Xue-ClimateChangeChallenges-2013
Xue-ClimateChangeChallenges-2013
Xue-ClimateChangeChallenges-2013
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access to Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance
Abstract
549
A. Introduction
The world’s oceans cover more than 70% of the planet and contain a variety
of natural resources vital to nearly every nation.1 However, since the 1980s,
global warming and the rise in sea levels have brought about significant
negative consequences to the health of the ocean as a result of various forms
of natural disasters and an increase of extreme events.2 The low-lying coastal
and islands states, particularly the SIDS, are likely to face some of the earliest
and most severe climate change impacts over the course of this century with
immense environmental, social and economic implications.3 These are
recognised not only as challenges to the ecological system, but also as a
“threat multiplier” of economic and social instabilities to sustainable devel-
opment of humankind.4
As projected temperature increase accelerated, the scale of sea level rise
and adverse threat to the world oceans has emerged as a planetary crisis
going beyond environmental concerns. The climate change and its adverse
impact, together with the search for measures to tackle such an overwhelm-
ing challenge have moved up to the top of the agenda amongst civil society,
business and government, and cast strong influence to every individual state.
There is an urgent need and mounting pressures for strong and focused global
action to mitigate the negative climate effects. Unfortunately, it is a frus-
1 The oceans comprise a complex, dynamic and vast component of the Earth’s ecolog-
ical system, second in size only to the global atmosphere. The oceans are a major
provider of ecosystem services, food, mineral and other resources, and a major medi-
um for global transportation and communication. For information on the importance
of oceans and marine resources, see “Ocean Resources”: http://marinebio.org/ocean
s/ocean-resources.asp, last accessed 03 May 2013.
2 In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), issued its Fourth Assessment Re-
port of more than 3,000 pages. The most important conclusion of this report is that
global warming is evident and that its highly probable cause is a greenhouse effect
triggered by increasing concentration levels of greenhouse gases. In 2009, UNEP
Climate Change Science Compendium reaffirms the strong evidence outlined in the
4th Assessment Report, and shows that climate change is accelerating at a much faster
pace than previously predicted by scientists. For the IPCC reports, see http://www.ip
cc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1, last accessed
03 May 2013.
3 The United Nations (UN) defines small island states as islands with less than 10,000
square kilometers in land mass and with less than 500,000 inhabitants. For details, see
http://aosis.org/, last accessed 03 May 2013.
4 Kim (2010:101).
550
5 The UNFCCC was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (the first Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 5 May 1992. It
was opened for signature on 4 June 1992 and entered into force on 21 March 1994.
Currently, it has 195 Parties. It provides a definition on climate change as: “a change
of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.” For ratifications, see http://unfc
cc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php, last
accessed 03 May 2013.
6 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted on 11 December 1997, entered into
force on 16 February 2005, and has 191 Parties. For ratifications, see http://unfccc.in
t/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, last accessed 03 May 2013.
7 Burns (2003).
8 The text of UNCLOS and relevant implementation agreements are available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los, last accessed 03 May 2013.
9 It is based on the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958:
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; Convention on the High
Seas; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas; and Convention on the Continental Shelf. They codified the customary inter-
national law. UNCLOS draws together the four conventions and made it the old law
of the sea in a single unified treaty. States that have not acceded to UNCLOS may still
be bound by the provisions of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions and the norms
551
Climate change is typically discussed in global terms, yet its effects do not
vary dramatically among different researching areas.12 Compelling evidence
from the current literature suggests that ecosystems are responding to tem-
perature changes and increased carbon dioxide (CO2) levels with significant
impact on natural and coastal resources and national security.13 Recent re-
search has strengthened the findings that climate change rapidly transforms
the world’s oceans by increasing the temperature and acidity of seawater,
and alters atmospheric and oceanic circulation.14 Much literature has been
published on both the predicted impacts and responses to it in terms of mit-
igation and adaptation.15 Predictions based on current scientific research and
climate trends suggest an enormous challenge in two respects: continental
glaciers will continue to melt, and sea levels will rise to one meter by the
end of this century under “business as usual” scenarios.16 Thus, it is a settled
fact that sea levels have been rising at an accelerating rate and are to rise
of customary international law. For details on UNCLOS and its related institutions,
see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_co
nvention.htm, last accessed 03 May 2013.
10 For ratifications, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lis
ts_of_ratifications.htm#, last accessed 03 May 2013.
11 Koh (1982).
12 IPCC (2007e).
13 Elliott & Caballero-Anthony (2012:33).
14 Lubchenco (2008).
15 IPCC (2007d).
16 IPCC (2007c).
552
17 More information on the importance of oceans and marine resources may be found
online from Ocean Resources, http://marinebio.org/oceans/ocean-resources.asp, last
accessed 03 May 2013.
18 As a planetary crisis, climate change and its catastrophic consequences result in not
only rising sea levels, droughts and famine, but also the loss of up to a third of the
world’s plant and animal species. See Shah (2012).
19 Costanza et al. (1997).
20 Doney et al. (2012).
21 (ibid:13).
22 Staudinger et al. (2012:296).
553
intensity, put the ocean ecosystems under new combinations of stress, being
described as “multiple jeopardy”.23
554
rived from coral reefs are roughly estimated to be between $172 to $375
billion dollars per year.30
Coral reefs have extremely narrow temperature tolerances between
25-29ºC, with some species in Pacific Islands currently living near their
threshold of thermal tolerance. Rising ocean temperatures and increasing
ocean acidification have negatively affected coral reefs in many parts of the
world, to name a few, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Red Sea and
Caribbean Sea, leading to the loss of 50% of the subsistence and artisanal
fisheries owing to coral bleaching.31 Global threats to coral reefs have been
increasing in the context of wider environmental degradation, so that the
value of coral reefs may be even greater because they are integral to the well-
being of the oceans, and loss of coral reefs may result in decreased net pro-
ductivity and stunted growth in certain species.32 Rising sea levels will de-
stroy vast areas of mangrove trees on the world’s tropical coastlines and wipe
out critical beach habitats (for sea turtles) that could adversely affect many
species more directly.33
One of the most pressing issues on the climate policy agenda is reducing
CO2 emissions. As an attempt to mitigate global warming, some projects
have been proposed or are already being implemented worldwide that take
the ocean as a great absorber and also a receptor of man-made CO2 emis-
sions.34 Such projects, known as marine geo-engineering projects including
carbon capture and storage (CCS) and ocean fertilisation (OF) have attracted
great international attention.35
CCS, also known as carbon capture and sequestration, is the process of
capturing waste CO2 from large point sources, transporting it to a storage
site, and depositing it where it will not enter the atmosphere, normally an
underground geological formation, as a potential means of mitigating global
30 For the value oceans provide, see http://www.consvalmap.org, last accessed 03 May
2013.
31 Andersson (2007).
32 Conservation International (2008:1–7).
33 Gilman et al. (2006).
34 IPCC (2005:77–88).
35 See Nolon (2012:204).
555
Climate change has reached us with many implications, from social, eco-
logical, economic, to legal and environmental. The environmental implica-
tions are obvious and dreadful, particularly based on the adverse impact of
global warming on marine living resources and detrimental effects of ocean
acidification on marine ecosystem and biodiversity, as the ocean is our last
resort for survival and existence.41 From a human perspective, the acceler-
ating biodiversity loss risks human security, as there might be a major change
556
in the food chain, water sources and other resources we rely on.42 Edward
O. Wilson believes that the loss of biodiversity is killing ourselves and the
rest of life.43 Mary Wood observes the evolution of international law and
comments that “[h]umanity is violating nature’s laws not only at the level
of individual species and ecosystems, but at the level of atmospheric func-
tioning and ocean health – a truly global level.”44 Indeed, the rapidly rising
GHG concentrations are driving ocean systems toward conditions not seen
for millions of years, with associated risks of fundamental and irreversible
ecological transformation.45
Changes in biological function in the ocean caused by anthropogenic
change go far beyond death, extinctions and habitat loss, as fundamental
processes are being altered.46 The domino effect of the horrific path towards
mass extinction of marine biodiversity and ecosystems is already showing
negative impacts under current levels of climate change, and more frequent
extreme weather events can be expected to have significant impacts on bio-
diversity.47 In addition, the past half-century has seen an explosive growth
in the size and number of marine dead zones, areas too low in dissolved
oxygen to support life, and it is no coincidence that dead zones occur down-
river of places where human population density is high.48
The IPCC suggested that in the foreseeable future, the disastrous conse-
quences of biodiversity loss are likely to be significant and many types of
ecosystems will be altered or destroyed by the combination of global warm-
ing and conventional threats such as habitat destruction and pollution.49 In
the absence of stringent mitigation measures by the global community, cli-
mate change, as the keystone environmental issue of this generation and
future ones, appears inevitable to continue apace. The existing biodiversity
conservation strategies are of no effect under its mounting pressure. Without
strategic action and updated law and policy, many of the global marine
ecosystems will collapse. Fish stocks and coral reefs will only retain their
42 Shah (2012).
43 Wilson (2010).
44 Wood (2010:177).
45 For details, see Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Findings (2005), available at
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.359.aspx.ppt, last
accessed 02 May 2013.
46 Hoegh-Guldberg (2011).
47 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010:56).
48 Diaz, & Rosenberg (2008).
49 IPCC (2007a:72–73).
557
50 WBGU (2006).
51 For general information on the development of the law of the sea, see Churchill &
Lowe (1999).
52 (ibid.:12).
53 Details on law of the sea negotiation history and relevant documents are available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/doalos_publications.htm, last
accessed 03 May 2013. See also Charney (1977).
558
UNCLOS divides the ocean into different types of zones measured from
baselines.54 The territorial sea, immediately adjacent internal waters,55 with
a breadth of 12 nautical miles (nm) from the baseline, is the zone which
represents the seaward limit of the coastal state’s sovereignty and concerns
its airspace, sea bed, and subsoil.56 The contiguous zone is a belt of sea
contiguous to the territorial sea stretching for 24 nm from the baseline, in
which the coastal state exercises jurisdictional powers in relation to its cus-
toms, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws and regulations.57 The exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), adjacent to the territorial sea, is less than 200 nm.58
The coastal state has sovereign rights in respect to environmental protection,
scientific research, exploration and exploitation of natural resources.59 The
continental shelf constitutes the submerged prolongation of the coastal
state’s land territory and stretches for 200 nm from the baselines when the
outer edge of the continental margin is less, or up to 350 nm (or 100 nm from
the 2,500 meter isobaths) if it is wider.60 The coastal state has sovereign
rights over this area in respect to the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources.61 The high seas are located beyond the external limit of the EEZ
at a maximum of 200 nm from the baselines, and are not subject to the
sovereignty of any state.62 Based on the UNCLOS regime, baselines serve
a vital function in establishing literally all maritime zones and boundaries
of a state.63
54 UNCLOS, Article 5 specifies that the normal baseline is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal state.
55 The internal waters locate on the landward side of baselines and are subject to full
sovereignty of the coastal state. See UNCLOS, Articles 2(1)(2) and 8(1).
56 UNCLOS, Articles 2, 3 and 4. Foreign ships only have a right of innocent passage
in the territorial sea and are bound to respect the national legislation of the coastal
state on the regulation of maritime traffic, fiscal, immigration and environmental
protection, marine scientific research, etc. See UNCLOS, Articles 17–22.
57 UNCLOS, Article 33.
58 UNCLOS, Article 57.
59 The other states have the freedom to overfly, navigate, and lay cables and pipelines
on it. UNCLOS, Articles 56 and 58(1).
60 UNCLOS, Article 76.
61 Other states benefit from the freedom of the high seas on the continental shelf. See
UNCLOS, Articles 56(1a) and 77(1).
62 UNCLOS, Article 86.
63 UNCLOS, Articles 57, 76(1) and (6).
559
64 UNCLOS, Article 7. A state may employ the method of straight baselines only in
localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe
of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, across mouths of rivers (Article
9) and bays (Article 10). For discussions, see Scovazzi (2008–:para. 2).
65 United Nations Office for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea (1989:para. 39).
66 UNCLOS, Article 7(3).
67 Attenhofer (2010:2).
68 See Vaughan & Spouge (2002).
560
right to the waters off its coast” is challenged.69 This could impose a sig-
nificant impact on the external limits of the maritime zones, particularly
against low-lying coastal areas. As maritime zones recede, coastal states may
in the worst of cases suffer from the loss of jurisdictions regarding the border
of maritime zones and rights to essential marine resources, except for the
maximum extent of outer continental shelf area which has to be established
on the basis of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS) recommendations.70
Meanwhile, based on Article 76(9) of the UNCLOS, the outer limits of a
continental shelf should be permanently determined by the CLCS. Article 7
provides that where, because of the presence of a delta, the coastline is highly
variable, the appropriate points may be selected as a baseline. It also gives
latitude for a coastal state to change the baseline to the extent that the change
is made under the UNCLOS. There are no provisions permanently fixing the
outer limits of the EEZ or even territorial seas. This may indicate that the
legal and physical boundaries of the EEZ and territorial sea that are not
touched upon by the UNCLOS are of a temporary nature.71
69 The principle “the land dominates the sea” (North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, para.
96).
70 A unilateral delimitation of the outer continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm re-
quires the submission of a claim to the CLCS under Article 76(8) for geological
factor consideration. The CLCS, set up under Annex II of UNCLOS, can recommend
the final and binding outer limits of the shelf in absence of overlapping claims or
consent of the overlapping states has been given. See UNCLOS, Article 76 (4–6, 8,
and 10).
71 Roach & Smith (1994:67).
72 For a fuller account, see Caron (2008:17) and (1990).
561
562
As defined in the UNCLOS, all maritime zones are measured from a base-
line. Accordingly, any movement of such baseline will lead to a change in
maritime boundaries. If a base point such as an exposed rock disappears, it
may be claimed that the boundary based on such a point has moved or dis-
appeared. The UNCLOS does not explicitly stipulate that the boundary
should be moved together with a base point. Facing unprecedented changes
on the scale of coastline and maritime boundaries,76 it is necessary to con-
sider different submerging scenarios of an island or rock belonging to a state
and critical effects occurring to the types of baselines regarding which an
issue may be raised owing to the rising sea level while considering legal
implications and possible solutions.
The types of baselines regarding which an issue may be raised owing to
the rising sea level include low-tide elevations, fringing reefs, islands, and
river banks. Under Article 13 of the UNCLOS, a low-tide elevation may be
used as the baseline. However, if such low-tide elevation is submerged per-
manently by rising sea level, the state concerned may lose the territorial seas
accorded by such base point.77 At the same time, “[a]n island is a naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide”.78 The provisions differ only with regard to the dry or submerged status
at high tide. Low-tide elevations therefore “literally do not rise to the status
of islands”.79 According to Article 121 of the UNCLOS, an island is entitled
to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, as well as a 200 nm
EEZ. Rising sea levels may submerge an island in part or entirely. Where
an island is no longer regarded as such due to its submerged status at high-
tide, it will only be considered for measuring the maritime entitlements, if
it lies within the territorial sea.80 Where, however, a low-tide elevation (or
former island) lies at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea
from the mainland or a ‘real’ island, it has no territorial sea of its own.81
76 Kim (2010:101).
77 UNCLOS, Article 13(1).
78 UNCLOS, Article 121(1).
79 Roach & Smith (1994:73).
80 The court in Qatar/Bahrain held that “there [is no] doubt that a coastal State has
sovereignty over low-tide elevations which are situated within its territorial sea, since
it has sovereignty over the territorial sea itself, including its sea-bed and subsoil”
(para. 204).
81 UNCLOS, Article 13(2).
563
With the rising sea levels, the nature of some insular features will invariably
change from island to low-tide elevation, which could indicate massive
losses to resource rich maritime zones.82 Under such circumstances, it may
be the case that any affected island state is deprived of the right to use a part
of the island for expansion of its EEZ. The situation is unsatisfactory where
former islands, lying outside the territorial sea, once had the sovereignty of
a state and accordingly could be used to generate a territorial sea of their
own.83 The question thus arises if the concepts of sovereignty and appro-
priation should apply to low-tide elevations which had once been islands.
In the case of islands surrounded by reefs, the baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial seas is the seaward low-water line of the fringing
reefs. Accordingly, a rise in sea level may change the scope of the territorial
sea of such islands. The entitlement to maritime zones beyond the territorial
sea does not apply if an insular feature is not an island in the sense of para-
graph 2 but a rock in the sense of paragraph 3 of UNCLOS Article 121.
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.84 These criteria have been debated
for lack of clarity in distinguishing rocks from islands.85 Being mixed with
the sea level rise, the island versus rocks criteria will almost inevitably be
complicated and causing more confusion in state practice about their legal
status and entitlement.86
With respect to river banks, UNCLOS Article 9 provides that if a river
flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the
mouth of the river between points on the low-water line of its banks. How-
ever, river banks are susceptible to constant erosion and sedimentation,
which may subsequently cause changes in the maritime zone determined on
the basis of river banks. It is getting more important and vital to make clear
distinction between islands, low-tide elevations or even reefs as it may be-
come particularly contentious in the event that sea levels should rise rapidly.
82 (ibid.).
83 UNCLOS, Article 13(1).
84 UNCLOS, Article 121(3).
85 The ability of rocks to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own may
be altered in the course of economic development, possibly fuelled by technological
advancement. Many rocks thus have a potential capacity to host at least some human
population or produce some economic activity. See Dipla (2008–:para. 8).
86 For a discussion on this, see Xue (2011).
564
The temporary nature and legal uncertainty of maritime boundaries are not
desirable, since they have the potential to intensify existing conflicts over
marine resources or trigger new ones. This problem may appear not so sig-
nificant compared to the humanitarian challenge but it is of undeniable im-
portance since it brings in its wake a whole series of geopolitical and eco-
nomic consequences, especially in the current context where natural re-
sources are becoming increasingly rare. They could pose a threat to world
peace if they are not wisely negotiated and carefully managed.
With the ambulatory nature of baselines, numerous legal issues are raised,
among which, determining the extent of rising sea levels on baselines and
boundary delimitation are the core ones. In order to prevent such dispute,
some scholars suggested a change of great importance as the formulation of
strict procedures to officially modify a maritime boundary and to guarantee
firm expectations of interests to all states concerning a maritime bound-
ary.87 It is worth mentioning that the drawing of baselines is necessarily a
unilateral action, however, the validity of the delimitation with regard to
other states depends on international law.88 As the states concerned take
different stances, it is advisable to settle maritime boundary delimitation on
a permanent basis with defined geographical coordinates by bilateral agree-
ments.89
Proposals are also made for the affected states to fix or freeze presently
accepted baselines and/or outer limits of maritime zones where appropri-
ate.90 A coastal state may announce the baselines established in accordance
with the UNCLOS as permanent once it has deposited the geographical co-
ordinates with the UN on an adequate scale with due publicity, notwith-
standing subsequent changes in geographical features of coasts or islands
due to sea level rise. The reality is that the totally submerged islands (dis-
appeared) may cease to generate any maritime zones, and the partial sub-
merged ones may become rocks that are not entitled to an EEZ or continental
shelf. More importantly, only states can claim maritime zones, therefore
87 Caron (2008).
88 Kwiatkowska (2007:944).
89 According to UNCLOS, Articles 5 and 16(1), to declare baselines by recourse to
geographical coordinates may require amendment of domestic legislation.
90 Such proposals include fixing of baselines by Caron (2008), fixing of outer limits by
Soons (1990), Freestone & Pethick (1994).
565
when a state ceases to exist, maritime zones cease and may revert to global
commons or to other states.
To avoid uncertainty and possible conflicts under the situation of constant
rising sea levels, it may be necessary to promote the adoption of universal
rules by means of a multilateral agreement or an international organisation
to protect the affected baselines drawn in accordance with UNCLOS to make
it permanent from the time they are publicly declared.91 Although this is
deemed to be very difficult, it is a task of legal scholarship to aid societal
adaptation to global climate change by identifying and addressing legal
challenges.”92
D. Possible Effects of Sea Level Rise on Low Lying States and Legal
Remedies
The effects of rises in sea level and the threats this poses for low lying coastal
states have been the subject of extensive study and commentary since the
1980s. More than half of the world’s population lives in coastal areas, and
the accelerating sea level rise imposes serious adverse human impacts in a
566
variety of ways.95 As the effects of climate change intensify, the coastal and
island communities of the low-lying Pacific SIDS are especially endan-
gered.96 They may lose not only their homes, but their entire nations, and
will be forced to leave their homes within the next half-century.97 In the
worst scenario, some extremely vulnerable SIDS such as Maldives, Tuvalu,
Marshall Islands and Kiribati98 will suffer from partial or total loss of sub-
merged territory and become the victims of climate change as de-territori-
alised states and climate exiles.99
Although there is no comprehensive review of present and projected cli-
mate change impacts on the SIDS as a whole, there is no great gap and
difference about the influence of climate risk on SIDS.100 The SIDS, com-
prising 52 small countries and territories in the tropics and low-latitude sub-
tropics, are the least responsible for GHG emissions, yet are likely to suffer
95 Burns (2001).
96 A rise in sea level of only one meter would allegedly destroy a large portion of
Bangladesh, 75% of the low-lying islands in Vanuatu and 80% of the Majuro Atoll
of the Marshall Islands, and inundate residential areas for half of the public. Ghina
(2003a) and (2003b:7).
97 Park (2011).
98 Tuvalu, a small island state in the South Pacific Ocean with an average altitude of
less than 3 meters, risks being wiped off the map in the next decades. Kiribati is
seriously contemplating moving their inhabitants on to floating islands constructed
on the model of giant oil platforms. Tuvalu and three other small Pacific island
nations (Fiji, Kiribati, and Nauru) have contemplated a lawsuit, as evidenced by
their declarations upon signing the UNFCCC in 1992 that preserved its right to seek
legal redress for damages allegedly suffered as a result of climate change. See http://
www.aosis.org, last accessed 03 May 2013 for more information and the full
Declaration.
99 Under international law, refugees are strictly considered to be those who have been
forced to flee their homes countries as a result of war or persecution and have the
possibility of return when things get better in the future. They seek asylum under
the condition that they cannot obtain protection from their own state; often their
own state is responsible for their vulnerable situation. But when a person’s home,
land or indeed entire country is wiped out by a phenomenon such as rising seas
there is no hope or chance that the person will ever be able to return home. Such
individuals will therefore essentially have become ‘climate exiles’ who will have
no legal status and few options other than to become permanent boat people unless
the international community develops early strategies to address their legal needs.
For discussions, see Kelman, & West (2009); Kelman (2011); Dore (2005:1168).
100 Lewis (1999).
567
In the light of wide-ranging effects of current global warming and sea level
rise, two broad policy responses have been adopted in addressing the nega-
tive impacts. One is mitigation, which searches for actions aimed at slowing
down climate change by reducing net GHG emissions, the other is adapta-
tion, which seeks for actions taken in response to, or in anticipation of, pro-
jected or actual changes in climate.107 While scientists, managers and re-
source users work actively to design adaptation strategies that reduce the
vulnerability of marine species, systems and industries to climate change,
legal scholars have been trying to search for means of possibilities to legally
101 A List of Small Island Developing States (UN and Non UN Members) is available
at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm, last accessed 03 May 2013;
Ghina (2003a).
102 Lewis (1990). See also Wisner et al. (2004).
103 IPCC (2007b:18).
104 The Alliance of Small Island States, an intergovernmental body established in 1990
to address global warming and negotiate within the UN system, has 37 members,
36 of which are UNCLOS states parties.
105 Voccia (2012).
106 Based on an estimate that includes anyone who was foreign-born in their current
country of residence, migrants worldwide make up about 175 million people. See
Hinrichsen (1998); Lewsey & Kruse (2004).
107 Dang et al. (2003).
568
maintain the statehood and maritime entitlement of the affected states in the
event of inundation.108
Questions have been raised about who will bear the costs of adaptation
measures of the affected states and who has to pay for the damages and
compensate the climate exiles for their loss of homelands and property, the
damage to their health and life?109 How can these states be better protected
through the path of international legal remedies with regard to states’ re-
sponsibilities and environmental liability? However, current international
law does not adequately address the statehood dilemma and continued main-
tenance of their entitlements in the context of sea level rise. The cross-cutting
issues of climate exiles link to many areas of key interests of those dislocated
people, including development, national security, and human, indigenous,
and cultural rights.
The emerging issues relating to the statehood dilemma and climate exiles
are particularly pressing in the context of vulnerable SIDS whose very ex-
istence is threatened. In an attempt to build pressure to force states to take
action on climate change, a widespread consensus on the need for interna-
tional legal protection of climate migrants has emerged by turning to the
courts as a means and strategy to bringing about major change and promote
greater action to address the adverse impacts,110 and to seek to hold those
responsible for GHG emissions accountable for the impacts of their past and
future actions.111
To rescue their ‘disappearing’ territory and statehood, the SIDS have also
been trying to seek assistance from international law for adaptation, stability,
108 1994 Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small
Island Developing States. Document A/CONF.167/9 (October, 1994) from the
Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States, Bridgetown, UN, 25 April – 6 May 1994.
109 Legal issues have been raised and suggested concept recognition of new category
of state as de-territorialised state in international law. For details, see Rayfuse
(2010).
110 Climate litigation is a relatively new phenomenon, but recent decisions in Australia
ruling in favour of the arguments of environmental applicants suggest that it is a
trend that will only continue to grow in the coming years. See Peel (2007:103).
111 According to Vicuña (1998:280), “responsibility and liability for environmental
damage should not always be regarded as a negative sanction, but rather…as a
positive inducement to prevention, restoration or compensation as the case may be.”
569
112 A group of SIDS, headed by Palau, asked the UN General Assembly to seek an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal responsibilities
of nations whose corporations cause international harm through contributing to
climate change. See International: Palau to seek ICJ Advisory Opinion, available
at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/intl/icj/palau, last accessed 03 May
2013. UN Department of Public Information, Advisory opinion on climate change,
03 February 2012, at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/120203_ICJ.d
oc.htm.
113 Vicuña (1998).
114 Weinbaum (2011) holds the view that tort law and human rights-based litigation
may not be the most effective approach to meet the immediate needs of SIDS’ facing
the dire consequences as climate victims.
115 For the first time, nations agreed at the UN climate conference in Qatar that “de-
veloping nations that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change” and might have a right to redress from major polluting nations for any
resulting “loss and damage.” The IPCC directed its staff to begin research on how
to ensure that redress. The new diplomatic language about “loss and damage”
adopted in Qatar signifies that there has been a potential breach of the UNFCCC
agreement. And that breach can only intensify the demand for the responsibilities
of states to be defined in law. The latest action taken in Qatar suggests nations now
concede that damaging impacts of climate change are inescapable.
570
116 The no harm rule is a rule of customary international law that declares a state has
a duty to prevent, reduce and control the risk of environmental harm to other states.
The rule has been applied in many cases and is included in international agreements,
such as the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment. See Schwarte (2012).
117 For discussions on this, see Brownlie (1983); Churchill & Freestone (1991); Free-
stone & Hey (1996); Yamin & Depledge (2004).
118 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2011); United Nations General As-
sembly (1994); Report of the International Meeting to Review the Implementation
of the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Devel-
oping States. A/CONF.207/11, Port Louis, Mauritius, 2005.
119 Wiggins (2007).
120 McAdam (2009).
571
121 The traditional ways in which law and policy have been divided into fields of inquiry
and operation, such as human rights, trade, development and so on, do not reflect
the messy, complex interconnectedness of the issue. Dernbach & Kakade (2008).
122 Ingelson et al. (2010:456).
123 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (Ar-
ticle 47). International Law Commission, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/la
w/ilc/texts/State_responsibility /responsibilityfra.htm, last accessed 03 May 2013.
124 Myles (2003:892).
125 Bach & Brown (2009); Tol & Verheyen (2004:1111).
126 Basse (2009:36).
127 (ibid.).
572
Facing the critical changes occurring in the oceans and disappearing low
lying states, how to address the climate change damages and find practical
solutions to support the affected states, has become arguably the most press-
ing legal, environmental, political, economic, social and ethical issue of our
time.128 This section looks into the UNCLOS regime in controlling pollution
of marine environment and settling disputes with special attention to its po-
tential in protecting the affected states.
573
health of the oceans and the living resources, and that must be no less ef-
fective than the “global rules and standards”.130
As one of the most important instruments and widely ratified multilateral
treaties, its provisions on environmental protection by themselves would
constitute a critically important environmental treaty to protect the physical
health of the ocean, also the living resources therein. This is reflected from
how the term is defined on “pollution of the marine environment” to mean131
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legit-
imate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction
of amenities.
There is no direct reference to climate change in this definition, no indication
in forming a basis for ocean damage compensation. Nevertheless, it makes
clear that any “substances or energy” introduced by human activities, either
directly or indirectly, into the marine environment resulting in “deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life” constitute the pollution
of the marine environment. Through this expansive definition, GHG emis-
sions from or through the atmosphere appear to be pollution covered under
its regime.132
As discussed earlier, evidenced from scientific findings, the accumulation
of CO2 has resulted in the temperatures and acidification increase of sea
waters that has caused damage to marine living resources such as corals and
the habitat. The rising sea levels have also brought negative consequences
to the livelihood and very existence of low lying states. These manifestations
574
may give rise to actions under the UNCLOS.133 Similarly, UNCLOS makes
no direct mention of the impermissibility of geo-engineering measures in
general or CCS and OF in particular, its definition would prohibit such ac-
tivities because of their potential risks of deleterious effects to the marine
environment.134
Such an expansive definition was said to have originated from a series of
drafts and proposals embodying a comprehensive approach and reflecting
principles adopted in the 1970s by the international community including
the UN Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Confer-
ence)135 and “the consensus that pollution from all sources should be dealt
with, in relation to a broad, indeed all embracing, concept of ‘marine envi-
ronment.’”136 The concept is consolidated by concrete efforts through 46
Articles of Part XII and relevant provisions of other parts prescribing specific
duties for states to protect and preserve the marine environment.137
Articles 192–237 in Part XII of the UNCLOS set out rights and duties of
states in controlling pollution with appropriate care and formulates a com-
prehensive set of regime marine environmental protection.138 Under the
UNCLOS, states are required to undertake all measures necessary “to pre-
vent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any
source,”139 including “the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those that are persistent140... from land-based sources, [or] from
575
576
also obligated under Article 204 to act directly or through competent inter-
national organisations to monitor the risks or effects of pollution of the ma-
rine environment, and to keep under surveillance the effects of any activities
which they permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether
these activities are likely to pollute the marine environment. As a reflection
of UNCLOS “as strict as possible approach”, this requirement has also been
adopted in recent decades by the international community in the form of the
precautionary principle with implications to states that produce GHG emis-
sions.147 In the same fashion, Article 212 is also pertinent where it requires
parties to act through competent international organisations or diplomatic
conferences to establish measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution.
The UNFCCC should clearly be analysed as such “competent organisation”
to address climate change given the fact that it has been ratified by 195
parties, including all of the world’s major GHG emitting states.148 The obli-
gations under UNFCCC should be recognised as “international mechanisms
to control pollution” under Article 212 of UNCLOS, since its overarching
purpose is to control GHG emissions so as to “prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system.”149
It is noteworthy that whilst some UNCLOS provisions set regulatory
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
Articles such as 213–222 and 235 are rules for those standards to be enforced.
In particular, Article 235 explicitly deals with state responsibility and lia-
bility for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment. Under Article 235, state
responsibility is triggered when it fails to fulfil the responsibilities provided
by the UNCLOS, and states need to ensure available recourse for prompt
and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by
pollution of the marine environment. With the objective of assuring prompt
and adequate compensation, states are to cooperate in the implementation
of existing international law and to further develop international law relating
to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for
adopts treaties and guidelines at the intergovernmental level, and member govern-
ments are responsible for implementing and enforcing the adopted regulatory
framework. For details, see http://www.imo.org, last accessed 03 May 2013.
147 For general discussions, see Freestone & Hey (1996).
148 See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/item
s/2631.php.
149 UNFCCC, Article 2.
577
damage and the settlement of related disputes, and develop criteria and pro-
cedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory insu-
rance or compensation funds.150
This imposes a very stringent standard of care in mandating states’ obli-
gations and liabilities as juridical persons in accordance with international
law.151 It also secures the linkage between Article 235 and the UNFCCC
regime. The latter is clearly an international obligation that can contribute
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment by reducing
GHG emissions. Indeed, the UNFCCC specifically acknowledges the po-
tential impacts of climate change on natural ecosystems,152 and the need for
special regard of countries with fragile ecosystems.153 Article 304 also af-
firms that a state is responsible and liable for damage to the marine envi-
ronment.
Another such linkage rests between UNCLOS and other environmental
treaties represented by the 1972 London Convention and its 1996 Protocol,
which substantially increases the viability of UNCLOS to reduce GHG
damages to the marine environment.154 One of the important consequences
lies in the fact that parties to either UNCLOS or the London Convention/
Protocol are obligated to the “global rules and standards” referenced by Ar-
ticle 210 that provides the foundation for regulation of dumping activities
including CCS and OF types of marine geo-engineering projects.
Under Article 210 (6) of the UNCLOS, the national laws, regulations and
measures of a state shall be no less effective in preventing, reducing and
controlling pollution than the global rules and standards, which implicitly
578
579
580
581
171 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is in force since 27 January 1980 and
has 108 parties (as of 15 December 2008). The Convention has been ratified by all
major greenhouse gas emitting nations with the exception of the United States. For
more information, see http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html, last ac-
cessed 03 May 2013.
172 All industrialised countries are Parties to the UNFCCC. See supra, note 5.
173 Osofsky (2005).
582
legal and scientific questions pertaining to climate change, for example, the
attribution of damages, causation, the standard of proof, striking a balance
between sovereign rights to exploit natural resources and protecting the ma-
rine environment, possible justifications or whether states can be held jointly
and severally liable. The low lying states such as SIDS which suffer from
sea level rise causing adverse impacts could bring a lawsuit as claimants, as
long as a state is an UNCLOS party and can demonstrate that it has suffered
detrimental effects from climate change, and it qualifies as a potential litigant
in compulsory dispute resolution tribunals of the UNCLOS.174 Scores of
such states are positioned to initiate climate change lawsuits against the ma-
jor emitters such as the United States if it accedes to the UNCLOS.
F. Concluding Remarks
174 The Alliance of Small Island States, an intergovernmental body established in 1990
to address global warming and negotiate within the UN system, has 40 members,
38 of which are UNCLOS states parties. For a list of the members, see http://aosis
.org/members/, last accessed 03 May 2013.
175 Burns (2006).
583
key connections and linkages between the UNCLOS regime on marine en-
vironmental protection and other international rules and standards in the
form of treaties, from pollution definition to GHG emission inclusion, from
UNCLOS compulsory dispute settlement to UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol im-
plementation and emission control. The article demonstrated the justification
of GHG as one of many marine pollution sources and its catastrophic con-
sequences to oceanic systems before going on to scrutinise existing inter-
national mechanisms as responses and remedies for such disastrous conse-
quences.
UNCLOS creates an extensive framework for taking and enforcing mea-
sures against different sources of marine pollution and strongly clarifies state
responsibilities for breaching its duties. UNCLOS can serve as an important
mechanism and strategy to combat climate change. Although, as with most
international treaties, it lacks the executive power of enforcement, UNCLOS
may prove to be a primary battle-ground under mounting pressures from
climate change, species extinction, overfishing and maritime pollution. Giv-
en its broad definition of pollution to the marine environment and the dispute
resolution mechanisms, UNCLOS has a remarkable ability to adapt to
changing circumstances and great potential to provide means for affected
states such as SIDS to seek for remedies for climate damages. As a promising
instrument, UNCLOS will continue to develop its normative effect in the
ocean domain and play a key role as a mechanism to confront climate change.
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