Farmers' Suicides in Maharashtra

Author(s): B. B. Mohanty and Sangeeta Shroff

Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Dec. 25-31, 2004, Vol. 39, No. 52 (Dec. 25-31,
2004), pp. 5599-5606
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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 Farmers' Suicides in Maharashtra
This study, based on three districts of Maharashtra, reveals that though crop losses,
indebtedness and market imperfections cause economic hardship to farmers, social factors
are also at work, which lead in some cases to their suicides.

B B MOHANTY, SANGEETA SHROFF

new production technology and accompanying infrastructral

arrangements.
uicides among the farming communities in states like In pursuance of policies laid down in the country's five-year
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka have been plans, the government launched land reforms. The Madhya Pradesh
hitting the headline for the last couple of years. While stateAbolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950, the Bombay Tenancy
governments attribute the deaths to crop failure due to badand Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act,
weather, the media emphasises the rising cost of cultivation,1958 and Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings)
mounting indebtedness and bottlenecks in agricultural marketing.Act, 1961 are some of the important measures. Notwithstanding
A number of studies have been undertaken to explain theseloopholes, these acts had a positive impact on the redistribution
suicides, particularly in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Theyof land [Nanekar 1968; Rao 1972; Rajasekaran 1998; Deshpande
vary not only in style and temper but also in their major findings.1998]. Vidarbha region reported greater success in land reforms
While one group attributes these suicides mainly to agro- measures and within the region, the districts of Amravati and
economic problems like crop failure, indebtedness, etc [Shiva Yavatmal registered a better performance [Rajasekaran 1998;
and Jafri 1998; Deshpande 2002], others highlight politico-Mohanty 2001]. It is estimated that up to 1995, the surplus land
economic issues, blaming the state for the tragedies [Assadi 1998; amounting to 10,751 holdings consisting of 15,963 hectares in
Revathi 1998; Vasavi 1999; Sarma 2004]. It is also suggested Amravati, 4,635 holdings of 8,178 hectares in Yavatmal and
that the suicides are the outcome of historical factors associated 7,198 holdings of 8,800 hectares in Wardha were distributed to
with cotton cultivation [Prasad 1999]. Parthasarathy and Shameem the landless families [Rajasekaran 1996]. As a consequence, the
(1998) opined that though growing indebtedness is the main number of operational holdings increased substantially in these
reason for the strain on the farmers, it does not entirely explaindistricts. According to the Reports of Agricultural Census, the
suicides since the social milieu in which an individual gets operational holdings in Yavatmal, Amravati and Wardha districts
alienated from the family and society has to be also taken into increased by 111 per cent, 83 per cent and 77 per cent respectively
account. between 1970-71 and 1995-96. However, the increase in the
Most of these studies have analysed the issue at theofmacro
number holdings may also be attributed to the breaking up
level relying mainly on secondary sources. Besides, they are
of the traditional joint family system. The increase in the number
studies of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, and hence their find-
of operational holdings led to a corresponding growth of the
ings may not be necessarily relevant for Maharashtra,
numberwhere the over a period of time. To go by the census
of cultivators
agro-climatic and social-cultural features are different. However,
estimate, the proportion of rural cultivators in total main
a recent study undertaken by Mohanty (2001) of Amravati
workers whichand
was 29 per cent in 1971 rose to 32 per cent in
Yavatmal districts revealed that the suicides in these districts
2001 in Yavatmal. Similarly in Wardha it increased from 29 per
were the results of a complex process of interaction of both
cent to 31 per cent during this period. Though there was a decline
historical and contemporary socio-economic forces. But it was
in Amravati (from 24 per cent to 22 per cent) it increased
confined to a study of the suicide victims and did not make a
substantially in absolute numbers (from 1,14,108 in 1971 to
comparison of the socio-economic activities of the deceased
2,09,100 in 2001).
farmers with that of the farmers who continued to bear their In these three districts, the increase in the gross cropped area
problems without taking this extreme step. In view of this, anhas been marked, as has been the rise in cropping intensity. The
attempt has been made in the present study to understand thedata furnished by the Season and Crop Reports reveal that the
suicides of the farmers in Maharashtra with reference to three cropping intensity rose to 136.95 in Amravati and 115.17 in
districts of Amravati, Yavatmal and Wardha which account forYavatmal in 2000-01 as against 103.64 and 101.90 respectively
over 90 per cent of the total of such deaths in the state [Mohantyin 1980-81. However, in the case of Wardha, it did not show
and Shroff 2003]. any significant change (104.97 in 2002-2001 as against 105.14
in 1980-81).
Looking at the cropping pattern (Table 1), it is found that cotton
continues to be the dominant crop. Though the area under cotton
Amravati, Yavatmal and Wardha form a part of Vidarbhain Yavatmal did not indicate any trend, in Amravati and Wardha,
region of Maharashtra. Prior to the formation of the state, they
by and large, a declining trend was observed. The fall in the area
were a part of Madhya Pradesh. Though this region witnessed under cotton and also foodgrains was mainly due to the increasing
changes from the latter part of the 19th century due to extensivecultivation of oilseeds. Consequent upon the recommendation
cotton cultivation, systematic changes in agriculture took placeof the government for the adoption of high yielding varieties that
in the post-independence period under the impact of land reforms,provide higher profit, the area under these seeds has become

Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 20045599

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widespread. Almost the entire area under kharif jowar, cottonthe amount of loans advanced by them to the non-traders (in-
and wheat came under these varieties. cluding the farmers) decreased noticeably [Mohanty and Shroff
2003]. Moreover, in the recent years the licensed moneylenders
In order to meet the demands of the farmers for more working
capital, the credit network was expanded largely through havetheceased to play any role. As a result, the farmers have no
choice other than to depend on the informal moneylender/shop-
establishment of agricultural cooperative credit societies. Though
their number has not grown considerably over the last decade,keepers for timely agricultural input requirement who usually
the membership and average outstanding loans have increased charge exorbitant rates of interest. As a consequence, a significant
[Mohanty and Shroff 2003]. Previously, the price of cotton, portion of farmers' agricultural income goes in repaying
their loans. At times, distress sales of agricultural produce also
which was the predominant crop in these districts, was uncertain
due to unpredictable foreign market demand and the monopoly take place.
purchases of local middlemen. This introduction of the MonopolyBesides, the new methods of farming have made the traditional
Procurement Scheme for Cotton in the state from 1972 ensured skills and knowledge almost obsolete. The farmers have to
guaranteed prices to the cultivators. This price remained the same
acquire scientific know-how about the methods of seed treatment,
throughout the season and the cultivator was assured of it, even application of fertilisers, pesticides and other inputs. Ignorance
if the sales were not made at that price. Since then, by and large
of these methods leads to the loss of crop. Usually, the government-
an increasing trend in the price of cotton has been noticed and supported extension services are expected to educate the farmers
on appropriate farm practices and input use. But these services
there has also been a rise in farm (harvest) prices of other crops.
Trade in agricultural produce was fraught with several irregu-have failed in educating the farmers, particularly the small farmers
who were mostly illiterate and in need of such information.
larities and malpractices, which were detrimental to the interests
of the agriculturists in the past. In view of the adverse effects[Mohanty 2001]. The farmers largely depended upon the private
of the malpractices observed in the marketing of agricultural agencies and local dealers who often prescribed inputs in their
own interests (ibid).
produce, the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1927) recom-
mended to the government the need for regulating the marketingAlthough regulated marketing is expected to ensure a better
deal to the farmers, the existing arrangement seemed to be
of agricultural produce. Accordingly, the Central Provinces and
Berar Cotton Markets Act was enacted in 1932 and amended inadequate. Though the area served per regulated market de-
in 1935. Its purpose was to regulate trade in foodgrains.creased Sub- in these districts, the number of markets has not increased
sequently, the then government of Madhya Pradesh enacted considerably
the (Table 2). As per the 1994-95 data, Amravati and
Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets (Amendment) Yavatmal had 13 regulated markets each and there were only
six in Wardha district. Moreover, the area served per regulated
Act in 1954. Finally, with the formation of the state of Maharashtra,
the government enacted the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce market was 44 sqkm in Wardha, 121 sqkm in Yavatmal and
Markets (Regulation) Act in 1963. The principal objectives 108of
sqkm in Amravati. In this context, the small farmers find
this act were: (a) to bring about equity in bargaining power among
it both difficult and uneconomical to sell their produce in distant
the agriculturists and traders, (b) to promote mutual confidence
markets and thus prefer to sell it to the local traders. Further,
between the two parties, (c) to prevent malpractices in trading, the marketing of cotton, which is supposed to be entirely con-
trolled by the monopoly procurement scheme since 1972, has
and (4) to give a fair deal to the peasants. All the principal centres
of trade in these districts were brought under the purview of this
not been entirely successful in checking the illegal trade by the
act. Market committees were constituted comprising the elected local middlemen. It is often reported that the sale of cotton
representatives of agriculturists and traders, as well as nominated
through monopoly procurement scheme involves irregular pay-
members from the government and local bodies. The officials ofto farmers, waiting for long hours to tender the produce,
ments
the market committee supervise marketing operations at all stages
difficulties in transportation, etc. As a result, many farmers prefer
and the methods of sale and purchase were prescribed by them.
to sell their cotton to the traders of the neighbouring states through
Though the agricultural revolution initiated by the government
the local middlemen in contravention to the law. Figures related
of Maharashtra was expected to spell prosperity for the farmers,
to the estimated production of cotton and its procurement under
the to
it also created conditions that are likely to push the farmers scheme revealed illegal movement of cotton to the
distress. The increased cultivation of cash crops and extensive
neighbouring states. For example, in 1993-94 the estimated
adoption of HYV varieties required heavy doses of fertilisers,
production of cotton was 26.25 lakh bales while the monopoly
pesticides and other complementary inputs. As a result, thescheme
cost procured only 13.25 lakh bales, which means that about 50
of cultivation increased substantially. To go by the Reports of of the produce was sold outside Maharashtra. In Amravati,
per cent
62 per cent of the produce was sold outside the state while in
the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices of the govrment
of India, the total per hectare cost of cultivation of cotton in it was 66 per cent (Sanstha Committee Report, 2001).
Yavatmal
Maharashtra which was Rs 2,143.74 in 1981-82 went up to True, the emergence of new technology has led to a rise in
Rs 6,341.18 in 1995-96 in real terms. Similarly, the cost theofaverage yield of the major crops. It increased noticeably in
cultivation ofjowarrose toRs 2,118.87 in 1995-96 from Rs 716.32
crops like cotton, jowar and tur (Table 3). However, the yield
in 1981-82. of these crops often fluctuated largely due to variations in rainfall
The credit facilities extended by the cooperative societies and
andclimatic conditions. The agriculture in these districts depends
other formal agencies in view of the rising cost of cultivation,
almost entirely upon the vagaries of the monsoon, with hardly
are inadequate. They hardly benefit the small farmers [Mohantyany irrigation projects, barring few wells and tanks. According
1999]. The credit provided by the licensed moneylenders (who to the Season and Crop Report, 2000-01, while in Amravati, the
advanced loans under the Bombay Moneylenders Act, 1946, proportion of irrigated area was 8 per cent of net sown area, in
which came into force in the Berar district February 1, 1960)
Yavatmal and Wardha it was even lower at 6 per cent and 7 per
was also limited. The number of these moneylenders andcent,
also respectively. The expansion of irrigated area is negligible

5600 Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004

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over the years [Mohanty and Shroff 2003]. Thus, capital- respectively. Similarly, in the control group there were 11 farmers
intensive crops like cotton were cultivated almost without each from the small and medium category and eight were large
irrigation. Hence, crop failures are a frequent occurrence. Though farmers. As the suicides covered in this study relate to the year
yearwise data are not available, there is no doubt that adverse 2002, the data were collected with reference to the agricultural
climatic condition caused crop losses in several years (Table 4). year of 2001-02.
But the macro-level data do not clearly support the view that The control and suicide victim farmers were largely owner
economic hardship caused by these adverse agricultural condi- cultivators. Only a few of the deceased farmers of the medium
tions led to suicides. In rural areas, suicides are regular pheno- holding group leased-in some land which came to 34 per cent
mena and their rate continues to increase over the years (Table 5). of their total land. The small farmers belonging to both suicide
The suicide rate in rural areas which was 1.77 in Amravati, 1.60 and control groups received small portions of land through land
in Yavatmal and 2.86 in Wardha per lakh of population in 1981 reform measures. The average landholding of the control farmers
has gradually gone up to 6.31, 7.63 and 11.38, respectively, in was slightly higher than that of the suicide group. However, the
1999. Moreover, looking at the distribution of suicides by causes average holding of the large farmers who committed suicides
(Table 6), it is found that suicides in these districts were mostly was higher compared to the large farmers of the control group
due to a variety of social factors. The economic causes, which because one of the deceased large farmers owned more than 40
include bankruptcy or sudden change in economic status, poverty, hectares of land.
etc, have a negligible effect. However, the suicides due to unknown When the area under crops of the deceased and control farmers
causes were also significant in some years. is taken into account (Table 7), it is evident that cotton was the
On the whole, it may be inferred that the existing agricultural predominant crop, which covered more than one-third of the gross
conditions have possibly contributed to the occurrences of suicides. cropped area. The proportion was relatively higher among the
But such an effect is difficult to discern at the macro level owing small and medium farmers. The soil and climatic conditions,
to the non-availability of other related socio-cultural information. formal credit facilities and a relatively greater margin of
A closer look at the micro-level can explain fully the causes of profit motivated the farmers to cultivate cotton. The large farmers
farmers' suicides. in the control group had less area under cotton cultivation
(24 per cent). Besides, the tillage area under jowar was also
Ill substantial. Tur was mostly inter-cropped with cotton and the
practice was common among the small farmers. Some farmers,
The present study has covered 30 suicide cases from the three had orange trees and the cropped area for the fruit tree was
districts. Based on the random sampling method, 10 cases were significant among the deceased large farmers (17 per cent).
selected from each district. As the study attempts to juxtapose Despite certain variations across the size classes, the cropping
the agro-economic conditions of the victims' families in the
background of a control group, an equal number of control cases Table 3: Average Yield of Principal Crops (kg/hectare)
was selected from each district. The control cases were from the
Years Amravati Yavatmal Wardha
villages to which suicide victims belonged. The farmers of both Kharif Tur Cotton Kharif Tur Cotton Kharif Tur Cotton
groups had almost similar characteristics in terms of landholding, Jowar (Lint) Jowar (Lint) Jowar (Lint)
cropping pattern, etc. The deceased and control farmers were 1980-81 1174 782 57 802 742 72 810 931 72
further divided into three categories on the basis of landholding 1985-86 1216 993 95 1333 772 110 1121 916 179
size, viz, large farmers (more than 4 hectares), medium farmers 1990-91 1415 612 116 1553 621 85 965 659 200
(2.01 to 4 hectares) and small farmers (up to 2 hectares). Of the 1995-96 1723 966 159 1012 835 135 969 673 226
2000-01 1433 676 82 1102 1163 91 1019 1099 193
30 deceased farmers, while 11 were small farmers, 12 and 7
farmers were from the medium and large holding size Source: Season and Crop Report, Maharashtra Sta

Table 1: Area Under Principal Crops (Per Cent of Gross Croppe

Years Amravati Yavatmal Wardha
Foodgrains Oilseeds Cotton Foodgrains Oilseeds Cotton Foodgrains Oilseeds Cotton
1980-81 44.00 6.04 46.88 50.53 4.83 43.31 48.87 5.78 43.58
1985-86 46.40 5.00 44.53 43.35 3.80 51.47 46.18 9.63 42.21
1990-91 45.86 7.94 40.36 47.42 5.10 46.60 45.89 13.59 37.61
1995-96 39.48 13.40 41.03 43.32 5.26 48.56 40.43 20.94 35.65
2000-01 38.80 19.85 30.04 4.93 9.43 45.85 36.95 36.92 36.55

Source: Season and Crop Report, Maharashtra State, relevant

Table 2: Status of Regulated Market

Districts 1982-83 1987-88 1994-95
No of Villages Area Served per No of Villages Area Served per No of Villages Area Served per
Served per Regulated Market Served per Regulated Market Served per Regulated Market
Regulated Market (sq km) Regulated Market (sq km) Regulated Market (sq km)
Amravati 189 1357 131 939 1869 120.86
Yavatmal 146 1132 135 1045 1981 107.6
Wardha 145 901 169 1052 1040 43.48

Source: Statistical Abstract of Maharashtra S

Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004 5601

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pattern of the control and deceased farmers exhibited broadly the village. Also payment was made in instalments, whereas the
the same pattern. traders made immediate payment in full. However, the large
Added to the extensive cultivation of cash crops, the agriculture farmers preferred to sell to the federation because of their large
of both deceased and control farmers was heavily dependent upon volumes of transactions, their capacity to wait for payments and
high-yielding varieties. The major crops such as cotton andjowar higher prices offered. In the case of jowar and tur, the small and
were largely covered by them. Keeping in mind their greater yield medium farmers who made local sales received prices which were
potential, the farmers adopted these seeds extensively in the hope lower as compared to the prices received by their counterparts
of getting a higher income. The large-scale adoption of HYV selling in the regulated market. For cotton, the small deceased
seeds necessitated the farmers to invest more in agriculture in and control farmers, who sold to the local traders, received prices
terms of fertilisers, pesticides and other inputs without which that were 19 per cent lower, as compared to the farmers dealing
the size of the harvest would be substantially reduced. directly with the federation.
Compared to the control farmers, the cost of cultivation of the The farmers of all size classes in both the groups were able
deceased farmers was higher. While the cost of cultivation of to recover their cost of cultivation. They reaped relatively less
the control group was Rs 6,987.32 per hectare, the corresponding than the usual profit owing to crop loss caused by bad weather.
figure for the suicide group was Rs 8,994.60, i e, 29 per cent The per hectare net income of the small and medium deceased
higher. However, the cost of cultivation among the small control farmers was less than that of their counterparts of the control
farmers was much higher than that of their counterparts in the group. Nevertheless, large deacesed farmers were ahead of the
deceased group. The higher cost of cultivation of the deceased large control farmers in terms of per hectare income as well as
large farmers was mainly due to a greater area under orange average net income. The per hectare income of the large deceased
cultivation. The cost of cultivation of the small farmers was higher farmers was Rs 2,787.49 as against Rs 1,343.60 of the large
not due to their higher dose of inputs alone but mainly because farmers of the control group. The net income of the small
of the purchase of a greater proportion of inputs from private deceased farmers was substantially less than that of the farmers
agencies. A number of small farmers of both the groups purchased of the all size classes of both groups.
a significant part of their agricultural inputs from the private However, in a capital-intensive cash crop area, the farmers'
agencies on credit. Therefore, the cost of these inputs was high interest is not confined to the simple recovery of the cost of
and quality sub-standard. Furthermore, two suicide victim farm-
ers and one of the control farmers from the small holding group Table 5: Suicides in Rural Areas

have spent Rs 345 on an average on transportation of fertilisers (Per One Lakh of Estimated Population)
and pesticides from distant places on credit, because the local Year Amravati Yavatmal Wardha

private agents did not provide credit facilities to them. 1981 1.77 1.60 2.86
Besides, the farmers, especially small farmers, sold their produce 1982 2.77 4.00 3.71
in village markets. In the case of tur and jowar, they retained 1983 2.14 3.87 5.00
1984 NA NA NA
more than half the production for self-consumption. As their
1985 3.43 3.19 4.86
marketable surplus was limited, they preferred to sell the produce 1986 3.07 4.44 6.00
in the village market itself. This was observed in the case of both 1987 3.86 4.06 3.13

the suicide group as well as the corresponding control group of 1988 4.67 2.88 6.25
1989 NA NA NA
farmers. Large farmers, however, sold mostly in the regulated
1990 6.27 4.41 8.75
markets. Though with regard to cotton, the farmers were bound 1991 6.53 4.82 11.25
by law to sell their produce solely to the agent of the government, 1992 6.87 3.44 8.50
1993 5.73 5.22 11.00
a number of farmers, mostly in the small size category, sold their
1994 6.07 4.72 10.13
produce to private traders, who, in turn, passed it on to the 1995 7.06 6.56 11.50
federation or illegally moved it out of the state. The small farmers 1996 5.63 5.00 9.75
sell to the local traders in view of their small lots. They wanted 1997 5.50 7.16 8.13
1998 7.06 7.05 11.13
to avoid transportation of their produce to the collection centres,
1999 6.31 7.63 11.38
as weighing and grading necessitated a long wait. In some cases,
the regulated markets were at a distance of about 20 km from Source: Annual Vital Sta

Table 4: Estimate of Crop Loss

Years Amravati Yavatmal Wardha
Villages Population Loss Villages Population Loss Villages Population Loss
1981-82 1519 NA NA 629 29944 71.39 562 20829 8.65
1982-83 1223 NA NA - - NA 305 106188 NA
1983-84 1705 NA NA 357 NA NA 649 349541 41.91
1984-85 49 NA NA 406 NA NA 563 277667 100.96
1985-86 1561 NA NA - - NA - - -
1986-87 1561 NA NA 771 559108 NA - -
1987-88 105 72669 NA 243 105490 NA -
1988-89 237 138539 NA 1235 1227052 NA 7 NA NA
1990-91 22 NA NA - - NA - - -
1991-92 1984 NA NA - - NA
1997-98 NA 376613 3243.54 - 21369 164.78

Sources: (i) Socio-Economic Review and District Statistical Ab

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cultivation with a marginal net income. They usually expect a concern. True, when a farmer fails to realise his expected income
higher margin of profit based on which they plan their expenditure beyond a minimum point, his dissatisfaction grows. The estimate
for the given year. Of course, the level of expectation of the revealed that the farmers of both the groups received income
farmers varies because it is largely influenced by the quality of amounting to more than 50 per cent of their expectation.
land, amount of investment, quantity and quality of agricultural As regards indebtedness, farmers of all categories had taken
inputs, market conditions, experience, socio-economic back- loans mostly from the formal agencies (Table 8). While 80 per
ground, etc. Nevertheless, one way of estimating the loss of cent of the deceased farmers had borrowed from banks and
agricultural income of the farmers due to crop failure is to measure cooperatives, the corresponding figure for the control farmers
the extent to which their expected income was realised. The per was 93 per cent. However, the per hectare and average loan o
hectare loss of expected income among the small and large the deceased farmers was higher than those of the control grou
farmers of the suicide group was more than those of the control for all size classes. In terms of average as well as per hectare
group (Table 7). The variation among the medium farmers of indebtedness to the formal agencies, the medium farmers of both
both the groups was negligible. The average loss of the medium the groups were much ahead of others. The per hectare loan of
and large farmers of both groups was higher due to large land- the large farmers of the control group was only Rs 847.33 which
ownership, as each additional hectare added to their loss. was the lowest among all the categories of farmers. The forma
Generally, a farmer in a village in the semi-arid tropics oc- credit agencies provided low-cost credit, facilities of repaymen
casionally experiences crop productivity up to his expectation. in instalments and the possibility of postponement of repaymen
Only in exceptionally good agro-climatic years the production in case of crop failure. Hence, these loans are not considered
matches his level of expectation which is a rare phenomenon. burdensome by the farmers. In some villages many large an
In such a context, a decrease in the expected income from medium farmers, who normally do not require credit support,
agriculture of a farmer up to a certain level may not cause serious borrowed from banks and cooperatives to utilise the low-cos

Table 6: Distribution of Suicides by Causes

(Per cent)

Causes Amravati Yavatmal Wardha

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

All Economic Causes 7.99 7.06 4.09 5.60 8.48 7.41 10.63 7.99 9.16 9.13 17.13 11.60 14.84 6.91 5.67
Social Causes 85.97 56.50 63.49 88.92 76.58 75.39 55.94 69.42 87.42 85.70 22.65 51.66 49.88 69.35 92.23
Othercauses 0.53 28.25 3.81 0.00 0.14 11.99 23.13 10.38 2.69 0.96 0.00 36.74 23.11 4.38 0.42
Cause not known 5.51 8.19 28.61 5.48 14.80 5.21 10.31 12.20 0.73 4.21 60.22 0.00 12.17 19.35 1.68
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: Office of the Director General of Police (CID), Maharashtra State, Pune (Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India Annual R

Table 7: Information on Agriculture of Deceased and Control Farmers

Particulars Deceased Farmers Control Farmers
Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All
Per cent of area under cotton 44.34 37.40 35.73 37.27 39.30 37.65 23.66 30.87
Per cent of area under jowar 25.00 29.27 10.23 17.08 13.90 33.33 24.43 25.31
Per cent of area under tur 15.59 16.59 10.56 12.73 16.31 16.67 13.74 15.08
Per cent of area under orange - 1.29 16.58 10.48 4.81 - 7.63 4.73
Cropping intensity 107.95 104.81 103.36 104.30 103.66 108.00 111.02 108.15
Per hectare cost of cultivation (Rs) 6229.36 5030.25 12557.32 8994.60 9789.32 4132.56 7836.25 6987.32
Per hectare net income (Rs) 359.93 370.66 2787.49 1346.50 601.95 871.85 1343.60 1104.31
Average net income (Rs) 497.36 949.82 28810.70 5309.70 1023.32 2567.99 8800.58 3809.87
Per hectare loss of expected income (Rs) 3130.04 3249.72 5071.60 4002.90 1725.57 3309.22 512.95 1432.85
Average loss of expected income (Rs) 4325.15 8327.41 52418.61 15784.77 2933.47 9747.16 3359.82 4943.33

Source: Field survey.

Table 8: Indebtedness to Formal and Informal Sources

Particulars Deceased Farmers Control Group Farmers

Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All
Per cent of farmers who taken loan from formal agencies 72.73 83.33 85.71 80.00 90.91 100.00 87.50 93.33
Average loan from formal agencies (Rs) 8909.09 20208.33 21894.57 16958.73 6272.73 12181.82 5550.00 8246.67
Per hectare loan from formal agencies (Rs) 6447.37 7886.18 2118.34 4300.61 3689.84 4135.80 847.33 2390.34
Per cent of loan taken loan from formal agencies for agricultural
purposes 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.91 100.00 - 93.33
Per cent of farmers taken loan from informal sources 18.18 41.67 12.50 26.67 - - 25.00 10.00
Average loan from informal sources (Rs) 9090.91 5416.67 17142.86 9500.00 - - 1750.00 466.67
Per hectare loan from informal sources (Rs) 6578.95 2113.82 1658.60 2409.13 - - 267.18 135.27
Per cent of loan taken loan from informal agencies for
non-agricultural purposes 69.55 92.33 94.48 88.95 - - 100.00 100.00
Per cent loan from all sources of indebted farmers to the value of
their major assets 13.67 10.31 2.91 5.78 2.36 4.70 1.08 2.35
Source: Field survey.

Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004 5603

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credit for other income generating purposes. It was also reported In fact, a major part of the borrowings of the farmers o
by the cooperative officials that many rich farmers remained categories was due to non-agricultural reasons such as so
wilful defaulters. Two deceased large farmers and one large functions, family expenses, investment in business, etc. Howev
control farmer, who had taken loans from the formal agencies, 30 per cent of the borrowings of the small farmers from
were themselves moneylenders. informal agencies was due to agricultural reasons.
In case of loans from the informal sources, the number of Taken together, the percentage of total borrowings from b
indebted farmers was much less when compared to that of the formal and informal agencies to the value of major assets
formal agencies (Table 8). Among the control group farmers, not found to be high for the farmers of all size classes of b
except 25 per cent of the large farmers, others had not borrowed the groups. However, in the case of some deceased farm
from the informal agencies. The average loan of the large farmers particularly of the small farmers, it was significant (14 per
came to Rs 1,750. On the contrary, many deceased farmers took in the context of their poor asset ownership and perpetua
loans from the informal agencies and the proportion of indebted nancial deficit. Hence, they would have found it difficul
households was higher in the case of medium farmers (42 per dispose of their assets to discharge their liabilities. But no farm
of either group (deceased or control) reportedly sold his a
cent). In terms of the average loan, the large farmers had a higher
rate of indebtedness. Their average loan was Rs 17,143 as against to come out of the debt trap.
Rs 9,091 and Rs 5,417 for the small and medium farmers Thus, the loss of agricultural income did cause an econo
respectively. However, most of the large and medium farmerscrisis for all the farmers, but given their resource base, its im
(over 65 per cent) had taken loans, either at zero interest or at on the large and medium farmers was relatively less. Since,
a nominal rate from their friends and relatives. Excepting theloss of agricultural income was common to both deceased
small farmers, the medium and large framers had borrowed control farmers, with variations here and there, it could not h
money from informal sources largely without any collateral. Thebeen the only factor that made the farmers take the extreme
average value of the collateral for the small farmers amounted of committing suicides. The cause of these suicides may
to Rs 6,091. Further, unlike the formal sources, the indebtedness lie in the social experiences of the farmers. Emile Durkh
to informal agencies was caused by non-agricultural purposes. (1952), who developed a sociological model for understand
Table 9: Distribution of Suicides by Reasons suicides, believes that the latter are individual phenomena
(Per cent) so their causes are essentially social in nature. He argues
Reasons Size Classes the victim's act which at first seems to express only his per
Small Medium Large All temperament is really the supplement and prolongation
social condition which he expresses externally (1952: 29
Loss of agricultural income 27.27 8.33 14.29 16.67
Indebtedness 9.10 16.67 - 10.00 The distribution of suicides on the basis of the major reas
Family problems 18.18 16.67 28.57 20.00 (Table 9) reveals that suicides were mainly attributable to so
Old age and illness 18.18 25.00 28.57 23.33 reasons such as family problems, old age, illness, drink
Drinking and gambling habits 18.18 16.67 14.29 16.67
Miscellaneous 9.10 16.67 14.29 13.33
gambling, etc. Other reasons included social causes like
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 affairs, death of close relations, etc. Among the size classes
social reasons of suicides were more prominent in the cas
Note: As there are multiple causes in many cases, the major c
the large and medium farmers. A significant number of s
identified by the family members of the victims have been t
account. farmers committed suicides due to loss of agricultural inco
Source: Field survey. and indebtedness. Of the 7 large farmers who committed suici
Table 10: Social Characteristics of Deceased and Control Farmers

Particulars Deceased Farmers Control Farmers

Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All
N=11 N=12 N=7 N=30 N=11 N=11 N=8 N=30

Family size 4.45 5.00 4.29 4.67 6.27 6.36 6.63 6.40
Per cent of nuclear family 81.82 66.67 66.67 70.00 45.45 41.67 57.14 46.67
Per cent of divorced/separated/unmarried/single deceased farmers 36.36 33.33 57.14 40.00 - .
Per cent of deceased farmers belonged to the age group of
60 years and above 9.10 16.67 28.57 16.67 - - - -
Per cent of farmers engaged in gambling 27.27 8.33 - 13.33 - - -
Per cent of farmers having drinking habits 54.55 16.67 14.29 30.00
Average amount lost in gambling and drinking in the year (Rs) 5272.73 2727.27 1428.57 3266.67 - - - -
Per cent of illiterate members 85.85 57.14 9.80 54.66 5.80 7.14 11.32 7.84
Per cent of earning members 46.23 19.52 21.57 23.60 21.74 24.29 18.87 21.88
Per cent of households belong to lower castes 36.36 25.00 14.29 26.67 - 9.10 - 3.33
Per cent of farmers received land through land reform measures 27.26 - - 10.00 9.10 - - 3.33
Per cent of farmers having more than five years of experience
in farming 36.36 - - 13.33 - - -
Per cent of farmers taking farm related decisions independently 100.00 75.55 100.00 90.00 27.28 18.82 37.50 26.67
Per cent of deceased farmers having higher educational
qualifications (above matriculation) 18.18 16.67 28.57 20.00 - - -
Per cent of deceased farmers who were head of their households 63.64 91.67 71.43 76.67 - - -
Per cent of expected amount spent on food 82.40 99.57 99.58 98.53 99.05 100.27 97.92 99.37
Per cent of expected amount spent on clothing 33.56 23.78 90.68 49.64 50.85 60.37 100.60 72.83
Per cent of expected amount spent on social functions 18.88 41.99 37.81 26.55 55.35 54.83 113.58 76.81
Per cent of expected amount spent on miscellaneous items 17.53 14.18 29.72 20.51 84.18 77.53 81.72 81.33

Source: Field survey.

5604 Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004

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the loss of agricultural income led to the suicide of only one decisions and activities. Most of the victims were independently
farmer (14 per cent). Though loss of agricultural income and looking after agricultural operations and expenses thereof. As
indebtedness appeared to have taken the life of a number of many as 90 per cent of the deceased farmers took farm-related
small farmers, in many cases the roots of such deaths lay in the decisions on their own in the family. But the farmers of the control
social issues as well. A perusal of the cases (1 to 8), which group mostly shared the responsibility with other members of
describes the background of suicides, provides a firm evidence family and some of them did' not have even direct involvement
in this regard. in agricultural activities. The conditions of modern agriculture,
A comparison of the social characteristics of the deceased particularly the cultivation of capital-intensive crops like cotton,
farmers with those of control farmers reveals that the social which involves regular purchases of agricultural inputs, provision
factors led to suicides (Table 10). Unlike the control farmers, of credit and sale of produce encouraged the family members
the suicide victims mostly belonged to smaller families. While of the deceased farmers to assign these responsibilities to one
person in the family who was relatively capable of managing
the average family size of the deceased farmers is 4.67, it is 6.40
in the case of the control farmers. Besides, most suicide victimsthe expenses efficiently. Given the nature of involvement and
encountered negative social experiences like divorce and sepa- responsibility, the unexpected loss of income from agriculture
ration. Many of them were unmarried. Taken together, 40 prompted per them to consider themselves as morally responsible
cent of the deceased farmers were unmarried, divorced and for the loss. The deceased farmers were deeply involved in the
separated. The proportion is higher among the large farmers agricultural
(57 work so much so that the other family members were
per cent). Durkheim rightly stresses that the larger the family generally ignorant about the details of the borrowings, etc.
size, the greater is the protection against suicide because it Apart from this, many deceased farmers had relatively higher
represents higher degree of social cohesion due to stronger educational qualifications. They took to agriculture because they
sentiments and historical memories [Morrison 1995: 174]. The did not succeed in getting government jobs. They generally kept
duties and obligations as well as the demands and expectations themselves aloof from other farmers due to their knowledge,
outlook, advanced method of farming, etc. But their failure in
in the family generate attachment to life. The immunity to suicide
is, therefore, less among the individuals who are unmarried, agriculture made them vulnerable to criticism.
members of small family and those who face widowhood, Social wants (such as the desire for high income and wealth)
separation and childlessness [Durkheim 1952: 180-216]. are essentially unlimited. The society sets limits on these wants
through moral restraints by linking them to available means.
Though the loss of agricultural income affects a farmer's family
as a whole, its effect is likely to generate suicidal behaviour When
for the regulatory power of the society fails, social wants
those members who had an active involvement in farm-related exceed the possible means for attaining them and the individual

Cases

1 A, 40, had two marriageable daughters and one son. She owned 12 acres of land and her husband looked after cultivation.
married to a boy from a neighbouring village. The daughter was content in the in-laws house. But when it was known that A h
person in the same village, the in-laws of her daughter started looking down upon her. A felt insulted and her husband abused h
their lives but also the future of the children. A ended her life.

2 B, 66, had two sons. Both B and his wife were suffering from prolonged illnesses. As the elder son worked in a factory, the younger son was looking
after them, besides pursuing his education. The younger son died suddenly after a snake bite. Unable to bear the shock, both B and his wife killed
themselves.

3 C, 62, owned 3.5 acres of land. He had three sons. C suffered from paralysis and became immobile. About Rs 1,000 per month was spent reg
on his treatment. After a couple of years when he could not recover from his illness, his sons were reluctant to spend more on his treatment. They
lived separately. At times his wife also ill-treated him. Hence, C felt helpless and committed suicide.

4 D, a Mahar, worked as an agricultural labourer. Though many of his friends left for Nagpur for better sources of income, he preferred to stay on in
village. Improvement of the socio-economic condition of his family through cotton cultivation was his cherished dream. In 1999, he acquired 4 acr
of land from the government which were of poor quality and without irrigation. D applied for and obtained a loan of Rs 48,000 to dig a well. When
was not found in the well, he was disappointed. He took money from the government under the Indira Awas Yojna but used it for cotton cultivat
But when the crop failed, he committed suicide in despair.

5 E, 56, was a large farmer. He was the sarpanch of his village. He cultivated mostly orange and cotton. He had expected that his investment in
cultivation would yield him an income of more than Rs 2.5 lakh. In anticipation of this income and also in view of his social status in the village, he in
an expense of Rs 1.5 lakh on the wedding expenses of his daughter, taking a loan of Rs 1 lakh, from his friends and relatives. But due to crop fail
he realised only about Rs 15,000 from orange cultivation. In case of cotton too he suffered a huge crop loss. Being an ex-sarpanch, he felt he
not maintain his status and therefore ended his life.

6 H, 55, was an alcoholic. H had a poor dwelling and virtually no assets. He had four children, aged between 10 and 19 years. Though he owned 3 acres
of land he never cultivated them properly. H's wife looked after the family and agricultural expenses. H borrowed Rs 10,000 from one of his wife's
relatives in the name of agricultural expenses, but spent the entire amount on liquor consumption. A year later, when H failed to repay the loan, his
wife came to know about this. H killed himself.

7 N, 40, owned 2 acres of land. He had gambling and drinking habits. His monthly expenditure on these expenses was about Rs 1,200. His wife and
children disliked him for these habits. He received assistance under the Swarna Shahari Rozgar Yojna scheme for the purchase of nine goats and
thus availed a loan amount of Rs 7,000 from a commercial bank. He sold these goats and lost the amount in gambling. Due to this, his wife and children
isolated him. So N committed suicide.

8 J, 65, owned 13 acres of land. He had six children. He had taken a loan of Rs 37,500 from a commercial bank to purchase a thresher. But after a few
days the thresher was damaged. Further, he took crop loans of Rs 22,000 but his crop also failed. None of his children was doing well at school. The
one who was doing relatively well failed in the final school level examination. J blamed himself for this failure and hanged himself.

Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004 5605

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remains in a perpetual danger of suffering from the disproportion IV
between his aspirations and achievements. This situation,
according to Durkheim (1952), generates disappointment and To recapitulate, both the macro and micro level analysis in-
feelings of failure, which lead to the growth of "suicidogenic dicates that though the loss of agricultural income due to adverse
impulse". weather, market imperfections and consequent indebtedness has
Compared to the control farmers, the area under cotton, which pushed the farmers to distress, social factors are also at work
usually fetches a higher income, was more among the deceased when it comes to their suicides. [i1
farmers. As many as 27 per cent victims were the farmers of
the lower castes. More than 36 per cent of the deceased small Address for correspondence:
farmers belonged to the lower castes like the mahars, nav-buddhs, [email protected]
matangs, chamars and dhangars. Many of them took to farming
recently by acquiring land through land reform measures or by [The paper is a part of the larger study, 'Market Imperfections and Farmers'
Distress in Maharashtra' undertaken by the Agro-Economic Centre of Gokhale
outright purchase. In view of their low socio-economic status,
Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, and submitted to the ministry
the acquisition of land appeared to them as a means to fulfil their of agriculture, government of India, New Delhi.]
long cherished desires (Case 4). Believing that high doses of
inputs lead to higher productivity and hence larger profits, they References
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5606 Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 2004

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