Reductive violence

哲学系 郭政昱
 Abstract
Violence is a kind of political action that occurs in power relations. Without
hierarchy, violence cannot exist. The problem is the asymmetrical power structure
that exists between the object of violence and the object of violence. The text
mainly classified the objects and types of violence into two categories. The first
is the reductive violence that is inevitably placed by philosophers as they use
language as a tool in their laboratory. When expressing the characteristics or
categories of an object, we inevitably place the object in the structure of "X is Y".
The problem is that when a being whose existence cannot be defined in any
language, such as a human being, is expressed as a language, such violence is
visible. Such violence is violence that replaces similarity with equality, and
entities that cannot be explained by this are treated as exceptions. Such exceptions
are recognized as objects to be removed from all parts of society in the process
of politicization, and they belong to defective products. The second violence is
reductive violence which occurs when one tries to recognize an object from
knowledge. This violence can be understood in a reductionist context similar to
the aforementioned violence, which occurs when one evaluates the knowledge of
another object based on one's own beliefs. At this time, a hierarchical order occurs
between knowledge, and the form of violence appears as discipline and
punishment.
How can we escape from this reductive violence? We can break free from
verbal violence through “performance” based on constant “experience”. By
constantly training ourselves to recognize the existence of an object as a system
of language, we can break free from this violence. How can we escape from the
second kind of violence? In fact, this problem is still stuck in a labyrinth.
Thousands of philosophers offer different approaches, but one thing is certain: we
were not even aware of the causes of this violence and the terrible consequences
it produced. Criticisms against Eurocentrism and colonization of knowledge
came from other civilizations other than European society, and the violent
institutions and consequences created by the beliefs of knowledge that exist
within individuals and societies are still valid. In the latter part, I tried to find a
clue as to whether such reductive violence can be eliminated in Roger's
recognition of Chinese philosophy.
1. Reductive violence from languege

Reductive violence refers to any act that deprives the object of the opportunity to
determine and recognize its existence by unilaterally defining the existence of the object.
In this sense, non-human beings, more precisely, all beings who cannot enjoy human
language, are inevitably exposed to such violence. However, it can be seen that these
discussions are practically meaningless. This is because we cannot seek the subject's
consent for the "name" that we unilaterally give to the subject. Because we can't get
consent for what we call a chair a chair. In that sense, we would not be able to define
this as "violence". In this sense, violence can only be established when the object must
be a human from a linguistic point of view. Then, from a linguistic point of view, where
does “violence” occur?
Through Wittgenstein's linguistic paradigm, we can find out how various changes in the
dictionary definition of "human" cause reductive violence. Here, we use Wittgenstein
thoroughly in terms of human ontology and prove how each philosopher defined human
beings and society and why their methods inevitably lead to violence. What we want to
see through the tool called Wittgenstein is how Western philosophy's thorough view of
humans and society is engulfed in the linguistic structure, and how immersed in the
linguistic structure inevitably creates violence. According to Wittgenstein, a state of
affairs consists of the synthesis of objects, and the synthesis of object propositions
constitutes the elemental proposition corresponding to the state of affairs. The synthesis
of these elemental propositions constitutes a compound proposition corresponding to
the facts. Let's consider this existentially for a moment. Then, to accurately define a
group such as "society" or "state", what elements should we look at as facts, state of
affairs, and objects? Here, we can see that many philosophers in history defined things
and facts in various ways and thoroughly linguistically explained the state and society
through them. We will go a step further and examine why such a linguistic argument
inevitably causes violence.
First reductive violence under the assumption that “human are X” is a kind of the state
of affairs(Sachverhalt) arises from "elemental propositions" that linguistically respond
to a state of affairs. The state of affairs, “Human is X,” does not have violence by itself,
but when it tries to define humans with the characteristics of X, it inevitably has
reductive violence. Because the object of "human" can never be separated by sub-
objects, the state of affairs created by the connection of such objects also cannot have
any meaning. Second reductive violence also occurs under the assumption that "Human
is X" is a compound proposition acting as a fact. Therefore, in this assumption, the state
or group that corresponds to “fact” is recognized as a group of individuals resulting in
the homogeneity of “reason”. In this assumption, the state exists as a "fact" in which the
beings of each reason are united. Of course, this method cannot explain reality at all,
and in the end, That only leads to the result that "must be pursued". The establishment
of an ideal state in such a dutiful way inevitably results in the inevitable violence against
those who are not suitable for it or the discussion. Let’s see what Plato said in “Politeia”:

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a
tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But
whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other
legislator,–they will have nothing to do either with individual or State and will inscribe no
laws until they have either found, or themselves made a clean surface. They will be very
right, he said. Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the
constitution? No doubt. And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will
often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute
justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and
temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they will conceive
according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form
and likeness of God. Very true, he said. And one feature they will erase, and another they
will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the
ways of God?

Pluto <Politeia> Chapter6

Plato's "Human is reasonable" proposition is an elemental proposition, and when each

individual is identified under such a goal, the state constantly runs toward their ideal,
as seen above, and the existence of the individual as an individual in such a goal is
denied. This phenomenon is also evident in the study of international politics, which
produces even more dire consequences. Hans Morgenthau's proposition "Human is
evil" seems to be arguing the opposite with several philosophers at first glance, but it
can be understood on the same line as them in that it inevitably accompanies violence.
Morgenthau’s argument went one step further from the simple discussion of the state
in Plato's complex proposition and went on to homogenize the international political
system corresponding to "language" in the Wittgenstein philosophical paradigm. Let's
listen to the characteristics of international politics that he asserts:

The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as a power
among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the
statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and
legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil.

Hans Morgenthau < Politics Among Nations>

Morgenthau explains international politics from the proposition "Man is selfish". Here,
"Man is selfish" corresponds to the elemental proposition, and "Nation is selfish"
corresponds to the compound proposition. Regardless of whether the proposition "Man
is selfish" is true or false, all nations are reduced to the characteristic "Selfish". This
reductive violence treats characteristics other than the characteristic of “selfish” as
“exceptions” in the international order, and countries that do not maximize national
interest are criticized for ignorance of the essence of the international order.
Of course, when humans were defined as a state of affairs, attempts to dissect the
elements included in the matter were made by several Western philosophers in history.
1
It was created by considering what happens in the human head as an atomic fact and
imagining its components. The most representative example is human "reason". From
Plato, Kant to Hegel, it is a representative product born from the process of considering
what happens in the human head as a state of affairs and contemplating what constitutes
it. When "Human is rational" is understood as an elemental proposition, man is
understood as a matter, and the reason is understood as an object. Regardless of whether
the proposition is true or false, reductive violence occurs by defining man as a reason.
This is because, by defining human beings as reason, all beings that do not appear to
have reason are defined as “non-human”.
When understood from Saussure's point of view that the signifier and the signified are
not necessarily connected, In the situation of "Human is X", X plays a role in indicating
the difference between Human and other signifiers. For this reason, philosophers
forcefully incorporate beings classified as "non-Human" into other signifiers distinct
from humans or invent other languages that can represent "non-Human". The example
in which "non-human" is classified as an animal belongs to the representative example
of the former, and the creation of the word "maniac" belongs to the representative
example of the latter.
Michel Foucault also discusses how the definition of "fous" (crazy) changed throughout
history in his book "Histoire de la folie a lage classique". According to Foucault, in all
western eras, madness exists as a different form of consciousness, largely in the face of
historical differences. What they have in common is to separate the madmen from the
human category by understanding humans through reason2. Under the assumption that
the aforementioned "human is X" is a state of affairs, if we accept Wittgenstein's point
of view that the state of affairs constitutes a fact, the creation of the word "maniac" is
the inevitable violence created by the proposition "Human is reasonable".
we also could regard the proposition "Human is X" as a compound proposition

1
As for them, Maybe The proposition like “Human is reasonable” is very clear proposition
like “The Sun is red” or “The Sky is blue”. Whether It is true or not, What I want to prove is
that it is inevitably accompanied by violence.
2
Histoire de la folie a lage Classique, Michel Foucault, 182~186pg
corresponding to the facts rather than an elemental proposition. Then, "Human is X"
will be proved true according to whether the elemental propositions composing it are
true or false. In this case, in the place of X, some combination of state of affairs, not a
noun or an adjective, must come. Then, among Western philosophers, who put a
combination of events other than an adjective in the place of X? It is to find common
characteristics that distinguish humans from other non-human beings in their individual
actions. Philosophers who define human beings from the common characteristics found
in these individual actions all fall into this category. For example, "Man is a socially-
relational being", "Man is a being who actively composes the world through language",
"Man is an artistic being", etc.; What They did is to discover and define human beings
in a reductive way through it.
Of course, in this definition, the relationship between X and Humans is interdependent,
and characteristics called X are expressed by each individual. In this sense, Human
beings as facts are defined as the synthesis of X’s existing as things. In this respect,
"events" become individual characteristics of human beings. And as a synthesis of these
"events", we come to understand human beings. Just as humans are cooperative,
creative, artistic, working, making tools, and using language. Man as a synthesis of
these "events" acts as a "fact". This seems a bit closer to reality at the national level than
the previous ones. However, this understanding as a “fact” returns to another identity:
something exists beyond the state. Just as in Wittgenstein's biographical philosophy he
compared the swamp of language to a fly from which philosophers cannot escape,
Western philosophers and political scientists cannot get out of this swamp of "identity."
To prove the truth of any "fact", for Wittgenstein, the paradigm necessarily requires a
true elemental proposition. In addition, such elemental propositions can only be applied
to objects that can logically match true and false. However, how can we be understood
as objects in our human problems? Plato and Kant tried to understand human beings’
elemental propositional by creating strange tools such as the logos that exist in human
beings. The modern and contemporary Western political ideology that emerged based
on such criticism assumes human characteristics as an elemental proposition instead of
giving up on the existence of any object within humans, and derives the complex
proposition of the state or international order from it.
The problem is that none of the characteristics of a human can accurately explain the
existence of a human being. Therefore, the understanding of the state that starts from
humans is inevitably false for two reasons. As Wittgenstein also pointed out, to know
an object, we need to know all of its internal properties. Whether we understand humans
as objects themselves, elemental propositions, or compound propositions, all of them
inevitably fail. This is because, in humans, setting the object is unavoidable in the first
place. To explain such inevitability, some create "words" and some avoid understanding
the object altogether. Freud's "unconsciousness", Marx's "class consciousness", and
Zizek’s "solidarity consciousness" cannot avoid such criticism3.
This excessive preoccupation with "identity" created the illusion that there would be a
certain law in the relationship between elemental propositions. This may serve as a
general critique of "social science" in particular. In economics, international politics, or
psychology, variables are constantly controlled to achieve any meaningful "identity".
After all, such controls can yield experimentally significant results that appear to follow
a certain pattern, but predicting or explaining the world with such results can be very
risky. Because such predictions and explanations are necessarily accompanied by
violence.
So, how did Wittgenstein view these limitations? This position is reflected in
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. In his later work, "Philosophical investigation,"
Wittgenstein retracts his earlier claims and introduces the concept of "family
resemblance". He said that most of the languages people use in real life contain a
complex network of overlapping and intersecting similarities. Scientists and
philosophers view human language as an abstract system rather than a practical activity
and try to study it scientifically. However, in reality, the language that people use in
their daily life is not a scientific and artificially unified concept, but rather contains
ambiguous commonalities and similarities, but the boundaries are not clear.
For example, the various activities corresponding to the word game, such as soccer,
rock-paper-scissors, and block stacking, each have different rules and characteristics.
Therefore, characteristics common to these various games cannot be found. However,
we can group each activity into a similar concept with the linguistic expression 'game'.

3
Although I do not agree with all of Slavoj Žižek's views, he categorizes violence
into three categories in "What is Violence?" One is subjective violence accompanied
by violent acts, which are recognized through social phenomena such as terrorism and
riots. Except for this, the other two types are classified as objective violence. One is
symbolic violence embodied through the language that Heidegger describes as the
“house of being”, and the other is structural violence, in which socio-political and
economic systems determine the existence of individuals. He categorizes violence in
this way, but I disagree with this opinion. He thinks that by looking at objective
violence separately from subjective violence, it is possible to get closer to the essence
of violence. However, there is a “similarity” between the two types of violence that he
classifies as objective violence, and it is expressed as reductive violence in my texts.
In other words, the act of defining the subject through the object of anything, and
furthermore, the act of defining the way of existence through the object is a way of
expressing violence. The way of existence of such violence is no different from the
political point of view. We are exposed to violence that defines an existence based on
nationality, race, culture, etc., and I classify these problems as inevitable risks arising
from using language itself, not thinking separately from language.
Through this concept of family similarity, Wittgenstein pointed out that the existing
philosophical approaches were too biased toward universality and commonality, and
argued that it should be supplemented with the concept of family similarity. In other
words, he insisted on gaining insight into various characteristics and ambiguous
properties that could be ignored due to excessive classification and demarcation of
boundaries. Then, How can we solve this eternal paradox?
Can Wittgenstein's "family equality" really solve this reductive problem? Ironically,
Wittgenstein defines "familial equivalence" as the structure of equivalence between
entities that we cannot find but "feel" as such in the laboratory of language. Before
examining whether this method can solve the reductive understanding of the
relationship between human beings and society based on Wittgenstein's philosophy, we
must first understand why the currency exchange problem occurs. The word I made, the
reductive problem, is the inevitable violence that arises from the sum total of all
attempts to define humans through X in the problem of "Human is X". This is a
linguistic problem that inevitably arises no matter what X is. As we saw earlier, This X
cannot define a Human in any way. The problem is not the difficulty with the definition
of Human. In conclusion, the attempt to define humans through X inevitably brings with
it the inevitable violence that binds and oppresses Human in the process of politicization.
Then, why does such violence occur in the process of politicization?
In history, it is not difficult to see numerous examples of ideologies arising from human
justice oppressing humans with violence in the process of politicization. Needless to
say, they were horrendous and caused a lot of violence. I saw the problem in which the
problem of defining human beings inevitably arises in the process of politicization in
the attempt to define human beings linguistically. The problem is, I think that
understanding humans through this definition replaces the order of similarity between
humans with the order of equality. The purpose of any attempt to define man is to
replace the kind of similarity that exists between each individual called the man with an
order of equality. The purpose here is to discover some equivalence, which is
accomplished by destroying the similarity that appears as the "difference" between
individuals. Only equivalence makes it possible to ascertain the identity of a
phenomenon within the specific conditions of linguistic and political experimentation.
Here repetition appears only in the transition from one order of generality to another4.
To make it a little easier to understand, let us understand Kant and Marx as
representatives. In political matters, the goal that Kant wants to set is permanent peace
for all the nations of the world. Marx wanted to liberate man from work and realize the
true essence of man. In order to prove the setting of these political goals, it was
inevitably necessary to discover certain laws and order among the recurring events that
exist between human or human-created historical "events". In the experiment to

4
Deleuze, “Difference et Repetition” 28pg
discover these laws and orders, the general order is replaced by another general order,
that is, the order of similarity is replaced by the order of equality. Wittgenstein said that
we feel the order of similarities between languages. In fact, we can feel the similarity
between the order of similarities that humans have and the many repeating events in
human history. The problem is that when you try to understand these similarities by
replacing them with an order of equality within your own linguistic (philosophical)
laboratory, violence inevitably occurs.
Let's look at another example in which similarity is replaced by equality. This is because
the proposition that "human beings are biologically composed of male and female" is
extremely true at first glance. This thesis itself has no violence whatsoever. However,
the problem arises from such political attempts to understand humans as men and
women. As an extension of the previous discussion, these political attempts inevitably
cause violence. The dangers of ideas such as feminism can be understood in this context.
Regardless of whether it is recognized as an elemental proposition or a compound
proposition, it inevitably causes a reduction error. Because they explain the world from
these explicitly true propositions, it seems as if it is true, but once every attempt to
understand humans as biological males and females cannot necessarily explain the
world in itself. The inexplicable part is treated as an exception, and an inevitable
hierarchy is formed between the exception and the virtual world they have created.
Reductive violence occurs in this hierarchy. In other words, it is the violence that a
compound proposition or language inflicts on some exceptional part that cannot be
explained by it.
The same problem occurs in international politics. Kant and the democratic pacifists
started from the proposition that "all countries are classified into states with and without
democratic institutions," and derived the similarity that "wars rarely occur between
democratic countries," In conclusion, it leads to the bizarre and violent result of
establishing a global democratic system. Among the new political theories that emerged
to overcome Morgenthau's argument, in particular, the arguments of neo-realists such
as Orgensky and Mearsheimer are also the same. The attitude of rejecting the elemental
interpretation of "human beings are selfish" refusing to discuss human beings and going
straight to the discussion of the state to interpret the international order inevitably
implies violence. The interpretation of countries starting from their proposition that
“States are classified as hegemons and states without hegemony” inevitably makes
violent results like “the rule of the hegemons leads to peace in the international order”.
If so, how can we solve the reductive violence of these languages? Is the philosopher
inevitably exposed to such violence because, unlike the artist, he cannot give up the tool
of language? In fact, the violence that such language creates arises from the way in
which his ideas are accepted by the masses through the system of language rather than
philosophers. Even though the authors did not use any word as a dictionary meaning,
readers are always exposed to such violence, which is easy to understand as a dictionary
meaning. In particular, this reductionist understanding causes considerable violence
when it is politicized. A language-speaking philosopher is always exposed to the danger
of such a reductionist interpretation, and in the process of politicizing them, they are
exposed to the danger of misuse of their ideas.
If so, how can this violence be eliminated? 5 Buddhist philosophy gives us certain
implications in this respect. It is one of the methods of "practice", which is the
elimination of attachments through habit. Although we understand the object in the
structure of language, the moment we try to understand the object through such
language, such understanding turns into violence. However, the moment we give up the
tool of language, according to Wittgenstein, we cannot understand the object. How can
we get out of this constant paradox? In Buddhism, the state of “enlightenment” refers
to a state of being free from a kind of attachment. Enlightenment is a kind of "state"
pursued by renunciation of attachment, and all Buddhist monks practice to attain this
enlightenment. The problem is that pursuing this realization itself causes addiction. If
we let go of attachment, we cannot pursue enlightenment, and if we try to pursue
enlightenment, the attachment will be born6.
The paradox experienced by all these meditators is eliminated through the “habit” of
the practice. If you constantly repeat the practice of letting go of attachments, you will
reach a state of not becoming attached to yourself, even if you don't intend to. That is
enlightenment. The answer to the problem of the violence of language can also be found
in a similar context. Through the practice of abandoning the habit of not understanding
the subject through the object, that is, the violence of trying to understand the object
from the language, we constantly get away from the language and pay attention to the
object itself 7 . At this time, the similarity that exists between objects exists only as

5
Of course, there are also skeptical views as to what kind of meaning this practice really has.
Here, Lacan's critique is relatively reasonable, according to which man's ability to commit
violence surpasses that of animals, for the very reason that man uses language. Language cuts
things into parts, destroys their organic unity, and treats each part and attribute as
autonomous. In other words, language pushes things into the realm of meaning, which in the
end is external to the thing. We can think of this in the human realm as well, and by making
the name "Orient" to Asians, we give them a foreign and mysterious orientalist feeling that is
different from the West. In fact, the Orient is only an abstract system and has nothing to do
with Orientalist features. According to this position, such reductive violence cannot be
permanently eliminated as long as language is used.
6
Changseong Hong, "The Paradox of Enlightenment and Private Language Argument" ( 홍
창성, “깨달음의 패러독스와 사적언어논증”)

7
"Practice" in Buddhism and "removal of violence to define objects from language" here
have similarities in terms of "experience". Just as in Buddhism, the practitioners constantly
practice through repetition in order to break free from their obsession, students must
constantly remove the violence that seeks to understand the existence of an object through
similarity and is not replaced by equality8.

2. Reductive Violence from Knowledge

When we partially accepted Wittgenstein's proposition that "language constitutes the

world," we can see in the previous part 1 how the philosophical and especially the
political paradigm that the system constitutes in defining human beings linguistically
affects reductive violence. We found out that it is inevitable. If so, we need to find out
how this reductive violence actually works. This is because, as Wittgenstein also
mentioned, "similarity" between objects that cannot be explained linguistically by using
language is clearly a kind of psychological mechanism and cannot be logically fully
explained. Unable to explain too broad a psychological mechanism, we can only
understand how the form of "human" that is "recognized" from the propositions that
define humans linguistically operates within our psyche and why we perceive them as
such propositions. We need to find out whether our understanding of human beings
leads to violent results.
Then, how can we understand the psychological mechanism of violence if we
understand "linguistic understanding of humans" as a kind of extension of knowledge
about humans? In other words, our understanding of man is a kind of extension of
"knowledge" about man, and that "knowledge" is expressed by new words within the
system of language. For example, even before the word "art" existed, humans would
have performed a kind of artistic action, and these actions would have been explained
by the word "art" by later generations. As the meaning of the word "art" is explained
differently by different philosophers, the proposition "Man is an artistic being" can also
be interpreted in various ways. In this respect, we can understand philosophy as creating
a kind of knowledge system through "words". This characteristic can be easily found in
the history of philosophy, and it is the act of establishing a system of knowledge or
expanding the meaning of a word by interpreting it differently or giving it differently.
So, what is knowledge and how is it created? According to Gettier, the traditional
system of knowledge consists of:
S knows that p if

language. This concept is expressed as "漸修" in Buddhism.

8
The many similarities and differences between Western and Eastern philosophies that you
have shown in your class show that they are not easily replaced by equivalence. They have
certain similarities within the category of philosophy, but they are paradigms with different
ways of being that can never be replaced. Your philosophy, as I understand it, is that the
Chinese are more "trained" to understand the nature of the object in relation to their cultural
use of their language, but in Western languages, they are not impossible.
 A. P is true;
B. S believes that p;
C. S is justified in believing that p
Let's take an example. Let's start with the proposition that seems to be kind of true "Man
is classified into the proletariat and the bourgeoisie according to the possession of the
means of production". This is a kind of “knowledge” Then, when I see that I am the
person who accepts the proposition composed in such a language, I judge the
authenticity of this knowledge in the light of my experiences and circumstances.
Experience and circumstances cause justification for it (this is true of (C)), and I believe
this to be true (this is true of (B)). In other words, “knowledge is justified true belief”.
Two factors, “justification” and “belief”, are necessary and sufficient conditions for
constituting knowledge9.
In this way, it is possible to acquire various knowledge about one object (limited to
Human here). Such knowledge is necessarily based on justification for beliefs and
propositions. Here, belief is ultimately based on the highly subjective experience of the
individual who acquires knowledge. Beliefs based on these subjective experiences are
justified on the condition that requires relatively objectivity called justification. In this
respect, knowledge requires both subjectivity and objectivity at the same time. Then,
how does violence occur in the knowledge justified on the basis of objectivity through
"experience" and observation? It occurs when we explicitly expand the object of
knowledge formed on the system of belief that guarantees this objectivity. In other
words, violence occurs when one tries to understand the other through knowledge that
is believed to have secured objectivity on top of one's own "belief". Such violence is
still valid in the philosophical circles of the past and present, represented by
colonization and Eurocentrism 10 . Colonization is a method that was systematically
carried out in the process of colliding with European civilizations and other civilizations
in the past, and it means to make the discussion of knowledge of other civilizations
meaningless or result in a discussion inferior to that of European civilizations. This
colonization is based on the belief that modern Europeans believe that their arguments
are superior to those of other civilizations, and their own objective superiority is
represented by science and positivism. The debate on Eurocentrism still valid today
starts from the belief that "European philosophy's epistemology or ontological
discussion can include all philosophical discussions from other civilizations".
Eurocentrism appears in the form of violence that imposes their beliefs on others, citing
the lack of objectivity for "knowledge" from other civilizations. Reductive violence

9
Gettier, “what is knowledge” ,1~2pg
10
Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Philosophy and Philosophical Practice: Eurocentrism as an
Epistemology of Ignorance.” The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Edited by Ian
James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. London: Routledge, 2017. 397-408.
here occurs in the process of asserting that the understanding of the object through
knowledge based on one's own beliefs is superior to the understanding of the object
through knowledge based on others’ beliefs. It is the violence created by the hierarchical
order formed between paradigms constructed from knowledge based on different beliefs.
The violence created by this hierarchy of knowledge is achieved in such a way that
others completely abolish their beliefs. This phenomenon is everywhere in society, and
this hierarchical way of existence of knowledge causes violence between individuals
and individuals, society and society, nation and nation, and civilization and civilization.
In these relationships, the beliefs of the subject exist hierarchically. Their knowledge
also has an asymmetry of power. The violence created by the power asymmetry of
beliefs possessed by these different knowledges is expressed as "discipline" and
"punishment" against the object inflicted upon disobedience to power in the power
relationship between objects. "Discipline" and "punishment" are strictly enforced even
between these individuals and individuals, between society and society, between states
and nations, and between civilizations and civilizations. Then, we need to find out how
the violence created by the asymmetric power of the beliefs possessed by knowledge
occurs in the relationship between different objects11.
First, it is a form of expression of asymmetric violence created by the belief of
knowledge in the relationship between the individual and the individual. The
hierarchical order created by interpersonal beliefs is mainly formed in the upper and
lower classes, teachers and students, and parents and children. Parents engage in violent
acts of forcing their children the knowledge formed on the basis of "beliefs" acquired
through their "experiences", and this behavior occurs equally and frequently between
teachers and students, and between superiors and subordinates. In particular, the
asymmetric power of knowledge beliefs between teachers and students, parents and
children arises from asymmetry in knowledge beliefs about "morality"; Based on the
"fantasy" that parents and teachers know more about "morality" than students and
children, they unilaterally justify violence in the name of edification against children
and students who do not meet the standards. Such violence does not mean simply
physical and physical violence, but violence acting on the mind, and they lead to a
reflective situation that denies the subject's self12.
The justification of discipline and discipline resulting from this hierarchy of knowledge

11
Such asymmetrical violence occurs when an object is defined as knowledge as reductive
violence. This is because, if there is no act of defining an object with knowledge itself, the
power relationship between subjects who have knowledge in the first place will not be
established. Consider the case of teachers and students. The reason why a teacher can
discipline and discipline students is based on the conviction that the knowledge the teacher
possesses can define the subject more objectively and clearly.
12
“Surveiller et punir”, Michel Foucault, 173~200pg
and beliefs and the resulting self-reflection results directly apply to other subjects as
well. In group-group relationships, a characteristic often referred to as “professionalism”
reveals this characteristic well. As a professional group, they create the illusion that
some elite group will know the subject better than the general public and justify their
control over such group. Such elite groups make the subordinated self-reflection about
being dominated. Discipline and punishment at this time are implemented as legal
punishment. The same can be considered in the relationship between the state and the
state, and this asymmetry of knowledge is an important justification for aggression. The
self-commendation that the United States invaded Afghanistan or Iraq and established
a democratic system reflects this characteristic. Their belief in their knowledge stems
from the belief that their system is superior to them, and punishment at this time is war
and appears as aggression. Clashes between civilizations also show this characteristic,
and the characteristics experienced in China's modernization show this well. The “self-
denial” and “self-reflection” of Chinese intellectuals are the result of this hierarchical
order of beliefs in knowledge. The hierarchy of Europeans' knowledge and beliefs
appears in the form of "Eurocentrism" and the colonization of knowledge, and such
beliefs made an illusion as Europeans' philosophies can replace other philosophies or
encompass all categories of philosophical discussions of other civilizations.
On the surface, this kind of violence does not appear to be the violence produced by
reductionism. This is because knowledge arises from the hierarchy that exists between
beliefs. The hierarchical order existing between these knowledge beliefs is externally
justified by the elaboration of objectivity during their justification process
(corresponding to (C) in Gettier's analysis of traditional knowledge), but in the end their
objectivity is especially important with humans. This is because it is difficult to
guarantee objectivity in matters of politics. Then why do I view these as a kind of
reductionism-generated violence? In the politicization of ideas, they deliberately try to
understand the world through knowledge, and based on them, they make people
understand the world. In particular, these characteristics often appear in the form of
ideologies including hatred towards a country or people.
There are many examples, but let's find out how Hitler carried out reductionist violence
from the proposition of state and nation in Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kamph," who created
the clearest and most brutal fascism.
Some view the state as a characteristic of language as a means of realizing the largely
obscure political power tendencies of the peoples forming a unified state... For
example, blacks and Chinese people learn German and are willing to do so in the
future. To try to speak German and to believe that voting for a German party makes
them German... Ethnicity, or more precisely, race is in the blood, not in the language,
so the loser's If blood can be changed by such a process, then we will be able to talk
about Germanism. However, it is impossible....especially when married to an inferior
race, no matter how well a mixed-race child born between them can speak the
language of the superior people, the cultural creativity will disappear.
 Adolf Hilter “Mein Kamph”
For Adolf Hitler, a state is a politicized group of people. The problem is that Adolf
Hitler, starting from this proposition, asserts that the coexistence of different
nationalities in the country hinders the development of the country, and presents
evidence that numerous other ethnic groups in Germany are harming the Germanic
peoples as such. Therefore, for him, two options remain in order to maximize the
interests of the Germanic people. One is to get other people to use the Germanic
language through education and to assimilate them into the culture of the Germanic
people, and the other is to remove factors that hinder their development, which can
only be done by removing them. Hitler cleverly used a reductionist element here to
justify violence against other peoples in Germany. For him, the empirical evidence
wrapped in "knowledge" is quite clear. It is the basis of biology, proving that the
composition of culture or ethnicity is not limited to language or culture, and how
meaningless such efforts to assimilate ethnic groups are. In fact, the multi-ethnic
problem that many countries are experiencing now supports Hitler's thesis plausibly
and rationally. These grounds are the so-called grounds supported by neo-fascism and
neo-Nazis to this day. So what was the biggest error in Hitler's argument? He justifies
his reductive violence by wrapping the knowledge derived from his beliefs into the
illusion of being objective. His discussion, wrapped in such reductive violence, was
wrapped in the historical mission of indiscriminate violence against Jews and the
revival of the Germanic peoples.
If so, is this reductive violence limited to fascists like Hitler? This reductive violence
is similar to all those who are called political leaders in many countries. They justify
violence from it through a reductionist understanding of understanding the state or
people, or other peoples or ideologies, in the packaging of knowledge beliefs as
objectification.
Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This question is the first question of the
revolution. All revolutionary struggles in China in the past had little success, and the
basic reason was that they could not unite their real friends to attack their real
enemies... landlords and compradors, petty bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat,
proletariat... ... we know that all warlords, bureaucrats, comprador classes, big
landlord classes and part of the reactionary intellectual circles attached to them are
our enemies
毛泽东 《中国社会各阶级的分析》中
In this way, in the process of politicization, knowledge intentionally and reductively
indicates an object, and the beliefs possessed by knowledge are transformed into a
political product called ideology. The problem is that they are using the shell of
objectification as the basis for justifying their beliefs in knowledge, and this
characteristic is misused as a tool to justify their own violence by the public. This
deliberate reductionist violence of knowledge continues to this day. In particular, such
violence is being reorganized in modern society under the concept of "nation". The
similarities found between Trump's revival of the American people, Putin's revival of
the Pan-Slavic empire, and Xi Jinping's revival of the great Chinese nation sufficiently
suggest the possibility that this kind of violence will be repeated. However, the
"similarity" between events that we repeat in history cannot be replaced by equality.
Moreover, it does not mean that we should simply let go of these repetitions and stand
by and accept such violence. Slavoj Žižek recognizes this violence as an inevitable
part of being part of life and simply separates aggression from “violence,” noting the
excess of aggression that becomes excessive and disrupts the normal flow of things,
craving more and more. It will stop at the extent of removal13. In addition, such
aggression of violence is inevitably caused by the use of language within Lacan's
mental world mentioned in Part 1.
In the previous discussion, we discussed that the possibility of reductionist violence
possessed by language can be removed through steady empirical practice by bringing
the Buddhist practice concept. If so, is it impossible to eliminate the violence that
arises from the misuse of knowledge politically? For politicians, this reductive misuse
of knowledge is a lure like sweet honey, and the public is also a means to justify their
violence. When both politicians and the public do not feel the need to remove this
violence, this synergy explodes, leading to a tragedy. Then, can the reductive violence
that arises from language and the reductive violence that arises from the misuse of
knowledge never be eliminated? If neither the public nor politicians feel the need to
eliminate this violence, there is virtually no way to do it. Slavoj Žižek's reflection on
violence is meaningful in some respects, as the numerous wars and genocide wrapped
up in names such as "revolution" or "justice" are the objectivity of such violence that
people never view them negatively. that it doesn't look. Rather, they package and
glorify such violence, and expose their own violence14.

3. A clue that can eliminate reductive violence

We generally think of "repeat" negatively. This constant reductionist violence re

peated throughout history makes us fall into nihilism too easily. The nihilism i
n Part 1 arises from the fact that not everyone wants to perform to escape ver
bal temptation. The nihilism in Part 2 arises from the fact that any knowledge
is inevitably exposed to the risk of misuse, and at the same time, philosophers
and politicians are encouraged to do so and to justify their violence over and

13
Slavoye Žižek, “What is Violence”, 102pg
14
We do not pay attention to the horrors that occurred in Russia's Civil War and China's Civil
War. Such phenomena are justified under the name of "revolution," and we exude inherent
violence by praising them and ignoring them.
over again. If so, what should we pay attention to? We should pay attention to
the minor "differences" that arise amid these constant "repeats". Deleuze revea
ls through his thoughts that we can only consider violence by paying attention
to the "difference" in which violence is constantly reorganized in the power str
ucture. Although we partially accept Lacan's opinion and acknowledge the psyc
hological mechanism that the use of language inevitably causes violence, we sh
ould pay attention to how such psychological mechanisms can be harmonized t
o eliminate violence as much as possible. Of course, as Slavoj Žižek pointed o
ut, violence does not necessarily occur superficially and subjectively but exists
objectively and inherently in our power mechanisms.
In the return to the nihilism in which language arises, the suggestive nature of
Chinese characters provides us with a certain clue. This is because the suggesti
ve nature of Chinese characters is difficult to conclude with a single meaning t
ranslation. Chinese characters are inevitably linked to other objects and have th
eir meaning, and ambiguity in interpretation is inherent. This ambiguity was act
ually one of the biggest problems faced by many translators in interpreting the
texts of early Chinese philosophy into Western languages. This is because, with
in the linguistic text of Chinese characters, the signified does not correspond o
ne-to-one with the signifier, but is interpreted as a kind of organic meaning. T
his characteristic is also a phenomenon often seen in art using language such a
s poetry as a tool.
Roger pays attention to the artistic nature of these Chinese philosophical texts.
The repetition of the same word is interpreted differently depending on its cont
ext and inevitably leaves room for different interpretations depending on the su
bject. Roger quotes the famous poem "The emperor of ice cream" by Wallace
Stenve to explain the artistic character of the Chinese language. The most imp
ortant thing in the artistic interpretation of a text is not to discern the object it
is trying to explain and its meaning. When we first encounter an artistic text, i
t approaches us in a way of intuition, rather than being understood as a corres
pondence between the signified and the signifier. Numerous Chinese philosophe
rs have developed their ideas by annotating “中庸”, which focuses on how to
understand artistic texts rather than on simple interpretations of words. From th
is point of view, Roger's interpretation is not simply a translation of the conten
ts of a book, but a way of philosophically digesting an artistic text and reveali
ng his thoughts. As previously stated in Chapter 1, we discussed the possibility
of overcoming the reductionist violence created by propositions through practice.
If so, how can such a practice be accomplished in detail? It is to understand t
he understanding of an object as a kind of organism rather than limiting it to
a single word or concept. Organisms are constantly changing and inevitably int
erdependent on other organisms. Just as human beings cannot survive without n
ature, words as an organic understanding are organically understood according t
o times, cultures, and interpretation subjects15. Roger emphasized the concept of
"cluster" in his interpretation of this book. Using clusters, he tries to understan
d the cultural sensibility of the text, not the philosophical sensibility of the Chi
nese text. In other words, Jung's artistic text creates another "difference" throug
h the subject of Rogers16. For this reason, he translates one word of the same
text differently into another. This is how he understands Zhongyong's text as a
kind of "poem". In particular, 中 is used as focus or focusing, and often equili

15
There is nothing better than quantum mechanics to further elaborate on these principles.
According to quantum mechanics, the matter is composed of particles that cannot be further
divided, and these particles exhibit particle-like properties but also wave-like properties. The
nature of these waves makes the next position of the particle completely unpredictable, and
the interaction between the particles can no longer be explained by causality alone. These
particles are entangled throughout the universe without being independent by quantum
entanglement, repeating fission, and fusion. The fusion of particles consists of the birth of
new properties, not the sum of the properties of each individual particle. Of course, such
objects include both observers and objects of observation.
Here, we can think of particles as words, which are the most basic units that make up the
world. These words lose their meaning when split, because the combination of d, o, and g in
the dog itself has no meaning. A "sentence" as a combination of these particles has a
completely new meaning composed of grammar, rather than simply having a meaning as a
combination of words. However, in both English and Chinese, some words can be separated,
and this separation allows the text to be organically interpreted by first connecting it with
other concepts. I would like to take Roger's way of thinking about the meaning of 诚 here as
a representative example. He first separates 诚 by etymology, and connects such an organic
understanding to other philosophies and ideas, not simply in the context of the sentences
used. . Just as in quantum mechanics, a completely new characteristic is created by
combining elements of different characteristics, Roger creates a new characteristic by
combining elements of other characteristics.
As words are arranged in the grammatical system, different properties and hierarchies are
given to each other, and sentences composed of such words are also given completely new
characteristics according to the arrangement. In this situation, the reader as an observer can
produce completely different observational results (interpretation results) even when
observing the exact same text, because our thinking system is also a constantly changing
being composed of language. There is nothing strange about the gap between the
interpretation of Zhongyong in a time when many concepts did not exist and the
interpretation of Zhongyong in the present day. This is because, when we understand
Zhongyong as a certain work of art, the interpretation of it and Zhongyong's way of existence
do not need to be fixed.
16
Focusing the Familiar : a translation and philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong ,
introduction
brium, depending on the context. 诚 means creativity, but it necessarily has its
meaning as a way of interacting with sincerity and integrity. Here, we can deri
ve an organic interpretation by deconstructing the word “诚” itself or placing t
he word in various texts. Roger derives an organic understanding of 诚, one fr
om the etymology of the letter, and assigns the analyzed 诚 to 庄子, Whitehea
d, and 论语, giving the letter 诚 a creative meaning of “creativity”17. This way
of understanding is also consistent with the aforementioned execution process.
By escaping from the dictionary meaning of a word and understanding the wor
d organically in numerous contexts, the possibility of being misused as reductiv
e violence is eliminated. Of course, it is not necessary to fully agree with thes
e meanings and interpretations. The problem is, what he shows us in how to i
nterpret texts is a kind of performance method that removes the violence of w
ords and how to creatively understand them and how they can be expressed 18.

17
Focusing the Familiar : a translation and philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong ,
introduction, 51pg
18
According to Jacques Derrida, violence arises by defining boundaries between the
periphery and the center. For this reason, works of art inevitably contain certain
ambiguities, and the method of interpretation and understanding of such ambiguities is
the essence of works of art. If we do not necessarily think of philosophical texts
separately from works of art, this characteristic becomes clearer. The ambiguity of the
interpretation of the central figure becomes the driving force to constantly create
something out of it. This is one of the biggest differences between Western philosophy
and Chinese philosophy. Annotating is not simply to grasp the meaning of the reader,
but to constantly create something in such ambiguity.