How did the Soviet Union

control eastern Europe?

As you saw in Chapter 4, after the Second World War the communists quickly gained con-
trol of eastern Europe with the help of the Soviet Union and the Red Army (see Figure 17
on page 91).
Soviet leader STALIN was determined that eastern Europe would be a SovIET
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. This meant that eastern Europe would be dominated politically
and economically by the USSR. The eastern European countries were controlled by their
communist governments, but Stalin kept tight control of them, particularly through the
Cominform (see Factfile). For Stalin, eastern Europe would serve as a buffer against a fu-
ture attack on the USSR. He also wanted the resources of eastern Europe to help rebuild
the USSR's industries and economy after the terrible damage caused by the war against
Germany. He used CoMecon to ensure this.

Factfile
Cominform
Cominform stands for the Communist Information
Bureau:
Stalin set up the Cominform in 1947 as an organisation to co-ordinate the various commu-
nist governments in eastern Europe.
The office was originally based in Belgrade in Yugoslavia but moved to Bucharest in Ro-
mania in 1948 after Yugoslavia was expelled by Stalin because it would not do what the
Soviet Union told it to do.
Cominform ran meetings and sent out instructions to communist governments about what
the Soviet Union wanted them to do.

Comecon
Comecon stands for the Council for Mutual Ecanomic
Assistance
It was set up in 1949 to co-ordinate the industries and trade of the eastern European coun-
tries.
The idea was that members of Comecon traded mostly with one another rather than trad-
ing with the West.
Comecon favoured the USSR far more than any of its other members. It provided the
USSR with a market to sell its goods. It also guaranteed it a cheap supply of raw materials.
For example, Poland was forced to sell its coal to the USSR at one-tenth of the price that it
could have got selling it on the open market.
It set up a bank for socialist countries in 1964.

The impact on ordinary people

For some people of eastern Europe the communists initially brought hope.
The Soviet Union had achieved amazing industrial growth before the Second World War.
Maybe, by following Soviet methods, they could do the same. However, the reality of So-
viet control of eastern Europe was very different from what people had hoped for.
Freedom Countries that had a long tradition of free speech and democratic government
suddenly lost the right to criticise the government. Newspapers were censored. Non-com-
munists were put in prison for criticising the government. People were forbidden to travel
to countries in western Europe. Protests, such as those in East Germany in • 1953, were
crushed by security forces.
Wealth Between 1945 and 1955 eastern European economies did recover, but soon
wages in eastern Europe fell behind the wages in other countries. People in eastern Eu-
rope were short of coal to heat their houses. Clothing and shoes were very expensive.
Consumer goods People could not get consumer goods like radios, electric kettles or tele-
visions, which were becoming common in the West. The economies of Eastern Europe
were geared towards helping the Soviet Union. Factories produced items such as machin-
ery or electric cables, not what ordinary people wanted.

Stalin to Khrushchev: a new era?

When Stalin died in 1953 many people in eastern Europe hoped for a more relaxed form of
rule. After some power struggles in the USSR the new leader who emerged in 1955 was
Nikita Khrushchev. He appeared to be very different from Stalin. He talked of peaceful co-
EXISTENCE with the West.
He talked of improving the lives of ordinary citizens. He closed down Cominform and re-
leased thousands of political prisoners. In an astonishing speech in 1956 he openly de-
nounced Stalin for his harsh rule.
This new approach from the Soviet leader encouraged some critics of communist rule. In
the summer of 1956 large demonstrations broke out in Poland.
Protestors demanded reforms and the appointment of the Polish war-time resistance
leader Wladyslaw Gomulka as the new Polish leader. There were violent clashes between
protesters and Polish police. Gomulka was not the loyal ally Khrushchev would have
wanted, but he compromised and accepted Gomulka as the new Polish leader. At the
same time he moved Soviet tanks and troops to the Polish border just to make it clear that
he would only compromise so far.
The world watched with interest. Who was the real Khrushchev - the compromiser with
new ideas or the Soviet leader who moved tanks to the Polish border? In October 1956 the
answer would become clear as Khrushchev faced a crisis in Hungary. You will investigate
his response in the Case Study on page 132.

Hungary, 1956
From 1949 to 1956 Hungary was led by a hardline communist called Mátyás Rákosi. Hun-
garians hated the restrictions imposed on them. Most Hungarians felt bitter about losing
their FREEDOM OF SPEECH. They lived in fear of the SECRET POLICE. They resented
the presence of thousands of Soviet troops and officials in their country. Some areas of
Hungary even had Russian street signs, Russian schools and shops. Worst of all, Hungari-
ans had to pay for Soviet forces to be in Hungary.

What happened?
Opposition: In June 1956 a group within the Communist Party in Hungary opposed Rákosi.
He appealed to Khrushchev for help. He wanted to arrest 400 leading opponents. Moscow
would not back him.
Khrushchev ordered Rákosi to be retired 'for health reasons'.
Protest: The new leader, Ernö Gerö, was no more acceptable to the Hungarian people.
Discontent came to a head with a huge student demonstration on 23 October, when the gi-
ant statue of Stalin in Budapest was pulled down.
■
Reform: The USSR allowed a new government to be formed under the well-respected
Imre Nagy. In October Soviet troops and tanks that had been stationed in Hungary since
the Second World War began to withdraw. Hungarians created thousands of local councils
to replace Soviet power. Several thousand Hungarian soldiers defected from the army to
the rebel cause, taking their weapons with them.
Plans: Nagy's Government began to make plans. It would hold free elections, create im-
partial courts and restore farmland to private ownership. It wanted the total withdrawal of
the Soviet army from Hungary.
It also planned to leave the WARSAw PAcT and declare Hungary neutral in the Cold War
struggle between East and West. There was widespread optimism that the new American
President Eisenhower, who had been the wartime supreme commander of all Allied
Forces in western Europe, would support the new independent Hungary with armed troops
if necessary.
How did the Soviet Union respond?
Khrushchev at first seemed ready to accept some of the reforms. However, he could not
accept Hungary leaving the Warsaw Pact. In November 1956 thousands of Soviet troops
and tanks moved into Budapest. The Hungarians did not give in. Two weeks of bitter fight-
ing followed. Some estimates put the number of Hungarians killed at 30,000. However, the
latest research suggests about 3000 Hungarians and up to 1000 Russians were killed. An-
other 200,000 Hungarians fled across the border into Austria to escape the communist
forces.
The WESTERN POweRs protested to the USSR but sent no help; they were too preoccu-
pied with a crisis of their own (the Suez crisis in the Middle East).

Outcomes
Khrushchev put János Kádár in place as leader. Kádár took several months to crush all re-
sistance. Around 35,000 anticommunist activists were arrested and 300 were executed.
Kádár cautiously introduced some of the reforms demanded by the Hungarian people.
However, he did not waver on the central issue - membership of the Warsaw Pact.

Czechoslovakia and the Prague Spring, 1968

Twelve years after the brutal suppression of the Hungarians, Czechoslovakia posed a sim-
ilar challenge to Soviet domination of eastern Europe.
Khrushchev had by now been ousted from power in the USSR. A new leader, Leonid
Brezhnev, had replaced him.
What happened?
In the 1960s a new mood developed in Czechoslovakia.
New leader: In 1967 the old Stalinist leader was replaced by Alexander Ducek. He pro-
posed a policy of 'socialism with a human face': less CENSORSHIP, more freedom of
speech and a reduction in the activities of the secret police. Dubiek was a committed com-
munist, but he believed that CoMMUNIsM did not have to be as restrictive as it had been
before he came to power. He had learned the lessons of the Hungarian uprising and reas-
sured Brezhnev that Czechoslovakia had no plans to pull out of the Warsaw Pact or
Comecon.
New ideas: As censorship eased, opponents were able to criticise the failings of commu-
nist rule, expose corruption and ask awkward questions about events in the country's re-
cent past. This period became known as 'the PRAGUE SPRINg' because of all the new
ideas that seemed to be appearing everywhere. By the summer even more RADICAL
ideas were emerging. There was even talk of allowing another political party, the Social
Democratic Party, to be set up as a rival to the Communist Party.
How did the Soviet Union respond?
The Soviet Union was very suspicious of the changes taking place in Czechoslovakia. So
were the other communist leaders in eastern Europe.
They worried that the new ideas might spread. Brezhnev came under pressure from the
East German and Polish leaders to clamp down on reform in Czechoslovakia.
Through the summer the USSR tried various tactics to slow Dubiek down.
To intimidate the Czechs, Soviet, Polish and East German troops performed public training
exercises right on the Czech border.
It thought about imposing economic SANCTIONS - for example, cancelling wheat exports
to Czechoslovakia - but didn't because it thought that the Czechs would ask for help from
the West.
In July the USSR held a summit conference with the Czechs. Dubiek agreed not to allow a
new Social Democratic Party. However, he insisted on keeping most of his reforms. The
tension seemed to ease.
Then on 20 August 1968, to the stunned amazement of the Czechs and the outside world,
Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia. There was little violent resistance. Dubcek was
removed from power. Dubiek's experiment in socIALIsM with a human face had not failed;
it had simply proved unacceptable to the other communist countries.

Outcomes
Unlike Nagy in Hungary, Dubiek was not executed. But he was gradually downgraded.
First he was sent to be ambassador to Turkey, then expelled from the Communist Party al-
together. Photographs showing him as leader were 'censored' (see page 128).
It was clear that reforming ideas were regarded as a threat to communist rule by all of the
communist leaders. We now know from a release of documents from the Soviet archives
that the suppression of Czechoslovakia was driven just as much by other eastern Euro-
pean leaders (particularly Walter Ulbricht of East Germany) as it was by Brezhnev. These
leaders feared that their own people would demand the same freedom that Dubiek had al-
lowed in Czechoslovakia.

The Brezhnev Doctrine

The Czechoslovak episode also gave rise to the BREZHNEv DOCTRINe. The essentials
of communism were defined as:
a one-party system
to remain a member of the Warsaw Pact.

You have already seen how Berlin was a battleground of the Cold War (see Source 17). In
1961 it also became the focus of the Soviet Union's latest attempt to maintain control of its
east European satellites.
The problem
The crushing of the Hungarian uprising (see page 132) had confirmed for many people in
eastern Europe that it was impossible to fight the communists. For many, it seemed that
the only way of escaping the repression was to leave altogether. Some wished to leave
eastern Europe for political reasons - they hated the communists - while many more
wished to leave for economic reasons.
As standards of living in eastern Europe fell further and further behind the West, the attrac-
tion of going to live in a CAPITALIST state was very great.
The contrast was particularly great in the divided city of Berlin. Living standards were toler-
able in the East,
6 How secure was the USSR's control over eastern Europe,
but just a few hundred metres away in West Berlin, East Germans could see some of the
prize exhibits of capitalist West Germany - shops full of goods, great freedom, great wealth
and great variety. This had been done deliberately by the WeSteRN PoweRs. They had
poured
1948-c. 1989?
massive investment into Berlin. East Germans could also watch West German television.
In the 1950s East Germans were still able to travel freely into West Berlin. From there they
could travel on into West Germany. It was very tempting to leave East Germany, with its
harsh communist regime and its hardline leader, Walter Ulbricht. By the late 1950s thou-
sands were leaving and never coming back (see Figure 18).

The solution
In 1961 the USA had a new president, the young and inexperienced John F Kennedy.
Khrushchev thought he could bully Kennedy and chose to pick a fight over Berlin. He in-
sisted that Kennedy withdraw US troops from the city. He was certain that Kennedy would
back down. Kennedy refused.
However, all eyes were now on Berlin. What would happen next?
At two o'clock in the morning on Sunday 13 August 1961, East German soldiers erected a
barbed-wire barrier along the entire frontier between East and West Berlin, ending all free
movement from East to West. It was quickly replaced by a concrete wall. All the crossing
points from East to West Berlin were sealed, except for one. This became known as
CHECKPOINT CHARLIE.
Families were divided. Berliners were unable to go to work; chaos and confusion followed.
Border guards kept a constant look-out for anyone trying to cross the wall. They had or-
ders to shoot people trying to defect.
Hundreds were killed over the next three decades.

Outcomes
For a while, the wall created a major crisis. Access to East Berlin had been guaranteed to
the Allies since 1945. In October 1961 US diplomats and troops crossed regularly into
East Berlin to find out how the Soviets would react.
On 27 October Soviet tanks pulled up to Checkpoint Charlie and refused to allow any fur-
ther access to the East. All day, US and Soviet tanks, fully armed, faced each other in a
tense stand-off. Then, after eighteen hours, one by one, five metres at a time, the tanks
pulled back. Another crisis, another retreat.
The international reaction was relief. Khrushchev ordered Ulbricht to avoid any actions that
would increase tension. Kennedy said, 'It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a
lot better than a war. So the wall stayed, and over the following years became the symbol
of division - the division of Germany, the division of Europe, the division of communist East
and democratic West. The communists presented the wall as a protective shell around
East Berlin. The West presented it as a prison wall.

Solidarity in Poland, 1980-81

Throughout the years of communist control of Poland there were regular protests. How-
ever, they were generally more about living standards and prices than attempts to over-
throw communist government. During the first half of the 1970s Polish industry performed
well so the country was relatively calm. But in the late 1970s the Polish economy hit a cri-
sis and 1979 was the worst year for Polish industry since communism had been intro-
duced. This is what happened next.
July 1980: The Government announced increases in the price of meat.
August 1980: Workers at the Gdansk shipyard, led by Lech Walesa, put forward 21 de-
mands to the Government, including free TRADE UNIONS and the right to strike (see
Source 24). They also started a free trade union called SoLIDARITY. Poland had trade
unions but they were ineffective in challenging government policies.
30 August 1980: The Government agreed to all 21 of Solidarity's demands.
September 1980: Solidarity's membership grew to 3.5 million.
October 1980: Solidarity's membership was 7 million. Solidarity was officially recognised
by the Government.
January 1981: Membership of Solidarity reached its peak at 9.4 million more than a third of
all the workers in Poland.

Reasons for Solidarity's success

You might be surprised that the Government gave in to Solidarity in 1980.
There are many different reasons for this.
The union was strongest in those industries that were most important to the Government -
shipbuilding and heavy industry. A GENERAL STRIKE in these industries would have dev-
astated Poland's economy.
In the early stages the union was not seen by its members as an alternative to the Com-
munist Party. More than 1 million members (30 per cent) of the Communist Party joined
Solidarity.
Lech Walesa was very careful in his negotiations with the Government and worked to
avoid provoking a dispute that might bring in the Soviet Union.
The union was immensely popular. Almost half of all workers belonged.
Lech Walesa was a kind of folk hero.
Solidarity had the support of the Catholic Church, which was still very strong in Poland.
The Government was playing for time. It hoped Solidarity would break into rival factions.
Meanwhile the Government drew up plans for MARTIAL LAW (rule by the army).

The Soviet Union also had half an eye on the West. Solidarity had gained support in the
West in a way that neither the Hungarian nor the Czech rising had. Walesa was well
known in the Western media and people in the West bought Solidarity badges to show
their support. The scale of the movement ensured that the Soviet Union treated the Polish
crisis cautiously.

Martial law
In February 1981 the situation changed. The civilian prime minister 'resigned' and the
leader of the army, General Jaruzelski, took over. From the moment he took office, people
in Poland, and observers outside Poland, expected the Soviet Union to 'send in the tanks'
at any time, especially when the Solidarity Congress produced an 'open letter saying that
they were campaigning not only for their own rights but for the rights of workers throughout
the COMMuNIST BLoC.
It proclaimed that the Poles were fighting 'For Your Freedom and For Ours.
Jaruzelski and Walesa negotiated to form a government of national understanding but
when that broke down in December, after nine months of tense relationships, the commu-
nist Government acted. Brezhnev ordered the Red Army to carry out 'training manoeuvres'
on the Polish border.
Jaruzelski introduced martial law. He put Walesa and almost 10,000 other Solidarity lead-
ers in prison. He suspended Solidarity.
Reasons for the crushing of Solidarity
Military DICTATORS are not required to give reasons for their actions. But if they were,
what might Jaruzelski have to say?
Solidarity was acting as a political party. The Government declared that it had secret tapes
of a Solidarity meeting setting up a new provisional government - without the Communist
Party.
Poland was sinking into chaos. Almost all Poles felt the impact of food shortages. Ra-
tioning had been introduced in April 1981. Wages had increased by less than INFLATION.
Unemployment was rising.
Solidarity itself was also tumbling into chaos. There were many different factions. Some
felt that the only way to make progress was to push the communists harder until they
cracked under the pressure. Strikes were continuing long after the Solidarity leadership
had ordered them to stop.
The Soviet Union had seen enough. It thought the situation in Poland had gone too far. If
Poland's leaders would not restore communist control in Poland, then it would. This was
something the Polish leaders wanted to avoid.
The significance of Solidarity
In the story of Soviet control of eastern Europe, Solidarity was significant for a number of
reasons:
It highlighted the failure of communism to provide good living standards and this under-
mined communism's claim to be a system which benefited ordinary people.
It highlighted inefficiency and corruption (see Source 25 for example).
It showed that there were organisations which were capable of resisting a communist gov-
ernment.
It showed that communist governments could be threatened by 'PEOPLE POWER'.
It also highlighted the nature of Soviet control. The only thing that kept the communists in
power was force or the threat of force backed by the USSR. When Jaruzelski finally de-
cided to use force, Solidarity was easily crushed. The lesson was clear. If MILITARY
FORCE was not used, then communist control seemed very shaky indeed. If Soviet policy
were to change, communist control would not survive. What do you expect to happen
next?

Enter Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985. He was an unusual mix of IDEAL-
IST, optimist and REALIST.
• The realist in him could see that the USSR was in a terrible state. Its economy was very
weak. It was spending far too much money on the ARMS RACE. It was locked into an un-
winnable war in Afghanistan.
The idealist in Gorbachev believed that communist rule should make life better for the peo-
ple of the USSR and other communist states. As a loyal communist and a proud Russian,
he was offended by the fact that goods made in Soviet factories were shoddy, living stan-
dards were higher in the West and that many Soviet citizens had no loyalty to the Govern-
ment.
■
The optimist in Gorbachev believed that a reformed communist system of government
could give people pride and belief in their country. He definitely did not intend to dismantle
communism in the USSR and eastern Europe, but he did want to reform it radically.
Gorbachev's policies in eastern Europe Gorbachev also had a very different attitude to
eastern Europe from Brezhnev. In March he called the leaders of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries together. This meeting should have been a turning point in the history of eastern Eu-
rope. He had two messages.
'We won't intervene'
Gorbachev made it very clear to the countries of eastern Europe that the were responsible
for their own fates. However, most of the Warsaw Pact leaders were old-style, hardline
communists. To them, Gorbachev's ideas were insane and they simply did not believe he
meant what he said.
"You have to reform'
Gorbachev also made it clear that they needed to reform their own countries. He did not
think communism was doomed. In fact, he felt the opposite was true. Gorbachev believed
the communist system could provit. better healthcare, education and transport. The task in
the USSR and eastern Europe was to renew communism so as to match capitalism in othe
areas of public life. However, they did not believe him on this count eithe In the next few
year these leaders would realise they had made a serious error of judgement.

Gorbachev's reforms
He had to be cautious, because he faced great opposition from hardliners in his own Gov-
ernment, but gradually he declared his policies. The two key ideas were GLASNOST
(openness) and PERESTROIKA (restructuring).
Glasnost: He called for open debate on government policy and honesty in facing up to
problems. It was not a detailed set of policies but it did mean radical change.
In 1987 his perestroika programme allowed market forces to be introduced into the Soviet
economy. For the first time in 60 years it was no longer illegal to buy and sell for profit.
He then went on to:
Reduce defence spending: The nuclear arms race was an enormous drain on the Soviet
economy at a time when it was in trouble anyway.
After almost 50 years on a constant war footing, the Red Army began to shrink.
osgecially with the USA.
Improve international relations: Gorbachev brought a new attitude to the USSR's relations
with the wider world. He withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which had become such
a costly yet
6 How secure was the USSR's control over eastern Europe,
unwinnable war. In speech after speech, he talked about international trust and co-OPER-
ATION as the way forward for the USSR, rather than confrontation.
Gorbachev and President Reagan
Ronald Reagan became US president in January 1981. He was president
1948-6.1989?
until 1988. He had only one policy towards the USSR - get tough. He criticised its control
over eastern Europe and increased US military spending. In a way, Reagan's toughness
helped Gorbachev.
It was clear by the late 1980s that the USSR could not compete with American military
spending. This helped Gorbachev to push through his military spending cuts.
Reagan got on quite well with Gorbachev himself. As SUPERPOWER relations improved,
the USSR felt less threatened by the USA. This meant there was less need for the USSR
to control eastern Europe.
Implications for eastern Europe: Listen to your
peoplé'
As Gorbachev introduced his reforms in the USSR the demand rose for similar reforms in
eastern European states as well. Most people in these states were sick of the poor eco-
nomic conditions and the harsh restrictions that communism imposed. Gorbachev's poli-
cies gave people some hope for reform.
In July 1988 Gorbachev made a speech to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. He
planned to withdraw large numbers of troops, tanks and aircraft from eastern Europe. Hun-
gary was particularly eager to get rid of Soviet troops and, when pressed, Gorbachev
seemed to accept this. In March 1989 he made clear again that the Red Army / would not
intervene to prop up communist regimes in eastern Europe, What followed was staggering.

People power
The western media came up with a phrase to explain the events on page 144 - people
power. Communist control was toppled because ordinary people were not prepared to ac-
cept it any longer. They took control of events. It was not political leaders guiding the fu-
ture of eastern Europe in 1989 but ordinary people.
Reunification of Germany
With the Berlin Wall down, West German CHANCELLOR Helmut Kohl proposed a speedy
REUNIFICATION of Germany. Germans in both countries embraced the idea enthusiasti-
cally.
Despite his idealism, Gorbachev was less enthusiastic. He expected that a new united
Germany would be friendlier to the West than to the East.
But after many months of hard negotiations, not all of them friendly, Gorbachev accepted
German reunification and even accepted that the new Germany could become a member
of NATO. This was no small thing for Gorbachev to accept. Like all Russians, he lived with
the memory that it was German aggression in the Second World War that had cost the
lives of 20 million Soviet citizens.
On 3 October 1990, Germany became a united country once again.

The collapse of the USSR

Even more dramatic events were to follow in the Soviet Union itself.
Gorbachev visited the Baltic state of Lithuania - part of the Soviet Union. Its leaders put
their views to him. They were very clear. They wanted independence. They did not want to
be part of the USSR. Gorbachev was for once uncompromising. He would not allow this.
But in March they did it anyway.
Almost as soon as he returned to Moscow From Lithuania, Gorbachev received a similar
demand from the Muslim Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. What should Gorbachev do now?
He sent troops to Azerbaijan to end rioting there. He sent troops to Lithuania.
But as the summer approached, the crisis situation got worse.
The Russian Republic, the largest within the USSR, elected Boris Yeltsin as its president.
Yeltsin made it clear that he saw no future in a Soviet Union. He said that the many RE-
PUBLICS that made up the USSR should become independent states.
Ukraine declared its independence. Other republics followed.
By the end of 1990 nobody was quite sure what the USSR meant any longer. Meanwhile,
Gorbachev was an international superstar. In October 1990 Gorbachev received the Nobel
Peace Prize for his contribution to ending the Cold War.
The Republic of Georgia declared its independence.
The USSR was disintegrating. Reformers within the USSR itself demanded an end to the
Communist Party's domination of government. Gorbachev was struggling to hold i to-
gether, but members of the communist elite had had enough.
Hardline Communist Party members and leading military officers attempted a coup to take
over the USSR. The plotters included Gorbachev's prime minister, Pavlov, and tr head of
the armed forces, Dimitry Yazov. They held Gorbachev prisoner in his holida home in the
Crimea. They sent tanks and troops onto the streets of Moscow. This w the old Soviet way
to keep control. Would it work this time?
Huge crowds gathered in Moscow. They strongly opposed this military coup. The Ru
president, Boris Yeltsin, emerged as the leader of the popular opposition. Faced by resis-
tance, the conspirators lost faith in themselves and the coup collapsed.
• This last-ditch attempt by the Communist Party to save the USSR had failed. A fev later,
Gorbachev returned to Moscow.
Gorbachev might have survived the coup, but it had not strengthened his position as So-
viet leader. He had to admit that the USSR was finished and he with it. In a televised
speech on 25 December 1991, Gorbachev announced his own resignation and the end of
the Soviet Union (see Source 32).

The end of the Cold War

SOURCE 32
A sense of failure and regret came through his [Gorbachev's] Christmas Day abdication
speech - especially in his sorrow over his people ceasing to be citizens of a great power'.
Certainly, if man-in-the-street interviews can be believed, the former Soviet peoples con-
sider him a failure.
History will be kinder. The Nobel Prize he received for ending the Cold War was well de-
served. Every man, woman and child in this country should be eternally grateful.
His statue should stand in the centre of every east European capital; for it was Gorbachev
who allowed them their independence. The same is true for the newly independent coun-
tries further east and in Central Asia. No Russian has done more to free his people from
bondage since Alexander Il who freed the serfs.
6 How secure was the USSR's control over eastern Europe,
From a report on Gorbachev's abdication speech, 25 December 1991,
in the US newspaper the Boston Globe.

Despite efforts to reform, the USSR continued to disintegrate, with republics like Lithuania and
Ukraine declaring independence. A failed coup by hardline communists in 1991 further weakened
Gorbachev’s position, leading to his resignation and the formal end of the Soviet Union on Decem-
ber 25, 1991.

Gorbachev’s reforms and the collapse of the USSR marked the end of the Cold War. The fall of
communism in Eastern Europe was largely a result of popular movements and Gorbachev’s refusal
to use force to maintain control.
Legacy of Gorbachev: While many saw him as a failure in the Soviet Union, internationally, Gor-
bachev was praised for his role in ending the Cold War and allowing Eastern European nations to
regain their independence.