barnes2022
barnes2022
barnes2022
Nicholas Barnes1
Abstract
How do organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions
intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have
proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and
confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several ex-
planations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches,
and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however,
has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and ex-
planations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months
of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and
informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and
occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active
territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to re-
spond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic
patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn
violent during intervention.
Keywords
organized crime, drug trafficking, gangs, military intervention, territorial
control, ethnography, Rio de Janeiro
1
School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
Corresponding Author:
Nicholas Barnes, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, The Arts Faculty
Building, The Scores, St. Andrews, KY16 9AX, UK.
Email: njb22@st-andrews.ac.uk
790 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
intervention. I argue that the fear of losing territory to a rival is the primary
reason OCGs respond violently to military interventions. I distinguish be-
tween active, latent, and absent territorial competition among criminal groups,
then show how these different threats shape criminals’ decision to fight, hide,
or flee during military intervention. Where OCGs face an active threat from a
rival, they will fight to defend their territory at all costs, including confronting
military forces directly. OCGs that face only a latent rival threat will hide by
demilitarizing and maintaining low profiles to avoid military enforcement.
Finally, OCGs which are unconcerned with losing their territory to a rival are
more likely to flee, displacing to other territories where they can wait out
military intervention. I also find that patterns of recruitment and OCG member
connections to specific territories and communities determine when and where
existing rivalries turn active during military intervention.
Overall, this article develops a generalizable theory of criminal territorial
control and competition while demonstrating the utility of micro-level eth-
nographic research in adding causal depth and specificity to existing bodies of
research within comparative politics. This article also intervenes in current
policy debates concerning the use of the military to combat OCGs. First, by
better understanding how OCGs respond to military intervention, we can
identify contexts in which such militarized strategies are likely to be especially
ineffective. Second, holding militaries accountable for their behavior during
intervention will require closer documentation and examination of the on-the-
ground tactics of military forces. And third, I find that even “softer” versions
of military intervention (e.g., “hearts and minds” or developmental ap-
proaches), are insufficient in gaining the support of marginalized communities
in which interventions often occur. While there is perhaps a role for the
military to play in combating some OCGs (see Pion-Berlin, 2017), this study
finds military interventions woefully unprepared and ill-equipped to provide
longer-term solutions to the presence of OCGs in Latin America.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section evaluates
existing explanations for violent OCG responses to military intervention.
Section two develops a theoretical framework concerning the logic of criminal
territorial control and the consequences of military intervention. In the third
section, I summarize the research design and methods employed during
ethnographic fieldwork in Complexo da Maré, Rio de Janeiro. I then describe
the territorial control and competition between Maré’s three drug trafficking
gangs prior to the arrival of the military and outline Maré’s occupation and the
various strategies the Brazilian military employed to combat the local OCGs.
In section six, I analyze how and why each of Maré’s three drug trafficking
gangs adapted to occupation. Section seven then discusses these findings in
light of the theory and explores several alternative explanations. The con-
clusion considers the possibilities and limitations of military interventions to
combat OCGs, more generally.
792 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
existential threat to an OCG and its members in a way that even the world’s
most powerful militaries do not. Thus, OCGs must fight to defend their
territory or they are likely to lose it for good. Alternatively, OCGs that only
face latent threats post-intervention will go into hiding to avoid enforcement
by the military. They will stay in their territory because they need to be ready if
and when a latent threat turns active, which may or may not occur during
intervention. A criminal group which faces no threats to their territorial control
following intervention are likely to flee to avoid enforcement by the military.
Due to the absence of a territorial threat, they can wait to return until the
military leaves.
Descriptive characteristics
Number of neighborhoods 10 3 1
Population sizea 67,627 33,185 20,567
Territory size (sq. mile) 0.68 0.23 0.09
Pre-occupation situation
Occupation situation
Outcome
residents suspected of such behavior in the years after the takeover. “We killed the
men but if it was a woman, it depended on what they said.”28 I asked how they
knew who was an informant. “The other residents denounced them,” he told me.29
After 2009, the TCP gang also developed a more collaborative relationship
with the public security apparatus. In interviews with several TCP gang
members, they described how the gang paid an estimated 20% of their total
revenue, to the local Police Battalion and another R$100,000 to the Special
Barnes 803
Figure 2. (a) Complexo da Maré Territorial Control in 2009. (b) Terceiro Comando
Puro conquest of Amigos dos Amigos in June of 2009.
(arrego) was usually paid under the Yellow Line (Linha Amarela) bridge.
Their car would pull up and a mototaxi would make the dropoff. We paid a
bunch of the shifts (plantões) that way. The [police] commanders were even in
on it.”31 Internal investigations later revealed that several BOPE members
were, in fact, receiving regular bribes from TCP and at least 10 police inside
the local Police Battalion were suspected of involvement as well.32
In the months leading up to Maré’s occupation, however, TCP’s close
connection with these local police units did not prevent the state’s public
security administration from taking a stronger hand in preparing the entire area
for its occupation. A variety of special police units began to engage in more
frequent operations, eventually surrounding, then occupying the entirety of
Maré including the TCP area several weeks prior to the arrival of the mili-
tary.33 By the time the military arrived on April 5th, police had reportedly
arrested 162 individuals suspected of involvement with Maré’s gangs.34 Many
of the remaining TCP members initially fled or went into hiding, leaving only
the youngest gang members on the streets.
As in TCP’s territory, the only CVNH gang members that remained on the
streets when military occupation began were adolescents.
Figure 4. Map of Complexo da Maré with the Center for Preparation of Reserve
Officials military base.
time. Of these, 400–500 were assigned to mobile patrol units from which
soldiers monitored each of the gang territories. During the day, these mobile
units also conducted on-foot patrols in many of the narrow streets and alleys
through which the larger vehicles could not pass. At night, soldiers stayed on
the main thoroughfares with tanks replacing trucks and jeeps. According to the
Commanding General Roberto Escoto, this “saturation patrolling” strategy, in
which units were constantly moving through Maré’s streets 24 hours a day,
was necessary to avoid patrols becoming “static” and allowing the gangs to
operate in areas where the military was not.46
The military also set up 24-hour checkpoints around Maré, many of which
were strategically placed along the major thoroughfares, entrance points, and,
along the border between the TCP and CVNH territories. At these check-
points, soldiers stopped and searched cars, motorcycles, and persons for
weapons and drugs. The nature of these searches were highly targeted and
racialized. Darker skinned adolescents and young men were disproportion-
ately stopped and searched, a strategy the military assured residents was
necessary.47 Some of my interlocutors were searched dozens if not hundreds
of times during occupation and regularly expressed frustration and anger over
these methods.48 “They [the soldiers] can treat us like that cause they’re
wearing the fatigues but you take them off and you’re just another guy like me
from a poor family,” one gang member told me.49
808 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
favelas, where increases in theft, domestic and sexual abuse, and interpersonal
violence were reported (Cano et al., 2012; Savell, 2014).
While all three of Maré’s drug trafficking gangs lost their ostensive control
of the streets and each implemented the mobile boca strategy of retail drug
sales, it quickly became apparent that the dynamics of territorial control and
competition had shifted as a result of occupation. As occupation progressed, I
observed how each gang shifted its structures and activities according to the
security environments in which they found themselves.
the entrances that the army didn’t, and started carrying guns to defend their
community.”69
The details of these inter-gang dynamics also became known to me through
my involvement with an NGO project designed to rehabilitate gang mem-
bers.70 Nearly 30 TCP members would eventually enroll in the program and,
over the course of 6 months, I accompanied the project while conducting
dozens of interviews with them. Many of these men described their frustration
that the military was either unwilling or incapable of preventing ADA from
making incursions into their territory. They feared their rival would manage to
take back the territory, which would mean they and perhaps their families
would be expelled or killed even if they were no longer formally involved with
the gang. In one memorable interview, Josué, described how ADA had been
searching for him, “They went to my house and grabbed my wife. They
pointed a pistol in her face and asked where I was. They told her they were
going to kill me. My kids were there too.”71 Other former TCP gang members
reported that ADA had been searching for them as well and that their situ-
ations were becoming similarly insecure.72 The coordinators of the reha-
bilitation program told me they were having a difficult time keeping some
these men in the program.73 By the end of occupation, nearly half of the TCP
members had dropped out or were suspected of rejoining the gang.
Despite the military’s efforts to quell the violence, as occupation pro-
gressed into its sixth and seventh months, ADA gang members continued to
812 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
make incursions into the area. Confrontations intensified as the two rival
gangs as well as the military engaged in daily shootouts.74 “The situation is
horrible!” Olı́via, an NGO worker and resident of ADA’s former territories,
decried. “The streets are totally empty after 2 pm because everyone knows that
ADA is hiding in some of the houses.”75 Local schools, which serve more than
7000 students, were closed for several weeks.76 Even after ADA’s leader was
arrested in Maré in late September, invasions, skirmishes, and shootouts
between the gangs and with military soldiers continued through the end of the
year and into January,77 sometimes spilling out onto Avenida Brasil and
stopping traffic on the city’s busiest highway.78 Riding my bike through these
areas in the mornings and early afternoons, I observed TCP members armed
with semi-automatic weapons congregating in several areas. When army
patrols came near, these men ducked into houses, waited for the patrol to pass,
before reemerging to monitor the streets.79
For TCP gang members, the imperative to defend their territory against a
rival outweighed the possibility of arrest or even death at the hands of the
military. In several cases, TCP members even initiated confrontations with
military personnel in what appears to be purposeful efforts to provoke them.80
According to Valdemir, “TCP was shooting at the army to call attention to the
fact that they were still strong. They were also preventing ADA from invading
because there would be more soldiers on the streets.”81 In this way, con-
fronting state forces can actually help a criminal group preserve their territorial
control. This logic matches a phenomenon Lessing has theorized, in which
anti-state violence sends “a signal not to the state but to members of the drug
trade itself” (2017, p. 84). Such a strategy, however, can be costly.
In response to the growing levels of violence, the military implemented
even more aggressive tactics. They closed parts of Avenida Brasil to mount
massive operations involving dozens of tanks and militarized vehicles.
Hundreds of soldiers went house to house searching for gang members.82
They broke down doors and entered homes and buildings without warrants.
After a number of soldiers were injured and one killed in an encounter with
TCP members, the military ramped up their coercive presence even further.83
They installed permanent bunkers with machine guns at strategic points in the
community and placed snipers and lookouts on the rooftops of schools and
apartment buildings. Finally, in early 2015, TCP scaled back their fighting
strategy. According to Valdemir, “the leader (chefe) has ordered to stop
shooting at soldiers because the army was gaining the upper hand.”84
Confronting the military had taken its toll on TCP but, by then, ADA had
ended their takeover attempts as they had also suffered the consequences of
months of fighting. The threat presented by ADA once again reverted to a
latent one. TCP was able to relax their confrontational tactics without the
possibility of losing territorial control.
Barnes 813
For their part, residents of the TCP area became increasingly frustrated
with the behavior of the military and began protesting, which occasionally
brought them into direct conflict with the military.85 Several residents with no
known gang involvement were allegedly shot and killed by soldiers.86 In a
public meeting with the press, numerous residents and civil society leaders
described dozens of violations and episodes of violence and abuse in this
area.87 Survey results confirm these qualitative findings. Residents of the TCP
area reported twice as many violations by soldiers and twice the number of bad
or terrible evaluations of the military (Silva, 2017, pp. 75–79). Some sporadic
confrontations between TCP gang members and military soldiers would occur
until the very end of occupation on June 30th, 2015,88 likely the result of these
much more aggressive tactics. By the end of occupation, 23 soldiers had been
injured and one killed in confrontations with OCG members, nearly all of
them in TCP territory.89 Of the 12 civilian deaths that the military was re-
sponsible for in Maré, 11 of them occurred in the TCP territory, 8 of which
were alleged gang members.90 Nevertheless, when the last of the troops
vacated Maré, TCP quickly reasserted its full control over the area and their
bocas de fumo were up and running within a matter of hours.
being involved in more than 20.94 Such long-term and frequent violence had
clearly taken its toll on many of the CVNH members. Severino, for instance,
thought “it would be better for everyone if there weren’t territories.”95 Inácio,
a former senior member, even hoped that the drug trade would eventually
become more like the United States where “you just call someone and they
bring the drugs to your house.”96 Former CVNH gang members also believed
the military to be less violent and aggressive than Rio’s military police, which,
given BOPE’s focus on the CV areas in the lead up to occupation, is un-
surprising.97 While many of the CVNH members also complained of a lack of
parties and entertainment during occupation, they found military occupation a
much less stressful environment and, according to the coordinators of the
program, the CVNH members did not have the same issue with recidivism at
least during occupation.98
Although many of the senior CVNH members initially fled the area at the
beginning of occupation, after less than a month, I heard reports that they had
returned and were hiding out.99 In the subsequent weeks and months, I
occasionally observed these men, unarmed and unaccompanied by the large
security details which had surrounded them prior to occupation. They
maintained low profiles. Inácio, a close friend of the gang leader, said he had
returned because “he doesn’t want to lose his territory which can happen if you
spend too much time outside.”100 Several other CVNH gang members agreed
that it was important for the gang leader to not be absent, especially when
occupation ended, and police operations and violence with TCP resumed.101
Although territorial threat remained latent and CVNH members stayed in
hiding for the duration of occupation, conflicts between residents and the
military nonetheless emerged. For one, the military, responding to the in-
creasing violence within the TCP area, began to engage in more aggressive
practices throughout the entirety of Maré. In public meetings, residents de-
scribed increasingly hostile interactions between residents and the military.102
I personally witnessed several occasions in which soldiers pointed their rifles
at local youth and shouted racial slurs and insults at them.103 Frustrated youth
began to harass and provoke the soldiers. Large groups of 20–30 youth would
congregate on the main streets of CVNH’s territory late at night, shouting
obscenities, and throwing rocks and bottles at the soldiers.104 Troops used
rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowds.105 According to CVNH
gang members, these boys and adolescents were not gang members but
wannabees and hangers-on.106 Confrontations between unaffiliated youth and
the military continued until the end of occupation on May 1st, 2015, two
months before they would leave the TCP area.107 Within a matter of hours, the
CVNH gang had resumed their heavily armed presence, disbanded the
troublesome youth groups, and reestablished their open-air drug markets.
816 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
interviews with residents in this area. In public meetings, nearly all of the
denunciations and complaints came from other areas of Maré. Again, part of
the reason may be that Parque União had been a less violent and unstable area
for quite some time and, consequently, more economically secure. In fact, this
neighborhood has many of Maré’s most expensive shops and restaurants and
receives many visitors from outside. Parque União is even referred to by local
residents as the Zona Sul (Southern Zone) of Maré, a reference to the wealthy
and touristy neighborhoods surrounding Rio’s iconic beaches. This less so-
cially disorganized context likely helped contribute to a more pacific occu-
pation. And yet, despite the CVPU gang being little present in their territory
for the duration of occupation, when the military left for good on May 1st of
2015, CVPU gang members quickly returned to the area, reasserted their
presence on the streets, and resumed the open-air drug trade.
their longtime rival. CVNH needed to be prepared for the reactivation of this
territorial threat whenever occupation ended.112 Meanwhile, CVPU’s grip on
their territory was never in doubt. The gang has been led by members of the
same family since the 1990s and has never faced any territorial competi-
tion.113 Returning to the community during occupation was unnecessary and
would have only put them in danger of being discovered and arrested.
There are several plausible alternative explanations which must also be
addressed. First, could the violent reaction of TCP be the result of some other
internal gang process? For instance, TCP’s leader was arrested by Federal
Police in a luxury apartment in the Western Zone of the city several weeks
prior to occupation.114 Perhaps TCP members became violent due to the lack
of control of the rank-and-file or because of internal conflicts rather than the
threat from ADA. However, in interviews with TCP members, they all
maintained a clear idea of the leadership structure of the gang, never once
mentioning any internal fighting or conflicts. In addition, because Rio’s gangs
are thoroughly connected through prison-based networks, gang leaders retain
their leadership and continue to dictate some gang-level policy in spite of
incarceration. It is more likely that the arrest of TCP’s leader prior to oc-
cupation further reinforced ADA’s belief that they could take back their
territory.
Another possible explanation is that the various gang responses were the
result of the military’s different approaches to confronting them. The troops, at
least initially, were divided into three bases, called “strongholds” (pontos
fortes), a strategy the military had developed to combat Port-au-Prince’s gangs
as part of Brazil’s deployment in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (Harig, 2019). Perhaps each stronghold varied their tactics to produce
different gang reactions. However, the military’s strongholds did not match up
with the borders of the gangs but overlapped them significantly.115 Moreover,
the entire troop contingent, from the General down to every soldier, were
rotated out of service every 2 months. By its end, 23,500 troops eventually
took part in Maré’s occupation.116 While the strategies of the military certainly
evolved over time, the differences between Maré’s gangs were observed
across multiple troop deployments. The military’s behavior does not account
for the different gang responses.
Next, following the work of Lessing (2017), perhaps TCP remilitarized and
confronted the state in their effort to return to a corrupt equilibrium, from
which they benefitted before occupation. Brazil’s military, however, has no
history of corruption like Rio’s police and, by all accounts, soldiers did not
engage in any corrupt behaviors while in Maré. In fact, part of the reason why
the military decided to rotate their entire personnel every 2 months was to
prevent the emergence of such corruption schemes. It is unlikely that the TCP
820 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
Guys from outside create problems in the community because no one knows
them. I don’t know them! It’s different when you know someone from infancy.
The conversation is different. You ask how their kids are, you talk about family.
The community will always seek out the gang members from here to resolve
problems.118
For many residents in the CVNH territory, occupation improved the se-
curity environment dramatically because they no longer had to deal with
abusive foreign gang members or the violent confrontations between CVNH
and TCP. Thus, Magaloni et al.’s predictions seem to be borne out in this case.
However, the less abusive relations between CVPU and residents also resulted
in a more pacific occupation period. Overall, governance dynamics preceding
occupation do not seem to determine the outcome of such interventions.
Rather, I would argue that both governance dynamics and OCG responses to
state intervention are subservient to territorial imperatives vis-à-vis rival
groups. Such a finding is reminiscent of civil war contexts, where the need for
territorial control trumps all other considerations (Arjona, 2016; Kalyvas,
2006; Metelits, 2010).
Barnes 821
Conclusion
By the time the last of the troops left Maré on June 30th, 2015, the Brazilian
military had conducted an estimated 83,000 operations, arrested 674 indi-
viduals, apprehended 255 minors, and made 1356 seizures of guns, ammu-
nition, drugs, and stolen vehicles.119 And yet, within hours of the military’s
departure, each of the three gangs had reestablished their presence on the
streets and dozens of bocas de fumo were open for business. The four Police
Pacification Units which had been planned for Maré never came to fruition
and none of the military’s development or security initiatives remained in
place. If the goal of military occupation was to permanently weaken the gangs
in the area and reestablish the Brazilian state’s monopoly of violence for the
long-term, it had failed.
That said, according to Rio’s Institute of Public Security, the homicide rate
in Maré did decrease from 21 to 6 homicides per 100,000 during occupa-
tion.120 From this perspective, it might seem like occupation was a success.121
And yet, this number obfuscates the frequent confrontations and shootouts
between TCP and ADA that shut down schools and major thoroughfares, as
well as the numerous human rights abuses by the military.122 A myopic focus
on the homicide rate also ignores the increase in low-level crime and public
disorder in some areas of Maré, yet another reminder that social order can
actually deteriorate when OCG control and authority are removed (Arias &
Barnes, 2017; Magaloni et al., 2020). The falling homicide rate also masks the
fact that 2500 military troops with all of the resources of the Brazilian state
never really threatened the long-term presence and viability of Maré’s gangs.
Their divergent experiences during occupation further demonstrate the OCG
capacity to adapt to wildly different environments. Like other OCGs
throughout the world, they do not require a specific organizational form or
leadership structure to operate and can effectively reproduce themselves
without significant revenue streams for extended periods of time. The absence
of violence does not necessarily signify the underlying effectiveness of these
operations. Public security policy must understand that these groups are
incredibly resilient to such militarized operations, whether or not they engage
in outright violence.
In this regard, perhaps the biggest failure of the military in Maré was its
inability to garner resident support in their efforts to combat the gangs. This is
not for lack of trying. The Brazilian military had spent several decades de-
veloping just such a methodology from existing counterinsurgency policy and
stabilization missions (Harig, 2015a; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014;
Siman & Santos, 2018). In fact, an estimated 60–90% of the Maré troop
contingent had already been deployed to Haiti, where they used an almost
identical set of development tactics and militarized operations (Harig, 2015b).
In Maré, the military made significant upgrades to the infrastructure,
822 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
collaborated with local civil society, and engaged in 24,000 social actions,
spending an estimated R$ 350 million in the process.123 Despite these efforts,
less than 50% of 1000 surveyed residents said the military had had a positive
impact in Maré (Silva, 2017, p. 87). According to one community leader:
The ‘Pacification’ of Maré’ was a lie and an abstract term that doesn’t reflect the
reality. …They haven’t implemented more responsive institutions and although
they have sought out civil society to develop relationships, this is more in theory
and serves as subterfuge for them to control the space.124
Acknowledgments
I would first like to thank all the current and former gang members, community leaders,
and other residents of Complexo da Maré that agreed to participate in this project and
generously shared their time, opinions, and memories. I am forever indebted to my
Barnes 823
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
ORCID iDs
Nicholas Barnes https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9559-6676
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. I employ the overarching concept of OCG here because: (a) it is, practically
speaking, extremely difficult if not impossible to clearly separate gangs from
cartels, mafias, or other criminal and extra-legal armed groups (Barnes, 2021;
Varese, 2010); and (b) the use of OCG falls in line with other recent work on this
subject (Magaloni et al., 2020; Trejo & Ley, 2018, 2021). In this article, I will use
the terms gang and OCG interchangeably.
2. Magaloni et al. (2020) is a notable exception.
3. See also Albarracı́n (2018); Arias (2017); Arjona (2017); Berg and Carranza
(2018); Daly (2016); Durán-Martinez (2015); Moncada (2016, 2019); Magaloni
et al. (2020); and Wolff (2015) among others.
4. There are some exceptions to this rule. Idler, for one, finds that criminal and other
non-state armed groups can sometimes peacefully share territory in Colombia’s
borderlands (2012, p. 77). Recent research has also found less well-structured
gangs in some Brazilian cities (Wolff, 2015) and rural transportistas in Central
824 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
America (Blume, 2021) to share territory, though not always peacefully, because
they lack the capacity or desire for exclusive control.
5. Some OCGs also provide essential goods and services that the state does not
(such as dispute resolution, social welfare, and access to illicit markets), that
allows them to gain the more active support of a segment of the local population.
Beyond a basic level of order that comes with the control of violence, some
OCGs will develop more significant ruling structures and institutions to govern
various aspects of resident life while others may only offer only rudimentary
mechanisms for dealing with residents. This variation in governance activities is
remarkably similar to contexts of rebel governance (Arjona, 2016).
6. In this regard, it is useful to recall Kalyvas’ (2006) conceptualization of territorial
control in the midst of civil war. He distinguishes between fragmented, two or
more groups exercising limited control over the same territory, and segmented,
two or more groups exercising full control over distinct territories.
7. These three neighborhoods are Nova Holanda, Parque Maré, and Parque Rubens
Vaz but residents often refer to the entire area as Nova Holanda. The gang itself
uses the acronym “CVNH” on the packets of drugs it sells.
8. Coelho, 2014b (see Supplementary appendix for journalistic sources).
9. All meetings have been given a number. Further information about these
meetings can be found in the Supplementary appendix.
10. See appendix for a complete list of interviews. I have provided all interviewees
pseudonyms and removed all references to specific NGOs and RAs for further
anonymity.
11. All quotations included in this article were transcribed from these notes.
12. For the sake of space, I have noted the journalistic citations in the endnotes and
included the full references in the Supplementary appendix.
13. A third gang faction, Amigos dos Amigos, would emerge in the 1990s as a result
of a schism within Comando Vermelho. Terceiro Comando would later be re-
named Terceiro Comando Puro. Every favela-based gang in the city of Rio de
Janeiro is affiliated with one of these three prison factions.
14. Bruno 10/6/2014; 10/27/2014
15. Comprised of retired or off-duty public security personnel, milı́cias are seldom
involved in drug trafficking directly but often run protection rackets and mo-
nopolize certain illicit or informal markets within these neighborhoods. Although
research was also conducted in this area of Maré, gaining access to milı́cia
members was not possible for security reasons. Therefore, I have left the analysis
of the impact of occupation on this area of Maré out of this article.
16. The various roles, locations, and activities of the gangs became known to me
through dozens of interviews with members and hundreds of hours observing the
activities at bocas de fumo. For a more in-depth discussion of the structure of
Rio’s gang factions, see Dowdney (2003, pp. 39–51)
17. Bruno 10/6/2014; Severino 10/2/2013
Barnes 825
18. I attended several dozen baile funk parties across all three gang territories where I
observed gang activities and drug sales.
19. See Arias and Rodriguez (2006) for a discussion of these dynamics.
20. See Arjona (2017) on the importance of obedience.
21. Bruno 10/27/2014; Fulton 7/3/2014; Naldo 12/17/2014
22. Medo deixa, 2009; PM reforça, 2009; Sete morrem, 2009
23. Fulton 7/3/2014; Breno 12/16/2014; Valdemir 1/9/2015; Thiago 1/9/2015;
Megaoperação, 2013; Vieira, 2011
24. Josué 7/22/2015; Luiz 7/30/2014. This estimate is likely high but according to
reports, a similarly sized favela, Rocinha, allegedly sold R$10 million worth of
drugs per month even after the installation of a Police Pacification Unit, so the
estimate is plausible (Comandante da UPP, 2013).
25. Luiz 7/29/2014
26. Daniel 8/21/2014
27. Valdemir 1/9/2015
28. Josué 7/22/2014
29. This dynamic is reminiscent of civil war contexts (see Kalyvas, 2006, Chapter 7).
30. Fulton 7/3/2014; Josué 7/22/2014. Again, these estimates are likely high. Ac-
cording to interviews with former gang leaders across the city, most arrego
arrangements amount to about 10–15% of drug sales.
31. Josué 7/22/2014
32. Leitão, 2015; Sete morrem, 2009
33. Villela, 2014
34. Coelho, 2014a; de Andrade and Coelho, 2014; Platinow, 2014
35. At least once a week according to my field notes.
36. See Larkins (2013) for a description of the performative nature of these
operations.
37. One exception to this occurred in June of 2013 when a BOPE Sargent was shot
and killed during a surprise operation, which led to the 24-hour occupation of the
entire CVNH area by hundreds of BOPE police. Police went from house to house
hunting for gang members, eventually killing nine residents, eight of whom were
alleged gang members (Polı́cia Civil divulga, 2013).
38. Severino 10/2/2013; Marcos 11/3/2014
39. Timo 7/15/2014; Everton 4/17/2014; Marcio 4/17/2014
40. Marcos 11/3/2014
41. Severino 5/15/2014; Bruno 10/6/2014; Breno 3/6/2014
42. Vinicius 11/9/2014; Evaristo 12/23/2014; Gustavo 11/19/2014
43. Many residents and gang members referred to the territorial presence and control
of the CVNH gang prior to occupation as the “heaviest” (o mais pesado) of the
three.
44. Costa, 2014a
45. I followed one such group of soldiers over the course of the morning. They
searched several homes in Nova Holanda but did not apprehend any individuals
826 Comparative Political Studies 55(5)
nor find any weapons or drugs (Field notes 4/5/2014). In a subsequent meeting,
Mariano Beltrame, the public security secretary, described these warrants as
issued for “micro-regions” or 3-4 houses because they were unable to identify the
specific houses of gang members (Meeting #9).
46. Costa, 2014b
47. According to one military official during Meeting #20, this was because young
and poor men were most likely to be involved with the gangs.
48. Fulton 7/3/2014; Timo 7/15/2014; Naldo 12/17/2014
49. Fulton 7/15/2014. Even though I passed through their checkpoints nearly every
day for 9 months, the military only stopped and searched me twice.
50. Costa, 2014b; Ghali, 2017
51. According to military officials, the hotline received 1495 calls in the first
7 months of occupation (Valdevino and Antunes, 2014), though the number of
denunciations reportedly diminished significantly after the first few months
(Meeting #26).
52. Junior and Magalhães, 2015
53. See online appendix for a list.
54. Patrı́cio 6/28/2014; Vitor 8/22/2015; Meeting #26
55. Luiza 10/2/2014
56. Field notes 7/22/2014
57. Severino 5/15/2014
58. Many of the youngest gang members are colloquially referred to as bucha de
canhão (cannon fodder) because of their expendability.
59. Artur 1/11/2017; Bernardo 1/16/2017; Severino 5/15/2014; Fulton 7/3/2014
60. Inácio 3/26/2014; Marcio 4/17/2014; Everton 4/17/2014; Josué 7/22/2014
61. Inácio 3/26/2014
62. Josué 7/23/2014; Luiz 7/31/2014; Bruno 10/27/2014; Severino 5/15/2014
63. G. Brito, 2014; Exército intensifica, 2014
64. Meeting #13; Meeting #17
65. Olı́via 9/26/2014; Valdemir 1/9/2015
66. Beltrame Anuncia, 2014
67. Most residents work or go to school outside of Maré. Meeting #17
68. Valdemir 1/9/2015; Meeting #9; Meeting #13; Homem morre, 2014; Brito, 2014
69. Valdemir 1/9/2015
70. The program involved a series of interventions, including primary and
secondary-level classes and tutoring, individual and group counseling sessions, a
monthly stipend, and opportunities for legal employment in the service sector.
See pages 28–30 in appendix for more details.
71. Josué 7/15/2014
72. Timo 7/15/2014; Fulton 7/15/2014
73. Valdemir 12/1/2014; Manoel 9/15/2014
74. Constancio, 2014; Heringer, 2014
75. Olı́via 9/26/2014
Barnes 827
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