Foreign Policy

A multicultural America is impossible because a non-W ester n America is not American. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empir e is impossible. The preser vation of the United States and the W est r equires the r enewal of W ester n identity. The security of the world r equires acceptance of global multiculturality . Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1996: 318) The war against ter ror will not end in a tr eaty. Ther e will be no summit meeting, no negotiations with ter rorists. This conflict can only end in their complete and utte destr uction. Vice Pr esident Dick Cheney , Febr uary 15, 2002

international policies fr om trade policy to for eign aid. Whether the post-September 11 era will re-establish an enduring pr esidential dominance not simply primacy in for eign policy r emains to be seen, but the institutional and political pr essur es on pr esidential foreign policy ar e many and impr essive. Never theless, the image of a fragmented and competitive policymaking pr ocess is less applicable to for eign than domestic policy .

T h e H i s t o r i c a l C o n t ex t M a k i n g Fo re i g n Po l i c y TheUSConstitution T h e E xe c u t ive B ra n c h C o n g re s s TheMilitaryIndustrialCom p l ex c I n t e r m e d i a r y O rga n i z a t i o n s cConclusion

c c c c c c

Chapter Summary

America today is the worlds most power ful nation-state and sole mega-power. Having expended enor mous r esources to defeat the Soviet Union during the Cold W ar, the end of the Cold W ar promised Americans a new era of peace and pr osperity. But the ter rorist attacks of September 11 shatter ed such notions and usher ed in a new lodestar for American for eign policy: the war against ter rorism. Even prior to the attacks, however, American hegemony in the inter national system was clear , despite the content of American for eign policy and the pr ocesses by which it is made having changed significantly in the post-Cold ar era. A br oader set of issues fr om trade to the environment and an expanded set of players emer ged to ensur e that although the president r emains the central and dominant figu e in for eign policymaking, he cannot be said fully to contr ol American for eign policy. Congr ess, state gover nments, inter est groups, the mass media and public opinion all play impor tant roles in shaping Americas

Because the United States is currently the worlds leading global power, its internal politics matters not only to Americans but also to the rest of the world. The old aphorism that when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold remains more valid than ever. Few policy areas now exist where the priorities and preferences of the United States do not matter significantly to other nations and the international system as a whole. From international trade to immigration, environmental policy to exchange rates and, most significantly, in cases of war and peace from Colombia through Afghanistan to Iraq, America remains the premier military, economic and diplomatic force in the world. Such is Americas current technical and logistical superiority that superpower no longer adequately captures the extent to which American military, economic and cultural influence exceeds all its allies and rivals. America is now the worlds first megapower, comparable in its dominance to the Roman and British empires at their respective heights. As September 11 made crystal clear, the protection of national security is the imperative of American foreign policy and the defence of US national interests is at the heart of the foreign policymaking process. From 1947 to 1991, American foreign policy had been defined by the Cold War with the Soviet Union and its communist allies. Not just Americas relations with the rest of the world, but also its domestic political and social life were shaped by the overriding national imperative of containing the expansion of communism. But the end of the Cold War made it more difficult to articulate what exactly constituted the American national interest. With the terrorist attacks of September 11, some observers argued that a new era

was ushered into being, although most of the contours of US policy were in fact unchanged by the tragedy. Not least, the fundamental predicament for America since 1945 whether to accept a role as global policeman while being castigated abroad as a global bully remained inescapable. But if the international system is rarely stable, the mechanisms by which US foreign policy is formulated exhibit significant continuity. The Constitution left the control of foreign policy as an invitation to struggle between the president and Congress. During the 1990s, that struggle reached an intensity and bitterness rarely seen in the post-Second World War era. With post-Cold War foreign policy increasingly encompassing issues that broadened the definition of national security trade, drugs, environment, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction many more lawmakers felt compelled by domestic pressures and partisan imperatives to take an active interest in international matters. American foreign policy is therefore a product of the competition and compromises between the White House and Capitol Hill that have always been the hallmark of domestic policy. Even in the aftermath of 9/11 and a resurgent foreign policy presidency under George W. Bush, competition and coalition-building remained prominent and integral features of the foreign policy process.
Foreign Policy 263

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In his farewell address as Americas first president, George Washington famously warned his compatriots against foreign entanglements, but those warnings subsequently went unheeded by his successors. In a fashion that the Founding Fathers could not have anticipated, America had, by the second half of the twentieth century, established a national security state: a polity with a permanent and massive military establishment, a powerful Central Intelligence Agency authorized not only to collect intelligence information but to engage in covert action, and a set of interested actors weapons manufacturers, lawmakers with military bases or ports in their districts and states, international allies and organizations such as NATO for whom the maintenance and expansion of Americas military might made

extremely good financial, political and even moral sense. Contrary to popular notions of American isolationism, and despite the influence of a traditional notion that political differences between Democrats and Republicans should end at the waters edge, Americas world role has been the subject of intense domestic disagreements since the republics founding. In part, this was related to the nature of American identity that was discussed in Chapter 1. Many immigrant Americans escaped oppression and looked to America to build a new future. For some, the exceptional nature of the United States made concern for other parts of the world undesirable. With only about one-sixth of Americans owning passports, the people of America have acquired an international reputation for being inward-looking and insular, unconcerned by the rest of the world except in times of war. For many, as Exhibit 12.1 suggests, the Middle East is Kansas and the Far East is Maine. Against this, however, needs to be set the values that underpin American national identity, not least ideals of human rights and democracy that Americans cherish at home and take as an example for other nations to follow. The flip side of being an immigrant nation is that particular ethnic Americans have often looked to their homelands or that of their ancestors and sought to pressure decision-makers to act according to their interests. From German Americans and Italian Americans pressuring decisionmakers to avoid involvement in Europe during the 1930s, to African Americans pushing for sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s and Irish Americans encouraging active US involvement in the peace process in Northern Ireland during the 1990s, ethnic and racial lobbies have complemented business, labour, religious and ideological

Exhibit 12.1 The Middle East: Kansas?

1964: 58% of Americans knew that the USA was a member of NATO; 40% believed the USSR was also. 1983: 45% believed the US government supported the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 1985: 28% believed the US and USSR fought each other in the Second World War. 1985: 37% did not know the US had supported South Vietnam. 1993: only 25% could identify the Serbs as having conquered much of Bosnia.

 1994: 46% believed foreign aid was one of two biggest items in the federal budget (at 1%). 2000: Only 33% of Americans could identify their Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, but 76% could identify Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
Source: Kegley and Wittkopf (1996: 2656); National Journal, June 3, 2000, p. 1775.

264 American Government and Politics

advocacy groups in seeking to shape foreign policy. An additional factor that encouraged Americas engagement with the world was brute self-interest: national security and economic prosperity. As Exhibit 12.2 notes, four traditions have existed in American foreign policy, offering contrasting prescriptions for Americas role in the world. As such, and although the term has often been used to characterize US foreign policy, Americans have never been entirely isolationist. Rather, for most of American history, the nations foreign policy was unilateralist whether or not America decided to intervene in the wider world was a matter that Americans would decide alone, free from the entangling alliances of which Washington had warned, and interventions would rely on American forces rather than multilateral ones. On occasion, presidents would even announce a national doctrine on foreign policy not so much a sophisticated, strategic blueprint as a warning to other nations of what US national interests were and when the United States would act to defend them by force. The earliest, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, announced Americas intentions of safeguarding her own hemisphere in North and South America from European influence. In reality, however, international conflicts were relatively rare intrusions on a comparatively insular nation that was mostly preoccupied by domestic concerns. Not until the Second World War, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, did America, under FDR, assume the international responsibilities that it would not subsequently relinquish after 1945. Left at the end of that war as the worlds only economic and military superpower, but confronted by an

adversary in the Soviet Union that was intent to many influential Americans on global domination, the years since 1941 have seen the United States embrace internationalism. But it is important to note that even at the conclusion of the Second World War, the Truman administration moved to demobilize Americas armed forces. The notion that Americans, a people instinctively suspicious of concentrated power, eagerly embraced a national security state and global role does not stand up to close scrutiny. The onset of the Cold War (deliberately hastened by Truman in and after 1947 as US disillusionment with the USSR intensified) ultimately led to a broad agreement between the main two political parties on the content of foreign policy and the key institutional

Exhibit 12.2 The four traditions of American foreign policy

Walter Russell Mead (2001) argues that there exist four distinct traditions in US foreign policy: Hamiltonians advocate a strong alliance between the federal government and big business as crucial to domestic prosperity and success abroad, focusing on the need to integrate America into the global economy. Wilsonians argue that the US should focus on spreading American democratic and social values internationally, to create a peaceful and democratic international community that respects the rule of law. Jeffersonians argue that US foreign policy should be concerned more about safeguarding domestic democracy than promoting it abroad, disliking anything that increases the risk of war. Jacksonians hold that the US should prioritize the physical security and domestic wellbeing of Americans and act exclusively to achieve those ends. Foreign Policy 265

actor to achieve policy goals. Broad bipartisan support for the containment of communism as the guiding principle of foreign policy was accompanied by bipartisan acceptance of the presidencys pre-eminent role in prosecuting that policy through economic, military, diplomatic and covert means from 1947 to 1966. While Congress continued to influence foreign policy (controlling funds, ratifying appointments, etc.), it mostly actively supported or reluctantly acquiesced in presidential leadership from Truman to

Johnson. However, partisan differences did not disappear entirely. Republicans made important political gains at the Democrats expense during the McCarthy era of the late 1940s and early 1950s none more so than Congressman and then Senator Richard Nixon. Having been charged by Republicans as responsible for the loss of China in 1949, the Korean War (195053), and allowing communist subversion to spread at home, Democratic officials especially presidential candidates felt obliged to adopt strongly anti-communist principles in election campaigns and in office. From 1948 to 1968, Democrats such as John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson actively feared being tarred by their opponents as soft on communism. While, ironically, that fear ultimately led to the disastrous war in Vietnam (see Exhibit 12.3), the corresponding confidence of Republican presidents facilitated unusually positive steps towards erstwhile foreign enemies. As Nicol Rae argued:
The presidential majority assembled by Eisenhower and the Republicans, largely on the basis of national security issues, would give the GOP a lock on the White House for much of the next quarter-century. As long as the Cold War persisted and the profile of the presidency in foreign and security policy remained high, the Republicans held a crucial advantage in presidential politics over a Democratic Party that was never quite able to overcome the suspicion of naivete in foreign affairs. Ironically, the perception of the Republicans as hardliners on foreign policy allowed Republican presidents to be far more flexible and innovative in international affairs than their Democratic counterparts during the Cold War. By contrast, fears of a resurgence of Republican McCarthyism contributed to the decisions of the Democratic Kennedy and Johnson administrations to escalate American involvement in Vietnam. (Rae, 1998: 54)

1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left America as a superpower without a clear world role. Moreover, the post-Cold War world added divisions over foreign policy to existing differences on domestic issues among the two parties. But perhaps the most important consequence was to reduce the salience of foreign policy to the American public in federal elections. Thereby, the end of the Cold War helped to neutralize a problematic issue for Democratic presidential candidates. Despite the victory of US forces in the Gulf War of 1991, President George Bushs foreign policy record could not prevent his electoral defeat in 1992. Indeed, the perception that Bush was overly interested in international issues rather than domestic American problems contributed substantially to his defeat. As we will see later, President George W. Bushs response to 9/11 was shaped not only by Americas international needs, but also by partisan politics at home.

MAKING FOREIGN POLICY

The making of foreign policy differs from that of domestic policy in several key respects. Presidential authority is greater, congressional influence more limited, judicial interventions are unusual, and non-economic interest group input is rarely decisive in determining outcomes. But, as with all
266 American Government and Politics

aspects of American politics, the US Constitution exerts a profound influence on the process by which foreign policy is made.

THE US CONSTITUTION

As the popular saying had it, only Nixon can go to China. Much as the Cold War affected both parties, so its end dramatically affected domestic politics. Although conflicts over foreign policy had increased substantially from 1968 to

As early as the 1830s, de Tocqueville argued that democracies are much less effective than despotic regimes in regard to foreign affairs. Following his lead, contemporary critics frequently point to the constitutional division of powers between the executive and legislature as inhibiting an effective foreign policy. Just as with his powers in domestic policy, the presidents constitutional authority in foreign affairs is limited and checked. Whether America is at peace or war, the assertion by Congress of its formal powers is a constant. But, as is often the case in politics, which viewpoint is embraced depends heavily on whose ox is being gored. Arguably, by encouraging competition between and within the executive and legislative branches, the prospects for effective policies to emerge are

actually greater in democratic than in nondemocratic systems (where countervailing options to those in power are fewer).

and Soviet forces that could have turned hot. Foreign Policy 267

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Exhibit 12.3 America and Vietnam

The impact of defeat in Vietnam can be gauged from the many novels and movies that continue to deal with Americas growing and ultimately failed involvement in Southeast Asia from 1954 to 1975 (from Apocalypse Now to Born on the Fourth of July). The conflict was a national trauma that persisted until US forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1975 by President Ford. It was the first war that America unequivocally lost. Over 58,000 Americans died during the war, the largest loss of American military life in history. The war was the first televised US conflict. Although its effects are strongly disputed, there is little doubt that the television coverage of a losing war powerfully concentrated American politicians minds. Not least, political and military leaders subsequently devoted careful attention to both the CNN effect (the ability of television to place issues on the public agenda) and the Body Bag effect (the aversion to loss of military lives). Both are less significant than popularly imagined, but elite perceptions of their existence have shaped policy from 1975 to 2001. The war was deeply polarizing and divisive in America, pitting doves and hawks against each other, making foreign policy a salient issue in elections, and contributing to the erosion of the Democrats New Deal coalition. The war ended the Cold War norm of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Although the extent to which the two main political parties from 1945 to 1966 agreed on foreign policy has often been exaggerated, their differences prior to Vietnam were relatively modest. After Vietnam, Republicans and Democrats came increasingly to disagree over the content of foreign policy (on matters such as detente, human rights, and containment), the regional priorities for US strategic interests (Central America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and China) and the instruments by which foreign policy should be carried out (direct military engagement, covert activity, or foreign aid). Despite this, revisionist writers such as Michael Lind (1999) now see Vietnam as a necessary conflict that, like the crises over Berlin from 1958 to 1963 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, managed to avoid a direct confrontation between American

Along with the growth in the federal governments role and responsibilities, foreign policy has been the crucial bulwark in the development of the executive branch in general and the modern presidency in particular. Had the extension of the federal governments responsibilities not occurred during the New Deal, the international context would nevertheless have compelled a substantial increase in presidential power. The embrace of an ongoing global role during and after the Second World War was the main reason for the vast increase in the importance of the presidency in the constitutional order that has continued to the present day. In constitutional terms, the presidency retains important formal and informal powers that render the occupant of the White House especially influential on the world stage: c Constitutional powers. The presidents formal powers as Commander-in-Chief, chief diplomat, and Head of State and Head of Government make him the key figure in foreign policy. Only the president negotiates treaties with foreign states and it is for the president to nominate and receive ambassadors and nominate the key personnel to conduct foreign policy (the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser, and head of the CIA). c Nuclear weapons. The development of the worlds most extensive and sophisticated nuclear arsenal powerfully elevated the presidents authority within and outside the United States. When commentators speak of the presidency as the most powerful political office in the world, this is a large part of the explanation. A single individual holds the capacity to destroy the world several times over. c Media attention. Television and newspaper journalists often focus on the president as the sole shaper of foreign policy. This is inaccurate, since a vast bureaucratic network exists that collates information, makes recommendations, and is charged

with implementing foreign policy decisions. However, what America stands for is typically associated with the presidents priorities and preferences, as the only nationally elected figure and the only official with a national constituency. c Information. Thanks to the array of executive branch departments and agencies with a foreign focus, the president possesses easily the most comprehensive and sensitive collection of information and intelligence on the international system. Combined with the need for secrecy, efficiency and clarity in decision-making, this informational advantage confers on the president a uniquely influential role. Not only does the president possess exceptional political legitimacy, but his authority is augmented by the possession of information that his competitors in Congress and elsewhere lack. c Legal authority. As Exhibit 12.4 documents, rather than constraining the president, many laws passed by Congress have either intentionally or inadvertently given the president additional authority to prosecute foreign policy by conferring powers with respect to specific nations, issues or institutions. That is, the powers that successive presidents have claimed have been granted (or at least, not withheld) rather than seized. Taken together, the combination of formal constitutional powers, legal authority and the growth of Americas international role make the president a formidable player on the world stage. But of course, the powers by themselves imply nothing about the wisdom with which they are used. Few presidents leave office without some failures in international affairs. In some cases, these can be relatively modest, but in others they can be of an immense magnitude (JFK and LBJ and Vietnam, for example). This is especially important since, even when initiatives fail,
268 American Government and Politics

But, as Table 12.1 notes, presidential foreign policy powers are checked and balanced under the Constitution. Only Congress has

Exhibit 12.4 Select laws on foreign sanctions

presidents can be tempted to take action in international affairs to boost their standing at home. Even genuine foreign policy disasters, such as the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the seizure of American hostages in Iran in 1979, can result in an increase in presidential popularity at home.

The following laws passed by Congress gave the president the authority to impose a wide range of sanctions (from total economic embargoes to bans on sales of specific weapons) against other nations. Trading with the Enemy Act (1917). The First World War law allowed the president to impose economic restrictions during war or national emergency. Provisions include authority to control foreign exchange, gold and foreign property. ExportImport Bank Act (1945). Prohibited the bank from supporting countries involved in terrorism, nuclear proliferation or human rights abuses. Foreign Assistance Act (1961). Allowed the restriction of foreign aid in cases of illegal activities such as human rights violations, press censorship or limits on religious freedom. Arms Export Control Act (1968). Permitted sanctions against countries that spread nuclear arms or when the president deemed sanctions were necessary for world and US security. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (1977). Amended the Trading with the Enemy Act to remove wartime as a necessary condition for the president to restrict overseas financial transactions or freeze foreign assets; allows export embargoes during national emergency and economic embargoes. International Security and Development Cooperation Act (1985). Authorized the president to ban imports from countries involved in terrorism. IranIraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (1992). Imposed sanctions on governments and companies that transferred technology to Iran or Iraq that could be used to develop advanced weaponry. Cuba Sanctions (HelmsBurton) Act (1996). Codified the long-standing US economic embargo on Cuba, effectively prohibiting normal trade while Fidel Castro remained in power. IranLibya Sanctions Act (1996). Imposed sanctions against foreign companies that invest in the oil industries of Iran or Libya or that sell weapons or other goods to Libya. TABLE 12.1 The separation of powers in for eign policy Formal powers of the pr esident Formal powers of Congr ess

 Commander-in-Chief of ar med forces Power to declar e war To negotiate tr eaties To ratify/r eject tr eaties (Senate only) To nominate ambassadors and key for eign policymakers (e.g. Secr etar y of State, Defense, CIA Dir ector) To confi m or r eject pr esidential nominees (Senate only) To r eceive r epresentatives of for eign gover nments To raise and suppor t ar mies

problematic. The issue of whether, when and how to send military forces to war is surrounded by controversy. The intentions of the Founding Fathers were reasonably clear in this regard. For example, in Federalist Papers, No. 69, Alexander Hamilton wrote that:
The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as the first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.

Foreign Policy 269

the power to declare war (although most US military engagements have not been accompanied by declarations of war, including Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism). The president can negotiate treaties but the Senate must ratify these for them to become law (notoriously, the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 that President Wilson had negotiated, while more recently a Republican Senate in 1999 rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiated by the Clinton administration). The president can make nominations but the Senate must confirm these (in 1996 the nomination of former Massachusetts Governor William Weld to be Ambassador to Mexico was held up by Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) because Weld was too soft on drugs and sympathetic to gay rights). Finally, whatever a president seeks to do, the power of the purse the authority to pay for actions in international affairs is vested with Congress. One of the distinguishing features of foreign policy is also the marked judicial reluctance to enter the political thicket on foreign policy. In contrast to domestic affairs, where (as Chapter 8 noted) federal courts have been an important influence, only rarely has the federal judiciary intervened on matters of foreign policy. One of the most famous was when the Supreme Court, in US v. CurtissWright Export Corporation (1936), stated that the president acts as the Sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. More recently, the Court has regularly refused to adjudicate conflicts between Congress and the president over the exercise of war powers. In some respects, this latter refusal is especially

Similarly, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison in 1789 that: We have already given in example one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the executive to the legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay. Madison in turn wrote to Jefferson in 1793 that: the Constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature. Contemporary practice has therefore tilted far away from what was intended by the Constitutions authors. Michael Glennon even argued that the Gulf War of 1991 (when the US and 27 other nations acted to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait) represented a textbook example of how an audacious executive, acquiescent legislature and deferential judiciary have pushed the Constitutions system of separation of powers steadily backwards toward the monopolistic system of King George III (Glennon, 1991: 84). Although, as Exhibit 12.5 notes, Congress after Vietnam attempted to impose constraints on the presidents ability to wage war without consultation, these have been mostly ineffective.

The Constitution ensures that presidential authority is in theory checked and balanced by Congress in many ways, but on the issue of implementing foreign policies, Congress is hampered by possessing only some fairly
270 American Government and Politics

blunt weapons. In particular, neither writing new laws nor withholding funds from the executive are politically easy to achieve. Not only is it difficult to muster majority support in the two chambers, but also, since the president can veto ordinary legislation, Congress must obtain super-majorities to overcome presidential resistance. This is difficult on domestic issues but when questions of foreign policy are at stake it becomes particularly problematic to achieve. As in domestic politics, the existence of an array of Departments and agencies within the executive branch also serves as both a resource and a constraint on presidential power in foreign affairs. As Chapter 10 noted, the federal bureaucracy is a vast and complex entity whose agencies frequently find themselves in conflict and competition with each other, and who serve two political masters: president and Congress. On foreign affairs, too, Congress possesses the ability to determine the budgets of key Departments such as Defense as well as the power to investigate agencies activities. As such, the bureaucrats who staff the foreign policy establishment must attend not only to presidential directives but also congressional pressures. In diplomacy, it is formally the Department of State that is charged with formulating and implementing American policy. In practice, however, presidents since Truman have tended to rely more on the National Security Council and its head, the National Security

imminent involving US military personnel broke out. Once the report was issued, the president was required to win congressional approval for the authorization of force within 60 days. If this did not occur, the president then had a further 30 days in which to end the military action (a total 90-day cut-off). However, the WPR has proven singularly ineffective in achieving its goals. Successive presidents have ignored its provisions and cast doubt on its constitutionality. The reasons for the lack of teeth of the WPR include: Ironically, the WPR gave the president the legal authority to wage war without a congressional declaration for the first time in American history, albeit only for 90 days. No president of either political party has fully recognized the constitutionality of the WPR. The federal courts have refused to pass a clear ruling on the WPRs constitutionality, sometimes describing the issue as a political question beyond judicial competence, at other times stating that Congress could make the WPR effective if it wished simply to act to that end. Presidents since Vietnam have been shrewd in their use of military personnel. Most conflicts involving American forces have generally been short and avoided large-scale deployment of ground forces (such as the invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 198990). The political will has not existed in Congress to enforce the WPR or to strengthen its provisions. Most legislators are reluctant to vote against the president at times of war, especially once the military are already deployed. To do so would be likely to court electoral damage or even defeat. Foreign Policy 271

Exhibit 12.5 Curbing presidential wars? The War Powers Resolution

In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR), overriding President Nixons veto. A direct response to the conduct of the Vietnam War by Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the WPR was a deliberate attempt to restrain the authority of the president, as Commander-in-Chief, to wage what were, in effect, undeclared wars. The WPR required that the president report to Congress within 48 hours if hostilities either actual or

Adviser, than on the State Department. Competition between the Department and the Agency can be intense, to the extent that Nixon deliberately chose William Rogers as his Secretary of State because he would be outwitted by his NSA, Henry Kissinger. Equally, the Department of Defense, or Pentagon, is a frequent antagonist of the State Department, while other executive players, such as the Commerce Department, may also pursue separate political goals. For example, while the Pentagon lobbied against the sale of dual use technology to Iraq before and after 1991 on grounds of national and regional security, the State and Commerce Departments both supported bids by US companies to be allowed licences to

export goods. The result is that competition within the executive branch, while not as severe as on domestic policy, is still endemic. In the aftermath of September 11, for example, hawks such as Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz were strongly in favour of an aggressive military response to terrorism, encompassing not only Al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan but also so-called rogue states such as Iraq. By contrast, Secretary of State Colin Powell was far more wedded to the construction of an international coalition, multilateral action with allies, and nonmilitary mechanisms of exerting influence in the international arena. Such competition can be functional for US policy the administrations response to the terrorist attacks saw one of the most impressively coordinated and coherent approaches in postwar foreign policy but, as Exhibit 12.6 notes, without a clear presidential lead, such competition can also be ill-suited to coherent and consistent policymaking.

should engage or how we should engage. The tendency of the administration to juxtapose engagement with isolation is a false one that only succeeds in polarizing the foreign policy debate further. (2000: 252)

Clintons failure to prioritize counter-terrorism, along with U-turns on the defence budget and national missile defence, added strongly to the picture of a president only intermittently interested in and relatively poorly equipped to manage foreign policy at a point of transition in the international system. 272 American Government and Politics

CONGRESS

The role of Congress in international affairs is altogether more complex and contested than in domestic politics. Traditionally, Congress

Exhibit 12.6 The Clinton foreign policy

As the governor of a small, rural southern state, President Clinton had minimal experience of foreign policy on entering office in 1993. He had also run an election campaign focused on domestic policy concerns. Clintons defenders point to some important accomplishments during his two terms: the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the successful bail-out of Mexico in 1995, more or less cordial relations with Russia and China, continued containment of Iraq, successful intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and important achievements in the peace processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. But critics argue that Clinton squandered opportunities to assert a more effective American role in the world after the collapse of communism. As Emily Goldman and Larry Berman observed:
Absent a strategic guidepost, Clintons foreign policy has been broad but shallow; many international initiatives underway but few resources and little time devoted to any one because of a lack of priorities. Absent enlargement, all we are left with is engagement, with no sense of why we

has had little influence over crisis-level policies, more over strategic policy and the greatest on structural policies (see Exhibit 12.7). With the Vietnam War and then the end of the Cold War, the role of Congress became stronger than at any time since the 1930s. Increasing congressional activism on international matters since the late 1960s has been driven by: c Constituency pressures. As the foreign policy agenda has broadened to encompass issues with a direct effect on local districts and states, such as trade, drugs and immigration, the incentives for lawmakers to take up an active international role have grown. With substantial inward financial investment into America, this is especially the case. For example, a representative from Alabama with a major source of employment in Mercedes Benz cannot afford to ignore issues affecting the auto trade from gas emissions to sanctions on foreign nations trading with Cuba to laws on labour union recognition and plant closures. c Partisanship. Some groups are particularly strong supporters of particular parties. For example, the consistent support offered to the Democrats by African Americans and Jews has encouraged Democratic lawmakers to take up active positions on matters such as sanctions against apartheid South Africa and support for Israel (although, ironically, the most vociferous American supporters of Israel Christian evangelicals are also among the most loyal supporters of Republican presidents and Congresses). c Complexity of legislation. By the 1990s, much legislation that appears ostensibly

domestic in focus in fact contains an international dimension. For example, federal government subsidies to farmers also raises issues of fair trade and tariffs, while reform of the CIA has knock-on effects for the intelligence community as a whole.

Exhibit 12.7 Three levels of foreign policy

Structural policies deployment of resources or personnel. Congress has conventionally played an especially powerful role here, largely due to the re-election benefits that can accrue from winning the allocation of new military bases, the building of new ports for the Navy, and the expansion of weaponsmanufacturing plants and research and development contracts. Strategic policies to advance the nations interests militarily or diplomatically. Although most lawmakers have tended not to take an active interest in diplomacy, some legislators have always been interested in foreign affairs. For example, black members of Congress lobbied over many years to impose sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa, while Latino lawmakers have lobbied over immigration reform (though not in the same direction). Increasingly, lawmakers take up foreign policy issues to appeal to particular active lobbies within their constituencies or particularly generous campaign donors, such as the Christian Coalition. Crisis policies to protect Americas vital interests against specific threats. Congress is least well equipped to intervene on crisis matters such as wars, terrorist attacks and hostage-taking. In part, this is a function of its size reaching a quick and decisive agreement for action among 535 members is impossible. Partly, Congress lacks the extensive and often sensitive information that the executive possesses, and partly, Congress is notoriously leaky sensitive information can reach the press and even opponents of the vital interests of the US. Foreign Policy 273
c Organized interest activity. Congress is a

fragmented and open legislature and, as Chapter 9 noted, this means there exist many points of contact for organized groups to make their case. Some of these are economic interests (from Microsoft to mushroom growers). Some are religious and advocacy groups (Christian groups and human rights groups seeking to pressure the government on China). Others are ethnic or racial groups; for example, Frank Pallone (Democrat, New Jersey)

represents a district that includes a large Indian American population and he joined other New Jersey lawmakers in establishing the House India Caucus in 1993. c Media. Given the global reach of news organizations today, concerns that might have been ignored in the 1930s can now become visible overnight in the livingrooms of ordinary Americans. The CNN effect means that television coverage can provide instant and graphic attention to famines, civil wars and environmental catastrophes. By placing such events before the American public, the media can advance (or retard) international matters on the agenda of Congress, although the extent to which mere coverage of an issue determines the response of governing institutions has been contested. Because so many competing pressures are brought to bear on Congress, the national legislature can rarely speak with one voice on foreign policy another reason why many foreign policy observers prefer to see a strong presidency making the running on international matters. But advocates of presidential power need to remember that Congress is a co-equal branch of government under the Constitution. The fact that the source of political legitimacy and authority for Congress is different from that of the president does not, and should not, marginalize the congressional role in international matters. On foreign as well as domestic affairs, the Framers opted for certainty of action over speed. As Exhibit 12.8 notes, matters such as whether the president can negotiate free trade agreements are ones that Congress has a legitimate role in influencing (such fast track authority allows presidents to make an agreement that must then be voted up or down without allowing any amendments by the two houses of Congress).

THE MILIT ARYINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

As we noted in Chapters 9 and 10, the reality of who makes policy can often be different from the formal democratic theory. In particular, iron triangles or sub-governments can exert a parochial force on policymaking. President Eisenhower in particular warned about the danger of the militaryindustrial complex on leaving office in 1961. Fearing

that the development of a garrison state could destroy the small-town America that he cherished and even undermine democracy, he cautioned that the
conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry . . . new in American experience, exercised a total influence . . . felt in every city, every state house, every office of the federal government . . . In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex.

Having conceded that much, though, the extent to which policy is determined, rather

Exhibit 12.8 The history of fast track

Ikes theme has been regularly repeated since 1961, but mostly by individuals far to the left of the conservative general. In its milder versions, critics have questioned whether particular defence expenditures were warranted by the international context (see Exhibit 12.9). In its more extreme and lurid versions, writers from Noam Chomsky to Gore Vidal have popularized the claim that American foreign policy is determined not by the nations actual national security needs but more by the combined and mutually beneficial interests of weapons producers and their bureaucratic allies in the Pentagon.
274 American Government and Politics

But how far the thesis is valid is questionable. It would certainly be naive in the extreme to ignore the mutual interests shared by members of the iron triangle: the Department of Defense requires the best military hardware for its formidable fighting forces, Pentagon bureaucrats wish to maintain and expand their own programmes, while weapons manufacturers naturally have a selfinterest in an expansive military establishment employing (and increasing) the range of its products. The location of military, scientific and space bases is also strongly connected to the home districts and states of the lawmakers sitting on the relevant congressional committees (in particular the armed services committees). As Exhibit 12.10 notes, instances abound of legislators supporting a particular weapons system whose manufacturer just happened to be based in their state or district. Nothing new or novel here simply Congress as usual at work.

1974. The 1974 Trade Act created expedited procedures for congressional approval of non-tariff trade agreements. The president was required to give 90-day notices before entering into a trade pact and had to consult with appropriate congressional committees. Congress had a maximum of 90 days to vote up or down on the implementing legislation (without amendments). 1979. A law implementing the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations extended fasttrack procedures until January 3, 1988. 1988. The omnibus trade bill re-authorized fast-track procedures until May 31, 1991, with a two-year extension possible, barring disapproval by either chamber. The extension was contingent on the president submitting reports to Congress about the negotiations. 1991. In response to intense White House lobbying, Congress rejected an attempt to disapprove of the two-year extension. President Bush wanted the extension to continue talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to commence talks on a USMexico free trade pact. 1993. Congress extended fast-track authority to April 15, 1994, for the sole purpose of completing the GATT agreement. President Clinton wanted the bill enacted before he attended a summit of industrial nations in Tokyo in July. The focus on GATT allowed him to avoid a fight with Congress over broader fasttrack authority. 1994. Clinton tried but failed to get a long-term extension of fast-track authority as part of legislation implementing the GATT agreement. Republicans objected to Clintons attempts to include labour and environmental requirements for trade talks. 1995. The House Ways and Means Committee approved a fast-track renewal bill that was good until December 31, 1999 with a possible two-year extension. Clinton wanted the renewal to facilitate talks with Chile, but objected to provisions that would have barred trade negotiations from dealing with labour and environmental issues. 1997. The Senate easily passed a fast-track bill acceptable to Clinton but the House version was shelved after Clinton was unable to rally support from Democrats, who were under strong pressure from organized labour to defeat the measure.

1998. The House defeated an attempt by Clinton to renew fast-track procedures. Opponents had turned the debate into a referendum on NAFTA, dooming the bill. The Senate Finance Committee approved a trade bill that included fast-track authority but the full Senate never considered the issue. 2001. In December the House of Representatives voted by a one-vote margin to approve trade promotion authority for President George W. Bush. Foreign Policy 275

than influenced, by the three-pronged complex outlined in Exhibit 12.11 is far less clear. A plausible case can be made to the contrary: that over the course of American history, the external environment casts the crucial influence on the size of the military budget. Perceptions of threats (real and imagined) play a powerful role in conditioning policy responses. Some international events came as genuine shocks to Americans: the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the collapse of the Eastern European and Soviet communist bloc, German reunification, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11,

corporation being paid $640 by the federal government for an aeroplane toilet seat. Universities, which should keep a critical oversight of the militaryindustrial complex, are seduced by it, accepting millions of dollars worth of research and development contracts connected to defence expenditures. Defence industry consulting firms and think tanks have mushroomed most employ former Pentagon and Armed Forces personnel, whose advice usually supports the militaryindustrial complexs priorities and preferences. Defence expenditures have remained a priority even in times of massive budget deficits.
Source: Kegley and Wittkopf (1996: 3024).

Exhibit 12.10 Rivers Delivers

Exhibit 12.9 A militaryindustrial complex?

Employment in America is significantly linked to military expenditure: one in ten jobs is directly or indirectly linked to such expenditures by the Pentagon, arms manufacturers and related sources of employment. Congress has sometimes gone beyond presidential requests in voting defence appropriations. Congress was responsible for increasing expenditures on the MX missile from $150 million to $600 million per missile in the 1980s. Defence industry profits are higher than those in most other manufacturing sectors. This is in large part due to the generous manner in which the Pentagon treats defence contractors, handing out millions of dollars in grants and interest-free loans, repaying the costs of even unsuccessful bids, and allowing tax deferments on profits. Sheer extravagance, waste and fraud has been identified, most notoriously the Lockheed

Mendell Rivers (Democrat, South Carolina) represented Charleston, South Carolina from 1941 to 1970. During that time he used his position on the House Armed Services Committee to transform the citys naval yard into a major Atlantic Fleet base. The base acquired squadrons of destroyers and nuclear submarines, an Army depot, Air Force base, Marine air station and veterans hospital. His campaign slogan was Rivers Delivers. When he took over as chairman of the committee, Charlestons share of the annual Navy construction budget more than doubled. A congressional colleague once advised him, You put anything else down there in your district, Mendel, its gonna sink (Anton and Thomas, 1999: 65). 276 American Government and Politics

2001 on New York City and the Pentagon itself in Virginia. Events can and do drive policy. Take, for example, the issue of national ballistic missile defence (a system to intercept ballistic missiles launched against America). Although the notion of such a defence was proposed by President Reagan in 1983 (the Strategic Defense Initiative, rapidly dubbed star wars by its critics), with the end of the Cold War, American planners faced an entirely new strategic context. States such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea attempted to develop the capacity for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction while states such as Russia and China assisted the spread of nuclear technology and ballistic hardware to other nations. For most of the 1990s, the Clinton administration did relatively little in terms of a military response to this new context, holding that diplomacy

and increasing economic ties might ameliorate the situation. Yet in Clintons final year in office, and especially when George W. Bush became president, the focus of attempting to deploy a defensive shield gained greater urgency. Under heavy congressional pressure from Republicans, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act into law in 1999. With the attacks of 9/11, the defence budget in general gained a substantial boost that simply could not have been viable prior to the atrocities. But perhaps the clearest rebuke to the militaryindustrial thesis is the simplest one. That is, were the thesis accurate, we would expect to see a linear upward increase in the defence budget. This is not the case. As Tables 12.2 and 12.3 indicate, the levels of military expenditure, commitments and types of force have ebbed and flowed sharply over time. This is not to deny or minimize the significance of the connections between lawmakers, bureaucrats and interest lobbies, but it is to suggest that the key to the making of policy lies less in an iron triangle and more in successive administrations and Congresss perceptions of the national interests of the United States at large in the world. The end of the Cold War, in particular, ushered in substantial reductions in Americas military personnel, bases and equipment. As Table 12.4 shows, the defences of the United States experienced a substantial downsizing between 1989 and 1999. It is difficult, then, in the light of such data, to accept the claims that a sinister cabal of Pentagon bureaucrats, hawkish lawmakers and profiteering arms makers is behind a consistent

House and Senate members from districts/states with interest in the defence industry Executive Agencies Defence Contractors Department of Defense Boeing, Lockheed NASA Martin, Northrop Department of Energy Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Hercules Foreign Policy 277

attempt to expand Americas military resources and expenditures.

INTERMEDIAR Y ORGANIZA TIONS

Exhibit 12.11 The iron triangle on defence policy

Congress House National Security and Senate Foreign Relations Committees Armed Services Committees; Defense Appropriations Committee Subcommittees Joint Committee on Defense Production Joint Economic Committee Government Operations Committee

The end of the Cold War not only increased the conflicts between and within the executive branch and Congress but also ended the era of bipartisanship in foreign policy that had existed from 1941 to 1966. In some respects this had ceased as early as 1966, when Senator William Fulbright (Democrat, Arkansas) commissioned hearings on the Vietnam War and progressive elements within the party mobilized for a withdrawal. Subsequently, Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Clinton faced an influential chorus of critics from both parties. Even with the war on terrorism and overwhelming public support, President George W. Bush had to cajole and persuade key actors within his administration and Congress to support his objectives during 200102. Strong elements of bipartisanship persist on foreign policy. The Democratic and Republican parties as a whole have not polarized in the dramatic ways that have occurred on domestic policy issues such as gun control and abortion. For example, most of the members of the two parties are committed to internationalism only a few seek an isolationist policy that sees a wholehearted American withdrawal from a global role. However, some important changes have occurred. In particular, as Exhibit 12.12 notes, two crosscutting axes on international affairs on traditional national security concerns and trade/economic policy have yielded four broad positions on foreign policy within the two parties. Broadly speaking, the Democratic Party is
TABLE 12.2 Federal expenditur es on national defence, 196096 Year Total ($bn)

Percentage of federal outlays Percentage of GDP

1960 53.5 52.2 9.5 1965 56.3 42.8 7.5 1970 90.4 41.8 8.3 1975 103.1 26.0 5.7 1980 155.2 22.7 5.1 1985 279.0 26.7 6.4 1990 328.4 23.9 5.5 1996 303.3 16.9 3.6 Source: US Bur eau of the Census, 1996.

TABLE 12.3 US Navy active ship for ce levels, 19172000 Year Number of ships
1933 311 1936 322 1939 394 1945 6,768 195053 1,122 1964 859 1973 641 1989 592 1990 529 2000 315 Source: CQ Weekly, April 15, 2000, pp. 8767.

278 American Government and Politics TABLE 12.4 Americas downsized defences: 1989 v . 1999 1989 1999
Active-duty militar y personnel 2.2m 1.4m Militar y bases 495 398 Strategic nuclear war heads 10,563 7,958 Army Main battle tanks 15,600 7,836 Armoured personnel car riers 27,400 17,800 Navy Strategic submarines 36 18 Tactical submarines 99 66 Air Force Tactical fighter squad ons* 41 52 Long-range combat air craft 393 206 * Squadrons contain fr om 1224 air craft. Source: Defense Depar tment, Ar ms Contr ol Association, Inter national Institute for Strategic Studies (The Militar y Balance 198889 and 199899 ).

Exhibit 12.12 Contemporary positions on US foreign policy

UNILATERALISM Bob Dole George W. Bush Pat Buchanan Jesse Helms FREE PROTECTIONISM/ TRADE FAIR TRADE Bill Clinton Al Gore Tom Daschle Ralph Nader Dick Gephardt MULTILATERALISM Foreign Policy 279

Democrats tend to favour humanitarian interventions, support strongly international organizations such as the United Nations, and want to act with allies in pursuit of international goals such as environmental protection. On trade, however, most congressional Democrats tend to support fair trade rather than untrammelled free trade. Many favour attaching provisos to free trade treaties that mandate protections for workers and for the environment. As such, a majority of Democrats in Congress opposed President Clinton when he sought ratification of NAFTA, and the imposition of a 30 per cent steel tariff on European steel exporters in 2002 reflected George W. Bushs concern to win over the electoral support of traditionally Democraticleaning states such as West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio. The Republican Party is, by contrast (and despite Bushs uncharacteristic stance on the steel tariffs), typically more unilateralist on security issues and more committed to free trade. Although most Republicans are strongly internationalist, many have grave reservations about multilateral action and supra-national institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund. They tend to favour a strong military but are wary of expansive commitments to military intervention, particularly where the use of ground troops is employed. On trade, most in the GOP are keen for the expansion of free trade and new markets for American producers. Clinton owed ratification of NAFTA to the support of a majority of congressional Republicans, who joined with a minority of Democrats to support the treaty. Although a significant minority of Republicans opposed the permanent normalization of trade relations with China in 2000 on both human rights and military grounds the party is generally pro-free trade agreements, whether bilateral or regional. The parties positions have been powerfully influenced in turn by their particular electoral coalitions and allied organized interests. It was noted earlier that ethnic lobbies have traditionally sought to play a role in

multilateralist and idealist on foreign policy.

making foreign policy. Some popular perceptions even hold that American foreign policy is compartmentalized into ethnic enclaves: policy towards Israel being driven by the Jewish lobby, towards Ireland being driven by the Irish lobby, towards Cuba by Cuban Americans, and so on. But, as with the militaryindustrial thesis, such claims need to be evaluated carefully. In particular, the outcomes of policy need to be analysed according to what policymakers determined to be Americas national interests. Tony Smith (2000) argues persuasively that there have been three periods of ethnic influence on American foreign policy but that the zenith of such influence has occurred with the end of the Cold War (see Exhibit 12.13). As a result both of increased activism by ethnic lobbies and the apparent legitimacy that the influential public philosophy of multiculturalism accords such activism, US foreign policy is ripe for sectional influences to be felt. Smiths argument is powerful and persuasive but, as with domestic politics, we should generally be cautious in equating activism with influence. There is often a tendency to infer back from foreign policy towards a given region or state to the activism of a particular domestic American lobby, and then to conclude that the policy was a response to that lobbys pressure. But the fact that a lobby has access to decision-makers within executive departments, agencies and Congress, and that policy is congenial to it, need not indicate proof of influence. As Exhibit 12.14 notes, there are often multiple factors at work in determining American foreign policy. One particularly important consideration here concerns the existence of a countervailing lobby. Ethnic lobbies can influence policy much more easily if no opposing domestic
280 American Government and Politics

the increasing pressures brought by American farmers and other producers to relax relations with Cuba, no organized pro-Castro lobby exists in America, effectively ceding policy influence to the strongly anti-Castro Cuban American lobby with its stronghold in Miami, Florida. Alternatively, one can refer back to the example of Israel. Traditionally, the powerful Israeli lobby has faced no counterpart on the side of Arab Americans. George W. Bush did

Exhibit 12.13 Three periods of ethnic group influence on US oreign policy

191041. Influential immigrant groups within America exerted a drag on the nations commitment to an internationalist role. In particular, German and Italian immigrants were hostile to US participation in the First World War and tempered American intervention in Europe during the 1930s. The Cold War. From 1947 to 1991, many ethnic groups consolidated Americas rise to globalism. Polish, Italian and Cuban Americans were strongly opposed to communism and helped successive administrations to take a clear stand for containment. The post-Cold War era. From 1992 to the present, the glue of anti-communism that had held ethnic lobbies together now broke apart. As a result, a range of ethnic lobbies competed to influence US policy: Armenian Americans, Jews, Cubans, Indian and Pakistani Americans.

Exhibit 12.14 US policy towards Israel

lobby exists. For example, although many Anglophile Americans have expressed concern about groups such as NORAID, no organized anti-Irish republican lobby of consequence exists in America. Similarly, despite

Critics of American policy towards the Middle East frequently charge that the policy is driven, even determined, by the influence of American Jews. While there is no doubt that the political activism of Jewish Americans has helped to shore up US support for Israel since 1948, the key to American policy has been more strategic (American vital interests in the region) than domestic. It is highly likely that, even if no Jewish Americans existed in the United States, US policy towards Israel would have been broadly similar to the one that has in fact obtained. The reasons for this are several: A common biblical heritage (most Arabs are Muslim). A shared European value system (most Arabs take values from Islam). The democratic nature of Israels political system (most Arab nations are monarchies or dictatorships). The Israeli role as a key regional ally of the US (Arab states have historically proven

either unreliable allies for the US, such as Nassers Egypt, or were clearly under the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, such as Iraq). The sympathy extended Jews as victims of genocide in the Nazi Holocaust and the Russian pogroms (by contrast, and long before September 11, Arabs have sometimes been portrayed in America as terrorists, fanatics and ruthless exploiters of the US economy through their control of substantial oil resources). Foreign Policy 281

make strong overtures to the Arab American population concentrated in Detroit, Michigan (a key swing state) in the 2000 election, but political support for Israel in Washington is bipartisan and strong. As Table 12.5 shows, on balance, and with Americas strategic global and regional interests as the priority, the most important conditions that generally shape American policy strongly favour the pro-Israel forces rather than Arab Americans. Overall, the picture of ethnic influence is highly complex and more subtle than popular coverage often admits. Ethnic lobbies are active and, in some case, influential. In the latter regard, some lobbies are strong forces, others weak, and many are episodic. But regardless of the group, it is very difficult to point to any lobby that can actually determine policy on a consistent basis. Americas vital interests, and the plurality of competing pressures on policymakers, preclude such an outcome. Under some conditions when decision-makers in government are divided, for example ethnic lobbies can exert an influence at the margins. But the ultimate test of such influence is simply whether or not the groups goals are consistent with the national interests of the US.

means of securing those goals has not been wholesale, but it has been substantial. At the same time, and well before September 11, 2001, presidential leadership in foreign policy remains largely intact albeit still vulnerable to regular challenge on many fronts. The two presidencies thesis has been undermined and the president must manage not only his relations with Congress, but also the many conflicts that regularly arise within his own administration. The president must also face a number of competing actors in foreign policy, not only from congressional allies and opponents but also interest lobbies of many types, national, sub-national and supranational economic actors, and international organizations of all descriptions. However, the president remains the key player in the policymaking process on international questions, largely because there is simply no other political force in the United States either able or willing to supplant him.
TABLE 12.5 A typology of conditions for ethnic inter est gr oup influence on US fo eign policy: the case of Israel Conditions Pro-Israel forces? Pro-Arab Americans?
Do group goals confor m to US strategic inter ests? Yes No Is the gr oup well assimilated into American society? Yes No Does the gr oup display a high level of political activity? Yes No Is the gr oup inter nally homogeneous? Yes No Does the gr oup command the suppor t of American public opinion? Yes No Is the gr oup able to exer t political clout? Yes No

282 American Government and Politics

CONCLUSION

Foreign policy remains subject to a constitutional invitation to struggle, but that invitation has rarely been refused in the post-Second World War era. Post-Vietnam, and especially with the Cold Wars end, America has seen a steady expansion of the struggle over its role and purpose in international affairs that is at once institutional, partisan, ideological, and informed strongly by domestic as well as global political considerations. The breakdown of bipartisanship on both foreign policy goals and institutional