Japanese inflicted some damage on our fleet but lost approximately 350 of their attacking aircraft, mostly to
forces.

Guam, scheduled
definitely.

for 18 June,

was postponed

P-47's arrived at On 22 June, D4-7, Seventh Aslito Field, Saipan, and assumed responsibility (Combat Air Patrol). Thereafter for the

AF

CAP

and during the assault on

entli

Guam and

Tinian, Sev-

cooperated with naval air units in providing close air support to the ground forces.
figliters

AF

our carrier-based fighters. The same day the submarine Cavalla reported that she had hit a carrier of the Japanese Fleet with torpedoes. This constituted the only surface

Progress on Saipan was slow. Heavy fighting with many casualties on both sides resulted from numerous Japanese suicide attaclcs. Two Marine divisions and one Army division did the bulk of the surface fighting. By 25 June, the bulk of our troops had been landed and by 9 July 1944 all organized enemy resistance had been overcome.

combat action of the First

Guam and

During and following the reduction of Saipan, Tinian were softened up by air attacks

Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The following day, 20 June, Task Force 58 attempted to close with the enemy fleet which by tliis time having shot its carrier air component was retreating. However, the enforced delay had been

too great and closure could not be effected. It was therefore decided to make a maximum range
air strike at the

by both carrier-and-land based aircraft. Guam was assaulted on 21 July and fully occupied by 10 August. Tinian was assaulted on 24 July and was In both operfully occupied by 1 August 1944. ations, air and naval bombardment were coordinated to systematically reduce the enemy prepared
defenses
ations employed in the seizure of Saipan.

following the general pattern of operforces

enemy

fleet in

order to

damage

it

This was considered to be the it down. only chance of bringing the retreating enemy fleet

and slow

Major

employed

in the

Marianas opera-

tion were the Joint Expeditionary Force, the carrier force,

into decisive surface contact.

The

air strike

was

and elements of the defense forces and

air.

launched at 1624 in the afternoon, at maximum range, with knowledge that returning aircraft, whose crews had no night carrier training, would have to make night landings and that they would be very low on gasoline. A successful air strike on the Japanese Fleet was made at 1845 but a high percentage of our attacking force was not

shore-based
c.

Invasion of Iivo Jhna. Pacific Ocean Area Forces continued the exploitation of the enemy's debilitated air force on their axis of advance and,
following the Mariana operation, pointed toward

recovered.

Iowa Jima. From August

1945, Seventh

1944, until the

middle of February

During the night, the battle line was released by the Task Force Commander from the necessitj' of
maintaining stations on the carrier task groups, who were compelled to head eastward into the wind
to effect recovery of those air

AF

B-24's, operating

from the Ma-

components which

re-

rianas, attacked Iwo Jima as a primary land target and devoted approximately 50 percent of their B-29s of effort to attacks on Japanese shipping. the XXI Bomber Command, between October

turned.

This was done so that the battle line group could pursue the enemy and be in position for decisive surface action at daybreak. However, during the night the crippled enemy
fleet

1944 and February 1945, also devoted about 10 percent of their effort against Iwo Jima. The pur-

increased the

distance between our forces to 360 miles.

At

0800,

pose of these attacks was principally to neutralize Japanese Air Forces which were in position on the island to threaten the B-29 bases in the Marianas.

21 June, the enemj' was outside air strike range. For this reason pursuit was abandoned, and the

As

Japanese attacks against

ary 1945.

a result of these attacks, there were no B-29 bases after 2 Janu-

enemy

fleet

escaped.

43


Iwo Jima followed the pattern of the Marianas opei'ation. Task Force 58 attacked air and shipping in Japan proper on D 3 and the heavy air and naval bombardment of the island started on the same day. Task Force 51,

The

assault of

The March

was finally fully occupied by 17 1945 after some of the bitterest and costliest
island

the Joint Expeditionary Force, again conducted the assault. Due to hills, caves, and the cinder-

ground fighting of the entire war. d. Invasion of Okinawa. On 31 December 1944, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, ordered the Ryukus operation, and directed the

Commander, Fifth
fend,

Fleet, to capture, occupy, de-

extreme difficulty was encountered in neutralizing the Japanese dug-in gun positions by the preassault air and naval bomAs a result, the underwater demolibardment. tion teams and beach reconnaissance parties suffered heavy casualties, and the later advance across the island was very slow.
like nature of the terrain,

and develop air and naval bases on Okinawa Retto, to gain and maintain control of the Nansei Shoto area, and to protect air and sea communications along the Central Pacific axis.

All forces of

the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area were as-

signed su^iport tasks and the target date was set as 1 April 1945. Naval forces employed consisted of

The

assault

against light opposition, but

was made on 19 February, initially movement became

progressively slower as the initial beach positions

was expanded. Close support to the ground forces was provided by carrier aircraft until 8 March when Seventh AF fighters occupied a captured airstrip and began operations. Our surface advance on Iwo Jima was slow and
our casualties were heavy principally because the preliminary air and naval bombardment had not
effected a satisfactory degi"ee of neutralization of

Task Force 58 (the strategic striking and covering force), Task Force 51 (the Joint Expeditionary Force), and various sup]Dorting groups totaling more than 1,200 ships. The assault force was composed of infantry, amphibious, and Marine
units.

Southwest Pacific Air Forces supported the

operation by search of the China Sea, Straits of

the

enemy surface

defenses.

The
blast,

cinderlike soil

absorbed and cushioned

to get at.

bomb

and caves and

reinforced dug-in positions on the hills were hard

Formosa, and sea areas east of Formosa, and by air strikes from Luzon bases against enemy air bases in Formosa. The Fourteeenth AF covered the China coastal Bomber Command attacked areas and the enemy air installations in northern Formosa. The

XX

Direct hits with heavy caliber bombs

XXI

or large shells were required to neutralize such

positions.

strikes

Bomber Command assisted the operation by against Kyushu airfields on L 3 and

strikes against targets

Napalm was

tried

more or

less

ex-

L 1

and by continuing

on

perimentally against various of these positions

the mainland of Japan.

but was not employed in such manner as to prove

effective.

It is highly probable that a very

heavy

saturation of entire areas with

ignition

napalm

would have provided the desired results, which some 6,000 tons of bombs and 10,000 tons of naval gun fire failed to produce. Air opposition was relatively light throughout the operation though our fleet suffered the loss

before

of one escort carrier,

rier,

damage

to one aircraft car-

and hits on several smaller vessels by suicide attacks which were normally launched in the half light of dawn or dusk. The high vulnerability of destroyers and smaller vessels resulted from the
practice of placing these isolated units as early air-

On 18-19 March, L-14-13, aircraft of Task Force 58 raided airfields on Kyushu and Honshu and shipping in the Inland Sea. On 23 March, Task Force 58 attacked 6 airfields in the Okinawa area. Air opposition was light. From L 6 to L 3, initial landings were made on Kerama Retto and on 1 April the assault on the western beaches of Okinawa was made. Initial landings were practically unopposed and the island was swiftly crossed from west to east. However, stubborn opposition developed in the northern and southern sectors and 81 days were required to desti'oy the last organized Again the Japanese took adresistance points. vantage of naturally defensible terrain, and our air and naval preliminary bombardment failed to
destroy the well-defended positions.

raid warning pickets several miles out.

position, the isolated vessel received

In this no support fire

tar-

Shortly after L-day, Japanese air resistance be-

from other

fleet

units and

became a vulnerable

get for suicide attack.

came very heavy in numbers, though the pilot quality was so low that the greater bulk of the

4$

damage

suffered

suicide attacks.

On

by our forces was the result of 6 April, as an example, Task

Force 58 claimed 236 enemy aircraft destroyed in

combat for a
aircraft of

loss of 2 carrier aircraft.

On

April,

Task Force 58

also intercepted the

dying

effort of the

Japanese Fleet, sinking by air

1

attack the Japanese battleship Yamato, 1 light

cruiser,
1

and

-i

destroyers of a force of

battleship,

and 8 destroyers. The remaining 4 destroyers were damaged but escaped.

light cruiser,

As a result of the suicide Okinawa operation, our naval

attacks during the

forces lost approxi-

mately 50 ships sunk and 216 damaged.

Des-

troyers and destroyer escorts serving as pickets

took the bulk of suicide attacks as they were normally on the fringe screening the carriei's and
heavier surface ships.
6.

Forces by reducing the enemy air opposition to the occupation of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. After our landing operations had commenced on Oivinawa, 1 April 1945, Japan assigned first priority to the disruption of this operation and the destruction of our fleet by suicide attacks. Carrier strikes on Japan proper undoubtedly reduced the numbers of enemy aircraft which were flown to the Okinawa area for this purpose. Carrier strikes against Japan proper had little, if any, effect on the opposition encountered by the Twentieth AF over Japan. B-29 attacks had been started 8 months before the first carrier attack and had been going on successfully since that time. Here again was clearly shown that a high degree of air domination had to be achieved before a fleet might approach land masses with impunity while a lesser degree of air domination permitted air attack with an

Japanese
a.

Home

Island Area.

acceptable loss rate.

Air attacks of Phase IV against the Japanese home islands were of two distinct types
General.
as follows
(1)

Attacks by carrier task forces for the purover Japan

proper,

poses of increasing the degree of our air domination

destroying Japanese

shipping, and attacking selected shore installations.

Preceding these carrier operations, our long range heavy bombardment attacks against Japan's home industry and people, both from the CBI in June 1944, and the Marianas in November 1914, had begun on a limited scale. Our earliest heavy bombardment attacks had been able to penetrate remaining Japanese air defense but operations were limited during Phase IV by the following

factors

Pioneering and service testing operations with very heavy bombardment aircraft against Japanese industry and cities for the purpose of preparing for the major air assault against Japan's
(2)

war structure. The further extension of air domination over Japan proper was an exploitation phase of the air war, the decisive engagements of which had
national

Inadequate base facilities within economibombing range of Japan. Service testing the very heavy bombardment equipment and eliminating the mechanical cal difliculties inherent to

new

devices.

Assembling and training the forces and

providing the logistics for the final assault. Light to moderate Japanese air and antiaircraft opposition in the objective area.

been fought by April 1944. Just as the advance of the Southwest Pacific Area Forces from Hollandia to the Philippines and the advance of the

Weather.
All of these limitations were largely overcome during Phase IV. Phase IV may be considered as an assembly and preparation phase in which was developed an air striking force of sufficient weight to crush the enemy's will and ability to continue the war. During Phase IV the forces were built up, tactics were developed, and, in experimental attacks, serious damage was inflicted upon Japan's home industry and civilian populabrief resume of air attacks against Japan tion. proper during Phase IV follows b. Land-Based Air Attacks, Phase IV. On 15 Bomber June 1944, China based B-29s of the

Ocean Area Forces through the Gilbert, Marshall, and Marianas Islands to Iwo Jima and
Pacific

Okinawa were

exploitations of the air victory in

the Solomons

New Guinea and

exploitation.

so also were the

a

air operations against

Japan proper

further

lished

The complete air domination estabover Japan proper during Phase IV, itself

an exploitation of an air victory, was further and Phase V in the intensive heavy bombardment attacks which ended the war. The carrier attacks of Phase IV against Japan's home
finally exploited in

island air installations also furthered the immediate objectives of the Pacific Ocean

more Area

XX

45

Command made

Japan proper B-25 attack Forty-seven B-29s bombed of April 1942. Yawata, steel center in northern Kyushu, in a night attack. Thereafter, and until early 1945,
the
first

raid on

plosives against targets illuminated by flares

fires.

and

since General Doolittle's carrier-borne

The
27

results

were not particularly impressive

China-based B-29s made periodic strikes at the Japanese home islands with forces usually under 100 B-29s. Bomb loads were fairly light on these attacks due to the fact that mechanical difficulties were being worked out of the aircraft and all operations were high altitude, maximum range
missions.

form of attack was discontinued. March 1945, the first aerial mines from the Marianas were laid by B-29s. These operations started directly in support of the Okinawa, landings and were for the purpose of blocking the western egress from the Inland Sea. This type operation was outstandingly effective and was continued until the end of the war. Not only did the aerial mines succeed in blocking the Shimonoseki Straits to what was left of the Japanese Fleet, but
this

and

On

24 November 1944, the first B-29 attack against Japan proper was launched from the Mari-

On

This was a daylight attack against the anas. major aircraft engine plants in the Tokyo area and was performed from high altitude. Between 24 November 1944 and 25 February 1945, B-29 attacks against Japan proper were launched from the Marianas about every fifth day with forces composed of less than 200 effective aircraft over the target. Targets under attack were principally aircraft engine and airframe plants. These were
daylight, high-altitude (28,000-32,000 feet) for-

they completed the interdiction of Japan's lifelines of communication to the Indies. After the aerial mining program was started, more shipping was sunk by this means than by any other agent, including submarines. During the latter part of March 1945, B-29s also attacked Kyushu airfields in support of the impending Okinawa landing.
first 15 days of April, the Twentieth turned again to Japanese industry and cities. Daylight, medium level attacks, at 12,000 to 18,000

During the

AF

feet altitude,

were run against aircraft engine

in-

plants at

mation attacks. On 25 February the first 200-plane attack was run a successful high-altitude, daylight, incendiary raid against Tokyo by radai' through the overcast. This raid burned out more than 1 square mile of the city and indicated the vulnerability of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks.

Tokyo and Nagoya and two night cendiary raids against Tokyo were made.

On

7 April 1945, B-29s were provided fighter

escort for the first time.

Eighty P-51s of the

VII Fighter Command, based on Iwo Jima,

joined three hundred B-29s in an attack against the aircraft engine factories at Tokyo and Nagoya.
shot down 21 Japanese two aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese kamikaze attacks against fleet units supporting the Okinawa landing were

Intercepting

P-51s

Bomb loadings in these initial attacks varied between 2 and 3 tons per aircraft due to the high altitude at which the missions were being run. March 9, 1945, marked a change in tactics which doubled the bomb loading. On this date the Twentieth AF sent approximately 300 B-29s against Tokyo at night, in an incendiary raid, at low altitude. The enemy's capability for defense against this type attack had been correctly assessed and losses were very light. Between 9 March-19 March five great incendiary raids were run against Japan's principal cities, in the same manner, with forces approximating 300 aircraft. Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe were each bombed once and Nagoya was attacked twice. These five attacks completely destroyed approximately 32 square miles of these
cities.

fighters for a loss of

causing the

Navy

serious concern.

Carrier air

components were being held, for the most part, close to the Fleet in an attempt to break up the enemy suicide attacks. They were thus not at liberty to seek out and attack the enemy in strength at his Kyushu bases. The situation was so critical that it was feared all naval forces would be compelled to retire if the situation did not improve.

The Twentieth AF was then directed to attack Kyushu airfields, from which the kamikaze attacks
were being mounted, as a first priority mission. Between 17 April-11 May 1945, B-29s attacked

Kyushu

airfields every

day with

foi'ces

averaging

75 to 100 aircraft.
19 March, the Twentieth

Enemy air opposition was more

By
its

AF

had exhausted
its

supply of incendiaries and turned

attention
ex-

the Tolcyo area

determined and in greater numbers here than in and 22 B-29s were lost. However,
the major air installations on

to night, visual, precision

bombing with high

Kyushu were

re-

46

duced to rubble by the Twentieth AF attacks and the kamikaze efforts immediately started fallmg
off.

fishing boats, canneries, in the Kurile Islands.

8.

and military

installations

On 29 April, Seventh AF P-51s, which had been

escorting B-29s since 7 April, were turned loose in a dive-bombing and strafing attacJv against

Results of the Action of Phase IV.

Atsugi Airfield, Tokyo, and added to the general decimation of Japanese airpower in the area. Eight c. Carrier-Based Attacks, Phase IV.

months

after the first

B-29 attack against Japan

its

That the period April 1944-April 1945, Phase of this report, was truly an exploitation phase of the war against Jai)an is beyond dispute. The 28 months preceding this phase had been marked by relatively strong Japanese air resistance and capability and bj' only minor Ameiicaii geographi-

IV

proper, Task Force 58 launched

against the Japanese

first

raid

cal surface

advances on the perimeter of the ex-

home

islands.

In support of

Iwo Jima landings, the Tokyo area was attacked on February 16-17 by several hundred carrier-based aircraft. Targets were principally air
the
installations

panded Japanese Empire. The 12 months of Phase IV, however, witnesod rapid extension of air domination to Japan proper and corollary surface advances so rapid that our

own

logistical

and shipping, and 509 enemy aircraft

were claimed destroj'ed.

On 25 February the same task force again attacked the Tokyo area with approximately 600 carrier-borne aircraft. This mission was coordinated with the Twentieth AF's B-29 attack of the same date and cleared the target area one minute before the first B-29 bomb, released by radar, came plunging tlirough the overcast.

March

18-21, preceding the

carrier aircraft attacked

Okinawa landing, Kyushu airdromes and the

It

and marshalling problems impeded our rate of advance more than did the Japanese opposition. During the 28 months preceding Phase IV, our forces reoccupied a surface area, land and water, of appproximately 940,000 square statute miles. Of this total, approximately 140,000 square miles were reoccupied during Phase II in the New Guinea-Solomons area, 160,000 square miles were reoccupied during Phase III in the New GuineaSolomons area, and 640,000 square miles were reoccupied in the first exploitation operation into the
Gilbert Islands.

Japanese Fleet in the Inland Sea.

had been

hoped that this series of preinvasion air strikes would discourage enemy air opposition to the Okinawa landings. However, the enemy's reaction was exceptionally strong and replacement aircraft were flown into the Kyushu bases as fast as they were destroyed. The carrier attacks while easily capable of destroying the half-trained Japanese pilot and his aircraft lacked the bomb tonnage required to wipe out the air installations and facilities and thereby reduce the Japanese capability for

During the 12 months of Phase IV, an additional

6,590,000 square statute miles ( approximate)
,

land

and water, came under our complete air and surface domination. This is an area more than twice the size of the United States.

Our exploitation of the defeat of the Japanese Air Forces manifested itself in two ways First Extension of our air domination toward

After the Okinawa landings started, limited carrier strikes were launched
continuing operations.
against

enemy Kyushu bases

^but

the

more

press-

ing task of defending the

fleet

imits prevented con-

centration of a decisive weight of effort.

fleet

The

combination of B-29 attacks on the Kyushu bases,

tles in the

Japan proper. Second Surface occupational moves over tremendous distances in a very short period of time. The ultimate result of the operations of Phase IV was to set the stage for a final exploitation of the air domination which our Army, Navy, and Marine air units had established and an exploitation of the surface advances our air forces had

and the carrier air batOkinawa area eventually cleared the area over Okinawa and set the stage for the next and
antiaircraft defenses,
last

made

possible. This final exploitation could be accomplished in one of two methods as follows
First.

From the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okiwas now

possible to launch direct air at-

planned invasion.

nawa,
It

it

7.

Aleutian Area.

tack in force against the Japanese

Home

Islands.

No change
Eleventh

of note occurred in this area.

The

was believed by some few air commanders that this method of exploitation would induce unconditional surrender without the necessity for a sur-

AF

continued harassing raids against

47

face assault and invasion at the final defense point. Or second. Our airpower could continue to

operate against the final objective and soften it up, over a period of time, for a surface assault to foland no low. This pattern was already doctrine commander minimized the advantages accruing to his forces by following this procedure. However, at this point a full evaluation was not made of the

again achieving domination of the air. It is significant to note that, at Leyte, our carrier air forces for the first time in the Pacific War endeavored to maintain air superiority in the proximity of a land mass suitable for the basing of an effective land-based air force, and that, despite the

low order of combat capability to which that opposing land-based air force had been reduced, it
still

difference in circumstances

which existed between

retained the capability of forcing a

more

softening up perimeter defenses by air and softening up the home islands by air. True, it had been

necessary to launch surface assault against many areas which were desired for advancing our chain of air and fleet bases and preliminary air attack

powerful concentration of airpower, far excelling the defender in combat capability, to an early withdrawal from the battle area by reason of a fundamental and controlling factor the high

vulnerability of the carrier base.

aircraft of the fleet off

rarely eliminated all resistance. It could therefore be expected, by a superficial evaluation, that the same would hold true for the home islands.

In hindsight, however, the differences were obvious. The outer defenses were military installations, whose suicidal sacrifices were justifiable in
that they served to protect the people of Japan. On the other hand, sustained air attack against Japan proper was capable of exterminating modern Japanese industry, economy, transportation,

While obtaining many hits, all of the antiOkinawa was incapable of preventing heavy damage from the kamikaze atCarrier fighter operations and B-29 detacks.

struction of the Kyushu fields brought this menace under control. Our b. Airpower Dominated Naval Warfare. naval forces assaulted the Mariana Islands under a cloud of aircraft which insured air domination over the limited enemy forces that could be mus-

and culture and plunging the remnants of the population into a state of chaos. General Takashima, when interrogated after VJ-day, stated that surrender had become unavoidable, that the intact Japanese home army, even though it might
repel a surface invasion attempt, could no longer protect the Japanese people from extermination.

tered in defense.

The

First Battle of the Philippine Sea

was

fought west of the Marianas again by carrier aircraft without surface elements making con-

tact.

Our naval carrier force was compelled to withdraw from the Leyte operation when we temporarily lost air domination.

However, without the benefit of hindsight, this evaluation was not made by our leaders in April of 1945, and invasion plans, following this second possible course of action, were prepared.
9.

Our naval forces off Okinawa were suffering damage due principally to enemy kamiattacks when the combination of carrier kaze air
excessive

Significance of the Action of Phase IV.

fighter .aircraft, B-29s,

and

final

defense anti-

aircraft artillery again secured air domination in

This exploitation phase of the war further substantiated the observations

relative to the role of

made earlier in the text airpower in the war against

the objective area.

c.

Airpower Continued

to

Dominate Land War-

Japan. a. Airpotver Dominated Its

Own

Element.

By

resorting to kamikaze tactics, the Japanese Air Force was able to inflict a degree of damage on our
carriers sufficient to enable the

This point has been covered in detail in fare. Sections IV and V. The experience in the Marianas, the Philippines, and Okinawa only add historical examples of the advantages accruing to a
land army which enjoys friendly air supremacy

enemy

to achieve

temporary control of the

air.

This jeopardized

the security of our beach operations, resulted in withdrawing the carriers before the planned date,

and hastened the deployment of land-based

air-

craft to the area. Land-based airpower then reasserted our general domination of the area by

and support. Logistid. Airpower Continued to Expand As a All American military operacal Instmment. tions in China depended on air supply. Burma was recaptured in an air-ground campaign in which more than 200,000 troops were en-

48

tirely

dependent on air snpply for months at a

In
port

all theaters,

the world girdling Air Transa vital service in the

time.

Command performed

The Tenth Army on Okinawa, having encountered more effective opposition than anticipated,

transportation of personnel and materiel.

e. Airpower Conclusively Demonstrated Its Area Interdiction Potential. Numerous islands and Japanese pockets of resistance were by-

and was

consequent!)' running short of ammunition,

relieved

from a very precarious

logistical posi-

tion by the emergency diversion of all available

passed.

ISIetliodical sea search, air attack

against

transport aircraft to the task of flying in anununition.

shipping, and aerial mining of the terminal ap-

proaches to Japan, coupled with the submarine

offensive, insured the isolation of

The rapid advance of Southwest

Pacific Forces

from New Guinea to the Philippines was materially expedited by air supply and air movement
of units.

Japan from her raw material resources in the Netherlands East Indies. This was a form of occupation an occupation in the third dimension which insured domina-

tion of critical surface activities.

49

SECTION VII

PHASE V, APRIL 1945-AUGUST 1945 PERIOD OF INTENSE DIRECT AIR ATTACK ON JAPAN PROPER
1.

China.

Japanese forces in China made their last major April 1945, in two surface assaults at Fourteenth AF key forward air bases. One thrust was aimed at the North Central Base, Hsian, on the Yellow River, from which the Fourteenth AF was attacking the railway system in North China. The second enemy assault was aimed at Chihkiang, the only east central base remaining in Allied hands, and a key base controlling the approaclies to Chungking and Kunming. These two Japanese attacks were repelled by close air-ground cooperation between Fourteenth AF, the Chinese- American composite wing, and Chinese ground forces. The intense training of the past year, during which the Fourteenth AF had attempted to develop an air-support system for the Chinese armies, was finally rewarded. Close tactical air support, coneffort in

trolled

by air-support parties

in the battle line,

was

successfully provided to the defending Chi-

nese troops and the

tors with very

enemy

retired

from both

sec-

heavy

casualties.

The Fourteenth AF continued the railway

diction

inter-

program in industrial North China and in North French Indo-China and also attacked Japanese air installations ranging from Shanghai to Formosa to Tourane, French Indo-China. In June 1945, constantly harassed by air attack on his lines of communication and unable to support or effectively employ the forces on the railroad corridor between Hankow and Canton, the enemy commenced withdrawing north toward Hankow and south toward Canton. Chinese forces followed in the wake of the withdrawal and reoccupied our eastern bases in June and July. These bases were promptly reconditioned and Tenth AF units moved in. In July 1945, Headquarters, Tenth AF was redeployed from India-Burma to China. At this time an over-all Air Headquarters was estab50

China Theater to which was assigned Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces. The Fourteenth AF was given the mission of operating against Japanese economy and communications in North China and was based north of the Twentyseventh parallel. The Tenth AF was designated as the Tactical Air Force and was based south of the Twenty-seventh parallel. Its mission was to support the operations of the Chinese armies in the assault on Canton, planned to begin on 15 August 1945, with the occupation of Fort Bayard, at the head of the Luichow Peninsula. When the war ended, the Tenth AF was assigned all tactical transport aircraft in China and effected the bulk of the large-scale air redeployment of Chinese troops to North China. The Fourteenth AF, at the same time, was assigned all combat aircraft in China and deployed these forces on an offensive-defensive line running from Hsian to Hankow to Shanghai. This was done as a security measure to guard against the unpredictable outcome of mixing li^ million surrendered Japanese troops, several Chinese National armies, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese Communists in the area north of the Yellow River and south of the Great Wall. Russian forces converging on northern China also added an element of doubt to this complex situation.
lished in the

the

2.

India-Burma.

Organized Japanese resistance in Burma ended during the preceding phase when the Allied three pronged air-ground assault covered 450 miles in 6 months and approached Rangoon. Rangoon fell on 2 May 1945, when a joint airborne, amphibious force moved into the city. The forces were welcomed by a lone RAF pilot who had landed alone at Mingaladon Airfield, Rangoon, the day before and had taken possession of the city. Japanese forces, decimated and disorganized by months of

had evacuated the city. Rangoon, like Tokyo, fell to airpower, and surface invasion became a political rather than a military problem. In July, redeploj-ment of Tenth AF units to China was commenced. This was to be a gi-adual
air attack,

base at Batavia, Java, in an 18-liour round trip

from Palawan, P.I. landings were also made in the Brunei Bay area, Borneo, on 17 June 1945, following heavy raids by Thirteenth AF B-24s, B-25s, P-38s, and by Royal Australian Ajr Force
units.

process
in

China

build-up consistent with the and was only partially completed when
logistical

Also, after 18 consecutive days of air

the

war ended. The Air Transport Command continued to expand its operations to China during this phase in

by Thirteenth AF units at Balikpapan, a landing was made by Australian ground forces. American Air Force and RAAF units continued to give air support to these ground operations durstrikes

anticipation of accelerated operations against Japanese positions in South China. With the fall of

ing July.

Burma, tactical transport groups and one heavy bombardment group, which had been committed
to

Burma

operations, were put on the

Hump

run,

During May and June, Thirteenth AF attacks were made from Philippine bases against shipping and shore installations on the China coast and Formosa.

ferrying supplies to China.

the peak in July 1945,

Deliveries reached

when approximately

70,000

tons were delivered by air to China bases. By this time it was apparent that the Stilwell road and

pipe line to China would not serve the logistical purpose for which they were built. During this phase, the India-Burma Theater plan for logisti-

China anticipated that a maximum of 13,000 tons of POL would be delivered through the pipe line to China each month and 4,000 tons per month (excluding the weight of transporting Air vehicles) would be delivered by the road. deliveries were to be expanded from the 70,000 tons of July 1945 to 130,000 tons per month by February 1946.
cal support to
3.

On 2 July 1945, Southwest Pacific Area Forces began moving to Okinawa. In the latter part of July, Fifth and Seventh AF Okinawa-based aircraft attacked Shanghai air installations and began shipping sweeps of the waterways between Japan and Korea. In August the tempo of air attacks from Okinawa was stepped up, principally against tactical targets on the Island of Kyushu in preparation for the invasion. The Seventh AF
concentrated a large part of its effort against the Nagasaki area destroying the docks and Mitsubishi aircraft factory while the Fifth

AF

has as

its

primary task the isolation of Kyushu from adjacent islands, disruption of communications on the island, and preparation for the planned invasion.

Southwest Pacific Forces.

During this period, the Thirteenth AF was also moved to Okinawa and was being organized and
equipped to be used as a close tactical air support
force after the
4.

While the greater effort of Southwest Pacific Forces were being marshalled for the planned invasion of Japan, mopping up operations in the Philippines continued until May 1945. The Fifth AF continued to give close tactical air support to these operations, employing high explosives, with a constantly increasing ratio of Napalm.
During April 1945, Fifth AF Philippine-based B-24s and P-38s attacked shipping and shore installations at Hongkong, and Thirteenth AF and Royal Australian Air Force heavy bombers attacked military installations and shipping at
Soerabaja, Java.

Kyushu

landings.

Central Pacific Forces.

Mopping up on Okinawa was

process.

a slow and tedious

All organized resistance ceased on 23

June

1945, releasing Pacific

Ocean Area Carrier

Forces for more active participation in operations

against the Japanese

home

islands.

Principal carrier activity for balance of war

was

as follows:
;

May

1945, strikes against

Japan

Minor surface thrusts were also made into the Netherlands East Indies area. On 1 May 1945, Australian ground troops landed at Tarakan, Borneo, after the area had been softened by Thirteenth AF attacks. On 3 June 1945, Thirteenth AF aircraft also attacked the Japanese seaplane

proper June, strikes in force against the Ryukyus and Japan proper, and a minor strike on Wake
Island July, strikes in force against Central and
;

Northern Honshu and Kyushu, and minor strikes against Wake Island and Balikpapan; August, strikes against Central and Northern Honshu and

Hokkaido.
51

5.

Japanese

Home

Islands.

attacks to complete the destruction of important

During Phase V, B-29s of the Twentieth

AF

industrial priority targets.

continued to support the Okinawa operation by attacking Kyushu kamikaze fields until 11 May 1945. The final mission in support of Okinawa, 11 May, was a heavy attack on the enemy fleet and Army refueling stations in the Inland Sea between Yawata and Kure. In this attack the oil and gasoline storage and refining installations were
destroyed.

In July, 42 secondary cities were wiped out by radar night bombing, incendiary attacks ^bombing absolutely blind.

During June, one entire B-29 Wing, stripped of armament excepting the tail gun and employing improved radar, was deployed in the Marianas and began the precision destruction of oil refineries and oil installations by night radar
all

In the

latter part of

May and

early June, the

bombing.
the end of the war, having run out of and small cities, and having paralyzed Japanese industry, attention was being turned to the communication system of the home islands, which was to be completely paralyzed before the invasion. The planned invasion was still 3 months in the future, allowing more than sufficient time to completely paralyze the Japanese communication system before the first landing was to be made. A resume of the major Army Air Force B-29
large
attacks of this period follows

incendiary attacks on the large industrial centers of Japan were virtually completed and on 17 Jime
1945, all of the big cities having been destroyed,

Toward

attention

was turned

to the cities of secondary

industrial importance.

Target selection was based generally on the following factors Inflammability, incidence of war industry supported by the city, congestion, communications facilities of importance, and popula:

tion.

cities

Night incendiary attacks against the secondary were supplemented by daylight precision

Date

Target

Comment

May
May May May May

14,

1945-

Nagoya.
do..

Second B-29 fire burned out.

blitz

launched

3.15

square miles of

Nagoya

16-17...
23. 25.
29.

Tokyo.
....."do.

YokohamaOsaka do

June 1 . June 3-July 3-4.. July 8-10.

Honshu

Island Sendai, Sakai, Wakamatsu, and Gifu.

Incendiary bombs fired 3.81 square miles of Nagoj'a; half of the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant destroyed. 520 B-29s dropped 3,720 tons of incendiary bombs. Tokyo was again struck by 564 B-29s; 22.1 square miles of the city destroyed in these 2 attacks. 450 B-29s destroyed 6.9 square miles of Yokohama. More than 3 square miles of Osaka burned out. More than 2 square miles of Osaka burned out. Second fire blitz ended. More than 470 B-29s struck secondary cities on Honshu Island. Secondary cities attacked by 497 B-29s.
63 stripped

Do.... Do.-..
July 12-13July 14-15July 16-17-

Yokkaichi
Inland Sea.

down

oil refineries

special radar at Yokkaichi.

B-29s attacked the Utsube River

Utsunomiya, Tsuruga, Ichinomiya, and Uwa Jima.

Kudamatsu Numazu, Kuwana, Hiratsuka on Honshu and Oita on

Kyushu.
Fukui, Hitachi, Okazaki.
Choshi,

Strait, Niigata Harbor and Nanao Bay waters mined by 30 B-29s. Fire and demolition bombs dropped by radar by 506 B-29s in raids on urban areas and Kawasaki petroleum center. Radar B-29s destroyed Nippon Oil Co. 471 B-29s carried out incendiary attack.

Shimonoseki

July 18-20.

and

July 21-23July 24

Ube Osaka-Nagoya
Kawasaki Omuta, Matsuyama, and Tokuyama. Tsu Aomori, Ogaki, Ujiyamada.

547 B-29s dropped 4,000 tons of incendiary and demolition bombs on industrial sections by visual and radar means. Synthetic oil plant destroyed by 77 radar B-29s.
4 large aircraft
factories,

Osaka-Nagoya by radar.
July 25July 26July 28...
Oil center

sector hit

Osaka arsenal, and textile mill in by 599 B-29s, bombing visually and

Bombed by 305
Shimotsu

attacked by 76 radar-eqiiipped B-29s. B-29s, dropping incendiaries.

562 B-29s started general conflagration in wide area, including 766 B-29s
Oil Refinery. in incendiary and high-explosive attack.

Aug. 1-2-

Nagaoka,'Toyama, Mito, Hachioji, and Kawasaki.

52

Date

rein within their operational radii.

Tlie following
Agent

table presents the actual resultant, with tonnage

from the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee Report of February 1947, and the sortie figures taken from the Transportation Division Report of the United States Strategic
figures taken

Bombing Survey.

All tonnage figures represent

only the tonnage allotted to a specific agent and

do not include tonnages for which two or more

agents received partial credit.
therefore conservative.

The

figures are

SECTION

VIII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AREAS OF OPERATION AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATE

USE OF FORCES
1.

China.
a.

China was important to our military effort Japan in four major ways If China capitulated to Japan and actively (1) joined the Axis camp, her resources of men, material, and food and her geogi-aphical position would
against

forces in Burma and China. With the exception of one American infantry regiment in Bui'ma, all

lend important assistance to Japan. (2) Unoccupied China was on the flank of the

American cojnbat forces in, India-Burma were Air Force units and, without exception, all American combat units in China were Army Air Force units. Even though India-Burma and China were air theatei-s, neither was commanded by an air officer. Throughout the war, a high

Army

extended Japanese sea lines of communication to the Netherlands East Indies, and also within air
striking distance of the communication lines of

percentage of the logistic support provided to the theaters was dispersed to support operations having little significance or value to the over-all war
against Japan. The development and maintenance of 36 American sponsored Chinese infantry divisions in China, principally from air tomiage over the "hump," the construction of the Stilwell Road, and the diversion of resources to the Central and South Burma Campaigns are examples of providing logistic support to secondary operations of little over-all war value. Had the logistic support which went to these programs been provided to the combat air arm in China, cumulative dividends of importance would have
effort

North China. If she remained a friendly and independent nation, she offered a
industrial

base for air operations against the life lines of the

Japanese empire.
(3)

Similarly,

if

China remained

in the

war

against Japan, a base was provided for other attrition operations against a considerable portion of

war machine. Japanese domination of all China would have rendered British control of India dangerously insecure. The nervous Indian population had been heavily propagandized by Japan and Indian revolt conceivably could have resulted from the capitulation of China. b. China was kept in the war by our military support and approximately 1 million tons of Japanese shipping was claimed sunk in air operathe Japanese
(4)

resulted from strengthening the inadequately supported air campaigns against Japanese deep sea

and river shipping, industrial North China lines of communication, and Japanese air and military
installations throughout China.
2.

India-Burma.

tions
c.

from China.

From

hindsight

it

appears that the military

expended in China was justified by the circumstances and the results achieved. d. The China-Burma-India Theaters were predominately air theaters. In addition to the orthodox functions of obtaining air superiority,
effort

a. British and American national interests in The primary India-Burma were divergent. American interest lay in utilizing India as a springboard for forwarding supplies to China

while the British interest lay in expelling the Japanese from Burma and recapturing Singapore
for postwar political reasons.
b.

attacking enemy logistical potential, and isolating

was utilized extensively for transport of personnel and materiel and more
the battle areas, airpower

air supply,

In order effectively to give aid to China by it was necessary to capture Northern

than customarily for close surface support operations,

Burma down

due to the dearth of

artillery

with ground

to and including Myitkyina. The capture of Myitkyina permitted a low altitude

55


Himalayan "hump," provided head and transport staging base halfway to China, and thereby materially increased our air supply potential to China. It also permitted esair crossing of the
oil

Japanese from

Burma

in a costly operation, the

an

enemy

logically should have been encouraged to

maintain his expensive garrisons

vulnerable to air attack

which were so in this part of the world.

tablishment of adequate fighter defenses to protect the air ferry route. This much of the Burma operation can be justified as essential to keeping

The more

China in the war. Myitkyina was captured by August 1944 at relatively low cost in air effort when compared to the campaigns which followed. In the entire Burma operation leading up to the

the enemy put into Burma, the less he would have elsewhere, and, here, at the end of the line, 1 airplane operational probably cost Japan 10 or 20 on the production line.

capture of Myitkyina, 57,606 tons of supplies were air lifted, 65,940 personnel were transported by air, and 12,814 tons of bombs were dropped. c. The Quebec Conference of September 1943

American and British India-Burma, and committed our India-Burma air forces to a campaign which not only contributed little to ending the war but actually penalized our paying operation from China. Following the close of the Myitkyina campaign, this compromise committed our forces to three major campaigns in Burma which resulted in
resulted in a compromise of
interests

in

This diversion of air resources to these three campaigns to retake Central and Southern Burma reduced the over-all air potential and supply available for China by 40 to 50 percent. d. The Stilwell Road, likewise, was a resource consuming enterprise which never supported its own engineers during the construction period and proved to be of little value as a supply route to China. Construction of the road required large air trans^Dort support and the entire air program in China-Burma-India was greatly retarded by the diversion of aviation engineers from airdrome

construction to road-building.
3.

Southwest Pacific and South

a.

Pacific.

(1) Clearing the area for completion of the Stilwell Road and pipe line to China. (2) The expulsion of the Japanese from Burma and the capture of Eangoon. From August 1944 to 1 June 1945, these three campaigns cost the following air effort to and within Burma:

Netherlands East Indies and

New

Guinea.

The Netherlands East Indies were most vital to the Japanese Empire as the main source of raw
air, ground, and naval operations which disrupted supply of these raw materials to Japan contributed directly to our

materials.

All

in this area

war

effort.

Tons supplies and equipment Personnel moved by air Tons bombs dropped

air lifted

467, 242
617, 737
22,

In addition, air operations in New Guinea broke the back of the Japanese Army Air Force, were
decisive,

075

and influenced the course of

all

succeed-

Close cooperation sorties flown transport)

(excluding

ing operations toward Japan.

83,000

As

a tangible result of these three campaigiis, a

weight of vehicles, came over the Stilwell Road to China, and 21,685 tons of POL came through the pipe line. Thus, while the Fourteenth AF in China was fighting on less than an average of 20,000 tons of supplies per month. Allied strategy spent 467,242
total of 151,793 tons, including the
air lifted tons,

moved

617,737 personnel

by

air,

Surface operations and advances from Port in that to Morotai were also essential they permitted advancing our chain of air bases, aided in the conduct of our air war and in the air interdiction of the Netherlands East Indies. Operations in the b. Rabaul-SoJomons Area. Rabaul-Solomons area were both decisive and necand in essary. Here at a perimeter defense point New Guinea Japan elected to defend the Nether-

Moresby

dropped 22,075 tons of bombs, and flew 83,000 combat missions in Burma, and as a militarily useful
result of three operations a total of 173,478 tons of equipment and supplies were moved over the

road and through the pipe line to China. Retaking the terrain of Burma south of Myitkyina served no essential military objective.

Burma was

at

the end

of communications.

of the Japanese line Rather than evicting the

lands East Indies. Our air and surface operations stopped the Japanese expansion at Guadalcanal, and our Army, Navy, and Marine air operations in the Rabaul-Solomons area destroyed the effective fighting power of the Japanese Naval Air Force. This decisive air action, plus the action in the New Guinea area, made possible advancing our chain of air bases to within striking distance of

Japan proper.

56

PhUippine Area. The significance of the Philippine area is hinged to basic concept as to how Japan was to be defeated. We elected to conduct the war in the Southwest Pacific area in conc.

Japanese domination before capitulation of the Emperor, these ethical considerations might be considered as governing factors overriding purely
militarj^ considerations.
d.

sonance with a basic Army strategic concept that of invasion and fighting decisive land battles to secure the final enemy capitulation. In pursuit of
this strategic concept, the occupation of the Phil-

Borneo.
the

The minor invasions of Borneo

undoubtedly

late

in

war

were

unnecessary

militarily.

ippine Islands became a natural and legitimate The Philippines provided the land objective. masses necessary for developing air and fleet bases
ever,

4.

Central Pacific.
a.

Gilbert

and Marshall

Islands.

Quite similar

to the Philippines, the significance of the Gilbert

and for marshalling large invasion forces. Howhad our strategy been predicated on a full
recognition of the military potentiality of airpower and had it pointed all our efforts, after the

defeat of the Japanese Air Force, toward marshalling an air striking force for decisive air attack, rather than surface attack,

on the Japanese

national structure, our combined forces had the capability of exploiting the Xew Guinea-Solomons

break-through and proceeding directly to the Admiralties, Truk, and the Marianas. Operations in the Philippines undoubtedly paid
military dividends.
air

They

resulted in increasing

domination over the Japathe degi-ee of our in reducing the air opposition we nese Air Force, would encounter in the home islands, in increasing the effectiveness of our blockade of Japanese life lines of communication, in reducing Japanese naval power, and in destroying large components of enemy land forces. However, as a result of these operations, Manila was wrecked and large numbers of Philippine citizens were casualties. With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that, had our strategy been hinged to concepts of air war, the power of our combined air, sea, and land forces operating throughthe Admiralties, Truk, and to
the Marianas and

and Marshall Islands is hinged to basic concept as to how Japan was to be defeated. While basic Army strategy was predicated on the invasion and decisive land battle concept, basic naval strategy was predicated on the concept of decisive naval surface battle line action with heavy fleet units and an exploitation of such decisive action by an advance across the Pacific. An advance across the Pacific required neutralization of key enemy Pacific bastions and provision of forward Again as our over-all strategy fleet bases. elected to employ Central Pacific Forces in consonance with Naval Strategic Concept the seizure of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands became a natural and legitimate objective. Again however had our strategy been oriented toward airpower and air weapons and had our air, sea, and land forces been combined in one powerful thrust, the route for all major forces through the Admiralties, Truk, and to the Marianas and Iwo Jima would have eliminated the requirement for the occupation of the Gilbert and Marshall

Islands, as well as the Philippines. As early as September 1943, there were definite

Iwo Jima was capable of

objective

achiev-

ing the

ultimate

without
if

the

flank

operations.

Paralleling these observations,

the effective-

ness of aerial mining had been appreciated a year

earlier,

and adequate steps had been taken

to pre-

pare for the program, night mining of Japanese

sea terminals could have started

by June 1944 from Marianas. This action would have renderetl the the sea and air blockade from Philippine bases
superfluous.

The comments above pertain

considerations.
If,

solely to military

on the other hand, our Nation

Japan was rapidly losing the air Postwar intelligence has fully confirmed these indications. By November 1943, the Japanese Naval Air Force had been destroyed as an effective fighting force, enemy carriers were out of the war for the time being, and the Japanese Army Air Force in New Guinea was being rapidly destroyed. At that time Truk and Guam were not fortified nor heavily defended while the Gilbert Islands were. Thus, postwar intelligence clearly confirms that the Marianas could have been taken at a much earlier date than was actually achieved in implementing our Army strategic concepts through the Philippines and our Navy strategic concepts through the Gilbert and Marindications that

war.

were morally obligated to free the Philippines of

shall Islands.

57


Occupation of the Marianas iDrovided essential air bases from which Japan could be brought under sustained, heavy air attack. Later developments of the war indicated that the B-29 operations from these bases had the
b.

Mariana

Islands.

when the war ended. Actual air operations from Okinawa were directed principally toward preparation of Kyushu for the projected landing.
Although five wings of B-29s were scheduled to go into Okinawa in order to double the air offensive against Japan proper, the Japanese capitulaprevented implementation of this plan. Hence, from hindsight, the Okinawa operation is justifiable in supporting an invasion strategy unjustifiable in supporting a decisive air assault or in supporting a strategy which did not require
tion

capability to bring about the collapse

and sur-

render of the Japanese Empire. c. Iwo Jhna. The occupation of Iowa Jima was highly desirable in that it eliminated possible Japanese air action against the Marianas bases, provided an intermediate and emergency B-29

and provided a base from which land-based perform escort and attack missions over Japan proper. d. Okinawa. Like the occupation of the Philippines, the Okinawa operation reduced the amount
base,
fighters could

invasion.

5.

The Aleutian

Area.

of air opposition remaining in the

It also provided another base

home

islands.

from which

As in the Burma area, Japanese efforts in the Aleutians were extremely costly and could pay little dividends to the Empire. The enemy logically

direct

on Japan proper could be mounted. However, later events showed that the Okinawa air bases were not essential to a decisive exploitation of our airpower. The B-29 operation from the Marianas constituted the great bulk of the attack against Japan proper both in physical damage and in tons of bombs dropped. Forces in the Marianas were only reaching full strength
air attack

more

might have been encouraged to weaken his critical defenses by dissipation of resources

to this area.

However

with

a constantly ex-

panding and unpredictable technology to cope with this course of action would have contained elements of danger. The Aleutian bases were only half as far from the United States as Japan

proper, and, for this reason, our action in neutralizing the enemy in this area was justifiable.

58

SECTION IX

AN EVALUATION OF THE OVER-ALL OPERATION

1.

Limited Concepts.

This discontinuity of land and sea was eliminated, for military purposes, by the airplane.
air

Since the strategy of wars is a product of the military thinlviiig of the time, it is appropriate
that a brief review be given of the military concepts,

The

mass over the earth

is

a continuous blanket.

both American and Japanese, which at

times led to the abandonment of sound principles. The flaws in our military concepts, without exception, resulted

from the

failure of military thinting

to keep pace with the evolutionary processes going

on

in the outside world.

They were founded on

and
classic

tradition, precedent, custom,

example

and influenced hj service-pride and a study of militarv' history which emphasized technique and results achieved, rather than cause and effect.
These faulty concepts were not inherently faulty from earliest inception. They became faulty, with the passage of time, as technology and science increased the destnictive power and range of weapons. Before World "War II, it was not fully appreciated by military thinkere that changes in the limitations and capabilities of weapons might profoundly affect the entire military structure, forcing a change, not only in tactics and employment of the new weapon, but in the logistic structure, the training structure, the intelligence re-

two dimendemanded a new military concept. This concept was slow in coming, and because it was not grasped by the American people, by the Congress, and by most military leaders, our preparation for and initial steps in the war against Japan were faulty. This old concept which saw a clear division between Army and Navy functions produced no requirement for unified command of these two forces, and no requirement for a common strategic military concept. Hence we entered and finished the war in the Pacific with a divergence of military concept between Army and Navy leaders and,
air eliminated the

The medium of

sional land-water barrier"

and

smothered beneath this conflict, the strategic concept of three dimensional warfare air warfare

quirements and in the basic strategic concept of warfare.

was struggling for expression. b. The Army Surface Concept of Warfare. Modern history contained no examples of a military victory without an invasion and a decisive land battle. Surface assault and occupation of the enemy's vital areas had always been necessary in the past. In general, our political and military
leaders adhered to this concept, putting insufficient

National Concept of Army and Namy Fimctions. Before the advent of the airplane, the functional division between Army and Navy was rather clear. The American public, the Congress, and military leaders accepted the concept that
a.

value on the potentiality of the new weapon. As a general rule, the new weapon the air weapon was accepted as an extremely valuable ancillary

the Navy was the first line of defense that it would fii-st meet an aggressive enemy on the high seas and attempt to defeat his forces before he approached our shores. If the Navy failed then our land armies would be employed to engage the enemy on shore. Military forces, before the airplane, moved in two dimensions. The Navy was inherently chained to the sea, and the Army was

inherently chained to the land for military operations.

which would expedite surface operations. That airpower was a decisive military force in its own right was not accepted. c. The Navy Battle Line Concept. Based on the theory that the Navy was the first line of defense, and that he who controlled the sea would emerge victorious in the Pacific War, naval doctrine was developed which embraced the "battle line" concept. This concept visualized opposing fleets engaging in a decisive naval surface battle as the result of which one would be outgunned and
sunk.

The

line of demarcation

was

definite.

Having

free exploitation of the sea, the

59

victor could then blockade the enemy,

move

troops

and supplies
victorious.
vras a

as desired,

and eventually emerge

Before the advent of the airplane, this sound concept. This doctrine demanded heavy battleships and a "balanced fleet." This battle line concept, however, outlived its temporal period during World War II, resulting not only in placing limitations on the employment of carriers and submarines but in major national logistical efforts in the production, operation, and protection of heavy surface vessels which had been rendered obsolescent by the progress of science and technology. The Jajjanese also suffered under this battle line concept. They sought domination of the sea by the attack at Pearl Harbor and later hoped to force the battle line action as a result of the Midway assault. However, in both of these engagements, the air weapon gave a clear demonstration that a new era in war had been ushered in.
Surface elements were incapable of closing in the face of even a limited amount of air opposition. A major naval surface battle occurred only
in the night action in Surigao Straits,

employment of airpower became unsound. e. The Air Force Concept of Strategic Borribing. While in varying measures disagreeing with Army and Navy Strategic concept, many Air Force leaders had not fully evaluated the requirements which would have to be met in implementing an
this doctrine for the
air strategy.

The Air Force strategic bombing doctrine was developed theoretically between World War I and World War II and was based on the concept of defeating an enemy nation by air bombing of her logistical potential for war. In order for this strategy to be effective, it is mandatory that the over-all damage inflicted on the enemy's capacity to wage war be greater than the loss of our own logistical and production potential through operational losses of materiel
tial air

and personnel. Our

ini-

operations failed to achieve this result for several reasons

First. Our Air Forces suffered from a strong tendency to commit forces to combat prematurely before a satisfactory degree of combat effectiveness had been achieved by training and before a force of sufficient strength for the task had been assembled. In the early days of the war, this resulted in a piecemealing of effort. It failed

when

the

Japanese

Southern Attack Force had suicide orders and no carriers and was blocked in the narrow waters by the Seventh Fleet. d. The Navy Concept of Carrier Airpower.

to saturate

enemy

air defensive capabilities, re-

Naval doctrine developed prior to World War II, being based primarily on the battle line concept, visualized naval airpower, like all components of the fleet, as a supporting element which would be
utilized generally to further the mission of the
fleet.

sulted in a high loss rate

ineffective both in accuracy

Second.

and a bombing effort and in weight of effort.

balanced air force

satisfactorily

was not developed prior to the war. This failure was hinged directly to the supporting role we had assigned to airpower in our prewar thinking. We
failed to appreciate that a defense in depth for

Since the primary mission of the

fleet,

fleet

was

the destruction of the enemy

like cruisers, destroyers,

carrier aircraft,

and even battleships, justi-

quired.

our bomber formations probably would, be reHence, our fighter aircraft, at the outset
.

fiably could be sacrificed, if necessary, to assist in

of the war, were short range, suitable for inter-

winning the decisive battle line engagement. It was a one-decisive-engagement, one-incident, theory to which were geared all the components of the fleet. So long as the battle line engagement
did in fact retain its importance as the decisive
action of the Pacific

ceptor defense and close support to surface forces,

but incapable of accompanying our bombardment

formations on deep penetrations into enemy terriSince the limited power of the explosives then available and the target systems selected
tory.

War,

this concept

was sound.
to

required a sustained bombing effort running into

However,

this doctrine did not provide for sus-

many thousand

sorties,

it

immediately became

tained offensive air action in a

war which was

be decided, not by the battle line engagement, but by the war in the air. Evolution had passed the emphasis from control of the sea to control of the
air

control of the
all

air as a prerequisite to control

of the sea and

surface operations

and hence

mandatory to establish a defense for the bombers which would enable them to carry out the bombing offensive. As the war progressed, it became apparent that the best defense to the bombardment effort was the destruction of the opposing Japanese Air Force rather than a shielding of the bomber

60

formation by fighter aircraft on each of

i

many

pinj tuidiif

uoisuauup

p.iu[] 9il} ojui D|dioui.id ai{^

missions or a reliance on the defensive fire power of the bombers themselves. This realization led
to drastic extension of the range of our fighter

established a far-flung perimeter early in the war.

Perimeter defense points were backed up by an adequate geographical disposition of middle and
rear bases, but these middle and rear bases were not logistically developed nor heavily fortified.

and to a sustained war in the air against both airborne intercepting fighters and against air
aircraft
installations

olfensive operations

from which Japanese defensive and were mounted. This air war against the Japanese Air Force initially had to be fought against the enemy air force in being on the perimeter and not against the production echelon, as the range of our aircraft and their ability to penetrate enemy defenses was not sufficient to carry the war, at the outset, to the Japanese industrial and production centers. Thus, our prewar
failure fully to evaluate the nature of the air

They were particularly undeveloped and inadequate with respect to land-based airpower. However, even this defense would have been difficult to penetrate solely by surface foices. It was clearly
hinged to the concept of opposing military forces impinging upon each other and making contact on the surface of the earth at the external fringes of occupied areas. While the perimeter defense points were so situated that they were actually mutually supporting against slow-moving surface forces once the Japanese had lost the initiative and had lost air domination, the natural military advantages of these areas were lost. Having won control of the air, our airpower, by virtue of its speed and range, isolated these garrisons. The distances were such that these enemy bases were incapable of providing mutual support against air attack with such of their air defenses as remained. Thus, the perimeter defense points became iso-

war

which would develop resulted in the production of sliort range fighter aircraft, and our early premature commitments, after the war started, resulted in a piecemeal and ineffective bombing effort. Fortunately, these shortcomings were recognized early in the war and corrective steps were taken. However, it should be pointed out that these same circumstances may not be repeated in a future war and an air war of a totally different nature
conceivably
of the atomic

may develop. The destructive power bomb coupled with a long range air

lated, nonreinforceable garrisons

weapon with the power to penetrate enemy defenses might permit progressing directly to the strategic bombing phase without the necessity for
preliminary destruction in detail of the enemy's air force in being. In all such efforts, the ultimate criterion is the measure of the damage inflicted on the enemy versus the cost of the
the
effort to

each subject to individual destruction in detail. Into these perimeter defenses Japan poured a steady stream of resources in a stubborn and vain attempt to hold

had occupied. The decisive war were fought on this perimeter. Here Japan dissipated her airpower and resources,
the surface areas she
battles of the
to a fatal degree.

our

own war

potential.

By this

criterion,

acceptable loss rates

may vary from

to 100 per-

Japanese strategy, in effect, established a surface defense in depth, but failed to make provision for effective concentration of her land based
airpower at any point on her expanded perimeter. g. Japanese Concept of Airpower. Japanese leaders saw airpower as an ancillary weapon extremely valuable to the conduct of surface operations. They failed to project their concept of naval warfare into the medium of air. They could visualize a naval battle line action and an exploita-

cent of the attacking force.

Third Although the tendency was not so pronounced in the air war against Japan as in the air
:

operations against Germany, there was, at times, a compartmentation of airpower into strategic and
tactical roles.
at times led to

This was an

artificial division

which

compromising fundamental princi-

ples of war.

It tended to restrict the ability to con-

tion of a naval victory

but they failed to visualize

was made much
it

centrate at the decisive time

and

place, diverted

an air war and an exploitation of an air victory.

airpower on many occasions to diversionary or premature exploitation and secondary operations

Our

victory in the air

easier

by

the limited Japanese appreciation of

ples of aerial warfare than

tlie pi-inci-

and did not provide for flexibility in employment, f. The Japanese Concept of Defense in Depth.

otherwise might
his air

have been.

The enemy chained

weapon

to^

The

principle of defense in depth

may

be sup-

his surface objectives.

He

failed

to establish,

ported by logicbut the Japanese failed to project

an air order of battle and the logistic structure

61


necessary for
its

support.

He

piecemealed and

dissipated his air resources on a surface perimeter

which, by its geographic nature, dispersed his air strength too thinly and insui-ed its destruction.
2. Logistics.

Three major factors, however, adversely affected our military intelligence operations throughout the war. These were
a. First. An artificial barrier existed between the intelligence services of the Army and Navy. Throughout the war, lacking unified command in

Our prewar

failure to keep pace with the im-

the Pacific,

pact of technology on warfare resulted not only in limited strategic concepts of warfare, but also in a faulty evaluation of the logistic requirements
necessary to implement our holding strategy in
the Pacific.

we operated without an intelligence system capable of meeting the requirements of coordinated land, sea, and air warfare. In numerous
cases, at all levels of

command down

to

and includ-

ing the squadron and company, essential intelligence available to one service was not necessarily
available or expeditiously forwarded to another participating service. At all levels of command, however, cooperation and coordination was at-

Our most basic strategic decision of the war had been to defeat Germany first and Japan second.
This was a sound decision and was to be implemented by sending minimum resources essential
for holding operations to the Pacific while build-

ing the big hammerhead to crush Germany. This same hammerhead, having been bought and paid for, would then be available to overwhelm Japan. However, the forces actually allocated to Navy, Army, and Air Forces in the Pacific proved to be

tempted in the exchange of intelligence information, many times with outstanding success. However, a system was not established during the war which insured the timely production of balanced,

and the timely dissemination of that intelligence to all those who needed it in the performance of their tasks.
objective intelligence
b.

requirements for Each area commander obtained suffisecurity. cient logistic support to seize the initiative in the air and to start major surface advances very early
far in excess of the

minimum

Second.

American

intelligence,

prior

to

World War II, had not been objective. As a result, much basic information which was essential to military operations was not available when
Such basic geographical information as weather, tides, winds, topography, depth of waters, locations of roads, trails, swamps, mountain passes,
needed.

These logistics were necessarily diverted (as far back as the production line in the
in the war.

from number one job of defeating Germany first. We actually defeated the Japanese Air Forces before we defeated the German Air Force, and Japan was hopelessly crushed before the German
case of the excessive naval forces created)

the

surrender.

Thus, an excessive allocation of resources to the

war against Japan upset our planned strategy and

two major military machines instead of one. This was a direct result of the prewar failure to realistically and fully evaluate the war potential of airpower and the combat capabilities of the submarine in a war
resulted in the construction of

and so forth was inadequate and wholly lacking in many cases. Similarly, specific information on man-made features in such form as to facilitate selection of target systems was wholly inadequate. Much of the essential information was available in hundreds of different businesses, books, documents, and other sources, but a gigantic task was
faced in
its

eolation for military use.

Combat intelligence, initially underestimating enemy capabilities, swung to the opposite extreme
and became overcautious, consistently overrating Improvement in combat intelligence, however, was steady throughout the war as experience with the enemy increased and as aerial reconnaissance and other
the enemy's forces and capabilities.
sources of information provided a constantly in-

against Japan.
3.

Intelligence.

The most outstanding feat of American military intelligence in connection with the war against Japan was the breaking of the Japanese code.
This permitted forewarning our forces of Japanese intentions in many instances and permitted making advance preparations for countering Japanese operations.
62

creasing measure of the enemy's deployment and

capabilities.
c.

Third.

The American national viewpoint has

Consequently, our

traditionally abhorred the spy.

national intelligence, including our espionage organization, was not adequate to satisfy our na-

tional security requirements.

Traditionally,

we

blow before obtaining essential objective intelligence and before taking up arms to defend ourselves. This abhorwere prepared to accept the
first

state of their training.

first

people and units produced rather than with the Particularly during the
2 years of the war, air crews, specialists, and
units

rence of national intelligence

iTigness to learn that a

work and

this will-

war is in progress only after we have been attacked can be disastrous in a future war. Our national security demands that our intelligence organization of the future, beginning

would have achieved a barely operable prowhen they were committed to active theaters. This was false economy. It actually
ficiency level

delayed rather than accelerated the effective impact of our Air Forces on the enemy. Only a

today, be aware of the plans, capabilities, and probable intentions of possible future enemies at

Only by having such information can all times. our military forces have an even chance of i^i-otecting our Nation.
4.

Training.

The training of military forces becomes more complex and requires more time with each successive war. Advances in technology have served
to complicate warfare, not only in the intricacies

moderate increase in the training given air crews and technicians would have produced a much higher combat capability and thereby would have reduced the logistic requirements and the over-all structure required. We had not fully comprehended that a war of technology depends more on the efficiency and the skill of a relatively small number of people employing powerful weapons than on the sheer weight of numbers of armed
masses.

The Japanese Air Force made

military establishment.

serious mistake in this matter than did our

much more own

of the equipment employed, but also in the problems of coordination and control. The ancient

Lacking a general depth

ill

in their technological echelon, at all levels, the

problem of training armed masses in the use of the spear and shield or the rifle and bayonet has given way to the problem of training highly
specialized technicians, both in the military service

Japanese Air Force could

afford to lose those

technicians and siDecialists which had been trained in pirewar years. It required much more time for

Japan
States.

to train a replacement than for the

United

and

in the

supporting civilian economy.

Fortunatety, during World War II, the United States of America possessed the greatest depth in
its

Having planned a war of short duration and limited objective, Japan had not provided the
training organization to replace attrition losses with an acceptable product. Hence, the early losses suffered by the Japanese Air Forces, both in
pilots

technological echelon of any nation in the

Our fighting and production forces already had a major degree of basic technical training due to our highly developed mechanical civiliworld.
zation.

and technicians, confronted the enemy with an impossible replacement task. When Japan had
lost

However, laboring under great pressure and

in

the fog of war, our military establishment did

make some
It

serious errors in its training programs.

must be borne in mind that the training problem was gigantic. The Air Force was expanding onehundred-fold and the ground and naval forces were also expanding greatly. Even though a tremendous task was accomplished in the training
those

her best pilots and technicians in the New Guinea-Solomons area, she had thereby lost the air war. While thousands of aircraft could still be built, only hundreds could be maintained and onl}^ scores could be manned by pilots qualified to
fight or

bomb

effectively.

Utilization

of

Civilian

Skills.

The second

greatest weakness in our training

failure, in

many

instances,

program, for the sake of future national security mistakes which were made should not be overlooked. The two most serious errors are discussed below. of our training

build from civilian skills.

program was a to utilize properlj' and This was not, however,

failui'e.

exclusively a training problem or

factors, including our di'af t laws,

Many

worked

to trans-

plant highly qualified individuals from one line

of productive

The Numhers Racket. In general, the emphasis program was on quantity rather

war endeavor

to other fields in

than on quality. In meeting deploj'ment schedules and in prematurely committing forces to combat theaters, we become obsessed with the numbers of

were not employed. One bright spot illuminating this situation, however,

which their

si^ecialties

was the fact that utilization of civilian acquired skills was much better in World War II than in
63

World War I. Nevertheless, it is mandatory that in a future war a system be established which will provide much better results than were obtained in World War II.
5.

The
vidual

principle of capacity with respect to indi-

strategy.

weapons profoundly In November 1943,

affected

our

own

just prior to the

Capacity for War.

assault of the Gilbert Islands, we had assembled a powerful carrier task force. There was no physical barrier between that task force and Japan

The

principle of capacity has not been promul-

proper.

However,

it

was 15 months

later before

gated in classic military literature as a fundamental principle of war. It would be appropriate if this generation contributed to the classic understanding of the art of war and recognized that "capacity" has a universal, direct, and major influence on military operations. The over-all cai^acity of a national economy, the capacity of an integrated military force, and the
capacity of individual weapons affect strategy

carrier task forces raided Japan.

The

principle

of capacity was being observed.

1943,

In November

and throughout

all

of 1944, the evaluation

of Japanese defenses indicated that a carrier task

force could not penetrate to and attack Japan proper with an acceptable degree of losses. In order to go direct to Japan, the required penetration into remaining enemy defenses was beyond
the capacity of force.

and tactics at every level of command. Japan violated the principle of capacity in her first action by attacking the United States. Her national industry and economy could not begin to compete with our own, and since her strategy did not visualize the destruction of our economy and industry, her entry into the war was a violation of the principle of capacity.

However, in June of 1944, 8 months before the carrier strike on Japan, B-29 attacks were initiated against Japan proper with an acceptable degree of losses. These circumstances served to show that the degree of air domination required to
first

bring air operations within the capacity of the air weapon was less than the degree of air domination required to bring fleet and carrier operations within the capacity of the carrier forces.

64

SECTION X
SIGNPOSTS
1.

Faulty Inferences

Which May Be Drawn From the

war against

War Against Japan.

a.

If any written evaluation of the

to

Japan were

leave with civilian or military

bombardment and fighter armed hostilities are underway. (C) That the logistical pattern of a future war will so nearly approximate that of the past war
and
utilize great fleets of

aircraft after open

war may be waged economically and successfully by the United States essentially along World War II lines, it were better that that evaluation had
readers the impression that another world

that our Nation will receive timely forewarning of

an enemy's preparation for war. (7) That the nation with the greatest natural
resources

and

logistical potential for

war

will be

the victor.
(8)

never been written. This paper has attempted to accent that the factors of geogi-aphy and weather, time and space, capabilities and limitations of weapons (which are functions of science and technology), and logistical organization

That amphibious

forces, supported

by

air-

power,

may

concentrate such overwhelming force

in selected areas that landings genei-ally

may

be

made and beachheads

(9)

secured.

and potential are the real factors which govern successful and economical

submarines, which could almost single-handedly have defeated Japan, will have the same capability in a future war.
(10) That, since our forces were successful in maintaining and protecting our sea lines of communication in the past war, they will be capable of doing the same thing in a future war. (11) That the bulk of future land armies will

That

strategy.

To

evolve a strategy for the future from the

experience of the past in emploj'ing carriers,

battleships, airplanes,

and armor and to depart from the basic considerations which should dictate,

not only strategy, but also lines of technological endeavor is to invite disaster.

be airborne.
(12) That, since the United States of America has been able to absorb the first blow in past wars, she will always be able to do so in a future war, and that the great military potential of the United States may again be mobilized and brought to bear

b.

There follows

a list of inferences, possibly

dangero'us to future national security if accepted vnthout critical appraisal, which may be drawn

from studying only the techniques and results of the military action against Japan.
(1)

after
c.

armed

hostilities are

under way.

That

it

will be necessary to fight for

and

Wliile some of these inferences

may

be sound,

win

air superiority in the area of operations.

(2) That conventional very long range bombardment aircraft will be capable of penetrating

hostile defenses to the

maximum limit of their radius of action and destroying the enemy's war
(

economy.
3 ) That aircraft carriers will be capable of successfully operating against an effective land-based
air force.
(4)

depending upon the timing of a future war, there is evidence today that many will be very unrealistic in the near future. A brief examination of each, viewed in the light of cause and effect, follows (1) That it will be necessary to fight for and win air superiority in the area of operations. Air superiority is not an end in itself. Air superiority was necessary in the past war in order that
surface operations could be successfully undertaken and in order that decisive bombing of the

That naval surface

fleets will

be able to

approach an enemy's shores and bombard his installations during the decisive phase of a war. (5) That it will be possible to build, deploy,

enemy's vital components could be accomplished. If science and technology produce an air weapon which can, unaided, penetrate enemy defenses and
65

accurately deposit

its

bombs,

it

may

not be neces-

land-based aircraft and that weakness

It

lies in

the

sary to fight the conventional air battle and obtain

vulnerability to air attack of the carrier

itself.

coventional air superiority before the decisive

economy are mounted. Any force, having successfully made such attacks, however, probably would quickly inherit air dominaattacks on an enemy's
tion for the exploitation phase of the war.
(2) That conventional very long range bombardment aircraft will be capable of penetrating
hostile defenses to the

was the vulnerability of the carrier, and not its airborne aircraft, which kept our powerful car-

rier task forces away from Japan proper until long after land-based aircraft were making the journey to the enemy's home industry on regular

schedule.
carrier's greatest advantage lies in its moand its ability to concentrate a relatively large number of aircraft quickly at selected points. This may be particularly appropriate and useful against an enemy who does not have an effective air force and whose vital targets are exposed to

The

maximum

limit of their

bility

radius of action and destroying the enemy's

war

economy.

Such operations must be evaluated

in terms of

the decisiveness of the action and the cost to our

own war
flicted

potential.

If the over-all

damage

in-

on the enemy significantly outweighs the cost of the operation in terais of manpower, materiel,

and production

potential, the operation

may

be strategically sound.

However, committing a
to penetrate
fire

bombing force beyond its capacity enemy defenses and deliver effective
disastrous in
tential.
its

could be
po-

water approaches, or against isolated defensive forces such as those frequently encountered in the Pacific War. However, we must approach with caution any future strategy which calls for the employment of carriers within an area accessible to an effective land-based air arm particularly if such strategy is founded on the faulty deduction
that carriers performed this task successfully in
the past war.

dissipation of our

own war

The

quality of

enemy

defenses, the de-

cisive nature of the targets selected, the destructive

power of the weapons employed, the accuracy with which the warhead may be delivered, and the range and power of the air weapons employed to penetrate enemy defenses are factors which will indicate the acceptability or unacceptability of such

Excepting the atomic bomb, the carrier is the most powerful and complete military force concentrated into such a small area. Its landing field, maintenance shops, logistics, manpower, living quarters, communications, antiaircraft, and command post are above one keel. Because of its
concentration
it

operations.
(3)

presents a very productive

That

aircraft carriers will be capable of

attractive target, singularly vulnerable to

and modern

successfully operating against an effective land-

based air force.

Major

carrier

operations in

World War II

against land-based aircraft were conducted after

weapons. In evaluating carrier aviation of World War II, the primary role of the force must be borne in mind. The carrier was designed to an objective

the Japanese Air Forces had been reduced to a

relatively impotent

raphy, also,
lected.

and ineffective force. Geogpermitted massing an overwhelming

which was sound and which was achieved. carrier. was intended to operate beyond the

The
effec-

tive radius of land-based aircraft in furtherance

carrier-borne air strength on the objectives se-

Geography, likewise, dispersed the enemy's remaining air defenses, prevented them from being mutually supporting, and reduced their combat capability by compounding command, control, and logistic difficulties. In the history of war, to date, a carrier force has never been pitted against an effective land-based air arm operating from a sizable land mass. Land- and carrier-based aircraft, once they are
airborne, are equally effective within their design

of the over-all mission of the fleet. Functions of carrier aviation included the maintenance of local
air superiority in the fleet area, destruction of

opposing enemy fleet air capability, destruction of opposing surface fleet units, search, and i-econnaissance.

Carrier aviation was not intended to

operate against the enemy's sustaining industry, as the weapon was too costly, the fleet in close

proximity to enemy shores was too vulnerable to

counter-air attack, and
it

was not

feasible to

mass

Carrier-based aircraft, however, have a quality of vulnerability not suffered by

restrictions.

from carrier decks the great air effort required to As the war neutralize an industrial complex.
progressed and air domination was achieved, car-

66

rier aviation

assumed another
fire

role with effectivefleet

be applied.

Here, again, the time of strategy

is

ness in augmenting the

of the

against

virtually important.

An

inferior over-all econ-

shore objectives.

Carrier aviation, thus, was not

special task

a competing instrument to hmd-based aviation, but

was primarily a

weapon designed
fleet.

to

further the over-all mission of the

(4) That naval surface fleets will be able to approach an enemj's shores and bombard his installations during the decisive phase of a war.

All major naval bombardments of enemy shore

World War II occurred after had been won and after local air superiority had been established. (5) That it will be possible to build, deploy, and utilize great fleets of bombardment and fighter aircraft after open armed hostilities are under
installations during

the over-all

war

in the air

and directed is highly organized toward a war objective may be capable of ovcrjiowering a much greater peaceful economy before it can be reoriented toward war production. In World War II, the range and destructive power of weapons was so small that major economic efforts had to be focused on the war program in order to produce significant attrition effects on an enemy national structure. This gave a tremendous advantage to the nation potentially the most powerful. The nature of weapons now available goes far toward eliminating this advantage and places the emphasis on force-in-being rather than
jjotential force.

omy which

way.

(8)

That amphibious

forces,

supported by

air-

power,
early

An

enemy blow

in strength at our internal

force,

concentrate such over-whelming force in selected areas that landings generally may be

may

econoni}', either

by subversion or military

made and beachheads

secured.

very conceivably could disrupt our training and

production capacity to the point that a planned

mobilization over a period of time would be impossible.

The time required

to develop the force,

essential to the

inferiority of the Japanese, early defeat of the Japanese Air Force, limited destructive power of explosives then available, and America's great logistical potential for

Geography, technological

the logistics,

and the base areas

not be available,
it

war made amphibious operations

these factors

possible.

All

operation of a large air force runs into years.

this

As

may be changed
would

in a future war.

An
on

time

may

may

be necessary
at the
size of

enemy's possession of the atomic bomb in reasonable quantities, alone,

cast serious doubt

to fight the

outset

war with the forces-in-being of armed conflict. Bearing on the

the feasibility of major amphibious operations

the required force-in-being are the atomic

bomb

against vital or seriously defended objectives.

(9) That submarines, which could almost singlehandedly have defeated Japan, will have the same

and, possibly, more advanced weapons of mass

destruction.

ployed,

may

weapons, scientifically emreduce to a high degree the numerical

logistical pattern of a future

Such

capability in a future war.

strength in aircraft of the air force required.

(6)

That the

will so

war nearly approximate that of the past war

The geography of Japan's economic structure made her a natural target for the submarine.
Possible future enemies, relying on interior land
lines of

that our nation will receive timely forewarning

communication, would not offer this vul-

of an enemy's preparation for war.

It
is

nerable target to the submarines.

On

the other

possible that a

war in the

foreseeable future

may

be decided by a force so radically different from the over-all military structure of the past war that the essential logistic preparations will
It
is

our strategy in a future war elected to conduct major operations from base areas which
hand,
if

had

to be supplied

by long sea
II,

lines of

communi-

cation, as in
effort

World War
is

not be self-evident.

also possible that the

over-all logistical effort required will be only a

would become enemy submarines. It

our own militai-y extremely vulnerable to

possible that the tech-

small fraction of that recjuired for

(7)

World War

II.

nological advances in submarine design and con-

resources

That the nation with the greatest natural and logistical potential for war will

World War II ended would make such an attempt on the part of the United States
struction since

be the victor.
Logistical potential for

prohibitively costly.

war must be converted

can

from

''potential" to a force-in-being before it

were successful in maintaining and protecting our sea lines of com(10)

since our forces

That

67

munication in. the past war, they will be capable of doing the same thing in a future war. Commented on above. That the bulk of future land armies will be ( 11 )
airborne.
It should be recognized that all significant airborne operations of World War II were exploitation operations conducted with almost negative air

surface combat appears logistically impractical,

uneconomical, and unnecessary. (12) That, since the United States of America has been able to absorb the first blow in past wars, she will always be able to do so in a future war, and
that the great military potential of the United
States
after

may

again be mobilized and brought to bear

opposition.

Further,

the

troops

moved were

equipped with such inadequate transportation that they were not satisfactorily mobile on the ground and such light firepower that they could not engage standard gi-ound force units on even terms. If we plan mass air movement of armies

with artillery and equipment essential to survival in ground combat, we face a staggering logistic problem. Such plans, if fully implemented, could result in the development and construction of only transport type aircraft fi-om the limited peacetime budget available. For example, the

armed hostilities are under way. In World War II, we had the protection of space and therefore time in which to mobilize our resources after the first blow had been struck. Because of the limited range and capabilities of the weapons then available, the enemy was incapable of seriously interfering with our mobilization and training programs. However, these barriers which were our protection in the past have been shrunken
by the increase in range and destructive power of weapons and they now constitute a threat, rather
than a protection, to our security. They constitute a threat in that they protect and conceal possible enemy axes of approach to within very short distance of our industrial vitals. With the

movement

of one infantry corps of three divisions (no tanks) on a 1,500-mile penetration, within a period of time considered tactically necessary to insure the security of the debarkation airhead,

currently would require the equivalent, in trans-

port types only, of a 70-group air force.

the total authorized size of the postwar
Forces. If the

This

is

Army

Air

example of two World Wars (in which American industrial capacity was the deciding factor) before a future enemy, he can hardly be expected to plan a strategy which would permit that industry and manpower ever to be mobilized again.
2.

movement of the airborne army

Signposts.

were to be accomplished before general air domination had been won. World War II experience indicates that an additional requirement for fighter
aircraft, far

From

tain fundamentals

the experience of the past, however, cerwhich are established by a

beyond our capacity, would be neces-

sary to protect the extremely vulnerable

aerial train in flight.

Army
re-

cause and effect relationship may be drawn. An evaluation of the war against Japan, in this light,
leads to the conclusion that our national security

If the air

movement were

made

after air domination

had been won, the

quirement of the ground

Army

for artillery and

It

heavy equipment

is

open to serious question.

must embrace the following programs Keeping the American Public Informed With Respect to the Dangers of Accepting the First Blow in a Future War. An enlightened American
structure
a.

therefore appears that the advisability and practicability of using the air

weapon for the mass

public will appreciate that, to be effective, defense of the Nation must be extended in space and
time.

transportation of lower order combat forces bears

close examination, as
it

very conceivably could imnullify

capabilities

pair the development and maintenance of the com-

bat air

arm and once again

it

its

We fully understand, today, that we will be defending ourselves if our forces are attempting to destroy enemy forces which are already raining weapons of destruction down upon our heads.
We
must appreciate, further, that it is still deand not aggression, if we intercept and destroy an enemy force en route to our Nation, bent upon our destruction. Still further, we must recognize that an overt act of war has been committed by an enemy when that enemy builds a milifensive action,

by binding
component.

in an ancillary role to a surface

This does not preclude the requirement for special purpose airborne forces designed for the
exploitation of specific situations.
forces

Such

special

be highly productive. However, mass air movement of armies for orthodox modern
68

may

tary force intended for our eventual destruction,


and that the destruction of that force before it can be launched or employed is defensive action and not aggression. If we adhere to the old concept that an overt act by an enemy nation can be only the actual delivery of the first military blow
of the war,
to exploit fully the current

weapons of war, organized and administered to assist in the timely development of new weapons of war, and supported by key segments of sustaining industry in
being.

we

invite disaster as a result of the

For

the future,

it is

important that our people,

decisiveness of that first blow.

As

a Nation,

we

must understand that an overt

act

of war has been

conmiitted long before the delivery of that first blow and that the earlier such an overt act is recognized the more effective the defenses may be.
gence.

our Congress, and our military leaders fully appreciate the part airpower played in World War II and grasp something of its future potentialities.

Provisions for Adequate National IntelliNational securitj' cannot be effected in national intelligence darkness and ignorance. system abridging the compartmentation of State
b.

Department, Army, and Navy intelligence activities of the past war is mandatory. To insure our national security to permit the proper timing of our strategj' this agency must be capable of providing and properly interpreting political, economic, geographical, scientific, technological, and military information concerning any possible com-

Before World War II the growth and development of airpower was restricted by concepts of surface warfare which visualized the air weapon as an ancillary force. Airpower entered the war under this handicap and by slow evolutionary steps, each based on hindsight, emerged as the primary force. Airpower was the dominant combat force of the war against Japan and was decisive
in that

bination of future enemies.

c.

Airpower Airpower Airpower Airpower

dominated its own element. dominated naval warfare. dominated ground warfare. possessed powerful and independ-

Extensive Basic and Applied Research and

ent logistical capabilities.

Development Programs. The United States no longer has an overwhehning logistical potential for war. The potential of possible coalitions of powers at a future date may even exceed our own. But even if we were to retain a preponderant logistical strength, technological superiority would still be essential to survival, and technological superiority depends primarily on the products of our research and development programs. The experience of World War II in the war against Japan confirms that the "new weapon" may well be the decisive weapon. d. Maintenance of an Adequate Military Force in Being. The maintenance of a military force in being does not mean simply manning a number of ships, aircraft, tanks, and associated weapons. It means the construction of a balanced military
force, abreast of technology, fully cognizant of the
capabilities, limitations,

Airpower established effective area interdiction by occupation of the air space over an
objective area.

Airpower was capable of forcing the capitulation of an enemy nation without surface
invasion.

The war against Japan dearly demonstrated the military potentiality of airpower and its importance and relationship to ground and naval forces. To be successful and efficient, our national military organization of the future must be so constituted

and directed that airpower may be fully exploited and employed in consonance with the principles
of war.
If our Nation
logic
is

to survive in this atomic age,

demands that our national defense agencies

and techniques of employment of weapons, organized and administered

be oriented toward airpower, and, further, that the future development of airpower not be restricted, as in pre-World War II years, by the inertia of
established organizations or personalities.

69

MAPS
Military maps normally show surface areas which are occupied by the opposing forces and arrows indicating surface operations. Such maps cannot accurately present the action of a war fought in three dimensions, nor do they show the

which takes place beyond surface The four maps which follow give a pictorial relationship between the air action and the surface action of the war against Japan,
air

action

boundaries.

70

'Sov lET
/N/Oiv
"wr.

'r'.M

/
K.
^tf-*

\OVERALLAlrt EFFORT
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^

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7
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0-47

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*<.:<;

746024

47 (Face

p.

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7480S4

47 (Face

p. 70)

No. 3

'

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A1r\

ON JAPAN PROPER
4 MONTHS, APRIL I9f 5 TO AUGUST I94S

victory fJiCPtOlf ED BY Ripi-SURFACE ADVANCES

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748024

47 ((ace

p.

70) No. 4

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing OflBce, Washington 25, D. C.

REPORTS
21
Vereinigte Deutscl e Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger-

many
22 23

Metallgussgesellschaft

Aluminiumwerk

GmbH, Leipzig, Germany GmbH, Plant No. Bitterfeld,

2,

Germany
24 25 26 27
28

Gebrueder Giulini

GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany

European War

Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin

GmbH,

Friedrichshafen

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

*1

on Bodensee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solingen,

Germany

Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke

G, Lunen,

*2 3

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Overall

Germany
29 30
Vereinigte

Deutsche

Metallwerke,

Heddernheim,

Germany
Duerener Metallwerke & Waren, Germany

Report (European War)

Effects of Strategic

G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin

The

Bombing on the German

War Economy

AREA STUDIES DIVISION

AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(By Division and Branch)
*4
5
Aircraft Division Industry Report Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)

31
32
33

34
Airframes Branch
6

Area Studies Division Detailed Study of on Hamburg A Detailed Study of on Wuppertal A Detailed Study of

Report
the Effects of Area
the Effects of Area
the Effects of Area

Bombing
Bombing Bombing

35

Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau,

Germany
7 8
9

36 37 38

A
A A

Erla Maschinenwerke

GmbH, Heiterblick,

AT G

Maschinenbau,

GmbH,

Germany

Leipzig (Mockau),

Germany
10

12 13 14

Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany Over-all Report Part A Part B I Appendices I, II, III Domier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany Kassel, Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu-

39

on Dusseldorf Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Solingen Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Remscheid Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Darmstadt Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Lubeck Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen

GmbH,

CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION

*40
41
Final Report Civilian Defense Division Cologne Field Report Bonn Field Repoit Hanover Field Report Hamburg Field Report Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhibits Bad Oldesloe Field Report Augsburg Field Report Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany

stadt, Austria

Aere Engines Branch

15

Bussing
wick,

NAG

Flugmotorenwerke

Germany
Inc.,

16
17

Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke

GmbH, BrunsGmbH, Taucha,

&
Durrerhof,

42 43 44 45 46 47

Germany
Bavarian Klotor Works,
Eisenach

EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical

Germany
18 19

Bayerische Motorenwerke

A G (BMW)
ICassel,

Munich,
*48 49

Branch

Germany
Henschel Flugmotorenwerke,

Germany

German Electrical Equipment Industry Report Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch

Light Metal Branch

20

Light Metals Industry (Part (Part of Germany

Aluminum II, Magnesium

I,

*50

Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report

71

Abrasives Branch
*51 52

Submarine Branch
92 93

The German Abrasive Industry Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany
Anti-Friction Branch

German Submarine Industry Report

Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg
burg,

G, Augs-

Germany

*53

The German

Anti-Friction Bearings Industry

94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schlff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger-

Machine Tools Branch

*54 *55 56 57 58

many
Friedrich

Krupp Germaniawerft,

Kiel,

Germany

Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany

Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany

Ordnance Branch
*101 102

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION

59 60
61

The Defeat of the German Air Force V- Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign

Ordnance Industry Report Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke

G,

MagdeburgJ

62

Air Force Rate of Operation Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Operations in the European Theatre 63 Bombing Accuracv, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO 64 Description of RAF Bombing 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics

103

104 105 106

107 108

1 Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,i Bochum, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, Germany Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany

MORALE DIVISION
*64b The Effects
of Strategic

(Vol

Bombing on German Morale and Vol II)

*109 *110 *111

OIL DIVISION
Oil Division, Final Report Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1) Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger-

Medical Branch
*65

The
in

Effect of

Bombing on Health and Medical Care

112

Germany

MUNITIONS DIVISION
*66
67 68 69 70
71

many
113

Heavy Industry Branch The Coking Industrv Report on Germany

Coking Plant Report No.
1,

The German
78

Oil Industry, Ministerial

Report Team

Sections A, B, C,

& D

114

Ministerial Report on Chemicals

Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-

Oil

Branch

many
Reichswerke Hermann Goering

115

Ammoniawerke Merseburg

G, Hallendorf,
116

Germany
72 73

August Thyssen Huette

Friedrich

G, Hamborn,

Germany
117 118 119 120
121

Krupp A G, Borbeck

Plant, Essen, Ger-

many
74
75 76

Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein A G, Dortmund, Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanl^s Branch German Motor Vehicles Industry Report Tank Industry Report Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany
Maschinenfabrik

A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany G, Luetzkendorf, Germany Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindustrie A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, GerBraunkohle Benzin
Winteishall

many

2 Appendices
A

GmbH,

Leuna, Ger-

many, Vol. I, Vol. II Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke

Refinery,

G, Harburg
G, Grasbrook

Hamburg, Germany Hamburg, Germany

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke

Refinery,

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke

Refinery,

G, WiUiehnsburg

*77 *78
.79

Hamburg, Germany

122 123 124 125

Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, Vol.

I

&

Vol. II

80
81

Europaeische Tanklager und Transport

A G, Ham.

82 83

Augsburg-Nurnberg,

Nurnberg,

Germany Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg burg, Germany

burg,

Refinery,

HamI

Germany
84 85 86 87 88 89 90
91

Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic

Oil Plant

Vol.

Auto Union
Henschel

&

G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Sohn, Kassel, Germany

Germany Germany Germany

126 127 128 129

&

Vol. II

Friedrichshafen, Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen,

Maybach Motor Works,

Rubber Branch
Deutsche Dunlop

Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-

Gummi

Co.,

Hanau on Main,
Germany

Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant
Ministerial Report on

many
Friedrich

Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany

German Rubber Industry

72

Propellants Branch

130
131

132

Elektrochemischewerke, Munich Germany Sehoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoflf Werke Bad Salzemen, Germany Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, Troisdorf, Clansthal, Dnimmel and Duneberg,

GmbH,

184 185 186 187 188 189 190

191

Germany
133

Deutsche Sprengchemie

GmbH, Kraiburg, Germany

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION

Overall Economic Effects Division Report Gross National Product Special papers Kriegseilberichte which together Hermann Goering Works comprise the Food and Agriculture above report Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 134a

192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199

134

.]

Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, tjlm, Germany Ruhroel Ilydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy Germany Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I & Vol II Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 135 Viliacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 137 Railroad Repair Y'ards, Louvain, Belgium 138 Railroad Repair Y'ards, Hasselt, Belgium 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 152 V Weapons in London 153 City Area of Krefeld 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany 155 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack,

*200
201

202 203 204

Effects of Strategic Bombing on Germany Transportation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions German Locomotive Industry During the War German Military Railroad Traffic

The

UTILITIES DIVISION
*205 206 207 208

German
I

Electric Utilities Industry Report to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant II to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant

Reports" Reports"

21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerke

A G

Pacific

War
War)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

*1

Summary Report
The
Effects of

(Pacific

*2 *3

Japan's Struggle to

End The War Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki

Germany

156
157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170
171

Brauweiler Transformer
weiler,

&

Switching Station, Brau-

CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian

Germany

Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach,

Germany
4 5

Defense Division

Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, EUer, Germany Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, German j' ^Verke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

GmbH,

*6 7
8 9

MAN

Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Erla Maschinenwerke,

GmbH,

Germany
Heiterblick,

Ger

man}'

AT G

Maschinenbau Mockau, Germany Erla Maschinenwerke Mockau, Germany Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke Taucha,

GmbH, GmbH,

Germany
172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180
181

GmbH,

*10
*11

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan No. 1 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and

Submarine Pens Deutsche- Werft, Hamburg, Germany

Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Y'ards, Kassel, Germany Ammoniawerke, Merseburg, Leuna, Germany Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany

Final

Japan Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan
Allied Subjects in

Medical Division
*12

*13

Bombing on Health and Medical ServJapan The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The
Effects of
ices in

182 183

Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany

Morale Division
*14

The

Effects of Strategic

Bombing on Japanese Morale

73

ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division

*33

*15 *16

The Japanese Aircraft Industry Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. I (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (Airframes & Engines) Naltajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. II

*34

m
*18

*35

Nissan Automobile Compan}' Corporation Report No. XVIII (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes and Engines) Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft Report No.

XX

(Nakajima Hikoki
(Airframes

Kawanishi Aircraft

KK) & Engines) Company

Basic Materials Division

*36

Corporation Report No. Ill

Coal and Metals

in

Japan's

War Economy

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha)

(Airframes)

Capital Goods,

Equipment and Construction Division

*19

Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company,

Corporation Report No.

Inc.

IV
Kogyo
Kabushiki

(Kawasaki
Kaisha) (Airframes

Kokuki

*37 *38 *39

The Japanese Construction Industry

Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric

*20

*21

& Engines) Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division Corporation Report No. VI
(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera
Seizosho)
(Propellers) Hitachi Aircraft Company

Power Division

*40
*41

The The

Electric Electric ports)

Power Industry of Japan Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-

Manpower, Food and

*42

Civilian

Supplies Division
of Living

*22

The Japanese Wartime Standard

zation of

and

Utili-

*23

Corporation Report No. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. VIII

Manpower

Military Supplies Division

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo

(Airframes)

KK)

*24

Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company

Corporation Report No. IX (Nippon Gakki Seizo

KK)

*25

(Propellers) Tachikawa Aircraft Company

*43 *44 45 *46 *47 *48

Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese

War

Production Industries

Naval Ordnance Army Ordnance Naval Shipbuilding Motor Vehicle Industry Merchant Shipbuilding
Oil

Corporation Report No.

(Airframes) Fuji Airplane Company Corporation Report No. (Fuji Hikoki KK) (Airframes) Showa Airplane Company Corporation Report No. (Airframes)

X
KK)
49 50

and Chemical Division

(Tachikawa Hikoki
*26

Chemicals in Japan's Chemicals in Japan's

Oil in Japan's Oil in Japan's

War War

XI

Appendix

51

52

War War

Appendix

*27

XII (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK)

Over-All Economic Effects Division

*53

*28

Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)
(Engines)

The Effects Economy

of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic Analysis and Comparison; Intelligence on Japan Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical Sources).

*29

Nippon Airplane Company

Corporation Report No.

XIV
*54

Transportation Division

(Nippon Hikoki
(Airframes)

KK)

The War Against Japanese

1945

Transportation, 1941-

*30

Kyushu Airplane Company

Corporation Report No.
(Airframes)

XV
Urban Areas Division
'*65

(Kyushu Hikoki KK)

*31

Shoda Engineering Company

Corporation Report No. (Shoda Seisakujo)

XVI
*56

Effects of Air Attack on Japanese

Urban Economy

(Summary Report)
Effects of Air Attack on

Urban Complex Tokyo-

(Components)
*32

Mitaka Aircraft Industries

Corporation Report No.

XVII

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Components)

*57 *58 59 60

Kawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on

Nagoya Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto
the City of
the City of Nagasaki the City of Hiroshima

74

i<l

MILITAUY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division

87

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Kffectiveness
of .'Vmmunition

61

62 63 64
65 66

Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan Japanese Air Power Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army
Logistics

88

Report of

Shijis

Bombardment Survey Party (En-

89

closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of Firing Reports of Sliii)s Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure K), iOffocts of Surface Bombardments on Japanese War Potential

Enipioynient of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific

Command
The
bardment
67
68 69 70
71
Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bomin the War Against Japan (Twentieth Air Force)
II

Physical

Damage
Cities)

Division

90
91

Effect of the Incendiary

Bomb

Attacks on Japan

(a

Air Operations in Clxina, Burma, India

World War
War
Against

Report on Eight

The

Effects of the

Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on

The Air Transport Command

Japan

in the

The Thirteenth Air Force in the W^ar Against Japan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War

92 93 94 95

Effects of the Effects of the Effects of the

Against Japan Fifth Air Force in the W'ar Against Japan 71a Air Campaigns of the Pacific W'ar.

The

(a Report on Nine Incidents) Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand and Five

Japanese Targets

Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Pargets

96

(a

Naval Analysis Division

Report on Eight Incidents) Report on Physical Damage Report)

in

Japan (Summary

72
*73 *74 *75 76

The

Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols.

and
97

G-2
98
99
100
101

Division

II)

77
78 79

Campaigns of the Pacific War The Reduction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul The .American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) The Reduction of Truk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and General

Japanese Alilitary and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics. Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the .lapanese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

Summary
80
81

Report

of Ships

Bombardment Survey Party (En-

102 103 104

105

82
83

84
85 86

closure A), Kamaishi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamamatsu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure C), Hitachi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure E), Muroran Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-

*106 *107
108

Saki Areas

0. S.

COVERHHENT PRINTIN6 OFFICEt 1947

75