Facts and Figures The World Bank Group has committed $196.

3 billion to its members since the financial crisis began in 2008. The global economy is expected to expand 2.5 in 2012 and 3.1 percent in 2013, according to the Bank's January 2012 Global Economic Prospects update. Developing country growth has been revised down to 5.4 for 2012 while high-income country growth is now expected to come in at 1.4 percent. World trade, which expanded by an estimated 6.6 percent in 2011, will grow only 4.7 percent in 2012, before strengthening to 6.8 percent in 2013. What the World Bank Is Doing Updated January 18, 2012 Recovery from the global financial crisis remains fragile. Persistent risks to economic health include high unemployment, debt and low growth in developed countries, and access to financing for developing countries. In addition, food prices in 2011 were volatile and near their 2008 peak, and millions of people in the Horn of Africa are in urgent need of assistance as a result of devastating drought, conflict, and displacement. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the World Bank Group has committed $196.3 billion to developing countries, including record commitments in education, health, nutrition, population, and infrastructure, providing much-needed investments in crisis-hit economies:

$106.3 billion from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which provides financing, risk management products, and other financial services to mainly to middle-income countries. $47.1 billion from the International Development Association (IDA), the World Banks fund for the poorest countries. $37.1 billion from IFC, the largest provider of multilateral financing for the private sector in developing countries. $5.7 billion from the Bank Groups political risk insurance arm Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Throughout the crisis, the Bank Group has helped keep children in school, health clinics open, and microfinance loans flowing to women. The Bank Groups commitments for social protection for the poorest and most vulnerableincluding school feeding and cash transfer programs, such as Mexicos Oportunidades -- reached more than $9 billion in 72 countries during fiscal years 2009-2011 (FY09-11). That figure is seven times the precrisis level of $1.2 billion. To boost food security, the Bank has increased annual financing for agriculture to $6 to $8 billion a year, up from $4.1 billion in 2008. The Banks $2 billion Global Food Crisis Response Program, established in response to the 2008 food crisis, is now assisting 40 million people. The Bank also set up the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), at the request of the G20. Six countries and the Gates Foundation have pledged $925 million to boost country-led food security and agriculture programs over the next three years. On September 24, 2011, the Bank increased support to drought-stricken Horn of Africa to $1.88 billion. A $30 million grant to fight malnutrition and disease in refugee camps will come from a new Crisis Response Window established to respond quickly to emerging crises in low-income countries. Some $250 million from that fund is

earmarked for the Horn of Africa. And though growth has recovered in many developing countries, demand for Bank Group assistance remains high. The World Bank Group committed $57 billion in fiscal year 2011, including $16.3 billion for the poorest countries, up from $14.5 billion in FY10. IBRD commitments, at $26.7 billion, are nearly double the FY08, precrisis level of $13.5 billion, and follows record commitments of $44.2 billion in FY10 and $32.9 billion in FY09, as the crisis peaked in developing countries.

The 2008 financial crisis is affecting millions of Americans and is one of the hottest topics in the Presidential campaigns. In the last few months we have seen several major financial institutions be absorbed by other financial institutions, receive government bailouts, or outright crash. So what caused the financial crisis of 2008? This is actually the perfect storm which has been brewing for years now and finally reached its breaking point. Lets look at it step by step. This video explains the economic crisis: The Crisis of Credit Visualized from Jonathan Jarvis on Vimeo.

Market instability
The recent market instability was caused by many factors, chief among them a dramatic change in the ability to create new lines of credit, which dried up the flow of money and slowed new economic growth and the buying and selling of assets. This hurt individuals, businesses, and financial institutions hard, and many financial institutions were left holding mortgage backed assets that had dropped precipitously in value and werent bringing in the amount of money needed to pay for the loans. This dried up their reserve cash and restricted their credit and ability to make new loans. There were other factors as well, including the cheap credit which made it too easy for people to buy houses or make other investments based on pure speculation. Cheap credit created more money in the system and people wanted to spend that money. Unfortunately, people wanted to buy the same thing, which increased demand and caused inflation. Private equity firms leveraged billions of dollars of debt to purchase companies and created hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth by simply shuffling paper, but not creating anything of value. In more recent months speculation on oil prices and higher unemployment further increased inflation.

How did it get so bad?

Greed. The American economy is built on credit. Credit is a great tool when used wisely. For instance, credit can be used to start or expand a business, which can create jobs. It can also be used to purchase large ticket items such as houses or cars. Again, more jobs are created and peoples needs are satisfied. But in the last decade, credit went unchecked in our country, and it got out of control. Mortgage brokers, acting only as middle men, determined who got loans, then passed on the responsibility for those loans on to others in the form of mortgage backed assets (after taking a fee for themselves originating the loan). Exotic and risky mortgages became commonplace and the brokers who approved these loans absolved themselves of responsibility by packaging these bad mortgages with other mortgages and reselling them as investments. Thousands of people took out loans larger than they could afford in the hopes that they could either flip the house for profit or refinance later at a lower rate and with more equity in their home which they would then leverage to purchase another investment house. A lot of people got rich quickly and people wanted more. Before long, all you needed to buy a house was a pulse and your word that you could afford the mortgage. Brokers had no reason not to sell you a home. They made a cut on the sale, then packaged the mortgage with a group of other mortgages and erased all personal responsibility of the loan. But many of these mortgage backed assets were ticking time bombs. And they just went off.

The housing market declined

The housing slump set off a chain reaction in our economy. Individuals and investors could no longer flip their homes for a quick profit, adjustable rates mortgages adjusted skyward and mortgages no longer became affordable for many homeowners, and thousands of mortgages defaulted, leaving investors and financial institutions holding the bag. This caused massive losses in mortgage backed securities and many banks and investment firms began bleeding money. This also caused a glut of homes on the market which depressed housing prices and slowed the growth of new home building, putting thousands of home builders and laborers out of business. Depressed housing prices caused further complications as it made many homes worth much less than the mortgage value and some owners chose to simply walk away instead of pay their mortgage.

The credit well dried up

These massive losses caused many banks to tighten their lending requirements, but it was already too late for many of them the damage had already been done. Several banks and financial institutions merged with other institutions or were simply bought out. Others were lucky enough to receive a government bailout and are still functioning. The worst of the lot or the unlucky ones crashed.

The Economic Bailout is designed to increase the flow of credit

Many financial institutions that are saddled with risky mortgage backed securities can no longer afford to extend new credit. Unfortunately, making loans is how banks stay in business. If their current loans are not bringing in a positive cash flow and they cannot loan new money to individuals and businesses, that financial institution is not long for this world as we have recently seen with the fall of Washington Mutual and other financial institutions. The idea behind the economic bailout is to buy these risky mortgage backed securities from financial institutions, giving these banks the opportunity to lend more money to individuals and businesses, hopefully spurring on the economy.

What? Credit got us into this mess! Why give more?!?

Ironic isnt it? Yes, it is true that credit got us into this mess, but it is also true that our economy is incredibly unstable right now, and being that it is built on credit, it needs an influx of cash or it could come crashing down. This is something no one wants to see as it would ripple through our economy and into the world markets in a matter of hours, potentially causing a worldwide meltdown. As I previously mentioned, credit in and of itself is not a bad thing. Credit promotes growth and jobs. Poor use of credit, however, can be catastrophic, which is what we are on the verge of seeing now. So long as the bailout comes with changes to lending regulations and more oversight of the industry, along with other safeguards to protect taxpayer dollars and prevent thieves from not only getting of the hook, but profiting again, there is potential to stabilize the market, which is what everyone wants. Whether or not it works is to be seen, but as it has already been voted on and passed, we should all hope it does.

Broken windows theory

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Not to be confused with the broken window fallacy in economic theory.

Broken windows in the PruittIgoe housing development

The broken windows theory is a criminological theory of the norm setting and signaling effect of urban disorder and vandalism on additional crime and anti-social behavior. The theory states that monitoring and maintaining urban environments in a well-ordered condition may stop further vandalism as well as an escalation into more serious crime. The theory was introduced in a 1982 article by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. Since then it has been subject to great debate both within the social sciences and in the public debate. The theory has been used as a motivation for several reforms in criminal policy. The broken windows theory has received support from several empirical studies. At the same time it has also been the subject of a large body of criticism.

Contents
[hide] 1 Article and book 2 Theoretical explanation 3 Support for the theory 3.1 New York City 3.2 Albuquerque 3.3 Lowell, Massachusetts 3.4 The Netherlands

4 Other advantages 5 Criticism of the theory 5.1 Criminology 5.2 Drawbacks in practice 5.3 Criticism in popular press

6 See also 7 References 8 Further reading 9 External links

[edit] Article and book

The broken windows theory was first introduced by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, in an article titled "Broken Windows" and which appeared in the March 1982 edition of The Atlantic Monthly.[1] The title comes from the following example:
Consider a building with a few broken windows. If the windows are not repaired, the tendency is for vandals to break a few more windows. Eventually, they may even break into the building, and if it's unoccupied, perhaps become squatters or light fires inside. Or consider a sidewalk. Some litter accumulates. Soon, more litter accumulates. Eventually, people even start leaving bags of trash from take-out restaurants there or breaking into cars.

The article received a great deal of attention and was very widely cited. A 1996 criminology and urban sociology book, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities by George L. Kelling and a co-author Catharine Coles, is based on the article but develops the argument in greater detail. It discusses the theory in relation to crime and strategies to contain or eliminate crime from urban neighborhoods.[2] A successful strategy for preventing vandalism, say the book's authors, is to fix the problems when they are small. Repair the broken windows within a short time, say, a day or a week, and the tendency is that vandals are much less likely to break more windows or do further damage. Clean up the sidewalk every day, and the tendency is for litter not to accumulate (or for the rate of littering to be much less). Problems do not escalate and thus respectable residents do not flee a neighborhood. The theory thus makes two major claims: that further petty crime and low-level anti-social behavior will be deterred, and that major crime will, as a result, be prevented. Criticism of the theory has tended to focus only on the latter claim.

[edit] Theoretical explanation

The reason why the state of the urban environment may affect crime may be described as due to three factors:
social norms and conformity the presence or lack of monitoring, and

social signaling and signal crime

A major factor in determining individual behavior is social norms, internalized rules about the appropriate way to act in a certain situation. Humans constantly monitor other people and their environment in order to determine what the correct norms are for the given situation. They also monitor others to make sure that the others act in an acceptable way. In other words, people do as others do and the group makes sure that the rules are followed. However, when there are no people around, as is often the case in an anonymous, urban environment, the monitoring of or by others does not work. In such an environment, criminals are much more likely to get away with robberies, thefts, and vandalism. When there are few or no other people around, individuals are forced to look for other cluescalled signalsas to what the social norms allow them to do and how great is the risk of getting caught violating those norms. An ordered and clean environment sends the signal that this is a place which is monitored and people here conform to the common norms of non-criminal behavior; a disordered environment which is littered, vandalized, and not maintained sends the opposite signal: this is a place where people do as they please and get away with it without being detected. Therefore, as people tend to act the way they think others act, they are more likely to act "disorderly" in the disordered environment.

[edit] Support for the theory

[edit] New York City

The book's author, George L. Kelling, was hired as a consultant to the New York City Transit Authority in 1985, and measures to test the broken windows theory were implemented by David Gunn. The presence of graffiti was intensively targeted, and the subway system was cleaned from 1984 until 1990. Kelling has also been hired as a consultant to the Los Angeles Police Department and to the Boston PD. In 1990, William J. Bratton became head of the New York City Transit Police. Bratton described George L. Kelling as his "intellectual mentor", and implemented zero tolerance of fare-dodging, easier arrestee processing methods and background checks on all those arrested. Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani and his police commissioner Howard Safir also adopted the strategy more widely in New York City after Giuliani's election in 1993, under the rubrics of "zero tolerance" and "quality of life". Thus, Giuliani's "zero-tolerance" roll out was part of an interlocking set of wider reforms, crucial parts of which had been underway since 1985. Giuliani had the police more strictly enforce the law against subway fare evasion, public drinking, urination, and the "squeegee men" who had been wiping windshields of stopped cars and demanding payment. According to the 2001 study of crime trends in New York by George Kelling and William Sousa,[3] rates of both petty and serious crime fell suddenly and significantly, and continued to drop for the following ten years.

[edit] Albuquerque
Similar success occurred in Albuquerque, New Mexico in the late 1990s with its Safe Streets Program. Operating under the theory that American Westerners use roadways much in the same way that American Easterners use subways, the developers of the program reasoned that lawlessness on the roadways had much the same effect as the problem individuals in New York subways. This program was extensively reviewed by the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and published in a case study.[4]

[edit] Lowell, Massachusetts

In 2005, Harvard University and Suffolk University researchers worked with local police to identify 34 "crime hot spots" in Lowell, Massachusetts. In half of the spots, authorities cleared trash, fixed streetlights, enforced building codes, discouraged loiterers, made more misdemeanor arrests, and expanded mental health services and aid for the homeless. In the other half, there was no change to routine police service. The areas that received additional attention experienced a 20% reduction in calls to the police. The study concluded that cleaning up the physical environment is more effective than misdemeanor arrests, and that increasing social services had no effect.[5][6]

[edit] The Netherlands

In 2007 and 2008 Kees Keizer and colleagues from the University of Groningen conducted a series of controlled experiments to determine if the effect of existing disorder (such as litter or graffiti) increased the incidence of additional crime like stealing, littering or conducting other acts of antisocial behavior. They selected several urban locations which they then arranged in two different ways, at different times. In one conditionthe controlthe place was maintained orderly. It was kept free from graffiti, broken windows, etc. In the other conditionthe experimentexactly the same environment was arranged in a way where it looked like nobody monitored it and cared about it: windows were broken, graffiti were placed on the walls, among other things. The researchers then secretly monitored the locations to observe if people behaved differently when the environment was disordered. The results supported the theory. Their conclusion, published in the journal Science, was that:
One example of disorder, like graffiti or littering, can indeed encourage another, like stealing.[7][8]

[edit] Other advantages

Other side effects of better monitoring and cleaned up streets may well be desired by governments or housing agencies, as well as the population of a neighborhood: broken windows can count as an indicator of low real estate value, and may deter investors. Fixing windows is therefore also a step of real estate development, which may lead, desired or not, to gentrification. In the education realm, the broken windows theory is used to promote order in classrooms and school cultures. The belief is that students are signaled by disorder or rule-breaking and that they, in turn, imitate the disorder. Several school movementsmost notably with the charter school movementencourage strict paternalistic practices to enforce student discipline. Such practices include language codes (governing slang, curse words, or speaking out of turn), classroom etiquette (sitting up straight, tracking the speaker), personal dress (uniforms, little or no jewelry), and behavioral codes (walking in lines, specified bathroom times). Several schools have made remarkable strides in educational gains with this philosophy such as KIPP and American Indian Public Charter School.

[edit] Criticism of the theory

This article's Criticism or Controversy section may compromise the article's neutral point of view of the subject. Please integrate the section's contents into the article as a whole, or rewrite the material.
(November 2010)

[edit] Criminology

According to most criminologists who speak of a broader "backlash",[9] the broken windows theory is not theoretically sound.[10] They claim that the "broken windows theory" closely relates correlation with causality, a reasoning which is prone to fallacy. David Thacher, assistant professor of public policy and urban planning at the University of Michigan, stated in a 2004 paper that:[10]
[S]ocial science has not been kind to the broken windows theory. A number of scholars reanalyzed the initial studies that appeared to support it.... Others pressed forward with new, more sophisticated studies of the relationship between disorder and crime. The most prominent among them concluded that the relationship between disorder and serious crime is modest, and even that relationship is largely an artifact of more fundamental social forces.

It has also been argued that rates of major crimes also dropped in many other U.S. cities during the 1990s, both those that had adopted "zero-tolerance" policies and those that had not.[11] In the Winter 2006 edition of the University of Chicago Law Review, Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig looked at the later Department of Housing and Urban Development program that rehoused inner-city project tenants in New York into more orderly neighborhoods.[12] The broken windows theory would suggest that these tenants would commit less crime once moved, due to the more stable conditions on the streets. Harcourt and Ludwig found instead that the tenants continued to commit crime at the same rate. In a 2007 study called "Reefer Madness" in the journal Criminology and Public Policy, Harcourt and Ludwig found further evidence confirming that mean reversion fully explained the changes in crime rates in the different precincts in New York during the 1990s[citation needed]. Further alternative explanations that have been put forward include the waning of the crack epidemic,[13] unrelated growth in the prison population due to Rockefeller drug laws,[13] and that the number of males aged 1624 was dropping regardless due to the shape of the US population pyramid.[14]

[edit] Drawbacks in practice

A low-level intervention of police in neighborhoods has been considered problematic. Accordingly, Gary Stewart writes that "The central drawback of the approaches advanced by Wilson, Kelling, and Kennedy rests in their shared blindness to the potentially harmful impact of broad police discretion on minority communities."[15] This was seen by the authors, who worried that people would be arrested "for the 'crime' of being undesirable". According to Stewart, arguments for low-level police intervention, including the broken windows hypothesis, often act "as cover for racist behavior".[15]

[edit] Criticism in popular press

In the best-seller More Guns, Less Crime (University of Chicago Press, 2000), economist John Lott, Jr. examined the use of the broken windows approach as well as community- and problemoriented policing programs in cities over 10,000 in population over two decades. He found that the impacts of these policing policies were not very consistent across different types of crime. He described the pattern as almost "random". For the broken windows approach, Lott found that the approach was actually associated with murder and auto theft rising and rapes and larceny falling. Increased arrest rates, affirmative action policies for hiring police, and right-to-carry laws were much more important in explaining the changes in crime rates. Lott's book, has been subject to criticism and has not undergone peer-review, although other peer-reviewed studies support Lott's conclusions.

In the best-seller Freakonomics, economist Steven D. Levitt and co-author Stephen J. Dubner both confirm and cast doubt on the notion that the broken windows theory was responsible for New York's drop in crime. Levitt noticed that years before the 1990s, abortion was legalized. Women who were least able to raise kids (the poor, drug addicted and unstable) were able to get abortions, so the number of children being born in broken families was decreasing. Most crimes committed in New York are committed by 16- to 24-year old males; when this demographic decreased in number, the crime rate followed. At the same time, Levitt also found that the greater number of police as well an increased incarceration rate had contributed to the decline in crime. Levitt's book is based on published scientific studies that have been subject to peer-review.

The Broken Window Theory

In a previous entry, I touched on the broken window theory. You might be familiar with the Pragmatic Progammers' take on this: Don't leave "broken windows" (bad designs, wrong decisions, or poor code) unrepaired. Fix each one as soon as it is discovered. If there is insufficient time to fix it properly, then board it up. Perhaps you can comment out the offending code, or display a "Not Implemented" message, or substitute dummy data instead. Take some action to prevent further damage and to show that you're on top of the situation. We've seen clean, functional systems deteriorate pretty quickly once windows start breaking. There are other factors that can contribute to software rot, and we'll touch on some of them elsewhere, but neglect accelerates the rot faster than any other factor. That's excellent advice for programmers, but it's not the complete story.

The broken window theory is based on an Atlantic Monthly article published in 1982. It's worth reading the article to get a deeper understanding of the human factors driving the theory: Second, at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in rundown ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.) Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family--father, mother, and young son--who removed

the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began--windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were welldressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites. Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves lawabiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx--its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"--vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers--the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility--are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares." There's even an entire book on this subject. What's fascinating to me is that the mere perception of disorder-- even with seemingly irrelevant petty crimes like graffiti or minor vandalism -precipitates a negative feedback loop that can result in total disorder: We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers. At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don't get involved." For some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their "home" but "the place where they live." Their interests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter greatly to other people, whose lives derive meaning and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet. Programming is insanely detail oriented, and perhaps this is why: if you're not on top of the details, the perception is that things are out of control, and it's only a matter of time before your project spins out of control. Maybe we should be sweating the small stuff. Posted by Jeff Atwood UI is Hard Keyboarding: Dell Minimalist Comments The same thing applies to comment spam, which is why it's important to fight the good fight and clean it up.

Haacked on June 24, 2005 2:07 AM Totally agree. I've had that exact thought before when browsing blogs totally overrun with comment spam. When the author has seemingly abandoned his/her blog, It's hard to take the content seriously no matter how good it is. Jeff Atwood on June 24, 2005 8:46 AM Interesting. I noticed the same thing about bicycles in Berkeley (on the campus). I would notice that a bike was in the same place day after day, and it remained untouched. After a week or two, I would notice that one of the wheels had been stolen. After that, the bike had about 3 days before it was stripped down to the frame. (Sometimes a wheel would be left as well if that wheel was locked up, but the wheel would be bent.) David on January 13, 2006 11:00 AM I think this works in reverse, too - I call it the Disney World Effect. The place is so clean, so perfect, that nobody would dare litter. You'll see people walk across the street to throw away the tiniest piece of trash. Few people want to be the first person to mess something up. But if the application is already hopelessly packed with bad and incomplete code, what's a little more going to hurt? jim on July 7, 2006 5:36 AM Do you think that this can be attested to people aren't tidy? Ewaku on November 9, 2007 4:34 AM If your windows are boarded up anyway, it's probably better to just have a wall. Don't claim to include features and then tell the user they're not implemented yet. That's still a broken window. WurdBendur on June 2, 2008 10:44 AM +1 WurdBendur - Amen. Mark Smith on June 3, 2008 4:25 AM If this is meant to be an analogy to neglecting your personal blog,I understand and agree. However,if it is attempting to show human actions in a broken window scenario,reading this and writing this is a superficial diatribe which plainly is a waste of time RuthE. on November 25, 2008 7:36 AM my windonw has just been smashed. Bummer. siking on March 1, 2009 9:09 AM Someone nearby crushed every window on one house un our neighbourhood. There I suggested that they hang name plates on windows and doors to make sure burglars know they should not be messing around them. I also posted some information about those name plates on my blog. David on September 28, 2010 12:23 AM Very interesting analogy here. I agree that everything should me maintained well in our lives would it be work, house or relationships. Ontario used cars Liliya Tyndyk on January 6, 2011 1:22 AM The comments to this entry are closed.

Content (c) 2011 Jeff Atwood. Logo image used with permission of the author. (c) 1993 Steven C. McConnell. All Rights Reserved.

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